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DIPLOMATIC  
DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO  
THE OUTBREAK  
OF THE  
EUROPEAN  
WAR

SCOTT

PART I  
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BELGIUM  
FRANCE

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
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
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

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DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS  
RELATING TO  
THE OUTBREAK OF THE  
EUROPEAN WAR

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION  
by  
JAMES BROWN SCOTT  
DIRECTOR

PART I

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NEW YORK  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
AMERICAN BRANCH: 35 WEST 32ND STREET  
LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY  
HUMPHREY MILFORD  
1916

57X  
1270  
107  
543  
107

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**CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

**THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS**  
**RAHWAY, N. J.**

## INTRODUCTION

The Bible tells us that "of making many books there is no end," and it would seem that the writers on the great war of 1914 are intent upon establishing beyond peradventure the truth of this pronouncement, if anyone should be bold enough to question it. Indeed, we are in danger of being engulfed by the multitude of books concerning its causes with which the world is flooded, many of which, it is believed, unlike the ark, will not survive the deluge; but notwithstanding the many, there is one book of an authoritative nature whose chapters are the official statements laid before the world by each of the belligerent governments, and the present volume justifies its appearance and its claim to usefulness because it is composed exclusively of the appeals which each of the nations at war has made to public opinion.

It is true that these many-colored books and papers have been more than once brought together and published, but there appears to have been in each case a special reason or an interested motive for so doing. The present publication has no purpose other than to lay before the reader the statements which the nations have been pleased to make as to the reasons which drove them to war (because apparently none of them wanted the war and yet each of them was forced into it), without an attempt to analyze the reasons given by the governments of the warring countries; to separate them into pretext or cause; to question their sincerity or to apportion praise or blame. The documents speak for themselves and the reader is left to judge.

Now, the value of these documents is greater than the truth which they may contain, for they are the reasons which each nation would have us regard as the justification of its action, and from this standpoint they are a contribution to the psychology of nations. Responsible statesmen thought that the publication of the documents would vindicate the propriety of their actions; otherwise the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries at war would not have issued them, and they thus furnish unimpeachable evidence of the processes of thought obtaining in the chancellories of Europe. The documents are further valuable as evidences of the fact that the actions of the nations at war required justification, and for the additional and even more important fact that they are addressed not merely to their citizens or subjects at home, but primarily to the opinion of neutral countries,

which the nations seek to influence as an advocate the judge, thus recognizing public opinion and striving to win it to their side.

To an American observer the issue of these documents by the different belligerent countries seems to be a confession that *a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to—war*. Admitting that each nation honestly believed that it was forced into the war against its will, and that it would, if it could, gladly have maintained the peace unbroken, these documents appear to show, as Hamlet would say to-day, that *something is rotten in the state of . . .*, and that the great need of the future is some kind of international organization which will enable nations, sincerely desirous of averting war, to settle their disputes peaceably without resorting to the sword, which they would prefer to have rust in the scabbard. What should be the nature, the visible form and shape of this international organization, requires the world's best thought, and it is only mentioned in passing that the reader may ponder these things after he has laid the volume aside.

In view of the size of a one-volume book which would be needed to include all these documents, this publication is arranged in two parts, of which Part I contains the Introduction, a table showing the Official Positions of the Principal Persons mentioned in the Correspondence, a separate table of contents for the Austro-Hungarian, Belgian and French Books, but which are printed consecutively and followed by the documents of these three countries; and of Part II, which contains a separate table of contents for the German, British, Italian, Russian and Serbian books, likewise printed consecutively and likewise followed by the documents issued by these countries. The editor is responsible for the table of contents to the *Austro-Hungarian Red Book (No. 2)*, *German White Book*, *Russian Orange Book (No. 1)*, *Russian Orange Book (No. 2)*, *Serbian Blue Book*, and to the appendices to the *British Blue Book (No. 1)*. He is also responsible for the translation of the table of contents to the *Belgian Grey Book (No. 2)*. In order to give no just ground for criticism of expressions used in the summaries of the different documents in the tables of contents, these summaries are much briefer than they would be made under other circumstances. The tables of contents to the other books reproduced in this publication were taken from the original sources, with only such slight variations as were necessary for the sake of uniformity. The table of Official Positions of the Principal Persons

mentioned in the Correspondence is repeated for convenience in Part II. The Analytical Index for the entire work is to be found at the close of Part II. The English system of spelling is used throughout all the documents, as well as in the tables of contents appertaining to them, inasmuch as the greater number of governments, in issuing English translations of their publications, used that system of spelling.

The popular titles of the different publications of the belligerents have been used, as for example, the *British Blue Book*, the *Belgian Grey Book*, etc. Where more than one publication has been issued by a government, as in the case of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, etc., the books are arranged chronologically in the order as issued by the particular government and are arbitrarily designated as (No. 1) and (No. 2). It is thought that this arrangement makes for ease of reference.

The documents in the present publication are printed from the originals, when they are in English, and when in foreign languages, from the official English translations supplied by the ambassadors and ministers of the several countries accredited to the United States, in all cases where such official English translations have been made and issued by the respective governments. In the case of Belgium, France, and Serbia, the official English translations issued by the British Government have been used, as acceptable to those countries.

In the present publication, the Division of International Law has endeavored to reproduce textually the different documents and it should be said, therefore, that practically the only changes made from the originals furnished, were in cases of clear typographical errors. In view of this textual reproduction, it will also be found that there is a variation in spelling of proper names when the same names occur in the documents issued by different governments, and it should be noted also that the same letters or documents, when printed in more than one book, may vary in phraseology because of different translators.

The undersigned is deeply grateful to the foreign representatives of the belligerent countries for their kindness and courtesy in this matter and regards it as a duty, for this reason as well as for others, that the introduction prefixed to this volume should be free from any expression which may, even to the most sensitive mind, imply or seem to imply a criticism of one or the other of the warring nations.

JAMES BROWN SCOTT,

*Director of the Division of International Law.*

Washington, D. C., February 28, 1916.





# OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

AEHRENTHAL, COUNT .....	Former Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
AKIDZUKI, S. ....	Japanese Ambassador at Vienna.
ALBERT .....	King of Belgium.
ALEXANDER .....	Crown Prince of Serbia.
ALLIZE, M. ....	French Minister at Munich.
AMBROZY, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Rome.
ANNOVILLE, M. D'.....	French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg.
APCHIER, M. D'.....	French Consul-General at Budapest.
AVARNA, DUKE D'.....	Italian Ambassador at Vienna.
BAPST, M. ....	French Minister at Copenhagen.
BARRÈRE, M. ....	French Ambassador at Rome.
BAUDIN, M. ....	French Minister of Marine.
BEAUMONT, MR. ....	British Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.
BELOW SALESKE, HERR VON.....	German Minister at Brussels.
BENCKENDORFF, COUNT .....	Russian Ambassador at London.
BERCHTOLD, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
BERTHELOT, M. ....	French Political Director.
BERTIE, SIR FRANCIS.....	British Ambassador at Paris.
BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, DR. VON	German Imperial Chancellor.
BEYENS, BARON .....	Belgian Minister at Berlin.
BIENVENU-MARTIN, M. ....	French Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
BOLLATI, M. ....	Italian Ambassador at Berlin.
BOMPARD, M. ....	French Ambassador at Constantinople.
BOPPE, M. ....	French Minister at Belgrade.
BOSCHKOVITCH, M. ....	Serbian Minister at London.
BRONEWSKY, M. ....	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
BRYAN, WILLIAM J.....	Secretary of State of the United States.
BUCH, HERR VON.....	German Minister at Luxemburg.
BUCHANAN, SIR GEORGE.....	British Ambassador at Petrograd.
BÜLOW, PRINCE VON.....	Special German Ambassador at Rome.
BUNSEN, SIR MAURICE DE.....	British Ambassador at Vienna.
BURIÁN, BARON .....	Austro-Hungarian Privy Councilor and Chamberlain.
BUISSERET, COUNT DE.....	Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg.
CAMBON, M. JULES M.....	French Ambassador at Berlin.
CAMBON, M. PAUL.....	French Ambassador at London.
CARLOTTI DI RIPARBELLA, MARQUIS.	Italian Ambassador at Petrograd.
CHEVALLEY, M. ....	French Minister at Christiania.
CLARY, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Brussels.
CRACKANTHORPE, MR. ....	British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

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CUCCHI BOASSO, M. ....	Italian Minister at Sofia.
CZERNIN, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd.
DAVIGNON, M. ....	Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DELCASSÉ, M. ....	French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DEMIDOFF, M. ....	Russian Minister at Athens.
DOUMERGUE, M. ....	French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
DUDZEELE, COUNT DE.....	Belgian Minister at Vienna.
DUMAINE, M. ....	French Ambassador at Vienna.
ELST, BARON VAN DER.....	Belgian Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
ESCAILLE, BARON DE L'.....	Counsellor of Belgian Legation at Petrograd and Chargé d'Affaires.
ÉTIENNE, M. ....	French Minister of War.
ETTER, M. DE.....	Counsellor of Russian Embassy at London.
EYSCHEN, M. PAUL.....	President of the Government, Minister of State, Luxemburg.
FALLON, BARON .....	Belgian Minister at The Hague.
FARAMOND, M. DE.....	Naval Attaché to French Embassy at Berlin.
FARGES, M. ....	French Consul-General at Basle.
FLEURIAU, M. DE.....	French Chargé d'Affaires at London.
FLOTOW, HERR VON.....	German Ambassador at Rome.
FORGÁSH, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
FRANCIS JOSEPH .....	Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary.
FUNAKOSHI, BARON .....	Japanese Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
GEORGE V. ....	King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, etc., and Emperor of India.
GEORGEVITCH, M. ....	Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.
GERRARD, MR. JAMES W.....	American Ambassador at Berlin.
GIERS, M. DE.....	Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.
GIESL, BARON VON.....	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.
GOSCHEN, SIR EDWARD.....	British Ambassador at Berlin.
GRAZ, MR. DES.....	British Ambassador at Belgrade.
GRENIER, BARON .....	Belgian Minister at Madrid.
GREY, SIR EDWARD.....	British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
GUILLAUME, BARON .....	Belgian Minister at Paris.
HALDANE, VISCOUNT .....	Lord High Chancellor of England.
HENRY .....	Prince of Prussia.
HOFLEHNER, HERR .....	Acting Consul for Austria-Hungary at Nish.
HOHENLOHE, PRINCE .....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, successor to Szögyény.
ISVOLSKY, M. ....	Russian Ambassador at Paris.
JAGOW, HERR VON.....	German Secretary of State.
JEHLITSCHKA, HERR .....	Austro-Hungarian Consul-General at Usküb.
JONNART, M. ....	French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
KAZANSKY, M. ....	Acting Russian Consul at Prague.
KLOBUKOWSKI, M. ....	French Minister at Brussels.
KOUDACHEFF, PRINCE .....	Russian Minister at Antwerp. Formerly Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna.
M. KROUPENSKI .....	Russian Ambassador to Rome.
LAHURE, BARON .....	French Consul at Brussels.
LALAING, COUNT DE .....	Belgian Minister at London.

## PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE ix

LICHOWSKY, PRINCE .....	German Ambassador at London.
LOUDON, DR. JKHB. J.....	Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.
MACCHIO, BARON VON.....	Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
MALLET, SIR L.....	British Ambassador at Constantinople.
MANNEVILLE, COUNT DE.....	French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
MENDORFF, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.
MÉREY, HERR VON.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Rome.
MICHAILOVITCH, M. ....	Serbian Minister at Rome.
MOHAMMED V. ....	Sultan of Turkey.
MAYRHAUSER, HERR VON.....	Austro-Hungarian Consul at Valona.
MONCHEUR, BARON .....	Belgian Minister at Constantinople.
MOLLARD, M. ....	French Minister at Luxemburg.
MÓRICZ DE TÉCSŐ, P.....	Austro-Hungarian Consul at Ancona.
MÜLLER, BARON VON.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokio.
NICHOLAS II. ....	Emperor of Russia.
NICHOLSON, SIR ARTHUR.....	British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
NIGRA, COUNT .....	Former Italian Ambassador at Vienna.
PALÉOLOGUE, M. ....	French Ambassador at Petrograd.
PASHITCH, M. ....	Serbian Prime Minister and Minister for For- eign Affairs.
PATCHOU, DR. LAZA.....	Serbian Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
PELLET, M. ....	French Minister at The Hague.
PENFIELD, MR. FREDERICK C.....	American Ambassador at Vienna.
PICHON, M. ....	French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
POINCARÉ, M. ....	President of the Republic of France.
POURTALES, COUNT DE .....	German Ambassador at Petrograd.
RENKIN, M. ....	Colonial Minister of Belgium.
RODD, SIR RENNEL.....	British Ambassador at Rome.
RONSSIN, M. ....	French Consul-General at Frankfort.
RUMBOLD, SIR HORACE.....	British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
SALVIATI, M. ....	Russian Consul-General at Fiume.
SAN GIULIANO, MARQUIS DI.....	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SAZONOFF, M. ....	Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SCHÉBÉKO, M. ....	Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
SCHOEN, BARON VON.....	German Ambassador at Paris.
SERRET, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ....	Military Attaché to French Embassy at Berlin.
SEVASTOPOULO, M. ....	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.
SONNINO, BARON .....	Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
SPALAIKOVITCH, DR. M.....	Serbian Minister at Petrograd.
SQUITTI, BARON .....	Italian Minister at Nish.
STEEN DE JEHAY, COUNT VAN DEN.	Belgian Minister at Luxemburg.
STORCK, RITTER VON.....	Counsellor of Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.
STRANDTMAN, M. DE.....	Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.
STUEGGCK, COUNT .....	President of Austrian Council of State.
SUCHOMLINOFF, M. ....	Russian Minister of War.
SWERBEEW, M. DE.....	Russian Ambassador at Berlin.
SZÁPÁRY, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd.
SZÉCSEN, COUNT .....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris.
SZOGYÉNY, COUNT DE.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin.
THIÉBAUT, M. ....	French Minister at Stockholm.
TISZA, COUNT .....	Hungarian Premier, Austro-Hungarian Min- ister for Foreign Affairs.

## x PRINCIPAL PERSONS IN THE CORRESPONDENCE

TOMBEUR, M. .... Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga.  
TSCHIRSCHKY, HERR VON..... German Ambassador at Vienna.

VESNITCH, DR. MILENKO. R..... Serbian Minister at Paris.  
VICTOR EMMANUEL III..... King of Italy.  
VILLIERS, SIR FRANCIS..... British Minister at Brussels.  
VIVIANI, M. RENÉ..... French Minister for Foreign Affairs, President  
of the Council.

WATSON, MR. GRANT..... Secretary of British Legation at Brussels.  
WEEDE, JONKHEER DE..... Netherland Minister at Brussels.  
WELLE, M. DE..... Belgian Minister at Belgrade.  
WHITLOCK, MR. BRAND..... American Minister at Brussels.  
WILLIAM II. .... The German Emperor.

YOVANOVITCH, DR. M..... Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.  
YOVANOVITCH, M. YOV. M..... Serbian Minister at Vienna.  
YPERSELE, M. VAN DE..... Belgian Minister at Bucharest.

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THE  
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK  
(NO. 1)



# THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 1)<sup>1</sup>

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## NOTE OF INTRODUCTION.

Ever since the Karageorgevitch Dynasty ascended Serbia's blood-stained throne, surrounded by the conspirators against King Alexander, the policy of the kingdom has been directed by various means and with varying intensity toward a hostile propaganda and a revolutionary agitation in those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by Southern Slavs. This underground policy has been aimed at the forcible separation of these territories from the Dual Monarchy, when the general political situation should favour the attainment of the aspirations for the establishment of a Greater Serbia.

The bitter disappointment caused in Serbia by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which drove the Servian nation to the brink of war, shows plainly what ambitious hopes were entertained by Serbia and how near she thought herself to be to the goal.

In the spring of 1909, Russia, though assuming the part of the protecting power, considered her armaments not sufficiently advanced to support Serbia. Under the circumstances the Servian government decided to declare solemnly before Europe that it recognised the international situation created by the annexation as an act which had not affected Serbia's rights. The Servian Government furthermore undertook to dissolve the irregular bands which had armed against the Dual Monarchy and to maintain good neighbourly relations with the latter for the future.

The Austro-Hungarian Government looked forward to the restoration of the peace and good understanding with Serbia which had prevailed under the Obrenovitch Dynasty. It hoped to be enabled to promote Serbia's interests in the friendly spirit which had been

<sup>1</sup> *Austro-Hungarian Red Book. Official English Edition, with an Introduction.* Published by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Title of publication in the original text: *Österreichisch-ungarisches Rotbuch, Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914. Volksausgabe. Abdruck der offiziellen Ausgabe mit einer Einleitung.* Wien 1915. Manzsche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, I., Kohlmarkt Nr. 20.

evidenced by Austria-Hungary at the Berlin Congress, when she successfully advocated the recognition of the independence of the kingdom. These Austro-Hungarian hopes were not to be fulfilled, however. Far from respecting the pledge of good neighbourly relations, the Servian Government permitted the Servian press to rouse unrestrained hatred against the Monarchy; it tolerated societies in Servia which, under the leadership of high officers, functionaries, teachers and judges, publicly carried on an agitation aiming to precipitate a revolutionary outbreak in Austro-Hungarian territories; it permitted prominent officers of the Servian military and civil services to demoralise the public conscience to the point where assassination was regarded as a legitimate weapon against the adjoining monarchy. This subversive agitation led to a series of outrages against prominent Austrian and Hungarian officials and culminated in the dastardly assassination of the heir apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Instead of precipitating the disintegration of Austria-Hungary which our enemies had foolishly anticipated, however, the Prince's martyrdom rallied all the peoples of Austria-Hungary in fervent loyalty to the defence of the Habsburg Dynasty. The whole world now sees that the Monarchy rests upon solid foundations, and that her sons are firmly united in the conviction that their dignity, self-respect and vital interests made it imperative to check Servia's criminal agitation.

Convinced by experience of the duplicity of the Servian Government, Austria-Hungary found only one method which promised a satisfactory settlement. That method was to demand from Servia absolute guarantees that those implicated in the infamous murder would be punished and that the subversive agitation for a Greater Servia would be suppressed.

Austria-Hungary's forbearance having been construed as an evidence of weakness, the Belgrade Government had to be made to realise that the Dual Monarchy was prepared to go to any lengths to uphold her prestige and integrity; Servia had to be taught that Austria-Hungary could not tolerate her policy of prevarication and ostensible compliance with the Austro-Hungarian demands, meant only to deceive the Great Powers while the Servians carried on their incendiary agitation. The necessity for decisive action was emphasised by the recollection of a similar act of duplicity and evasion successfully accomplished by Servia after the solemn declaration of 1909. Every time that the monarchy called Servia to account for her reprehensible campaign of disruption, the Belgrade Government



turned to the Powers for protection and impunity. Under the circumstances there was but one way of safeguarding the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary and putting an end to the ever-recurring economic disturbance of the Dual Monarchy, without endangering the peace of Europe. From the very beginning the Imperial and Royal Government, wishing to reassure the Powers, declared that it did not intend to go beyond the protection of its legitimate interests, and that no territorial aggrandisement was contemplated. It was compelled, however, to insist upon a direct settlement between Austria-Hungary and Servia within the designated restrictions. Russia's proposal to extend the time-limit for the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade Government with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Servia's behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined. Though Servia's hostility was plainly proved by the fact, that before giving her ambiguous reply, she had ordered a general mobilisation, still the Dual Monarchy did not declare war until another three days had elapsed.

The British Government's suggestion that the Servian controversy be submitted to a conference of the Powers reached Vienna too late, as hostilities had already begun. This proposal, however, could by no means have safeguarded the Dual Monarchy's interests. Nothing less than the unconditional acceptance of Austria-Hungary's demands by the Belgrade Government could have guaranteed even tolerable neighbourly relations with Servia. On the other hand, the Entente Powers were guided by the wish to put aside Austria-Hungary's demands by means of a compromise. This method would have nullified the assurances required for the future correct behaviour of Servia, which would thus have been encouraged to persist in her activities for the detachment of the southern territories from Austria-Hungary.

The demand that Servia punish the accomplices in the Serajevo murder who were on Servian soil, and live up to the obligations of a peaceful neighbour, was aimed solely at the protection of our dynasty and of the integrity of the Dual Monarchy from subversive agitations. The Austro-Hungarian Government acted as the spokesman of the civilised world when it asserted that it could not permit murder to be employed with impunity in political strife, and that the peace of Europe ought not to be continually menaced by Servia's ambitious projects.

The Entente Powers, dominated by selfish motives, ignored the laws of public morality and sided with the guilty party; in so doing, they assumed a heavy responsibility. The Dual Monarchy had given ample proofs of its conservative policy and thoroughly peaceful disposition during the crisis of the Balkan wars, when the balance of power in the Peninsula underwent far-reaching changes; she, therefore, deserved unrestricted confidence in the new situation. Had the Entente Powers accepted Austria-Hungary's assurances and adopted a policy of waiting, the general conflagration would have been averted. When the history of this war shall be written, it will place upon their shoulders the blame for the frightful disaster which their policy has brought upon the world.

The small Servian state would never have dared to carry on its disruptive agitation in the territories of a great Power, had it not been assured of Russia's secret protection. Servia had tangible pledges that in the event of a clash with Austria-Hungary, the powerful Pan-Slavic party in Russia would bring the Czar's Government to the active support of the movement for the establishment of a Greater Servia at the expense of the Dual Monarchy. Such a support was only a minor phase of the expansive policy of the Russian Empire which, like an ever-extending glacier, had ground down tremendous territories and many peoples, whose religious freedom and languages it has suppressed. The essential and traditional feature of the ambitious scheme of world-domination, of which the Servian agitation is only an incident, is the possession of the Dardanelles. Such an acquisition would make Russia predominant in the Near East, with exclusive political and commercial privileges.

Since the attainment of this purpose constituted a menace to the vital interests of both Austria-Hungary and Germany, it was bound to rouse their opposition; Russia's efforts were consequently directed toward weakening their capacity for resistance. This was to be attained by disrupting the powerful combination of the two countries which stood in Russia's way, and by isolating Germany. The first move was the creation of the Balkan League, designed to weaken Austria-Hungary, whose foundations as a great Power were to be undermined by the Pan-Slav and Servian agitation in her border districts. As a preliminary step Turkey had to be crushed and driven out of Europe. By this act the power of the augmented Christian Balkan States was to be made available for Russia's struggle against the two central European Powers.

When the Balkan League was rent asunder by the dispute over

the distribution of the territories wrested from Turkey, the "protecting power" of the Slavs assented to the defeat and humiliation of Bulgaria, who was deprived of the greater part of her recent conquests. New inducements were now offered for the reconstitution of the Balkan League by the promise of territorial expansion at the expense of Austria-Hungary. After the defeat of Turkey, the Balkan Federation could be directed solely against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Russia and France conceived this plan, which was to shift Europe's balance of power. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the peace of Europe and the existence of the Dual Monarchy, Servia was a trump card in Russia's hand, and Russia was determined not to lose this trump, even at the cost of a universal conflagration.

The following series of documents show that, up to the very last, the Imperial and Royal Government repeatedly assured the St. Petersburg Cabinet that it did not intend to violate any Russian interest, or to seize Servian territory, or to infringe upon Servia's sovereign rights, and that it was willing to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government for the adjustment of Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. These solemn assurances, however, did not satisfy the Russian Government, which, as early as the 24th of July, adopted a threatening tone in a public statement on the issues involved.

Though Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single soldier against Russia, the latter ordered on July 29th a mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, which implied a threat against the Dual Monarchy. In spite of the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in St. Petersburg and the intimation by the German Government on the 26th of July that preparatory military measures in Russia would compel Germany to take corresponding steps, and that mobilisation would mean war, the Russian general mobilisation order was issued on the 31st of July.

On the 24th of July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador met the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and emphatically pointed out the thoroughly peaceful disposition of the Dual Monarchy. He explained that Austria-Hungary only wished to put an end to the dangerous Servian policy of murderous outrages and of revolutionary agitation.

The vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, and she had to protect herself; she could not abandon her defensive policy even if Russia should choose to provoke a collision by taking Servia

under her protection. The Imperial and Royal Government had no choice but to endeavour to put an end to an intolerable situation wherein Serbia, in effect, would have continued its provocations under a Russian pledge of immunity.

On the 30th of July the British Foreign Secretary once more suggested that Austria-Hungary accept the good offices of mediating Powers in her controversy with Serbia. The Imperial and Royal Government, animated by a sincere desire to do its utmost to preserve the world's peace, agreed to accept this mediation. Austria-Hungary's honour and interests, however, demanded that this should not be done under the pressure of Russia's threatening measures. She, therefore, had to insist that Russia's order of mobilisation should be revoked prior to Austria-Hungary's acceptance of mediation. The St. Petersburg Cabinet responded by issuing the general call to the colours.

In coöperation with Great Britain's selfish policy and France's craving for *revanche*, the Russian Government had left nothing undone to place Europe under the domination of the Entente Powers and thus to open the way for her own bold schemes.

Russia has resorted to most unscrupulous methods in her efforts to twist a rope around the Monarchy's neck. When Austria-Hungary, acting in self-defence, set about to sever this rope, Russia tried to tie her hands and to humiliate her.

Threatened in their most vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany had to choose between protecting their security and surrendering to the Russian menace. They chose the way which honour and duty prescribed.

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No. 1.

*Von Storck to Count Berchtold.*

*Belgrade, June 29, 1914.*

Still under the profound impression of the ghastly outrage of yesterday, I find it difficult to comment upon the bloody deed of Serajevo in the calm, self-possessed manner befitting the seriousness of the occasion. I therefore beg to be allowed to confine myself to-day to a mere record of some facts.

Yesterday, the 15th/28th, the anniversary of the battle of Kosovopolje was celebrated with more than usual pomp, and the memory of the Servian patriot, Milosh Obilitch, who in 1389 treacherously

assassinated the victorious Murad, was solemnised. Wherever Servians live, Obilitch is counted a national hero. Yet, as a result of the propaganda fostered under the auspices of the Servian Government and of a press campaign carried on for many years past, we have been substituted for the Turks as Servia's hereditary foes.

In the minds of the three juvenile assassins of Serajevo (Princip, Gabrinovitch and the third unknown bomb-thrower) must have loomed up the glamour of a re-enactment of the tragedy of Kosovopolje. They have even shot and killed an innocent woman, and therefore may have considered that they have surpassed their model.

For years hatred against the Dual Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The seed has taken and the harvest is murder.

The news became known at about 5 p.m., and at 10 o'clock that night the Servian Government officially ordered the celebration of the Obilitch anniversary to be stopped. Unofficially, however, and under the cover of darkness, the festivities were kept up for some time.

According to eye-witnesses people embraced each other in delight and jubilant remarks were heard, such as: "Serves them right!" "We expected it for a long time!" "That's the revenge for the annexation!"

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#### No. 2.

*Von Storck to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, June 30, 1914.*

I presented to-day to M. Gruitch, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, the pertinent enquiry as to what steps the royal police had taken, or intended to take, in an effort to trace the threads of the outrage, which notoriously led into Servia.

His reply was that, so far, the Servian police had not even taken the matter up.

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#### No. 3.

*Consul General Jehlitschka to Count Berchtold.*

*Usküb, July 1, 1914.*

On June the 15th/28th, the Vidov Dan (Corpus Christi Day), which this year coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle

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of Kossovopolje fought in 1389, was for the first time officially celebrated at Pristina as the feast of the "Liberation of the Servian nation."

For four months a special committee had been working to make that festival as solemn as possible and to turn it into a great national Serb demonstration.

In preparation for the forthcoming festivities a propaganda had been extended into Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and especially into Hungary. Those desirous of taking part in the festivities were granted free passage on the Servian state railways, and the authorities promised them cheap lodging, food and other assistance. The agitation had been energetic and well planned. The guests were taken to Pristina on special trains.

The various speeches reveled in historical reminiscences connected with the scene of the celebration, and invariably led up to and dwelt upon the customary topic of the unification of all Serbs and the "liberation of the oppressed brethren" across the Danube and the Save, including those who live in Bosnia and Dalmatia.

During the evening hours, news of the terrible deed of Serajevo began to spread and the fanatic populace gave itself up to a spontaneous outburst of passion, which, to judge by the numerous utterances of approval reported to me from absolutely reliable sources, must be described as positively inhuman.

In view of this attitude, which was also taken up by the population of Usküb, and in consideration of the fact that the news of the crime has been received with unconcealed satisfaction by a representative gathering, all attempts of the Servian press to shift from Servia the moral responsibility for the deed crumbled to pitiable nothing.

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### No. 4.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 4, 1914.*

I conveyed to-day to M. Poincaré, the Imperial and Royal Government's thanks for his sympathy.

Referring to the anti-Servian demonstrations in our country, he remarked that after the assassination of President Carnot all Italians

were exposed to the most violent attacks at the hands of the population throughout France.

I drew his attention to the fact that the assassination to which he referred had no connection whatever with any anti-French agitation in Italy, whereas it can no longer be denied that for many years past a campaign has been waged in Servia against the Dual Monarchy, availing itself of all means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In concluding the interview M. Poincaré expressed his firm conviction that the Servian Government would lend us every assistance in the judicial investigation and prosecution of persons suspected as accomplices. He added: "No State could evade such a duty."

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#### No. 5.

##### *Acting Consul Hoflehner to Count Berchtold.*

*Nish, July 6, 1914.*

At Nish the news of the terrible outrage of Serajevo has caused a sensation in the full sense of the word. No signs of consternation or indignation could be seen, however. A feeling of satisfaction and even of joy was predominant, and was often manifested in an unconcealed manner. So little restraint was put on the public feeling, that many instances of coarse expression could be recorded. This chiefly applies to the so-called leading circles and educated classes, such as politicians, teachers, government officials, officers and students. The business community remained more reserved.

All declarations made from Servian official quarters and by prominent individuals expressing indignation at the outrage and condemning the deed, appear merely as irony to those who have had the opportunity to observe at close quarters the sentiments of the educated classes during the past few days.

Toward nine o'clock on the day of the outrage I proceeded to a local café, still ignorant of what had happened. A gentleman of my acquaintance informed me of the persistent rumours of the crime. It was revolting to witness the elation displayed by the numerous guests, who discussed the event with evident satisfaction. Exclamations of joy and mockery were heard, which could not have failed to painfully affect even those who had been hardened by the customary political fanaticism of the Servians.

## No. 6.

*Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.**Belgrade, July 21, 1914.*

Some time has passed since my return to my post after the unfortunate crime of June 28th, and I may now venture to give my estimate of the prevailing public feeling in Servia.

Since the annexation crisis, the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Servia have been strained by the jingoism and animosity of the latter and by an effective propaganda for the "Great Servian" cause, carried on in those parts of our country which are inhabited by Serbs. Servia's successes in the Balkan wars have intensified that jingoism, until it now manifests itself at times in outbreaks of frantic passion bordering upon madness.

I consider it superfluous to adduce proofs or instances. They may be obtained at any time and everywhere, in political circles as well as among the populace, without distinction of party. I affirm it as an established axiom that Servia's policy has but one aim, namely, the detachment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories inhabited by Southern Slavs and the eventual destruction of that monarchy as a great Power. Nobody who has spent a week in the discharge of his duties in this political atmosphere can question the truth of my assertion.

The latest political events have vastly increased the existing hatred against the Dual Monarchy. I here refer to the crime of Serajevo, Hartwig's death and the electoral campaign.

The outrage of Serajevo has evoked before the Servian people visions of the impending disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. They have been led to believe that the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian territories in question was to be expected shortly, that a revolution had broken out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the loyalty of the Slav regiments could not be relied upon. Thus the event introduced a certain system into the scheme of mad nationalism, and invested it with a semblance of justification.

In the eyes of the Servians the hated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has become powerless, and is henceforth hardly worth a military effort. Hatred is now accompanied by contempt. Without any further trouble exhausted Austria-Hungary would fall helplessly into the lap of the Greater Servian Empire which before long would come into being.



Papers, which certainly may not be classed among the most radical publications, emphasise in daily articles the impotence and disintegration of the neighbouring monarchy, and without fear of punishment insult our authorities, including the august person of our sovereign. The press organ of the government points to the internal conditions in Austria-Hungary as the sole cause of the damnable crime. The dread of a future settling of accounts has vanished. For decades the Servian people have been entirely under the influence of the press, and the press of the ruling party determines the national policy. The outrage of Serajevo is the horribly abortive product of this influence of the press.

I shall pass over the absurd accusations raised on the occasion of Hartwig's death, utterances verging on madness, which the *London Times* qualified as "raging mad." Nor shall I dwell upon the mendacious press campaign which endeavours to confirm the Servian people in their conviction that the government of Austria-Hungary as well as its representatives are outlawed. Terms like "murderers," "rascals" or "infamous Austrians" were some of the ornamental by-words applied to us.

Hartwig's death, which meant a profound bereavement to the Servian political world, has been followed by a fanatic cult of the departed. This sentiment, however, was due not only to gratitude for his assistance in the past, but to a sense of apprehension as to the future. Every effort was made to please Russia by a display of slave-like servility, in order to secure that country's good-will for the future.

The third important factor is the electoral campaign. A common platform of hostility to the Dual Monarchy has united all parties. No party aspiring to the powers of government, therefore, would risk exposing itself to the suspicion of weakly yielding to Austria-Hungary. Thus the electoral campaign is waged under the watch-word of battle against Austria-Hungary.

It is generally believed that, for reasons internal as well as external, the Dual Monarchy is utterly powerless and incapable of any energetic action. Solemn warnings emanating from our competent sources are regarded as mere bluff.

The leave of absence granted to the Austro-Hungarian War Minister and to the Chief of the General Staff have confirmed the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now evident.

In imposing upon your patience with this lengthy report, I am fully aware that I am presenting nothing new; but I consider this

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exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement with Serbia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided.

If we neglect to clear up our relations with Serbia, we shall lay ourselves open to blame for increased difficulties and disadvantages in a future conflict which, sooner or later, is bound to come.

In the view of an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian government, who is observing events on the spot, the realisation is inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of our prestige.

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.

Half measures, demands, endless debating and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's authority in Serbia and her standing as a Great Power.

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### No. 7.

*Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl, Belgrade.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

You are directed to hand the following note to the Royal Government, in the course of the afternoon of Thursday, July 23rd:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on instructions from the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

“Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such decisions as the Powers may take with regard to article XXV. of the treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.”

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events

of the 28th of June last, have disclosed the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the glorification of the authors of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last demonstrated its ominous consequences to the world.

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo assassination has been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy—in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it—and that it undertakes to suppress by every means at its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "journal official," of the 13th (26th) July the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the

Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the coöperation in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official positions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th of July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28 of this year has up to now established the following facts:

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1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Major Voja Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammunition, which were used by the criminals were obtained for them and handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch.

3. The bombs are hand grenades which come from the arsenal of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Top-schider, in Belgrade.

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzegovina frontier by the conspirators and the smuggling in of their weapons, a secret transportation system was organised by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of the frontier Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica and the co-operation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Grbitch of Loznica, and several other persons.

In presenting the above note you will add verbally that you are instructed to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation at the expiration of the time-limit mentioned in the note (forty-eight hours after the hour and day of its presentation) in the event that within that period you have not received an unconditional and favourable response from the Royal Servian Government.

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### No. 8.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople.*

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

The Imperial and Royal Government has found itself obliged to address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Imperial and

Royal Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Government of Serbia. (See instructions to the Imperial and Royal Ministry at Belgrade of July 22, 1914.)

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited, accompanying this communication with the following comment:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Serbia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities for detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the Servian frontier.

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their membership generals and diplomats, government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and has acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the Kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the world on the 28th of June last, when the heir apparent to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched in Belgrade.

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement which is menacing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that, in taking this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon to be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited a dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the connection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal Representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.



## No. 9.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 23, 1914.*

As England is the most likely of the Entente Powers to be brought to an unprejudiced judgment of our present move in Belgrade, I request your Excellency to point out among other things in the conversation which you will have at the Foreign Office on the 24th instant, following the presentation of the circular note, that it was within the power of Serbia to avert the serious steps she had reason to expect from our side, if she had spontaneously begun within her own territory proceedings against the Servian accomplices in the murderous attack of the 28th of June, and to disclose the threads of the plot, leading, as it has been proved, from Belgrade to Serajevo.

Until to-day the Servian Government, in spite of much notorious circumstantial evidence pointing to Belgrade, not only has failed to do anything of that sort, but even has endeavoured to efface the existing traces.

According to a telegraphic report from our Legation in Belgrade, the Servian State employee Ciganovitch, who is compromised by the corroborating depositions of the assassins, was still in Belgrade on the day of the murder; but when his name appeared in the newspapers three days later, he had left the town. At the same time the head of the Servian Press Bureau declared Ciganovitch to be absolutely unknown in Belgrade.

As to the short time-limit of our demands, it is based upon our long-standing experience with Servian proficiency in procrastination.

We cannot allow our demands, which, as a matter of fact, do not contain anything unusual in the intercourse between states which ought to be living in peace and friendship, to become the object of negotiations and compromises; and, with due regard to our economic interests, we cannot accept a political method which would enable Serbia to prolong the crisis at her pleasure.

## No. 10.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

London, July 24, 1914.

Circular note just presented to Sir Edward Grey, who perused it attentively. With regard to No. 5 he asked for explanations, as the installation of Austrian officials in Servia impressed him as equivalent to the termination of Servia's independent sovereignty. I replied that coöperation of police officials, as in this instance, would not infringe upon the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the brevity of the time-limit, which made it impossible to calm the first irritation and to induce Belgrade to give us a satisfactory reply. There would be time enough for an ultimatum should the answer prove unacceptable, he thought.

I explicitly pointed out our position. (Necessity to proceed against subversive agitation which threatened parts of the Monarchy; defence of our most vital interests, most complete failure of the conciliatory attitude we have shown up to now in our dealings with Servia, which has had more than three weeks' time to institute a spontaneous enquiry concerning complicity in the murder, and so on.)

The Secretary of State repeated his apprehension with regard to the short time-limit, but he admitted that what has been said about the complicity in the murder of Serajevo was justified, as are some of our demands.

He would be quite willing to regard the whole affair as concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Servia. Yet he is very "apprehensive" of the possibility that several Great Powers might be involved in war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he remarked that the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance are probably somewhat similar to those of the Triplice. I explained at length our point of view, and I repeated with emphasis that in this case we would have to remain firm in order to get some guarantees, as Servian promises hitherto never have been redeemed. I could appreciate his considering primarily the effect of our act upon the peace of Europe, but indicating that, in order to understand our point of view, he ought to put himself in our place.

He did not wish to enter into a further discussion of this subject, and said it would be necessary for him to study the note more carefully. As a preliminary step he will confer with the German and

the French Ambassadors, as he feels obliged to obtain an exchange of views first of all with the allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia, who, however, have no direct interests in Serbia.

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No. 11.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

Have just read your instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice, who is in charge of the affairs of the absent Foreign Secretary, and left a copy with him. M. Bienvenu-Martin, who was vaguely acquainted with our step in Belgrade through the reports in this morning's papers, seemed considerably impressed with my information. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the text, he readily admitted that recent events, and the attitude of the Servian Government, have made our energetic intervention appear intelligible.

Demand No. 5 of our note presented in Belgrade seemed especially to strike the Minister, as he asked me to read it again. The Minister thanked me for the communication, which, he said, would be studied closely. I took the occasion to emphasise the point that the issue was one to be dealt with exclusively by Serbia and ourselves, but that it would be to the general advantage of Europe if the unrest perpetuated for years by the Servian agitation against us were, at last, to be replaced by a clearly defined political situation. I pointed out that all friends of peace and order, among whom I am counting France in the foremost place, should earnestly advise Serbia to change her attitude fundamentally and to meet our legitimate demands.

The Minister conceded that it is the duty of Serbia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the assassins of Serajevo, which duty she would not be likely to evade. Emphasising the sympathy of France with Austria-Hungary, and the good relations between the two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be settled peacefully and in accordance with our desires.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or defend the attitude of Serbia.

No. 12.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

Baron Schoen, following out his instructions, will declare to-day that our dispute with Servia is regarded by the Berlin Cabinet as an affair concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Servia.

In connexion with this information, he will make it understood that, should a third Power try to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her Alliance, would be found on our side.

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No. 13.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

Baron Schoen has just taken the step enjoined upon him. M. Bienvenu-Martin told him that he could not yet give a definite reply, although he was prepared to say at the outset that the French Government shared our opinion that our controversy with Servia concerned only Vienna and Belgrade, and that hopes were entertained that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here has been advised that his Government should yield on all points as much as possible, yet with the restriction: "As long as her rights of sovereignty were not touched."

Baron Schoen emphasised the necessity, from the European point of view, of eliminating, at last, the center of unceasing disturbance in Belgrade.

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No. 14.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs received me with the remark that he knew the object of my visit, and declared that he would not

define his position at once. I began to read my instructions to him. He first interrupted me when the series of murderous attempts was mentioned. My explanation was met with the question whether it had been proved that all those attempts originated in Belgrade. I emphasised the fact that they were the outcome of Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he remarked that he knew what it all was about; that we intended to make war on Servia and this was to be the pretext. I replied that our attitude during the last few years was sufficient evidence that we neither sought nor needed such pretexts. The solemn declarations demanded from Servia did not evoke any objection from the Minister; he only repeated again and again that Pasitch already had expressed himself in the sense demanded by us, and interjected: "He will say that twenty-five times if you wish." I told him that no one in Austria was trying to infringe upon the integrity of Servia or her dynasty. M. Sazonow most vigorously declared himself against the dissolution of the "Narodna Odbrana," which he assured me Servia would never undertake. The Minister also objected to the proposed coöperation of Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the subversive propaganda. Servia, then, he pointed out, would no longer be mistress in her own house! "After that you will want to interfere again and again, and what will the life of Europe be like?" he asked. I replied: "It will be quieter than hitherto, if Servia shows some good-will."

The observations with which I accompanied the reading of the note were listened to by the Minister rather calmly. Our belief that our feelings in the matter were shared by all civilised nations, he declared to be erroneous. With all the emphasis of which I was capable, I pointed out how deplorable it would be if we were to fail to meet with a sympathetic response in Russia in a situation imperilling all that was most sacred to us as well as to Russia, whatever the Minister might choose to say. He endeavoured to belittle the monarchical aspect of the question.

With regard to the dossier held at the disposal of the governments, M. Sazonow wondered why we had taken the trouble, since we already had issued an ultimatum. This proved conclusively, to his mind, that we did not desire an impartial investigation of the case. I replied that the results of our own enquiry were sufficient to justify our proceedings in an affair solely concerning Austria-Hungary and Servia, but that, having nothing to conceal, we were quite willing to furnish the Powers with all the information they might desire.

M. Sazonow observed that, the ultimatum having been issued, he had no further interest in the proffered information. He presented the case in such a way as to make it appear that we were seeking a war with Servia under any circumstances. I replied that we are the most peace-loving Power in the world, and that all we want is to safeguard our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues and to protect our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of further discussion, M. Sazonow once more made the remark that we had certainly created a serious situation. In spite of the comparative calmness of the Minister's manner, his attitude was throughout one of negation and antagonism.

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No. 15.

*Communiqué in the Russian Official Gazette.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

The St. Petersburg Telegraphic Agency reports:

The Official Gazette publishes the following communication:

The Imperial Government, gravely alarmed by the surprising events in Belgrade and by the ultimatum addressed to Servia by Austria-Hungary, is following attentively the development of the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

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No. 16.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

After the Ministers had been in session for five hours, M. Sazonow received the German Ambassador in the course of the evening and had a long conference with him.

The Minister, probably as a result of the meeting of the Cabinet, advanced the opinion that the controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia was by no means a matter that could be confined to these two States, but that it involved all Europe, inasmuch as the com-

promise arrived at in consequence of the Servian declaration in 1909 had been brought about under the auspices of the whole of Europe.

The Minister stated emphatically that he was affected in a particularly unpleasant way by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered to submit a dossier for examination at a time when an ultimatum already had been sent to Servia. Russia would demand an international examination of the dossier which we had placed at the Minister's disposal. My German colleague at once drew M. Sazonow's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary would not accept an intervention in her differences with Servia, nor would Germany consent to a suggestion incompatible with the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In course of the conversation the Minister stated that Russia could not remain indifferent to Austria-Hungary's possible intention to "dévorer le Serbie" (absorb Servia). Count Pourtalés retorted that he did not assume such an intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, and that any such purpose would be contrary to the Monarchy's own interests. Austria-Hungary only considered it necessary to inflict a fully deserved chastisement upon Servia. M. Sazonow expressed his doubts as to whether Austria-Hungary would abide by such a declaration.

The conversation ended with an appeal by M. Sazonow that Germany coöperate with Russia for the maintenance of the peace. The German Ambassador assured the Minister that Germany had no desire to precipitate a war, but that she naturally would defend her ally's interests without reservation.

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#### No. 17.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

Re: Your yesterday's telegram.

I request you to explain to Sir Edward Grey without delay that our representations of yesterday at Belgrade should not be regarded as a formal ultimatum, but merely as a note with a fixed time-limit. You will give Sir Edward Grey the strictly confidential information, that, for the time being, the interruption of diplomatic relations with Servia and the beginning of the necessary military preparations would

be the only consequences if the time-limit should expire without result. We are absolutely determined to exact satisfaction of our legitimate demands.

You are authorised to declare that we shall, however, be compelled to demand indemnification from Serbia for all expenses incurred in such military preparations, should Serbia, after the expiration of the stipulated time, yield only under the pressure of the aforesaid preparations. It must be remembered that we already have had to mobilise twice on account of Serbia, namely, in 1908 and 1912.

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No. 18.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

I received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires this forenoon, and explained to him that I made a special point of informing him as early as possible of our step in Belgrade, and of acquainting him with our point of view in this matter. Prince Kudascheff thanked me for this mark of consideration, but did not conceal his uneasiness at our summary proceeding toward Serbia. He pointed out that it was feared at St. Petersburg that our action would involve the humiliation of Serbia, an event to which Russia could not remain indifferent.

I endeavoured to reassure the Russian Chargé d'Affaires on that score. I explained that our object was to obtain a readjustment of the intolerable attitude of Serbia toward the Monarchy. For this purpose we endeavoured to induce the Servian Government to make public disavowal of the existing hostile agitation against the integrity of Austria-Hungary, and to suppress it by administrative measures. We also desired an opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the measures adopted would be conscientiously carried out.

I emphasised the dangers which the continuation of the Great-Servian propaganda involved, not only to Austria-Hungary's integrity, but also to the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. I, moreover, pointed out that the safety of all dynasties, and not least of all, the Russian, would be threatened if the conviction were to spread broadcast, that murder could be employed with impunity as a weapon in a chauvinistic agitation.

Finally, I pointed out that we did not aspire to territorial aggrandisement, but merely desired the maintenance of the status quo;



a point of view that should be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Kudascheff then observed that he was unfamiliar with the views of his Government and he did not know what attitude Serbia would take with regard to several of the demands.

In concluding our interview the Chargé d'Affaires undertook to bring to his Government's knowledge the explanations I had given him concerning our action, and especially promised to mention our assurance that we did not intend to humiliate Serbia.

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#### No. 19.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith for you the dossier announced in the circular note to the Powers concerning the Pan-Servian propaganda and its connexions with the Serajevo plot.

You will please communicate this dossier to the Government to which you are accredited:

#### MEMOIR.

The movement emanating from Serbia which aims at the detachment of the Southern Slav parts of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy to unite them with Serbia, extends far back into the past.

The propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in purpose, varying merely as to means and intensity, reached its climax during the crisis of the annexation. Divesting itself of the protecting cloak of secrecy, this propaganda at that juncture emerged with an open confession of its tendencies. Under the patronage of the Servian Government, it strove to attain its object by every means at its disposal. While on the one hand the entire Servian press clamoured for war against the Monarchy in a series of broadsides wherein the facts were maliciously distorted, on the other hand associations were formed in preparation for a struggle. There were also other means of propaganda.

The Narodna Odbrana was the most important among these. Ostensibly organised as a private society, it was entirely dominated

by the Belgrade Foreign Office through the officers and State functionaries on its roll of membership. Among its founders were the following: General Bozo Jankovitch, former State Secretaries Ljuba Jovanovitch, Ljuba Davidovitch and Velislav Vulovitch; Professor Zivojin Dacitch (Barcitch), director of the State Printing Office, and the then Captains, now Majors, Voja Tankositch and Milan Pribicevitch. This society devoted itself to the recruiting and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Enclosure 2.)

As an illustration of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, the deposition of Trifko Krstanovitch, a subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a witness in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo, will be of interest. This man was then in Belgrade and had been hired by the Narodna Odbrana as a "Komitadji," together with other subjects of the Monarchy. With some hundred and forty other members of this band, Krstanovitch at the beginning of 1909 had been enrolled in a school established and managed by the Majors Voja Tankositch and Dusan Putnik in Cuprija (County of Jagodina) for the instruction and equipment of armed bands of men. In it all the instructors were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovitch and Captain Milan Pribicevitch made regular inspections of this three-months' course of education in irregular warfare.

The future "Komitadjis" were there instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph lines. It was their task to apply their newly acquired knowledge in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the orders of their commanders.

Through these activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which were carried on openly and were supported by the Servian Government, the guerrilla warfare against Austria-Hungary was organised. Subjects of the Monarchy were induced to commit acts of treason against their own country and were systematically trained to make treacherous attacks upon the defences of their country as Servian emissaries.

This period of aggressions was terminated by the declaration of the Servian Government on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein the latter declared its willingness to abide by the new political order created by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly pledged itself to maintain friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the future.

This declaration seemed to mark the end of the movement against Austria-Hungary, the source of so much unrest, and to point a path

to a really friendly approach between Servia and the Dual Monarchy. Deprived of the assistance of the Servian Government, and checked by the latter as in duty bound, the hostile propaganda would have been reduced to a mere shadowy existence, sure to vanish.

In such an event the kinship of Servia with the Southern Slavs in the Dual Monarchy by race, language and traditions, would have stimulated a joint work of culture which would have been of common value to both countries. But expectations in this direction were not fulfilled.

The aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy remained in operation, and, under the very eyes of the Servian Government, which has done nothing to suppress this movement, the propaganda against Austria-Hungary was intensified. Rancor against the Dual Monarchy was kept at a high pitch, and by new instigations was made implacable.

In the same old way, adapted to the changed conditions and supplemented by new methods, the people of Servia were roused to a struggle of extermination against Austria-Hungary. In a systematic manner secret meshes were woven to and fro in the Southern Slav districts of the Dual Monarchy, and the citizens of the latter were corrupted to betray their country.

Above all other agencies, the Servian press has not ceased to work in this direction. No less than 81 Servian publications had to be excluded from Austria-Hungary because their contents were in flagrant violation of the provisions of the domestic criminal code.

There was hardly a provision enacted for the protection of the august person of the Sovereign, members of the dynasty and the integrity of the State, which was not violated by Servian newspapers. A few specimens of these too frequent press utterances, selected from an abundant crop of such matter and referring to various periods, are tabulated in Enclosure 1.

Without entering into a more minute discussion of these indications of public opinion in Servia, it must be stated that they habitually referred to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act of robbery committed against Servia and requiring remedy. This view is not only repeated over and over in the ultra-radical papers in all the degrees of filthy expression of which the Servian language is capable, but it finds practically open utterance in the "Samouprava," a publication closely connected with the Belgrade Foreign Office. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.)

Attention must be directed likewise to the manner in which the

Servian press treated the murderous plot of Bogdan Zerajitch on June 15, 1910, in Serajevo against the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General von Varesanin.

Zerajitch, as is known, committed suicide immediately after his deed, having previously reduced all his papers to ashes. Under these circumstances the motive of his plot could not be completely established. However, from a badge found on him, one might infer that he was a believer in Kropotkine's tenets. Investigation led to the conclusion that the crime rested on Anarchist foundations.

The press of Serbia, nevertheless, extolled the assassin as a Servian national hero and glorified his deed. And the "Politika" even voiced a solemn protest against the assumption that Zerajitch was an anarchist, claiming him as an "heroic Serb whose name every Servian will cherish with sorrow."

The day of the 18th of August of the same year (the birthday of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty), was chosen as the appropriate occasion by the "Politika" for a resumption of its discussion of the plot of Zerajitch, whose name is uttered by the people as something sacred, and to publish a poem extolling this murderous attempt (lit. A of Enclosure 1).

Thus this crime, which had nothing to do with Servian aspirations to territories belonging to the Dual Monarchy, was utilised for the propagation of subversive ideas. Through the glorification of Zerajitch, murder was expressly commended as a model weapon in the struggle to realise Servian ideas, and as a deed worthy of emulation. This sanction of murder as a legitimate method in the fight against the Dual Monarchy recurs later in the press comments on the murderous attempt of Jukitch against the Royal Commissioner, M. von Cuvay. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.)

These sheets were not only circulated in Servia, but, as will be shown hereafter, were also smuggled into the Monarchy through well organised secret channels. It is these sheets that roused the masses and made them fertile soil for the activities of the associations antagonistic to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the focus of the agitation carried on by various organisations. The persons who had been at the head of this society at the time of the annexation were still its leaders. Now, as then, the most untiring and active organisers were the most violent enemies of the Dual Monarchy, to wit: General Bozo Jankovitch, Zivojin Dacitch, Director of the State Printing Office, and the Majors Milan Pribicevitch and Voja Tankositch. In its broader

organisation, which was under a strict hierarchical rule (see Enclosure 2 under "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana soon included about 400 committees, all of which displayed a lively activity.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna Odbrana became the centre of an agitation to which the Sharpshooters' Association, including 762 societies; the Sokolbund, with 2,500 members; the Olympian Club, the Equestrian Society, "Knez Mihajlo," the Jägerbund, the Kulturliga and numerous other societies belonged. Owing to a constant mutual interchange, these organisations were practically amalgamated and to-day their membership constitutes one body, the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana extended its close-meshed net of agitation over the whole of Servia, drawing to itself everybody who proved susceptible to the seduction of its ideas.

The spirit of the Narodna Odbrana is clearly disclosed by its official publications.

Disguised by its articles of association as a cultural organisation, concerned solely with the intellectual and physical development of the population of Servia, as well as with its material betterment, the Narodna Odbrana betrays the true and only reason for its existence, by the publication in its organ of the following programme of re-organisation: Under the pretext that the Dual Monarchy is seeking to despoil Servia of "her freedom and language and crush her utterly," the Odbrana pledges its members to preach to the people of Servia, "fanatically and untiringly," the "holy truth" that the waging of a war of extermination against Austria-Hungary, Servia's first and greatest enemy, is an imperative necessity; that this war must be carried on "with rifles and cannon," and that the people must be put in readiness "in every way" for "the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories where 7,000,000 of our enslaved brothers are suffering." (See Enclosure 2.)

The "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana are completely dominated by this idea. They are means to the end of organising and educating the people for the longed-for struggle of extermination against the Dual Monarchy.

The same spirit animates all the societies affiliated with the Narodna Odbrana. The Sokol Societies in Kragujevac (see Enclosure 3) are a case in point.

Like the Narodna Odbrana itself, these affiliated organisations are under the direction of army officers, professors and state officials. The opening address which the president of the society, Major

Kovacevitch, delivered in 1914, at the annual meeting, omits all mention of athletics, the main object of a Sokol Society, and deals exclusively with the "preparations for the struggle" against the "dangerous, heartless, lustful, hateful and greedy enemy in the north," who is "depriving millions of Servian brothers of their freedom and rights and keeping them in slavery and chains."

In the report of the management of this society all references to the nominal objects of its activities are relegated to the background. The report only indicates the real aims of the executive committee, to wit: the promotion of the national evolution and the strengthening of the "suppressed people," to the end that they may carry out their programme and accomplish that "great deed" which will be achieved in the near future—"the liberation of the brothers across the Drina, who are suffering the torments of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial report to sound a warning that it is necessary to "train falcons" which would be able "to bring freedom to the brothers not yet liberated."

Like the "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana, the "athletic sports" of the Sokols are not an end in themselves but a mere means to advance the same propaganda, which is carried on with the same idea, and even with the use of almost identical words.

The Narodna Odbrana, in inciting the "people" to the struggle of extermination against the Dual Monarchy, appeals not only to the masses in both Serbia, but to all Southern Slavs. To the Narodna Odbrana the Southern Slav territories of the Monarchy represent "our conquered Servian dominions." (Also see Enclosure 4.) Thus, the Southern Slav subjects of the Dual Monarchy are asked to participate in this "national work," this "sound, vital work" beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana appeals for "heroes for this holy struggle" on the soil of the Dual Monarchy, where Oblitch, Sultan Murad's murderer, is pointed to as an example of national devotion, worthy of imitation.

To spur on the "brothers outside of Serbia" to participate in the "work of private initiative," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers across the frontier." Nothing is said in the official organs of the society about the nature of this connexion, presumably because it belongs to that part of the "general work" which, for manifold reasons, is not to be disclosed.

How extensive this branch of their activity is, however, can be gathered from the fact that both the Central Committee of the

Narodna Odbrana and some of its regional committees maintain their departments "for Foreign Affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its affiliations is many-sided.

Relatively the least dangerous means of this agitation, because amenable to the control of the authorities, are the lecture tours which prominent members of the Narodna Odbrana undertake to south-eastern parts of the Dual Monarchy, where they address various societies on national and cultural subjects. On such occasions the opportunity is offered to the lecturer to recruit more or less openly for the above-mentioned societies, using words and expressions which carry a hidden meaning to the initiated.

In the ranks of these emissaries the above-mentioned director of the Servian State Printing Office, Zivojin Dacitch, plays a prominent part. Zivojin Dacitch had issued a proclamation to the Servian people on August 9, 1909, in which he designated Austria-Hungary as Servia's enemy and exhorted the country to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. He undertook many trips for purposes of agitation to the southeastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In one of these lectures, delivered in Karloci (1912), he abandoned his usual caution and advocated the "union of all Serbs against the common enemy." His references to Austria-Hungary in this instance lacked nothing in clearness.

More menacing were the relations which the Servian societies, imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana, entertained with organisations in the Monarchy under cover of a unity of interests and culture. The mutual visits of these societies, made either in a body or by delegates, could not be controlled by the police and authorities, and were utilised by Servia for the prosecution of many plans hostile to the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, a delegate of the Narodna Odbrana at the notorious celebration of the Prosvjeta Society in Serajevo (September, 1912), did not hesitate to secretly enlist Bosnian members for his society. (See Enclosure 6.) The delegating of a representative of the Sokol Society at Kragujevac to this celebration was meant to convey this message to the "Brethren in Bosnia": "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the falcons of the Sumadija are still powerful." As to the proceedings at such meetings in Servia, it is more difficult to report in detail. They are not under the control of the Imperial and Royal authorities, which have to collect their information at second-hand. (See Enclosure 3.) In this connexion the

visit of the students of Agram to Serbia in April, 1912, may be recalled. This event took on the aspect of a strongly suggestive demonstration, by reason of an official military reception and a review of Servian troops in honour of the students. Not without justification in fact did the report of the business manager of the Sokol Society at Kragujevac refer to this event "as the beginning and germ of a great deed which shall be performed in the nearest future," as "a seed which will put forth shoots when the soul of the people shall have been warmed to the task until there shall be no barriers which cannot be torn down."

Only a short while ago the authorities of the Dual Monarchy were apprised of the fact that the Servian Sokol Societies effected a secret union with corresponding organisations in the Monarchy, of which the exact character, pending investigation, is not yet clearly established. Tentative results of this investigation indicate, however, that herein has been traced one of the channels through which the Servian Sokols and their friends are instilling their subversive aims into the minds of beguiled and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This preliminary propaganda, affecting masses as a whole, is, however, entirely overshadowed by the "foreign service work" performed by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in their man-to-man canvass. This is the ground where the most deplorable results of the movement are evidenced. Through its secret emissaries and trusted agents, the agitation has stirred up unthinking youths as well as adults. Thus, Milan Pribicevitch induced the former Honvéd officers, V.B., D.K., V.N. and V.K., the last named a lieutenant in the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie, to desert the army of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy under serious circumstances, and to flee to Serbia. True it is that they have been disappointed in their hopes and some of them would gladly return to the country which they betrayed.

The agitation developed by Serbia in the middle schools in Croatia and Bosnia is unfortunately too well known to require exemplification. It is probably not so well known, however, that those expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools for gross breaches of discipline are welcomed with open arms in Serbia, often subsidised by the State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. Servian schools with their anti-Austro-Hungarian text-books and maps, and the large number of professors and teachers belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, lend themselves admirably to the training of these adepts. The following is a notable instance of this sort: In March, 1914, several pupils of



the training college for elementary teachers in Pakrac (Croatia) had to be expelled on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of them immediately obtained appointments as teachers, while others were admitted to a training college for teachers. Affiliating with people hostile to the Monarchy, one of these expelled school strikers publicly declared that he and his friends, on the occasion of the visit to Bosnia of the heir apparent, would produce convincing proofs that Bosnia was a Servian land. It must seem at least strange that the Royal Servian District Prefect and Krajna issued Servian passports to three of these compromised students at the time of the visit of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia, in which they were falsely designated as Servian subjects, although he could not have helped being aware of their Croatian citizenship. Provided with these passports, the three undergraduate teachers were able to enter, unrecognised, the territory of the Monarchy, where eventually they were identified and arrested.

These activities, however, do not exhaust the full scope of the "foreign" work of the Narodna Odbrana. For some time past the Imperial and Royal Government has had confidential information that military preparations were being made for the longed-for war against Austria-Hungary and that Servian emissaries in the Dual Monarchy were under orders to destroy means of transportation and communication, after the manner of guerrilla fighters, and to kindle revolts and cause panics in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. (See Enclosure 7.)

The criminal prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his confederates in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo in 1913 for the crime of espionage (see Enclosure 6) has produced evidence confirming this confidential information.

As at the time of its establishment, the Narodna Odbrana still has on its programme the preparation of a warfare of bands, supplemented by the development of a system of espionage. To-day the so-called "reorganised programme" of the Narodna Odbrana is in truth of broader scope, including the organisation of the so-called "war of extermination" against the Monarchy and the unfurling of the "old red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Here, it will be seen, an atmosphere of hatred, promoted openly and secretly against the Dual Monarchy, prevailed. Coupled with it was an irresponsible agitation, availing itself of any means in the struggle against Austria-Hungary and remorselessly advocating common murder as the most efficient weapon. It is evident that out of

such conditions acts of terrorism would be born, even without the active coöperation of anti-Austro-Hungarian individuals from Servia.

On June 8th, 1912, Luka Jukitch fired a shot at M. von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner, which fatally injured Councillor von Hervoitch, who was seated next to him in the carriage. In his flight Jukitch shot down a police officer who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

The views expressed by Jukitch at the public hearing of his case, were in full accord with the basic ideas and plans circulated by the Narodna Odbrana. Although Jukitch had been brooding over his murderous schemes for some time, these projects really matured when he joined the pilgrimage of students from Agram to Belgrade on April 18th, 1912. During the celebrations given in honour of the visitors, Jukitch came in close touch with various persons within the sphere of the Narodna Odbrana and he had political discussions with them. A few days later Jukitch was again in Belgrade, where a Servian Major handed him a bomb and another sympathiser a Browning pistol, with which he carried out his attempt at murder.

The bomb which was found in Agram had been, in the opinion of experts, manufactured for military purposes in an arsenal.

Jukitch's attempt was a matter of recent memory when Stefan Dojeitch, who came from the United States to Agram, made a murderous attack in Agram on August 18th, 1913, upon the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz—an act born of the "foreign" agitation carried on by the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates among the Southern Slavs in America.

The pamphlet, "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," published in Chicago by the Serb, T. Dimitrijevitich, contains unbridled invectives against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and an appeal to the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy to leave America and return to Servia for the impending "liberation." This publication shows a remarkable parallelism between the unrestrained propaganda carried on by Servia in America and the agitation carried on by Servia in the territories of the Dual Monarchy.

Hardly a year later Agram was again the scene of a murderous attempt of this kind, which happily failed. On May 20th, 1914, Jacob Schäfer attempted to kill the Banus, Baron Skerlecz, in the Agram theatre, which attempt was frustrated at the last moment by a police officer. The ensuing investigation uncovered a plot, of which the soul was Rudolf Hercigonja. The depositions of Hercigonja and his five

co-defendants made it plain that this plot also had originated in Serbia.

Having participated in an unsuccessful attempt to free the above-mentioned Jukitch, Hercigonja had fled to Serbia (October, 1912) where he and his accomplice, Marojan Jaksitch, associated constantly with "Komitadjis" and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As in so many other instances where premature dabbling in politics had driven youthful minds to frenzy, the result of this corrupting intercourse proved disastrous. Hercigonja brought home the dogma preached in Belgrade, that the Southern Slav districts of Austria-Hungary must be detached from the Monarchy and united with the Kingdom of Serbia. In this connexion he had acquired the notion from his associations in Serbia that this end could be attained solely by the perpetration of murderous plots against persons of high rank and leading statesmen of the Dual Monarchy.

Hercigonja sought to instil these ideas into the minds of his friends in Agram, some of whom he won over to his cause. In the foreground of his programme was an attempt upon the life of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne.

A few months previously, proceedings in connexion with a propaganda of high treason had been instituted against Luka Aljinovitch. In the course of the investigation three witnesses had deposed that Aljinovitch had declared in their presence that in 1913 he had received 100 dinars from the Narodna Odbrana and a like sum from a secret association of students for purposes of agitation and especially for an attack upon Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

These incidents indicate how the criminal activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its sympathisers had lately converged upon the person of the Archduke and heir apparent to the throne.

All these disclosures point to the conclusion that the Narodna Odbrana and the anti-Austrian circles affiliated with it in Serbia, deemed that the time had come to translate their teachings into deeds.

It is noteworthy, however, that in these activities the Narodna Odbrana confined itself to furnishing the impulses for deeds of violence, and, when its seeds had sunk into fertile ground, to supplying the material means for their commission; but that it left the dangerous rôle of the "propaganda of deeds" solely to the misled youth of the Dual Monarchy, who had to bear the full burden of their sorry "heroism."

All the features of this method we find in the history of the

origin of the deplorable murder plot of June 28, 1914 (see Enclosure 8). Princip and Grabez are types of the youth whose minds had been poisoned in school by the teaching of the Narodna Odbrana.

In Belgrade, associating with a circle of students nourished upon these ideas, Princip conceived schemes to assassinate Archduke Francis Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of all Servian elements antagonistic to the Dual Monarchy had turned under the impetus of his visit to the annexed provinces.

Princip was joined by Gabrinovitch, a member of the same circles, whose erratic radical-revolutionary views had developed, according to his own admissions, under the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and through perusal of Servian papers. Thus Gabrinovitch also drifted into ways hostile to the Monarchy and adopted the theories of "the propaganda of deeds." Thanks to his antecedent dispositions, Grabez also quickly succumbed to the influence of these surroundings, which he had entered later.

But, howsoever far the matter may have developed and howsoever firm the determination of the conspirators may have been to carry out the plot, it would never have materialised, had not other persons supplied the means for its accomplishment, as in the case of Jukitch. Princip and Gabrinovitch at their trial admitted that they had neither weapons nor money of their own.

It is interesting to note the quarters where the confederates tried to get their weapons. Milan Pribicevitch and Zivojin Dacitch, these two notorious leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, were the first whom they thought of as helpers in their hour of need, apparently because in the circle of would-be-murderers and plotters it had become a tradition to procure murderous weapons from those representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not in Belgrade at the critical time frustrated this plan; Princip and Gabrinovitch had no difficulty, however, in finding other helpers in the person of Milan Ciganovitch, a former "Komitadji" and now an official of the Central Servian State Railway in Belgrade, another active member of the Narodna Odbrana who had made his first appearance in its history as the graduate of a school for the training of bands in Cuprija in 1909. (See Enclosure 5.) Nor were they disappointed in Ciganovitch, who immediately gave them the required supplies.

Ciganovitch with his friend, the Servian Major Voja Tankositch, likewise a leader of the Narodna Odbrana and a former director of the school of bands in Cuprija (see Enclosure 5), became now the

intellectual leaders and promoters of the plot which they seemed to approve with an indifference characteristic of the moral qualities of the whole movement aimed at the Dual Monarchy. They had only one doubt in the beginning, and that was whether the three conspirators had firmly made up their minds to risk the deed. This hesitation, however, was soon overcome by the suggestive coöperation of the two Servian officials. Tankositch secured four Brownings with ammunition, and money for travelling expenses; six hand grenades from the Servian army stores supplemented this equipment, which in kind and origin invites comparison with the conditions in the Jukitch case. To make certain the success of the plot, Tankositch ordered that the conspirators be instructed in marksmanship, which task Ciganovitch assumed with a success now realised but too well. Special anxiety was evinced by both Tankositch and Ciganovitch in insuring secrecy about the plot. They supplied cyanide of potassium, with instructions that the perpetrators commit suicide with it after they should have performed their task. This precaution was to the sole advantage of the instigators of the deed, as the preservation of the secret would eliminate even the small risks which they had to assume in the undertaking. Certain death to the victims of its wiles, and complete security for themselves—such is the usual usage of the Narodna Odbrana.

To render possible the carrying out of the murder scheme, bombs and weapons had to be smuggled into Bosnia. Ciganovitch again acted as the helper, minutely designating to the conspirators the roads which they should follow and enlisting the coöperation of the Servian frontier authorities to pass them into Bosnia. The manner of the organisation of this passage, which even Princip found “mysterious,” leaves no doubt of the fact that this was a well prepared and often utilised road for the secret purposes of the Narodna Odbrana.

In a matter-of-fact way which indicates long-established habit, the frontier captains at Schabatz and Loznica placed their entire staffs and administration at the disposal of the authors of the scheme. This mysterious means of travel, with its elaborate system of constantly changing guides, always ready on the spot, as if by magic, when they were needed, worked without a hitch. Without even inquiring into the object of this unusual trip of a few immature students, the Servian authorities, at the behest of the former “Komitadji” and subordinate railway employee, Ciganovitch, set the machinery of their offices running smoothly for the accomplishment of the task.

There was, of course, no need of questions, as the instructions which they had received made it quite clear to them that another "mission" of the Narodna Odbrana was to be carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers elicited merely a benevolently approving smile from Grbitch, the customs officer on duty, which goes to show that on this "road" the sight of such contraband was quite customary.

The Royal Servian Government has assumed a heavy load in allowing all this to happen. Pledged to neighbourly and friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, it has permitted its press to disseminate hatred against the Dual Monarchy. It has permitted the establishment, upon its soil, of organisations designed to conduct a revolutionary campaign against a neighbouring State, under the leadership of high military and civil officials, teachers and judges. It has not suppressed the activities of men holding high posts in the State administration, who poisoned the national conscience to an extent that has made common assassination appear to be a commendable weapon.

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(ENCLOSURE 1.)

*Servian Press Comments.*

(a) On the occasion of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's 80th birthday, on August 18, 1910, the "Politika" published a large picture of Bogdan Zerajitch, who two months before this had attempted to murder Baron Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia. The accompanying article ran as follows: "Two months ago, on June 2nd, on the very day of the opening of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diet, a Servian youth, the student Bogdan Zerajitch, attempted to murder the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serajevo, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajitch fired five shots at this renegade, who had assured his career in the famous uprising in Rakovica by shedding the blood of his own brethren. Owing to a peculiar accident, the attempt to kill him was unsuccessful. Thereupon brave Zerajitch, with the sixth and last bullet, blew his brains out and instantly fell dead.

"In Vienna they knew full well that Zerajitch had not been prompted to attempt this murder by reading Russian and revolutionary writings. He had done this as a noble scion of a people,

which in this bloody manner desired to protest against foreign rule. For this reason they tried to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible and—also against their habit—tried to avert a trial, which would have compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina even more. In Vienna, the desire was expressed that the memory of Zerajitch be blotted out and that significance be denied to his murderous attempt. It is this fear of Zerajitch dead and the ban placed on his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has exalted his memory among the people as that of a saint—to-day, on August 18th, perhaps more than ever. On this day we also light a candle on his grave and cry: ‘Honour to Zerajitch!’ ”

Here are appended some verses which in rough translation run as follows:

“Bosnia lives, death not yet has come unto her;  
 In vain her body have you entombed;  
 A fettered victim, she still flashes her fire.  
 Time is not yet to intone her dirge.  
 With devilish hands you scratched upon the grave,  
 Yet will the living dead not go down to rest.  
 Emperor, harkst Thou? In the flash of the gun  
 Those bullets of lead how they whiz by Thy Throne;  
 Not slaves they; no, ’tis freedom divine  
 Shining forth from the brave hand of the conquered.  
 Why quaketh thus that terrible Golgotha?  
 In defence of Christ, Peter drew his sword.  
 His hand fell, but from his blood  
 A thousand more brave hands will rise;  
 Yon shot was but the first messenger  
 Of the Servian Easter that shall follow Golgotha’s pain.”

(b) On October 8, 1910, on the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Politika” and “Mali Journal,” the latter with black borders, published violent attacks upon Austria-Hungary.

“Europe must take note that the Servian people still thirst for revenge.” “The day of revenge must arrive; the feverish efforts of Servia to organise her army are a token of this accounting to come, as is the hatred of the Servian people for the neighbouring Monarchy.”

Such were some of the expressions used by these journals.

On the same occasion the "Samouprava" on October 9, 1910, said: "Invective and excesses are not the effective expression of genuine patriotism. It is solely through calm and dignified work that the goal can be reached."

(c) On April 18, 1911, the "Politika" wrote: "With the exception of a few cynics nobody in Serbia would look with favour upon a visit of King Peter to Vienna or Budapest. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered even the semblance of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This every Serbian feels."

(d) The "Belgradske Novine" on April 18, 1911, wrote as follows: "Most of the men close to the Government disapprove King Peter's projected visit to Emperor Francis Joseph. The storm of indignation which stirred all Servians because of this proposed trip of the King, is quite natural."

(e) The "Mali Journal" of April 19, 1911, has this to say: "King Peter's visit to the Sovereign of Austria-Hungary would mean an insult to all Serbia. Through this visit Serbia would lose her claim to Piémont's part. Serbia's interests can never be identified with Austria's interests."

(f) On April 23, 1911, the "Politika," "Mali Journal," "Tribuna," "Belgradske Novine" and "Vecernje Novosti" thus comment on the proposed visit of King Peter to the court of Vienna: "Between Serbia and Austria-Hungary there never can be friendship. King Peter's proposed visit means, therefore, 'an infamous capitulation,' 'a humiliation to Serbia,' 'a solemn sanction of all the crimes and misdeeds committed by Austria-Hungary against Serbia and the Serbian people.'"

(g) On April 18, 1912, the "Trgovinski Glasnik" publishes an editorial entitled "Austria's Collapse," which reads in part: "In Austria-Hungary there is ruin in every direction. What is happening beyond the Danube and Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, but a general Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians view with satisfaction such a course of affairs in Austria."

(h) In an article entitled "The Frontiers of Albania" the "Balkan" attacks Austria-Hungary as follows: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt on Austria, Montenegro and Serbia will do so by shouting to Austria: 'Stop; you shall go no further.' War between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dismembered the



Turkish Empire; we shall likewise rend Austria asunder. We have ended one war; now we are facing another."

(i) The "Vecernje Novosti," April 22, 1913, publishes a plea to the travelling Servian public and Servian business men to boycott the Danube steamship company. It says: "Nobody should travel on the ships of this Austrian company, nor should anybody transport cargo on them. Whoever does this, should be fined by a committee. The fines would go into the fund of the Komitadjis, which is to be utilised in the coming war with Austria."

(k) The "Tribuna," May 26, 1914, on the occasion of Austria-Hungary's occupation of Ada Kaleh, publishes the following: "Criminal black-and-yellow Austria has again played a burglar's trick. She is a thief, who, if she cannot steal a whole bag of money, contents herself with one dinar."

(l) On June 10, 1913, on the anniversary of the attempted murder of the Royal Commissioner in Agram by the student Luka Jukitch, Servian papers published commemorative articles. Says the "Pravda" in one article: "It must hurt the soul to its depths that not everybody has acted as our Jukitch did. We have Jukitch no more, but we have hatred and anger; we have to-day ten millions of Jukitch. We are firmly convinced that Jukitch, through the window of his prison, will soon hear freedom's last gunshot."

(m) "Mali Journal," October 7, 1913, published an editorial, wherein the right of existence is denied to Austria-Hungary and all Slavic nationalities are called upon to second the offensive war, which Servia planned to start soon.

(n) The "Piémont," October 8, 1913, has this to say on the anniversary of the annexation: "To-day five years have elapsed since an Imperial decree extended the sceptre of the Habsburgs over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people of Servia will feel the pain inflicted upon them on this date for many another decade. Humiliated and bereft, the Servian people moaned in despair. The nation made vows to wreak vengeance and to win freedom by heroic measures. This day has come again to rouse the slackened energies of the race. To-day, Servian graves dot the ancient Servian countries; Servian cavalry is treading on the battlefields of Macedonia and Old-Servia. The people of Servia, having finished their task in the South, now turn in the opposite direction, whence the moans and anguish of the Servian brother come to them, and where the gibbet is set up. Servian soldiers, to-day, fighting these Albanians, stirred up in Dusan's Empire by the State which took Bosnia and

Herzegovina from us, have vowed that they will proceed in a similar way against the 'Second Turkey,' as they have dealt by God's help with the Turkey of the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident that the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey has disappeared. The good God of Servia will grant that the 'Second Turkey' shall also disappear."

(o) The "Mali Journal" of November 4, 1913, publishes this: "Any thought of a reconciliation with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to treason against the people of Servia. Servia must reckon with the facts and forever bear in mind that Austria-Hungary is her dangerous enemy and that to fight that monarchy must be the most sacred duty of every Servian Government."

(p) Thus the "Pravda" of January 14, 1914: "Our new year's wishes go first to our not yet liberated brothers, groaning under an alien yoke. Servians may well persevere; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious march is not yet ended."

(q) The "Novosti" of January 18, 1914, published a picture of the religious ceremony of the blessing of the waters in Bosnia, in connexion with the following text: "Servians maintain their customs without modification even in lands which groan under foreign rule, until the day of freedom shall find them united in enthusiasm."

(r) The "Zastava" in the issue of January, 1914, admits that "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Serbs to revolution."

(s) The "Mali Journal" of March 9, 1914, has this to say: "Servia can never forget the rattling of Francis Ferdinand's sabre on the occasion of the Scutari affair."

(t) The "Zastava," April 4, 1914, publishes this: "The Austrian statesmen who promote a policy of hatred, a policy of bureaucrats, not a far-reaching policy, are themselves bringing about the ruin of their state."

(u) The "Pravda" of April 8, 1914, makes the following comment: "Austria has lost all rights to existence."

(v) In the Easter issues (April, 1914), all Servian papers express hope that their "unliberated, conquered and oppressed brethren may soon celebrate a glad resurrection."

(w) The "Tribuna" of April 23, 1914, says: "The Pacifists have discovered a new slogan: that of 'Europe's patriotism.' This programme can be carried out only if Austria is divided."

(x) The "Mali Journal" of May 12, 1914, says: "What is a crime in private life Austria calls politics. History knows only one monster, and that monster is Austria."

## (ENCLOSURE 2.)

*Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," the Official Organ of the Society of the Same Name, Published by the Central Committee of That Society. (Narodna Odbrana, izdanje stredisnog odbora Narodna Odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija "Davidovic," Decanska ulica br. 14. Ljub. Davidovica.)*

In a brief preface to this pamphlet it is pointed out that the publication "does not represent a complete, exhaustive analysis of the total general work of the Narodna Odbrana, as for many reasons it neither should nor could do that."

This publication is divided into three parts, the first of which consists of fourteen Chapters setting forth a sort of programme, while the second contains a report on the activity of the society and the third consists of sample rules for the organisation of similar societies beyond the frontiers of Servia.

In Chapter I., entitled "Genesis and Activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is pointed out that this society was the outcome of the popular movement which swept over Servia after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had the following object:

- (1.) To arouse, encourage and strengthen national sentiment.
- (2.) To enroll and recruit volunteers.
- (3.) To form volunteer-units and prepare them for armed action.
- (4.) To collect voluntary contributions in money and supplies for the realisation of the task.
- (5.) To organise, equip and drill special irregular troops ("committees") for special, independent warfare.
- (6.) To institute movements in all other ways for the defence of the Servian people.

In connexion with the above, it is pointed out that on account of the recognition by the Great Powers of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a stop was put to the work of the society, whereupon under the by-laws the programme of the Odbrana was reorganised and a new work was started in order that the "old, red war-flag of the Narodna Odbrana might again be unfurled" if a similar situation should arise.

In Chapter II., entitled "The New Narodna Odbrana of To-day," is the following passage:

"Experience taught us in the days of the annexation that Servia was not prepared for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon

her. The struggle which Serbia has to assume is more serious and difficult than was thought. The annexation was merely one of the blows dealt to this country by the enemies of Serbia. It was a blow preceded by many other blows, which will be followed by still others. In order that a new surprise attack may not find Serbia in an equally unprepared state, it is necessary to prepare ourselves for work."

The preparation of the people for a forward movement in all directions of national work in conformity with the requirements of modern times, is set down as the object of this "work" in which the mass of the people must take part. As a means to attain this end, a strengthening of national consciousness, athletic sport, economic and hygienic welfare, the raising of the level of culture, etc., are conspicuously enjoined upon the individual and upon the society, next to the state itself.

In Chapter III., "The Three Chief Problems," it is declared that the annexation taught that the national consciousness in Serbia was not so strong as it should be in a country which, with a population of less than three millions, constituted the hope and mainstay of seven millions of the subjugated Serb people. The first problem of the society was, therefore, to strengthen the national consciousness. The second problem was the promotion of physical training; the third was to accomplish the goal of proper valuation of these sporting activities.

In the fourth chapter, "About Shooting," the value of a good training in marksmanship, especially for the Servian contingents, is emphasised, inasmuch as there the military training lasts only six months. These remarks conclude with the sentence:

"A new blow like the annexation must be met by a new Servian people, in which every Serb, from childhood to old age, must be a sharpshooter."

Chapter V., which treats of "The Relation of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol Societies," begins with a general discussion of the conditions for the strength of States in culture and political life. In this connexion the decline of Turkey is pointed out, and it is added:

"The old Turks of the South are disappearing little by little, and only a part of our people still suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more terrible and more dangerous than the old. Stronger in culture and economically, the northern enemies attack us. They wish to deprive us of our freedom, to suppress our language, to crush us. The preliminary symptoms of the approach-

ing struggle are perceptible. The Servian people face the question, 'To be or not to be.' "

"What Do We Desire in the Lectures?" is the heading of chapter VII., the gist of which is summed up in the sentences:

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were more or less lectures of agitation. The programme of our new work was developed. At every lecture the annexation was spoken about, the old Narodna Odbrana and the tasks of the new. The lectures will never cease to be lectures of agitation, but they will always develop more and more into individual channels and concern themselves with every question of our social and national life."

Chapter VIII., "Woman's activity in the Narodna Odbrana," IX., "Work with reference to details and secondary matters," and X., "Renaissance of the Association," while referring to the task of the Narodna Odbrana, deal with the preparation and intensification of the association's activity, and with the necessity of regenerating individuals, the nation and the state.

Chapter XI., "New Obilitch \* and Singjelitch," says by way of introduction:

"It is a mistake to assert that Kossovo is a thing of the past. We are in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo to-day is the darkness and ignorance in which our people live. The other reasons for the new Kossovo exist on our borders at the north and west: The Germans, Austrians, and Swabians (Schwabas), with their encroachment upon our Slav and Serb South."

The heroic deeds of Obilitch and Singjelitch are pointed out, and the necessity of self-sacrifice in the service of the nation, and it is added: "The national cause involves sacrifices, namely, in Turkey and Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities, thrown into prison, and brought to the gallows. For this battle against darkness and ignorance, too, such heroes are needed. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the battle with rifles and cannon against the Schwabas and our other enemies our people will furnish a host of heroes. But the Narodna Odbrana is not satisfied

\* Milos Obilitch (also Kobilitch), Servian tradition tells, crept into the Turkish camp after the battle of Kossovopolie, or Kossovo, and murdered Sultan Murad, (*cf.* von Kallay, "History of the Serbs," Vol. I.).

Stephan Singjelitch, Knez of Resara, played a part in the Servian revolt of 1807-1810. In 1809 Singjelitch defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and it is said that when he realised he was no match for the superior forces opposed to him numerically, he blew up his position and part of his men, together with many Turks, (von Kallay, "The History of the Servian Revolt").

with that, for it regards the present so-called peaceful relations as a state of war, and calls for heroes likewise for this struggle which we are waging in Serbia and beyond the border."

Chapter XII. is headed "The Union with the Brothers and Friends," and its significance is suggested by the following sentences:

"Among the main problems of the Narodna Odbrana is that of maintaining the union with our near and distant brothers beyond the border and the rest of our friends in the world. By the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana is meant our entire race, not only those in Serbia. It hopes that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside of Serbia to more active participation in the work of private initiative in order that the new upward movement to-day for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana shall proceed in common in all Serb territories."

In Chapter XIII., which is headed "Two Important Problems," occurs the following:

"Inasmuch as we take the ground that through the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the encroachment upon our territories from the north has been fully revealed, the Narodna Odbrana regards Austria-Hungary as our greatest enemy." This work (namely, to designate Austria to the Servian people as its greatest enemy) is regarded by the society as a vitally necessary task, as its fundamental duty. Then the book continues:

"As once upon a time the Turks poured in upon us from the south, so Austria-Hungary to-day is attacking us from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of a war against Austria-Hungary, it is preaching a holy truth of our national situation."

The hatred arising as a result of this propaganda, it is pointed out, is not to be regarded as the goal, but as a natural phase of the work whose purpose is independence and freedom. If hereby hatred against Austria is engendered, it is Austria who sowed it through its course, a course which "makes necessary the war against Austria until that Monarchy is exterminated."

The modern conception of the national idea is extolled, and it is remarked that in talking about "deliverance and union" too much work is done with phrases. The people must be told:

"The liberation of our alienated Serb territories and their union with Serbia is necessary for our gentlemen, our merchants, our farmers, for the most fundamental requirements of culture and trade, for space and for bread. Recognising this, the people will lay a hand

to the national work with a will and great self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for the latter, not only out of pity for the brothers there suffering, but also for the sake of trade and for an outlet to the sea."

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then summed up in the following closing sentences: "Besides the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the more important task of carrying home to the people, with complete preservation of the holy national memories, this new healthy conception, so mighty in its results, of nationalism and of work for freedom and union."

Chapter XIV., the concluding division, opens with an appeal to the Government and the people of Servia to prepare with all means for the conflict "which the annexation foreshadowed."

In these passages the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are once more recapitulated:

"Since the Narodna Odbrana works in accordance with the spirit of the time and in conformity with the altered circumstances, maintaining at the same time all connexions that were formed at the time of the annexation, it is the same to-day as it was then. It is to-day Odbrana (defence); it is also to-day Narodna (of the people). To-day, too, it rallies to its banners the citizens of Servia as it did at the time of the annexation. At that time the cry was for war; to-day the cry is for work; at that time meetings, demonstrations, volunteer committees, rifles, and bombs were called for; to-day silent, fanatical, indefatigable work is required, and more work in the direction of the tasks and duties which we have indicated, as temporary preparation for the battle with rifle and cannon that will come."

On the subject of the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana, this annual report of the society contains the following:

A central Committee with its seat at Belgrade conducts all the minutes of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subordinate to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections: for educational work, for physical training, for financial collection, and for foreign affairs.

District committees, whose headquarters are at places where there are political authorities, direct the affairs of the respective districts.

Town societies are the directing organisations in the individual towns.

Trusted men are to be found in those places within the country where there is no need of forming a committee.

Societies which "stand in closest relations with the work of the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter are: the Sharpshooters' Union, with 762 societies; the Sokol Union, "Dusan Silni," with 2,500 members; the Olympic Club, the Riding Society, "Knez Mihaljo"; the Hunters' Union and the Culture League.

All these societies are similarly organised as the Narodna Odbrana, utilise the quarters of the latter, namely, society houses, libraries, etc.; prominent members of these societies are chairmen of committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

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(ENCLOSURE 3.)

*Extract from the "Report of the Activities of the Sokol Society Dusan Silni in Kragujevac in the Years 1912 and 1913." (Kragujevac, "Buducnost" Press, Tih. Lekitch, 1914.)*

At the head of this report appears the address with which the President of the society, the Royal Servian Major Kovacevitch, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914:

"It is known to you that the Sokol institution, born in the battle against Germanism, is a purely Slavic institution, which pursues the aim of uniting all Slav brothers, to inspire them with enthusiasm and through education and force to prepare for the battle against the foe of Slavdom.

"We Serbs, as a part of the great Slav community, have adopted the Sokol idea and joined hands in the common work for our own welfare and that of our brothers.

"We Serbs, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokol, for we wish to revive the weary and exhausted, to strengthen the weak and anxious, to free the captives and the enchained. We have done this both at present and in former wars. We have delivered a part of our brothers from the arrogance of the enemy in the south. We have torn away their chains, have freed them from pain, and have given them freedom so that in it they may enjoy happiness, equality, and fraternity."

After some words of praise of this "noble work" which realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevitch continued:

"But, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the north is more



dangerous and heartless because economically and culturally he is stronger.

“This enemy is insatiable in his lust; he holds millions of our brothers in chains and slavery. He deprived them of freedom and law, and subjugated them to his service. The brothers cry and beg for speedy help.

“We may not abandon them to the mercy of this terrible and devouring foe. Rather must we hasten to their assistance, because to do that is our duty. Could we, in the last analysis, be happy if so many of our brothers live, suffer, and complain in slavery?

“Brothers and sisters!

“The foe is dangerous, lustful, and vicious. Let us always be on our guard.

“Let us work with greater eagerness and self-sacrifice. Let us be faithful in our holy Sokol duty, true and persevering.

“Let us prepare for the struggle and for the support of the just Sokol idea.

“Let us unite with the numberless swarms of Sokols and let us always think of that truth which the Servian Sokolists have inscribed on their banner: That only a healthy, strong, nationally conscious, and well-organised people is fit to defend itself, to give battle, to conquer.”

To this address of the President is appended the report of the Executive Committee. After summarising the results achieved in the last wars, which hampered the society in its activities for two years, it points out: “The day has come on which we return to our work because our programme is not yet fulfilled and our task not yet completed. A large part of our people still endure the suffering of the Crucified Christ; we must still visit our brothers beyond the Drina; we must still seek the City of Serajevo and the heritage of the holy Sava; we must see to the homeland of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj, and the old Vujadin; we must cross the hills of Romanija and see why Travnik has wrapped himself in mist; some day that song must cease. Woe, Bosnia, thou orphan before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy tribe?”

After a discussion of the various undertakings of the society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the society maintains relations with “the brother societies beyond the Save and Drina,” and special emphasis is laid on the sending of delegates to the celebration of the Prosvjeta at Serajevo. In this connexion the report says: “By sending these delegates to the brothers in Bosnia the committee in-

tended to say to them: 'We have not forgotten you. The wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.' "

After a detailed account of a visit of Agram students to Servia and the consecration of the flag of the "Society of the Sober Youth" the report of the Executive Committee ends with these sentences:

"The administration knows how properly to value these phenomena—the arrival of the brother Croats in the Sumadija and the convening of the 'Sober Youth' from all districts in Serbdom, and it will be no exaggeration to say that these events signify the beginning and germ of a great deed that will be enacted in the very near future.

"They are the expression of a great, and until now silent, awakening of the national consciousness and strength of a down-trodden race, which is not permitted to arise and unite. Only a while longer and this germ will ripen, and when the popular soul expands still more there will be no restrictions that it cannot tear to pieces, no obstacles in its path which it will not be able to overcome. The work of strengthening this power, the coöperation in and hastening of the course of this national development, the development and support of this idea, was always the goal of the administration's actions."

The report of the Treasurer in the first place names all those who liberally supported the society: the District Committee of the Narodna Odbrana in Kragujevac, especially its cavalry section, which frequently has come to the assistance of the Sokol Society with precious help; the Director of the gymnasium at Kragujevac, who always "showed his active paternal interest" in the Sokols; the Divisional Commandant of the Sumadija, who liberally supported the society; the President of the District Court in Kragujevac, the district chief, and the community leader in Kragujevac.

After the Treasurer has memorialised the members of the society who had been killed in the war he concludes his report with the following words:

"After such a brilliant victory over a part of our enemy the society's leaders hope that all of you from now on will devote yourselves even more fully and joyfully to the activities of the Sokol institution, so that in our falcon aerie you may train falcons which at a given time will be able to soar aloft and on their mighty pinions bring to all our unliberated brothers fraternity, love, and freedom."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevitch as

President, by the Court Secretary, D. V. Brzakovitch, as Secretary, and by ten members of the board, among whom are two Professors (Emil Lukitch and Milan Jankovitch), as well as one other officer (Infantry Major Michael Vasitch).

From this annual report and from a table sent out by the Kragujevac Sokol Society to the "Srpski Sokol" in Tuzla for filling out, and likewise signed by Major Kovacevitch and Court Secretary Brzakovitch, it appears that the Sokol societies in Servia were linked with organisations of the same kind in the Monarchy in closer relations than had heretofore been the case.

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(ENCLOSURE 4.)

*The Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna Odbrana.*

The Servian official gazette, "Srpski Novine," of June 28, 1914, contained as a supplement an appeal to the Narodna Odbrana which was furnished to all subscribers to the gazette. This appeal contained the following passages:

"Brothers and Sisters: Only a part of Kossovo has been avenged, only a part of St. Vitus Day atoned for. Throughout the lands in which our popular tongue is heard—the Servian, Croatian, and Slavonic—from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Selo, extends the significance of St. Vitus Day and of Kossovo. As many national souls still weep upon this territory, as many chains still press our brothers, as much work is still to be accomplished, as much must we still sacrifice. St. Vitus Day might formerly have denoted a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have gone far into our new history, when back of us stand great and glorious national events, and still greater and more glorious ones still await us, to-day when we are in the midst of the creation of the great national State, St. Vitus Day must be for us a day of great rejoicing and pride for what has taken place, since it sprung from that day, and still more because of what is to come. Servian men and Servian women! Millions of our brothers, Slavonians, Croatians, and Serbs, outside of our borders look upon us to-day, the children of the kingdom, and their breasts swell with hope and joy as they look upon our majestic manifestations of to-day for the national cause.

"God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our holy

task that has not yet been accomplished summons us, that part which is still to be accomplished. St. Vitus Day, 1914, in Belgrade."

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(ENCLOSURE 5.)

*Testimony of Trifko Krstanovitch about the Narodna Odbrana.*

Trifko Krstanovitch, a journeyman baker of Zavidovitchi, was arrested on the night of July 6-7, 1914, because by a remark made by him shortly after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to the effect that this assassination was to have been expected, he had rendered himself suspicious of having had advance knowledge of the conspiracy.

He was, therefore, brought before the district court at Serajevo. In the examination of the prisoner it developed that the suspicion against him was not justified by the remark he had made, inasmuch as the remark was based solely on his former knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana and had merely been an expression of his opinion that in the agitation in Serbia against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against Archduke Francis Ferdinand, such an act was to have been expected. The prosecution of Krstanovitch was, therefore, dropped for lack of evidence, and the prisoner was examined as a witness with a view to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which was considered important for the purposes of the investigation.

The following extract from his sworn testimony on July 19, 1914, is of pertinent interest:

"In the Autumn of the year 1908 I crossed the border to Serbia on the Mokra Gora at Visegrad, in search of employment. I went to Bajina Basta in the Uzice district, and as I found no employment there I went to Belgrade, where I arrived at the time of the announcement of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inasmuch as I saw that on account of the annexation great excitement and commotion had been aroused among the populace and that I would be unable to find any sort of employment, I entered the Imperial and Royal Consulate in order to be helped home. But as I left the Consulate a gendarme grabbed me on the street and asked me where I came from. Thinking me to be a spy, he took me to a police station. Here I was questioned, and when I told them that I would like to go

home a subaltern officer began to abuse me, asking why I wanted to leave Servia at this time, when they needed men more than ever because there might be a war with Austria. When I told him that I had nothing to live on, he replied that I would get all I needed if I would enroll with the committee. In my distress I agreed, and a gendarme led me into the Hotel Zelenou Vijencu (The Green Garland) and there introduced me to Voja Tankositch, the leader of the committee and a Captain in the regular army. Here I received board and lodging, and, as I saw, others of the committee lived here.

"Voja Tankositch told me it was the purpose of the committee to give training in bomb throwing, in the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraph and railway lines, because things might easily lead up to a war between Austria and Servia. Thereupon a man led me into a house of smaller area adjoining the Ministry of Finance, where the offices of the committee were, and here in the office I met Milan Pribicevitch, who registered me in the committee. At this registration Milan Pribicevitch asked me if Voja Tankositch had told me what my duties as a committeeman would be, and I answered 'Yes.' He told me that the men who had been registered must be efficient, strong, and ready to make sacrifices. At that time we had been registered to the number of about seventy. We did nothing in Belgrade.

"After about a month and a half our leader, Tankositch, informed us that the Great Powers had ordered the dissolution of our committee and that we must leave Belgrade and hide in some out-of-the-way place. They sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here we were trained by the officers Voja Tankositch, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvozditich, and Mitar Djinovitch, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb affair and who was shot in Montenegro. We were forbidden to associate with the people of the place, so that nothing might be disclosed about our objects and our numbers. We practiced throwing bombs, laying mines, and destroying telephone and railroad lines, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevitch, Gen. Bozo Jankovitch, and the apothecary Skaritch, the delegate Zivko Rafajlovitch, a certain Glisitch Milutin, an official in the Ministry of Finance, and these watched as we practiced and each time paid the expenses of our keep. Our teachers told us that as soon as war should be declared we committees would go forward in advance, behind us the volunteers, and then the regular army.

"In Cuprija we were about 140 men. In addition to board, lodging, and clothes, each of us received 25 para a day for tobacco. The

course lasted about three months—that is, until March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed and that we must disperse, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great Powers, and our committee, therefore, had no further purpose. Upon the dissolution of the committee Gen. Bozo Jankovitch told me that I would enter into the service of Bozo Milanovitch in Sabac and get 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what sort of service that would be. I accepted, because I felt myself as a committeeman to be in duty bound to obey Gen. Jankovitch, and also because I had nothing to live on. Thus in March, 1909, I arrived at Sabac and announced myself to Bozo Milanovitch, a merchant in Sabac.

“Gen. Jankovitch had told me that Bozo Milanovitch was the leader of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac and that I would serve under him in this Narodna Odbrana. When I gave Bozo Milanovitch the General’s letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out instructions. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wherever they were addressed. In case I should not carry a letter to the place to which it was addressed, and in case any one else got in possession of this letter, my life would be involved. The very next day Bozo Milanovitch gave me a sealed letter which I was to carry to Cedo Lukitch, Guardian of the Treasury in Servian Raca. On the way toward Raca in the village of Bojatitch I was halted by the District Captain, who took my letter, opened it, and read it. In the letter Lukitch was instructed to buy three boats immediately, so that they might be ready in case they were needed. Enclosed in the letter were 100 dinar. On this occasion the Captain told me that strict orders had been given by the Ministry that the komitadjis should do nothing on their own initiative, so that no international diplomatic intervention might be provoked. I returned to Sabac and reported to Bozo Milanovitch what had happened. Bozo Milanovitch turned to the District Prefect, and the latter gave orders that the revolver which the Captain in Bojatitch had taken from me should be returned to me. He also ordered the Captain to expedite the letter to the Cedo Lukitch to whom it was addressed. From March, 1909, to October, 1910, I carried forty-three such letters to Servian Raca, fifty-five to Loznica, five to Zvornik, two to Ljubivija, and I know not how many to Koviljaca. I noted how many times I was in each place because these places were very far from Sabac.

“I carried the letters to the Directors of the customs offices in the respective places, and from these I received other letters in reply,

which I carried to Bozo Milanovitch. I remember that I also carried letters several times to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in carrying letters was a certain Vaso Eritch, a native of Srebrenica. I carried letters every week to Belgrade from Bozo Milanovitch and delivered them to Milan Pribicevitch and Bozo Jankovitch. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about these. So far as I could see the letters which Bozo Milanovitch sent were not in cipher, while the letters which the Directors of the customs offices sent were written with peculiar signs, which I noticed when Bozo Milanovitch opened them. Once I brought to Bozo Milanovitch such a letter in cipher, I think from Zvornik, and he sent me with the note to Mika Atanasijevitch, Professor in Sabac, so that the latter might decipher it. The latter did so, as he usually did. But he forgot to seal the translation, so I read it. In this letter was written that it was reported from reliable sources that money was to be coined with the portrait of the Heir Apparent, and that this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph would abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovitch, Bozo gave me a visiting card on which a skull had been drawn and on which was written that I had been appointed a trusted man (Povjerenik) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me that it was a matter of espionage.

“Once I learned from the officer Dusan Opterkitch, a member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana in Bosnia and Herzegovina had twenty-three members. Otherwise, however, I do not know whether the Narodna Odbrana has any organisation in Bosnia, or what kind of organisation it is. From time to time Milan Pribicevitch gave me a revolver, or sometimes money to buy a revolver, so that I might give it to the revenue men on the border who served as komitadjis, since they had no revolvers and no money to buy them. As it seemed to me, Milan Pribicevitch gave them these as a token of honour for being komitadjis. I had no other business with weapons.

“Once I was assigned by Bozo Milanovitch to accompany a man to a farm in Lijesnica, on the Drina, and was told that the farmer would give us information and show us everything necessary so that we two might kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, a Servian reserve officer who had fled to Bijeljina. The committee of the Narodna Odbrana had, it seems, discovered that Ljubo Stanaricitch was dangerous for the Servian State and had condemned him to death.

“From Bozo Milanovitch I and that other man received instruc-

tions to cross the Drina at a certain place and kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, who lives in the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side, in the Bijeljiner District. I and the other man started to ford the Drina, but because the water was deep, and also because we saw that Ljubo was walking around his house with his gun on his shoulder, we returned to the farmer. Because I saw that we could not kill him with a knife, I sent my companion to Sabac to inform Bozo Milanovitch that it was impossible to kill Stanaricitch in the manner in which he desired, namely, with the knife. Thereupon I received instructions from Bozo Milanovitch to kill him any way. Then we decided to shoot him with the rifle. The man who was with me was instructed by Bozo to shoot at Stanaricitch and kill him, and I was to make sure that this was carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme came, bringing instructions from the District Prefect in Sabac that we were to return and give up our original task. And so we returned to Sabac.

"In October, 1910, I asked Bozo Milanovitch to increase my pay, and when he was unwilling to do that I told him that I would no longer remain in his service. From Sabac I went to Belgrade, where I met Gen. Jankovitch, who had me arrested because I had refused obedience. They dragged me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had given notice that I would quit obeying commands and they were afraid I would betray their secrets. Finally the authorities decided to send me back to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my life was in danger. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where they turned me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. Thus I arrived in December, 1910, in Bosnia.

"I know nothing definite about any Black Hand except what I read about that Hand in Servian newspapers. I do not remember to-day what was written about that Black Hand in the newspapers. Likewise, I know nothing about the Black List. In Servia after the annexation there was a general resentment and hatred against the person of the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, for he was generally looked upon as a blood foe of the Serbs."

Krstanovitch also called attention to previous statements by him, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the above declaration:

The committee in which Krstanovitch was enrolled through Milan Pribicevitch was created by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school in Cuprija there were twenty-two members from the Monarchy. Among the pupils was also Milan Ciganovitch.



In the school at Cuprija it was taught that the committee must be ready to go to Bosnia at the order of the Narodna Odbrana and there to act under instructions to be received from their superiors.

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(ENCLOSURE 6.)

*Extract from the Documents of the District Court in Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his Accomplices for the Crime of Espionage.*

In the year 1913 a system of espionage carried on by Jovo Jaglicitch and several accomplices in Bosnia in favour of Serbia was discovered. The criminal prosecution, which was begun in Serajevo, brought out, among other things, the following facts, affording a glimpse into the methods of the Greater Servian propaganda and especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jaglicitch stated that in the month of August or September, 1912, he met for the first time the former Cattle Inspector in Foca, Petar Klaritch, called Pesut, who in the Autumn of 1912 fled to Montenegro and then became a "komitadji."

At their first meeting Klaritch asked Jaglicitch whether he knew Rade Milosevitch of Kalinovik, and upon his answer that Milosevitch was dangerously ill in the hospital, said: "It's a pity if he dies. We have been talking of wonderful things. Has he not told you anything about it?" Upon his replying in the negative, Klaritch said: "I would like to tell you something important. We are Serbs and must do something important for Serbia; come to my office." There then took place between them the following conversation:

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I do not yet know you or whether you will betray me. I tell it to you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart to do so betray me!"

Upon enquiry by Jaglicitch as to what it was all about, Klaritch answered: "Brother, in Serbia there is a society, the Narodna Odbrana. Many persons should join this society. There are already many enlisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the entire Monarchy; there are persons among them of intelligence and means, great heads; and if those can do it why should not we also, that we may contribute something to the work?"

Asked as to the aims the society pursued, Klaritch replied: "The

society has as its object—for example, you are in Kalinovik, you tell me what the news is there, how many soldiers, cannon, how much ammunition, different kinds of rifles, who comes and who goes, etc. We have a secret cipher, and correspond in it. If you are faithful you will receive it, too.”

Jaglicitch was afraid that Klaritch was only trying to pump him in order thereafter to betray him, and therefore he begged him to name some of the members, whereupon Klaritch deliberated for a while, and then mentioned to Jaglicitch a name which he whispered to him in strictest confidence.

Thereupon Klaritch said to him, “Shall I give you the cipher?” Jaglicitch agreed. Klaritch, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a scrap of paper and handed it to Jaglicitch.

Another time Klaritch told about his sojourn in Banja-Koviljaca (near Loznica,) where he had been trained in bomb-throwing by a Servian Captain, Todorovitch,\* and said in reply to an enquiry by the accused as to why he had learned this: “If it comes to anything, as I have already told you, it is necessary that I should understand how to handle bombs, that I should train you, and you train others, so that powder magazines and other important structures may be blown up. For that purpose we shall receive bombs from Servia.”

Klaritch described the appearance of the bombs and said he already had enlisted people who would cut telegraph and telephone wires in the event of a war.

At these meetings Jaglicitch also learned from Klaritch that it is one of the aims of the members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert their colours, to recruit volunteers (komitadjis,) and to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, &c. Klaritch also informed him that even the cipher correspondence between the Servian and Bosnian members is not intrusted to the postal service, but is carried across the border by messengers.

Klaritch further told Jaglicitch that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta celebration, (in September, 1912) a Servian Major together with the deputation sent to this celebration from Servia lived in the Hotel Europe† to which Klaritch led members of the Narodna Odbrana whom he swore in.

From a spy Jaglicitch learned that bombs would reach Serajevo

\* Capt. Kosta Todorovitch was then actually Frontier Commissioner and Director of the Servian Customs Service for the border territory from Raca to Ljuboiija.

† The Servian Major Mika Jankovitch appeared as a Servian delegate at the Prosvjeta celebration,

or had already reached it, that these had the appearance of pieces of soap \* and that two or three pieces would be sent to this spy also or that he would fetch them himself.

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(ENCLOSURE 7.)

*From Confidential Reports About the Narodna Odbrana.*

At the head of the Narodna Odbrana are representatives of all political parties, so that the Progressives and the opponents of the conspirators might coöperate. Its real moving spirit is the present Major Pribicevitch. The office of Secretary is always occupied by an officer on furlough.

The Narodna Odbrana seeks to develop in the Southern Slav portions of Austria-Hungary an effective propaganda in military and civil circles in order thus to prepare a revolution, disturb eventual mobilisations, precipitate panics and revolts, &c.

The organisation has several confidential men and emissaries in the Monarchy who carry on a silent man-to-man propaganda. Individuals have special missions, such as, for instance, to enlist persons—wherever possible railroad officials—at important bridge and junction points for the task of carrying out instructions received at the proper moment, or getting them carried out.

Communication between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is carried out wherever possible through personal contact.

Chiefly young people, workingmen and railroad men are enrolled as members.

\* The bombs used against Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the assassination at Serajevo and those which were found in the year 1913 in the Save near Broko, originating from the Royal Servian Arsenal at Kragujevac, bear a resemblance to pieces of soap.

## (ENCLOSURE 8.)

*Some Extracts from the Documents of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian District Court in Serajevo on the Prosecution of Gavrilo Princip and His Accomplices for the Crime of Assassination Committed on June 28, 1914, Against His Imperial and Royal Highness, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este, and Her Highness, the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg.*

## I.—THE ACT AND ITS AUTHORS.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubrilovitch, and Cetro Popovitch confessed that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehemedbasitch they formed a conspiracy for the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and equipped with bombs and Browning pistols, lay in wait for his Highness on June 28, 1914, on his trip through Serajevo, with a view to carrying out the attack they had planned.

Nedeljko Gabrinovitch confesses to have been the first among the conspirators to throw a bomb against the carriage of the Archduke, but says that the bomb missed its aim and injured only those seated at the time of the explosion in the carriage following the automobile of the Archduke.

Gavrilo Princip confesses to having fired two shots from a Browning revolver upon the Archduke's automobile, by which the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg were mortally wounded.

Both perpetrators admit murderous intent in the execution of their act.

Full corroboration of these confessions has been furnished by the investigations, and it is established that the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the late Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died of the consequences of the revolver shots fired upon them by Gavrilo Princip.

## II.—GENESIS OF THE CONSPIRACY.

The accused, agreeing in essentials, have given the following testimony before the examining Judge:

In April, 1914, Princip during his stay in Belgrade, where he associated in the local coffee houses with many Servian students, formed the plan for an attack upon the late Archduke Francis Ferdi-

nand. This intention he discussed with Gabrinovitch, then also in Belgrade, who already was busying himself with the same thought, and who expressed immediate readiness to participate in the attack. The plans for the murderous attempt were frequently discussed among the persons with whom Princip and Gabrinovitch associated, since the Archduke was regarded as the most dangerous enemy of the Servian people.

Princip and Gabrinovitch at the outset proposed that the bombs and weapons necessary for the carrying out of the deed be obtained from the Servian Major, Milan Pribicevitch, or from the Narodna Odbrana because they themselves did not have the means to buy them. But inasmuch as Major Pribicevitch and the influential member of the society named Zivogin Dacitch were at that time away on travels, they decided to try to get the weapons from the former "komitadji," then an official of the State Railway, Milan Ciganovitch, whom they knew.

Princip got in touch with Ciganovitch through an intimate acquaintance of the latter. Ciganovitch thereupon sought out Princip, spoke with him about the plan of attack, which he fully approved, and declared that he would think over the request for weapons. Gabrinovitch also spoke with Ciganovitch about the weapons.

At Easter Princip took into his confidence Trifko Grabez, who was also present in Belgrade at the time, and who, according to his own confession, likewise declared himself ready to coöperate in the attack.

In the following period Princip repeatedly had conversations with Ciganovitch about the carrying out of the attack.

In the meantime Ciganovitch had placed himself in communication with the Servian Major, Voja Tankositch, an intimate friend of his, about the proposed attack, and Tankositch thereupon placed at his disposal the Browning pistols for this service.

Grabez confesses, in corroboration of the evidence of Princip and of Gabrinovitch, that on May 24, in company with Ciganovitch, he visited Major Tankositch in the latter's home and at his request. After the introduction Tankositch said to Grabez: "Are you this man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez replied: "I am he." When Tankositch asked, "Do you know how to shoot with a revolver?" Grabez answered in the negative. Tankositch said to Ciganovitch: "I will give you a revolver. Go and teach them how to shoot."

Thereupon Ciganovitch led Princip and Grabez to the army shoot-

ing range at Topcider and gave them instructions in shooting with Browning revolvers at targets in a wood near the range. Princip showed himself to be the better marksman. Ciganovitch also familiarised Princip, Grabez, and Gabrinovitch with the use of bombs, which were later turned over to them.

On May 27, 1914, Ciganovitch gave to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez, according to their joint confession, six bombs, four Browning revolvers, and enough ammunition, as well as a glass tube containing cyanide of potassium, so that they might, after carrying out their act, poison themselves with the view of keeping the secret. In addition Ciganovitch gave them money.

As early as Easter, Princip had instructed Danilo Illitch about his plan for the attack. Upon returning to Serajevo he now begged Illitch to enlist several more persons to insure the success of the attack. Thereupon Illitch, according to his confession, enlisted for this Jaso Cubrilovitch, Cetro Popovitch, and Mehemed Mehemedbasitch.

### III.—ORIGIN OF THE BOMBS.

Only one of the bombs was at their disposal at the time of the carrying out of the attack. The remaining five were later found by the police in Serajevo.

These bombs, according to the opinion of experts in court, are Servian hand grenades, manufactured in a factory and destined for military use. They are identical with the twenty-one bombs which in the year 1913 were found in the Save at Brcko and some of which were still in the original package. By this it was shown with certainty that they had come from the Servian arms depot in Kragujevac.

It is established also that the bombs used in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand originated from the arms depot at Kragujevac.

Grabez of his own accord called the bombs which were handed over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs."

### IV.—TRANSPORT OF THE THREE ASSASSINS AND THE WEAPONS FROM SERVIA TO BOSNIA.

The following testimony was given by Princip:

Ciganovitch told Gabrinovitch, Grabez and Princip to take their journey over Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla, and there turn to Misko

Jovanovitch, who would take charge of the weapons. They should next go to Sabac, and there report to the border Captain, Major Rade Popovitch, for whom he gave them a note, which Princip carried. The three left Belgrade with their weapons on May 28. In Sabac, Princip delivered the note which he had received from Ciganovitch to Major Popovitch, who thereupon led all three to the commander's station (Kommando) and filled out a permit, in which it was certified that one of them was a revenue guard and the two others were his comrades. The permit also contained the name of this alleged revenue guard; but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popovitch handed them a sealed letter for a border Captain in Loznica, whose name was Pravanovitch, Prdanovitch, or Predojevitch.

The next night Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez spent in Sabac and went on the next day by train to Loznica, at half fare, on the strength of the permit that had been filled out for them by Major Popovitch. At noon they arrived in Loznica and handed to the local border Captain Major Popovitch's letter, in which was written: "See that you receive these people and conduct them through to you know where." The Captain said that he would call his revenue guards from the border and intrust the three to the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and ordered the three accomplices to report at his office at 7 o'clock the next morning.

On the next morning the three conspirators agreed that Gabrinovitch, with the pass of Grabez, should openly take the road to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabez should cross the border secretly. This plan was discussed with the border Captain and it was hereby agreed that a revenue guard from Ljesnica, named Grbitch, should take Princip and Grabez in his karaula and conduct them across the line. Gabrinovitch went on foot to Banja Koviljaca, in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabez rode with the revenue guard, Grbitch, to Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolvers in a hotel room. Here the revenue guard Grbitch saw these objects. Princip himself characterised the journey as "mysterious."

The testimony of Grabez agreed with that of Princip on the essential points and he added by way of supplement that Grbitch laughed when he saw the bombs and revolvers and only asked whither in Bosnia they were going with these bombs. The revenue guard certainly thought Grabez and Princip had a mission.

Grbitch and a second revenue guard brought Princip and Grabez in a rowboat to an island in the Drina. There Grbitch instructed

them to wait for a peasant who would fetch them. They spent the night on the island in a peasant's cottage to which Grbitch had directed them. On the next day a peasant took them during the night, first through a swamp and then across the hills to the neighbourhood of Priboj, where he turned them over to the local teacher Cubrilovitch, who seemed to have been waiting for them. The latter then took them to Tuzla, to Misko Jovanovitch.

Gabrinovitch testified concerning the happenings on the trip up to the moment in which he separated from Princip and Grabez in a manner that corroborated the essentials of what they had said, and added that Major Popovitch had told them he had come from Belgrade only on the day before their arrival in Sabac.

In Loznica, Gabrinovitch, Princip, and Grabez decided to separate, since it would be dangerous for them to go together. The border Captain in Loznica, whom they informed of this, expressed his approval of their plan and gave Gabrinovitch a letter for the teacher, M. Jaklojevitch, in Mali-Zvornik. Gabrinovitch thereupon turned over the bombs which he had carried, the Brownings and ammunition, to Princip and Grabez, and in company with a revenue guard, who had been given to him as escort, went to Mali-Zvornik.

There he found the teacher, Jaklojevitch, to whom he handed the letter of the border Captain of Loznica. The latter advised the Servian guard. When Gabrinovitch later reached this frontier guard with the teacher there was waiting there for them a man who brought them in a rowboat across the Drina to Greater Dvornik in Bosnia.

From there Gabrinovitch went to Tuzla to Misko Jovanovitch.

Cubrilovitch, the teacher, who undertook to guide Princip and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important points are summarised:

In 1911 Cubrilovitch, as a result of a Sokol excursion to Sabac, was made a member of the Narodna Odbrana through Bozo Fovitch, a member of the Board of Directors, and then made Commissioner of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). On his invitation Misko Johanovitch was later made Commissioner of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the dealings with Narodna Odbrana, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cubrilovitch with the news that he was bringing two armed Servian students with him. When he learned this he said that he knew this was a "message" of the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabez told



him that they had bombs and revolvers for an attempt on the life of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

*Supplement.*

Just before the close of this memoir, a sworn statement is produced by the District Court in Serajevo, from which it appears that a subject of the monarchy some days before the 28th of June of this year wished to notify the Imperial and Royal Consulate in Belgrade that a murderous attack had been planned against Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Bosnia. This witness, it is said, was prevented from giving this information by the Belgrade police, who, on a trivial pretext, arrested him before he could enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The sworn testimony and the cross-examination indicate that the Servian police officials had knowledge of the attack that was planned and only arrested this man to prevent him from furnishing the information.

Inasmuch as these statements have not yet been investigated, no judgment can yet be given as to their ability to stand the test. In consideration of the importance attaching to this, the further details of this testimony can at the present time not be divulged.

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(ENCLOSURE 9.)

*The Servian Press on the Assassination.*

(a) The Belgrade newspaper "Balkan" on June 29 wrote concerning the two assassinations:

"Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a typesetter, was imbued with anarchistic ideas and known as a restless spirit. Up to twenty days ago he lived in Belgrade, where he had gone after the war and found employment in the State printing plant. Before he left he said he was going to Trieste, where he expected to obtain work in a new printing plant. Gavrilo Princip also sojourned until recently in Belgrade. In the course of the war he volunteered for army service, but was not accepted; so he left Belgrade. But he returned to Belgrade on Christmas of the preceding year, attended the gymnasium for a while, and departed from Belgrade at about the same time as Gabrinovitch, but by a different route. Princip was silent, nervous, a good scholar,

and associated with several fellow-students who likewise came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in later times with Gabrinovitch. He inclined toward socialist ideas, although he originally belonged to the Progressive youth. Princip as well as Gabrinovitch had grown up in Serajevo; both had been united in inseparable friendship since their childhood."

(b) It is pointed out in the "Piémont" of July 1 that the loud protest of the assailant Zerajitch was followed by the protest of Princip. The work of the latter could likewise be explained by reason of the Bosnian Government system. The fact that Princip carried out his act of vengeance on the sacred national holiday of Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day), the day fixed for the carrying on of manœuvres, makes the desperate deed of the young martyr appear more intelligible and natural.

(The paper was confiscated by the police because of this article, but the confiscation was annulled on the following day by the Belgrade court of first resort.)

(c) The Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 3 says: "Arch-duke Francis Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national enthusiasm to celebrate a brutal manifestation of power and subjection. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, of hatred, and of revenge."

(d) The National Party organ, "Srpska Zastava," says in an article of July 3, headed "Suspicious and Threats": "The assassination appears even more and more the result of unhealthy conditions in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina excites the horror of the whole civilised world."

(e) The Progressive paper, "Pravda," of July 3 writes: "The Vienna policy is cynical. It is exploiting the death of the unfortunate couple for its repulsive purposes against the Servian people."

(f) The "Agence des Balkans" of July 3 reports: "The crimes practised in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs have been carried out under the auspices and direct incitation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The "Pravda" of July 4 says: "All murders and attacks heretofore committed in Austria have had one and the same origin. The oppressed peoples of the Monarchy were obliged to resort to this kind of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror it is natural and understandable that the era of murderous attacks should become popular."

(h) The "Balkan" of July 5 remarks that Austria-Hungary, "because of its persecution of the innocent, must be put under international control," since Austria-Hungary was less consolidated than Turkey.

(i) The "Mali Journal" of July 7 says: "A scion of the Middle Ages was murdered in Serajevo a few days ago. He was murdered by a boy who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to the point of paroxysms of emotion—the suffering which the despoilers of the lands of his fathers had inflicted upon it. What has official Austria-Hungary done thereafter? It has replied with general massacres, plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and property. By such exploits only those who are worthless distinguish themselves. The cowards are always great heroes when they are certain that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Gabrinovitch with these heroes, and the great difference will be noted at once. Civilization and justice in Austria-Hungary are a great, gross falsehood."

(j) The "Tribuna" of July 7 says: "We are of the opinion that the murderous deed of Serajevo was ordered to the end that the extermination of the Serbs might be accomplished with one blow."

(k) The "Piémont" of July 8 reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian authorities in Bosnia were preparing a massacre of the Christians.

(l) The "Balkan" of the 8th publishes a report from Bosnia, under the heading "St. Bartholomew's Night in Serajevo," and advocates a general boycott of all Austrians resident in Servia.

(m) The "Mali Journal" of the 8th demands a boycott against the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the caption, "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the "Tribuna" of the 8th writes that it is best to buy no goods originating in Austria-Hungary, not to visit the Austrian and Hungarian baths, and not to call any physicians from Austria-Hungary. Private initiative, it says, could accomplish much in the direction indicated. The State and the authorities would not have to take action. It would be enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) It is stated in the "Stampa" of the 8th that the police at Serajevo were subjecting the arrested assailants to the most shameless and inhuman torture in order to force confessions from them, to be used as the basis for an indictment of the Servian people.

(q) Commenting upon the statement by Premier Asquith, upon being informed of the death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, that he despaired for humanity, the "Balkan" on July 9 published a his-

torical survey of the events of the last forty years, from which it concludes that the Servian people in that period were subjected to the terrible tortures of the Jesuit policy of Austria-Hungary. Finally Archduke Francis Ferdinand, like all sons of Loyola who only work in the blood of human beings and believe in the principle that "the end justifies the means," was inexorably overtaken by fate and fell a victim to Jesuitism, even as entire Austria-Hungary will. But by the fall of Austria-Hungary humanity shall obtain peace and freedom. When one recapitulates all these truths, one must reach the conclusion that Asquith could with calm spirit have met the announcement of the death with the words, "I no longer despair for humanity."

(r) In a leading article the "Politika" of July 9 says, under the caption "Shameless Lie": "The manner and fashion in which the investigation of the Serajevo attack is being conducted point openly to the ends which Austria is pursuing. Since the assailants, despite all the torments inflicted upon them, refuse to state what is demanded of them, other individuals have been discovered, with difficulty, who declared themselves ready, under certain conditions, to confess to a certain complicity in the attack, but at the same time to accuse all those who are inconvenient for Austria. This method for the time being has succeeded, for the hired individuals show a willingness to say anything that one wants of them, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once circulated broadcast. Austria has no shame, and it believes that some one will be found who will believe such lies."

(s) The "Stampa" of the 9th says that not everything that has occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been uncovered and brought out to publicity. Much, it says, is being concealed. But truth will sooner or later come to the surface for all that. Blood-thirsty Austria simply wants to sate herself now with Servian blood and is doing it. It is reported that there are to-day about 10,000 dead and wounded in Bosnia.

(t) The "Politika" of July 10 hurls unmeasured insults at members of the Imperial House.

(u) The "Trgovinski Glasnik" of July 10 speaks of the corruptness and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it calls "Jesuitical, ruthless, and dishonourable." It ought to convince the Serb people in Austria-Hungary that they do not dwell in a civilised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must ever be armed and ready to defend themselves against robbery by the au-

thorities and the Government. After the latest events, the Servian people must no longer wait like a lamb that might be slaughtered any day, but like a lion ready for bloody defence.

(v) The "Stampa" of July 10 says: "Nothing is eternal, and Austria-Hungary will not remain forever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not distant when the Serbs, who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will range over the Ivan Planina on the Trebevitch."

(w) Under the title "Boycott Against the Worthless," the "Pravda" of July 10 demands a boycott of Austro-Hungarian firms in Belgrade as well as of Austro-Hungarian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to promote the strictest execution of the boycott.

(x) The "Zvono" of July 16 declares Princip a son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the task was allotted to avenge the death of the Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

(y) In the "Mali Journal" of July 19 occurs the following: "Princip was instigated to the attack by an Austro-Hungarian agent. In Vienna it is said that the really guilty person could be found only in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Belgrade."

(z) The leading Young Radical paper, "Odjek," of July 20 writes: "Austria-Hungary indicates by a hundred signs that it wishes to inherit the title of the Sick Man of Europe. While in Servia not a single Austro-Hungarian citizen was molested, villages and cities were plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact shows afresh how much higher Servia stands, morally and culturally, than Austria-Hungary."

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(ENCLOSURE 10.)

*The Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish on the Crime Against Archduke Francis Ferdinand.*

To the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come from a trustworthy informant, whose name can be given if necessary, reliable information that the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana recently held a session at Nish, in which its Chairman, the Director of the Nish House of Correction, Jasa Nenadovitch, spoke of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and told the following:

Servia was compelled absolutely to avail herself of some means like the attack on Archduke Francis Ferdinand, since the latter, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a formidable danger to Servia and, possibly, to other Slavic groups. Had he remained alive, he would soon have challenged Servia to war or attacked that country, in which case Servia, which is now so materially weakened and which has not finished organising its army, would unquestionably have been hopelessly beaten. But as matters stand, Servia has been saved by the Serajevo murder and, moreover, one of the men dangerous to Servia has been removed. Servia will now have quiet for some years, since the new Heir Apparent will certainly think twice before he follows in the footsteps of his predecessor.

The speaker was aware, he continued, that the murder of the Archduke would be a severe blow and a bitter sorrow to Austria-Hungary, and that it would cause the Serbs living there to be persecuted, but he did not think his suppositions would be so completely justified by events as they had been, and that the Croatians would rise to the requirements of the moment as they had risen. He said that his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were timid and would not go too far, but that these friends had been deceived and that we had been deceived through them; that if things continued thus, revolvers and bombs had yet to play their real parts, and whatever the Servian God might ordain, things could not continue in this way.

The statements of the speaker found complete support from those who heard him.

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(ENCLOSURE 11.)

*Anti-Austro-Hungarian Paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade.*

Before the Reception Hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are on the wall four allegorical paintings, of which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth pictures the realisation of Servia's anti-Austrian aspirations.

Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia), and part plain (Southern Hungary), there is shown the "zora," or dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are

the names of all the provinces "yet to be freed"—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

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No. 20.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio, Councilor, Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Lambach, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has informed me by telegraph that his Government has urgently instructed him to demand an extension of the time-limit in the ultimatum to Servia. I request you to reply to him in my behalf, that we cannot consent to an extension of the time-limit. You will please add that, even after the breaking off of diplomatic relations, Servia will be in a position to bring about an amicable settlement by an unconditional acceptance of our demands. In such case, however, we would be compelled to demand from Servia an indemnification for all costs and damages caused to us by our military measures.

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No. 21.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Bad Ischl, July 25, 1914.*

For your personal information and guidance:

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on Baron Macchio this forenoon and requested in his Government's behalf that the time-limit stipulated in our note to Servia be extended.

This request he based upon the ground that our move had taken the Powers by surprise and that the Russian Government would consider it a matter of due consideration on the part of the Vienna Cabinet toward the other Cabinets, if the latter should be given an opportunity to examine the merits of our communication to the Powers and to study the promised dossier. Baron Macchio replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would advise me at once of his request, but he could already venture to say that there is no proba-

bility of a prolongation of the stipulated time-limit being conceded by us.

As to the explanations given by the Russian Government in substantiation of its request, they appear to be based upon an erroneous conception of the premises. Our note to the Powers was by no means meant as an invitation to them to inform us of their views on this matter, but simply to convey information as a matter of international courtesy. Besides, we hold that our action concerns solely ourselves and Servia, and that this action, despite the patience and leniency which we have displayed for many years, had been forced upon us by the developments of a situation which compelled us to defend our most vital interests.

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No. 22.

*Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

The Cabinet met in council last night and this morning. According to various reports the reply to our note will be handed to me before the expiration of the stipulated time. I hear that the court train is being made ready for use; that the money of the National Bank and of the Railroad as well as the archives of the Foreign Office are being removed to the interior of the country. Several of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government, especially so the Russian legation, where packing is proceeding.

The garrison has left town in field equipment. The ammunition has been removed from the fortress. There is a considerable movement of troops at the railway station. Sanitary convoys have left Belgrade in a southerly direction. According to the instructions which I have meanwhile received, we shall leave Belgrade by train at 6.30 o'clock if diplomatic relations are broken off.

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No. 23.

*Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

General mobilisation has been ordered in Servia at 3 p.m.



## No. 24.

*Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Semlin, July 25, 1914.*

The reply of the Royal Servian Government to our demands of the 23rd instant being inadequate, I have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia and have left Belgrade with the staff of the legation.

The reply was handed to me at 5.58 p.m.

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 No. 25.
*Note of the Royal Servian Government, Dated July 12/25, 1914.*

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were discontinued as a result of the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal status created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government calls attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation, except one concerning a school book, when the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia in numerous instances has given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is due to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that the same has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the

press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Government is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary it showed much consideration and thus succeeded in settling most of these questions to the mutual advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully surprised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Serbia have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it stood ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations might be made to it.

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regardless of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes to publish on the first page of the "*Journal officiel*," on the date of the 13th/26th July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies which aim at the ultimate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal activities.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austro-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal

Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina, a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engages, at the impending revision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other association which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without delay from the system of public instruction in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts and proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military and the civil service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it a duty to begin an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the enquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the Servian enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that the Servian Government will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly furnish explanations of the remarks made by its officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, in connexion with which the Royal Government itself will take steps to collect evidence.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the

present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

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No. 26.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

In resolving to proceed firmly against Serbia, we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Serbia, we could not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because fundamental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an end to a situation which enables Serbia, under Russia's promise of immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished and unpunishable.

In case Russia should consider that the moment for an accounting with the Central European Powers has come, and therefore *a priori* be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to be useless.

Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that Russia might reconsider her attitude and not permit herself to be carried away by the warlike element, in case Serbia should refuse to comply with our demands and we should be compelled, in consequence, to resort to force.

The following is designed for the latter emergency and it is left to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonow and the Prime Minister.

I presume that under the present circumstances you are in close touch with your German colleague, who has surely been instructed

by his Government not to allow the Russian Government any room for doubt that Austria-Hungary would not stand alone in the event of a conflict with Russia.

I have no doubt that it will not be an easy task to bring Sazonow to a true appreciation of our action at Belgrade, which has been forced upon us.

But there is one point which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, namely, an emphatic statement by you to the effect that Austria-Hungary, in conformity with her established principle of disinterestedness, is guided by no selfish motive in the present crisis, although the situation has culminated in warlike action.

The Monarchy is sated with territory and has no desire for Servian lands. If war with Servia be forced upon us, it will be for us not a war of conquest, but of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently comprehensive, may be placed in a still more convincing light by a study of the dossier referring to the Servian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy and the relation between this propaganda and the crime of June the 28th.

You will therefore call the Russian Foreign Minister's special attention to this dossier and point out to him that there is no precedent of a Great Power tolerating so long and with such unexampled forbearance the seditious agitations of a small neighbour.

We had no wish to adopt a policy adverse to the free development of the Christian Balkan States, and therefore we have permitted Servia to almost double her territory since the annexation crisis of 1908, although we knew how little Servian promises are worth.

Since then the subversive movement fostered against the Monarchy in Servia has become so excessive that Austria-Hungary's vital interests and even her dynasty are seriously menaced by Servia's underground activities.

We must presume that conservative and dynastic Russia will not only understand our energetic action against such a menace to public order, but will even regard it as imperative.

On reaching this point in your conversation with M. Sazonow it will be necessary to state, in addition to your explanation of our motives and intentions, that, although we have no ambitions for territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity of Servia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands.

The course of the last 40 years, as well as the historical fact

that our gracious Sovereign has acquired the glorious name of "Guardian of the Peace," attest that we have always held peace to be the most sacred blessing of the people, and that, in so far as it depended on us, we have endeavoured to maintain it.

We would all the more regret a disturbance of the peace of Europe, because of our conviction that the evolution of the Balkan States toward national and political independence could only improve our relations with Russia, eliminating all possibilities of a clash of interests with that empire, and because in framing our own policy we always have been disposed to respect the important political interests of Russia.

To tolerate the Servian machinations any longer, however, would undermine our national existence and our standing as a Great Power, and would, therefore, imperil the European balance of power—an equilibrium the maintenance of which, we are convinced, the peace-loving statesmen of Russia regard as essential to their own interests. Our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of our position in Europe.

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No. 27.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

As clause 5 of our demands, which concerns the coöperation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of the subversive agitation in Servia, has called forth M. Sazonow's particular objection, you are instructed to give him the strictly confidential information that the insertion of this clause is due to merely practical considerations and is not intended as an infringement on Servia's sovereignty. The "collaboration" mentioned in clause 5 refers to the creation in Belgrade of a secret *bureau de sureté* which would work like the similar Russian institution in Paris and would coöperate with the Servian police and administration.

No. 28.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

Reports concerning Russian mobilisation have caused Count Pourtalés to call the Russian Minister's earnest attention to the fact that an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure by means of mobilisation is extremely dangerous at this juncture. In such an event the military considerations of the General Staff will be supreme and the situation will become irrevocable once "the button has been pressed" by the Chief of Staff in Germany. M. Sazonow gave the German Ambassador his word of honour that the reports of a mobilisation were unfounded, that for the present not one horse had been levied, not one reservist called, and that merely preparatory measures were being taken in the military districts of Kieff and Odessa, and possibly of Kazan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards a courier delivered to the German Military Attaché a request to call on the Minister of War. Suchomlinow, referring to Count Pourtalés's conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Russian military preparations, stated that, as the Ambassador might possibly have misunderstood some details pertaining to military questions, he would be prepared to give the Military Attaché fuller information. Major von Eggeling's report was summarised in the following telegram which Count Pourtalés sent to Berlin and placed at my disposal:

Military Attaché reports on conversation with Russian Minister of War:

M. Sazonow has requested him to enlighten me concerning military situation. Minister of War gave me his word of honour that no order whatever had as yet been issued for mobilisation. For the present merely preparatory measures were being taken, no horse levied, no reservist called. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross Servian boundary, the military districts adjoining Austria (Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan) would be mobilised. Under no circumstances would mobilisation extend to districts of Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburg, bordering on Germany. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. In answer to my question as to object of mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, War Minister shrugged his shoulders and hinted at diplomatic influences. I pointed out to War Minister that



we should appreciate friendly disposition but consider mobilisation against Austria-Hungary alone as decidedly threatening. War Minister repeatedly and insistently laid stress on absolute necessity and desire for peace.

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No. 29.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

M. von Tschirschky informed me to-day under instructions that, according to a telegram sent from London on the 25th instant, at 3 p.m., by Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey had forwarded the latter a draft of Serbia's reply together with a personal letter expressing the hope that, in view of the conciliatory tenor of the reply, the Berlin Cabinet would recommend its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it advisable that you should revert to this matter and call the Foreign Secretary's attention to the fact that, almost at the time when he sent his note to Prince Lichnowsky, *i.e.*, yesterday at 3 p.m., Serbia had already ordered a general mobilisation; this goes to prove that there was no inclination in Belgrade for a peaceful settlement. The unsatisfactory reply, which, it appears, had previously been wired to London, was not handed to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Belgrade until 6 p.m., after the mobilisation order had been issued.

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No. 30.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

Servia having rejected our demands, we have broken off diplomatic relation with that country.

You are instructed to call immediately on the Foreign Secretary or his representative and frame your statement as follows:

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the

demands which we had been compelled to make upon it in order to permanently safeguard our most vital interests, which Serbia is menacing. In so doing Serbia has manifested her unwillingness to abandon her subversive tactics, which are directed at fomenting disturbances in some of our border territories with a view to their eventual separation from the Dual Monarchy. To our regret, and much against our wish, we have been placed under the necessity of employing the severest measures to compel Serbia to modify radically her hitherto hostile attitude toward us.

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No. 31.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

I have just had a long conversation with M. Sazonow. I told the Minister I was under the impression that the nature of our action had been misunderstood in Russia. We were suspected of contemplating an attack upon the Balkans, and of intending to march upon Saloniki or possibly even upon Constantinople. Others go so far as to describe our action as the beginning of a preventive war against Russia. I declared all this to be erroneous and in a sense absurd. The purpose of our action is merely self-preservation and self-defence against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the Monarchy, carried on by word, writing and deed. No one in Austria-Hungary would think of threatening Russian interests or picking a quarrel with Russia.

We were, however, resolved to reach the goal which we had in view, and the road which we had chosen seemed to us the most effective. As we had embarked upon an action of self-defence, I emphasised the fact that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted by any consequences whatsoever.

M. Sazonow agreed with me in principle. He recognised our aim as a perfectly legitimate one, but expressed the opinion that the method we had selected for its attainment was not happy in its form. He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so.

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorised to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it.

His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The Minister then analysed all the points of our note and this time found that seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took exception only to the two clauses dealing with the coöperation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia and to the clause concerning the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form. With reference to the two first clauses, I found myself in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant. The third clause I qualified as a necessary demand. In any case events had been set in motion. The Servians had mobilised as early as yesterday, and I was ignorant of what had happened since.

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No. 32.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

I authorise you to tell M. Sazonow that Austria-Hungary has no intention whatever to make any territorial conquests, as long as the war remains localised between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

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No. 33.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

M. Sazonow declared to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee that no mobilisation had been effected by Russia. Certain essential military precautions had been taken, however."

German Military Attaché in St. Petersburg reports that "the Russian Minister of War had given him his word of honour that not one man or horse had been mobilised; yet certain military precautions had, of course, been taken"; precautions which, however, are "fairly extensive," in the personal opinion of the Military Attaché, expressed in his report.

No. 34.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,  
Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburg.*

*Vienna, July 27, 1914.*

You will receive herewith the text of the note which was handed to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Serbia on July the 25th by the Royal Servian Government, and our comments thereon.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

*Note of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal  
Austro-Hungarian Government, Dated 12/25th July, 1914, and  
Comments Thereon.*

*Servian Reply to Austrian  
Government.*

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were discontinued as a result of the declarations made by the Servian Government

*Comments of the Austro-Hun-  
garian Government.*

The Royal Servian Government confines itself to the statement that no endeavour has been made by either the Servian Government or its officers to modify the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the declaration of the 18th of March, 1909.

Thereby it deliberately evades

on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal status created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government calls attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation, except one concerning a school book, when the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia in numerous instances has given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is due to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that the same has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Government is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary it

the basic point in our representations, as we have not asserted that the Servian Government or its officers have officially undertaken anything to that end.

Our grievance, however, is that the Servian Government has omitted to suppress the agitation directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy, notwithstanding the obligations it entered into under the terms of the above-mentioned note.

The Servian Government, therefore, was in duty bound to a radical change in the trend of its policy and to establish good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary; and not merely to refrain from official attempts to dispute the status of Bosnia as an integral part of the Dual Monarchy.

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of associations have a private character and are beyond the control of the State, is plainly at variance with the institutions of modern States, even of those which have the most liberal regulations in this respect; these regulations, designed to safeguard public polity and right, impose State supervision upon both press and associations. Moreover, the Servian institu-

showed much consideration and thus succeeded in settling most of these questions to the mutual advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully surprised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Servia have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it stood ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations might be made to it.

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regardless of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes to publish on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of the 13th/26th July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns every propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies which aim at the ulti-

tions themselves provide for such supervision. The charge against the Servian Government is that it completely failed to supervise the Servian press and associations, although it well knew that both were engaged in a campaign against the Monarchy.

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government had been fully informed of the suspicion raised against certain designated persons, and therefore was not only in a position spontaneously to institute an investigation, but was even bound to do so by its own laws. It has done nothing at all in this respect.

Our demand read as follows:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary . . . "

mate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal activities.

“The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

“The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost vigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress.”

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies either that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist, or that its existence is not within the knowledge of the Royal Government. This formula is insincere and equivocal; it is intended to furnish the Servian Government with a loophole for future emergencies. The Servian Government might, in future, interpret this declaration as neither a disavowal of the existing propaganda, nor an admission of its hostility to the Monarchy; it might, furthermore, base thereon the claim that it is not bound to suppress any future propaganda similar to the present one.

The wording of our demand was: “The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated in . . . ” By the additional phrase, “according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government,” the Royal Servian Government seeks, as indicated above, to keep a free hand for the future.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina, a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engages, at the impending revision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution.

We had demanded:

1. The suppression of "any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity."

We thus wished to establish Serbia's obligation to provide for the prevention of such press attacks in the future; we wished, therefore, to secure definite results in the present instance.

Servia, instead, offers to decree certain laws intended to serve as means to that purpose, to wit:

(a) A law providing individual punishment of above-mentioned press utterances hostile to the Dual Monarchy. This is all the more immaterial to us, as it is a notorious fact that individual prosecution of press offences is very rarely possible, and as, furthermore, the lax application of such a law would leave unpunished even the few cases that might be prosecuted. This proposal, therefore, in no way meets our demand, as it gives no guarantee whatever for the results desired by us.

(b) An addition to Article 22 of the constitution, permitting confiscation, as referred to in the Servian note. This proposal likewise must fail to satisfy us. The existence of such a law in Servia is of no avail to us, whereas only a pledge by the Government to



apply it would be useful. This, however, has not been promised to us.

These proposals are, therefore, quite unsatisfactory, all the more so because they are also evasive, as they do not state the time within which these laws shall be decreed. Besides, no provision is made for the event of a rejection of the bills by the Skuptchina—not to mention a possible resignation of the Cabinet—in which case matters would remain unchanged.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other association which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

The propaganda against the Monarchy conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated associations permeates the entire public life of Serbia; the Servian Government's declaration that it knows nothing about this propaganda, is, therefore, an absolutely inadmissible act of evasion. Setting this contention aside, our demand is not wholly met, as we have also demanded:

The confiscation of the means of propaganda of these societies.

The prevention of the reorganization of the dissolved societies under other names and in other guise.

These two points the Belgrade Government ignores, thus eliminating even the guarantee which the preceding half-promise would imply that the proposed dissolution would put an end, once for all, to the activities of the societies hostile to the Dual Monarchy,

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without delay from the system of public instruction in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts and proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military and the civil service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later day the names and the acts of these officers and officials

and especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

In this case, be it noted, moreover, the Servian Government first demands proof that a propaganda against the Monarchy is being carried on in Servia's public instruction; this, too, when the Servian Government must know that the books in use in Servian schools contain much objectionable matter, and that a large number of the Servian teachers are connected with the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated associations.

The Servian Government has again in this instance failed to comply with our demand in the way indicated by us, inasmuch as the phrase, "with regard to both the teaching-staff and the means of instruction," has been omitted in the Servian note. In this eliminated phrase are clearly pointed out the mediums whereby the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is being conducted in the Servian schools.

If the dismissal of the military officers and civil officials referred to from the Government service should be conditional upon their guilt being first confirmed by means of a trial, the Servian Government restricts its acceptance of our demand to cases where persons are charged with having committed a crime punishable under the provision of the penal code. Since we, however, de-

for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it a duty to begin an enquiry against all such persons as are, or possibly may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in con-

manded the removal of officers and officials who carry on a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, our demand is palpably not complied with in this respect, for the reason that in Servia the propaganda of which we complain does not constitute an offence punishable by law.

International law and the penal code governing criminal proceedings have nothing whatever to do with this question; this is purely a problem of national polity to be settled by a special mutual arrangement. Servia's reservation is, therefore, unintelligible and, on account of its vague and undefined form, is likely to give rise to insurmountable difficulties in the attainment of a final settlement.

Our demand was perfectly clear and could not be misunderstood. We demanded:

1. The institution of a legal investigation against those who participated in the plot.

2. The coöperation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the enquiry (*recherches*, in contradistinction to *enquête judiciaire*).

We did not contemplate the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the Servian legal proceedings; these officials were only to coöperate in the preliminary police investigation, which was to seek out and collect the data for the judicial enquiry.

crete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

If the Servian Government has misunderstood us, it has done so intentionally, since it must be familiar with the difference between an *enquête judiciaire* (a judicial enquiry) and simple *recherches* (a preliminary police investigation).

Since the Servian Government wishes to evade every form of control in connexion with the proposed investigation which, if correctly conducted, would adduce results highly undesirable for that Government; and since it is unable to decline on plausible grounds the coöperation of our officials in the police preliminaries,—a police intervention for which there are a great number of precedents—it has adopted a contention designed to furnish an apparent justification of its refusal to comply with our demand and to make our demand appear impossible of acceptance.

This reply is equivocal.

Our investigations have shown that Ciganovitch took a leave of absence three days after the assassination, when it became known that he had participated in the plot; and that under orders from the Belgrade Police Department he proceeded to Ribari. It is, therefore, untrue that Ciganovitch had retired from the Government's service as early as the 15/28th of June. In addition, it should be stated that the Chief of the Belgrade Police, who him-

7. The Royal Government proceeded on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch.

As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to find out his whereabouts. Notices for his apprehension have been published in the press.

The Austro-Hungarian Govern-

ment is requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the enquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the Serbian enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier.

It goes without saying that the Serbian Government will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly furnish explanations of the remarks made by its officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, in connexion with which the Royal Government itself will take steps to collect evidence.

self had caused Ciganovitch's departure and knew his whereabouts, stated in an interview that no person of the name of Milan Ciganovitch existed in Belgrade.

The interviews here referred to must be well known to the Serbian Government. The request that the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish details concerning these interviews, and the fact that the Serbian Government reserves the exclusive right to conduct the formal investigation in this matter, prove that on this point, as on others, Serbia has no serious intention to accede to our demands.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

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No. 35.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

Great Britain's proposal for a conference in London, in which Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should take part, has been rejected by Germany on the ground that Germany could not bring her ally before a European tribunal for adjudication of Austria-Hungary's differences with Servia.

No. 36.

*Baron Müller to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Tokio, July 28, 1914.*

To-day's semi-official "Japan Times" concludes an editorial by saying that Japan is on the best of terms with the three Great Powers concerned, namely, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, and had no interest whatever in Servia.

In the event of war the Imperial Government would naturally remain strictly neutral.

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No. 37.

*Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office, Belgrade.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Royal Servian Government having failed to give a satisfactory reply to the note which was handed to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government is compelled to protect its own rights and interests, by a recourse to armed force.

Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers herself from now on to be in state of war with Servia.

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No. 38.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

For your information and for transmission to the Secretary of State.

I have received from Count Mensdorff the following telegram, dated the 27th inst.:

"I had occasion to-day to explain fully to Sir Edward Grey, that our action does not mean aggression but self-defence and self-preser-

vation, and that we do not contemplate conquest of Servian territory or destruction of Servian independence. We desire to obtain satisfaction for the past and guarantees for the future.

"In so doing I made use of certain points in your instructions to Count Szápáry. Sir Edward Grey said he felt very much disappointed at the fact that we dealt with the Servian reply as if it were a downright refusal.

"He had expected that this reply would furnish a basis upon which the four other Governments would be able to elaborate a satisfactory arrangement.

"This had been his idea when he suggested a conference. The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from all military operations while the other Powers endeavoured to find a satisfactory solution. (To-day's declaration by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons enlarges upon the project of the conference.)

"When he made the suggestion that we should refrain from military operations against Servia, I expressed the fear that it might possibly be too late.

"The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we were taking a great risk if we were bound, under all circumstances, to make war on Servia, on the assumption that Russia would remain inactive. Should we be able to persuade Russia to refrain from action, he would have no more to say; if not, the possibilities and dangers were incalculable.

"As a symptom of the feeling of uneasiness prevalent in England, he pointed out that the Great British fleet which had been concentrated in Portsmouth after the manœuvres and was to have been dispersed to-day, would remain there for the time being. 'We would not have called out any reserves,' he observed, 'but since they are gathered, we cannot send them home at this moment.'

"The object of his suggestion of a conference is to avert a collision among the Great Powers, if possible, and presumably to isolate the conflict. Should Russia mobilise and Germany take action, the project of a conference would automatically fall through.

"It seems to me superfluous to point out to you that Grey's project of a conference has been superseded by the course of events inasmuch as it concerns our conflict with Servia, in view of the existing state of war."



## No. 39.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

We attach great importance to Sir Edward Grey's impartial appreciation of our action in Servia in general, and of our rejection of the Servian note in particular. I therefore request you to explain in detail to the Secretary of State the dossier which has been despatched to you by post, and to emphasise the salient points in it. In the same sense you will discuss with Sir Edward Grey the critical comments on the Servian note (copy of the note together with our comments was despatched to you by yesterday's post) and make clear to him that Servia has only apparently met our demands with the object of deceiving Europe, without giving any guarantee as to the future.

In view of the fact that the Servian Government was fully aware that the unconditional acceptance of our demands alone could satisfy us, the Servian tactics are easily fathomed. Servia has accepted, with various reservations, several of our demands in order to deceive public opinion in Europe, confident that she never would be called upon to carry out her promises. In your conversation with Sir Edward Grey, you will lay particular stress upon the circumstance that the general mobilisation of the Servian army was ordered for July the 25th, 3 o'clock p.m., while the reply to our note was handed in shortly before the expiration of the stipulated time, a few minutes before 6 o'clock.

We had previously made no military preparations, but were forced to make them by the Servian mobilisation.

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 No. 40.
*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

For your information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador called on me to-day to inform me of his return from Russia after a short leave of absence, and at

the same time to comply with telegraphic instructions received from M. Sazonow. The latter had informed him of having had a long and friendly conversation with you (*re* your telegram of the 27th inst.) in the course of which you had, with great readiness, analysed the different points of Servia's response. M. Sazonow held the opinion that Servia had met our demands to a great extent, but that he considered several of these demands to be unacceptable, a view which he already had communicated to you. Under the circumstances the Servian response appeared to him to furnish the basis for an understanding, to which the Russian Government would willingly lend a hand. M. Sazonow therefore wished to propose that the exchange of views be continued with you and that I should instruct you to that effect.

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in Austria-Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discussion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware. Moreover, we have declared war on Servia to-day.

The Ambassador's arguments were chiefly to the effect that we would not stamp out the admitted ill-feeling in Servia by force of arms, but that on the contrary we would inflame it still further. In reply I shed some light upon our actual relation with Servia, which made it inevitable that we should, however reluctantly and without any underhand design, exert the necessary pressure to make it clear to our restless neighbour that we are irrevocably resolved no longer to permit a movement tolerated by the Servian Government and directed against the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, Servia's attitude after the receipt of our note was not such as would make possible a peaceful settlement, because Servia, before presenting her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and by so doing had committed a hostile act against us. Nevertheless, we had waited three more days.

Yesterday Servia inaugurated hostilities against us on the Hungarian border. Thus we are compelled to abandon our forbearing attitude toward Servia. It has now been made impossible for us to bring about a complete and peaceful adjustment of relations with Servia, and we are forced to meet the Servian provocations in the only manner compatible with the dignity of the Dual Monarchy under the circumstances.

## No. 41.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The British Ambassador called on me this morning and, according to instructions, explained Sir Edward Grey's attitude on our controversy with Serbia, as follows:

The British Government has followed with great interest the course of the crisis up to date, and wishes to assure us of its sympathy with the stand we have taken and of its thorough understanding of our grievances against Serbia.

Although Great Britain has no special concern about our difficulty with Serbia as such, the London Cabinet could not ignore the conflict, inasmuch as it involves the possibility of extending into widening eddies and thereby endangering the peace of Europe.

Only on this ground was Sir Edward Grey prompted to invite the Governments of the countries not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France) to examine all the possibilities by a continuous exchange of views and to consider methods of as speedy a settlement as possible. The Secretary of State considers it expedient that, following the precedent of the London Conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the aforesaid States in London should keep in continuous touch with him.

Sir Edward Grey already has received responses in which the above-mentioned Governments expressed their cordial assent to his suggestion. For the present the Secretary of State would desire, if possible, to prevent at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Should this, however, not be possible, he was anxious to avoid a bloody collision, possibly by inducing Serbia to withdraw her troops without giving battle. Serbia's reply to us seems to offer the basis for an understanding, in the opinion of Sir Edward Grey. England, he intimated, was willing to use her influence in this direction, subject to our desire.

I thanked the Ambassador for Sir Edward Grey's communication, and replied that I fully appreciated the views of the Secretary of State. His point of view, however, necessarily differs from mine, since Great Britain has no direct interest in our dispute with Serbia, and because the Secretary of State could hardly be thoroughly cognisant of the seriousness and importance of the pending questions for

the Dual Monarchy. Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the possibility of preventing an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat belated, since, as early as yesterday, the Servians had opened fire on our frontier-guards, and also because we declared war upon Serbia to-day. Referring to the idea of an exchange of views on the basis of the Servian response, I have to decline the suggestion. We had demanded an unqualified acceptance. Serbia had endeavoured to extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles. With such tactics we were only too familiar.

I added that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's personal experience surely placed him in a position to appreciate fully our standpoint and to explain it accurately to Sir Edward Grey.

Inasmuch as Sir Edward Grey is desirous to serve the cause of European peace, he certainly will meet with no opposition from us. But he should realise that the peace of Europe would not be preserved if Great Powers stood behind Serbia and assured her of impunity. Suppose, even, that we agreed to attempt such a compromise, Serbia as a result would only be encouraged to persevere in her old tactics—a situation which would once more endanger peace in a very short time.

The British Ambassador assured me that he perfectly understood our standpoint; but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under the circumstances, there was no chance of attaining the British Government's desire to bring about a peaceful compromise. He hoped to be allowed to remain in touch with me, particularly on account of the grave danger of a European conflagration.

I replied that I was always at the Ambassador's disposal, and with this the interview terminated.

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No. 42.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

I request you to call at once on the Imperial Chancellor or on the Secretary of State and to convey to him the following in my behalf:

According to corroborative news from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military

preparations. M. Sazonow, however, as well as the Russian Minister of War, have given their word of honour that a mobilisation had not yet been ordered. The latter Minister, however, has advised the German Military Attaché that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, which adjoin Austria-Hungary, would be mobilised if our troops crossed the Servian border.

Under these circumstances I would urgently request the Berlin Cabinet to consider whether Russia's attention should not be called, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above-mentioned districts would be equivalent to a threat to Austro-Hungary, and that should it actually occur it would have to be met by Austria-Hungary and her ally, the German Empire, with the most comprehensive military counter-measures.

In order to facilitate the possible adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by Russia, we think it advisable that such a move should be initiated by Germany, alone, although we would, of course, be prepared to join in the action.

Plain language would seem to me to be the most effective measure at this moment, in order to bring home to Russia the lengths to which her menacing attitude may lead.

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No. 43.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Imperial German Ambassador has advised me that Sir Edward Grey has approached the German Government with a request that it use its influence with the Imperial and Royal Government to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussions between the Cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to submit the British proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for its consideration.

No. 44.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

For your information:

I have conveyed to the Imperial German Ambassador to-day, the following memorandum in reply to a communication by him:

(MEMOIR.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government has noted with profound thanks the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador transmitted to it on the 28th instant, by request of the British Cabinet, to the effect that the Imperial German Government use its influence with the Vienna Cabinet in an effort to induce the latter, either to approve the response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a basis for discussions.

Referring to the communication made by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government wishes to point out, in the first place, that Servia's reply by no means conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reservations in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee for the realisation of our object.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise at the assumption that its action against Servia was aimed at Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, a supposition which would imply that the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is not only Servian but also of Russian origin.

Hitherto we have presumed that official Russian circles had no connexion with the agitation against the Dual Monarchy, and our present action is directed solely against Servia, while our sentiments toward Russia are perfectly friendly, as we can assure Sir Edward Grey.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government must point out that, to its sincere regret, it no longer is in a position to meet the

Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when the German request was presented here, a state of war already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government wishes to call attention to the fact that the Royal Servian Government has proceeded to the mobilisation of the Servian forces before it replied to our note, and subsequently has allowed three days to elapse without showing any disposition to modify its point of view, whereupon we have declared war.

Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace among the Great Powers, and for a localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by the Servian agitation of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation.

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No. 45.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

France undoubtedly is making military preparations as announced by the newspapers, though the latter may possibly be exaggerating. According to strictly confidential information, Baron Schoen has been instructed to touch upon the topic of these military preparations with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that, under the circumstances, Germany might be compelled to adopt similar measures, which, of course, could not be concealed and which would cause great excitement when they should become known to the public.

Thus both countries, though only desirous of peace, might be driven to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous.

Moreover Baron Schoen, acting on instructions, will also declare that Germany anxiously desires that the conflict between us and Servia shall remain localised, and that Germany counts on the support of France on this point.

No. 46.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that a mobilisation by Russia would be followed by a mobilisation by Germany.

Thereupon the Russian Government replied in the sense of my telegram of the 27th instant. Another telegram was sent to St. Petersburg to-day, to the effect that Germany may be compelled to mobilise if Russia carries on her mobilisation any further.

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No. 47.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

On information received from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonow appeared greatly disturbed by your apparent unwillingness to continue discussions with Russia and by the Austro-Hungarian order of mobilisation, which appears to him to exceed the necessary scope and therefore is believed to be directed against Russia, I called upon the Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which seemed to exist.

The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had refused point-blank to discuss matters any further. In accordance with your telegram of the 28th instant, I explained that, in view of recent events, you certainly had refused to discuss any further the wording of the notes and our conflict with Serbia in general; that, on the other hand, I have to state that I was in a position to open a much wider field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to interfere with any Russian interests and that we do not intend to take any Servian territory; provided, always, that the conflict be localised between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; that, moreover, we did not intend to violate Serbia's sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.



M. Sazonow replied that he felt reassured on the territorial question, but that he must adhere to his former view that the enforcement of our demand would place Serbia in a condition of vassalage; that such an event would affect the equilibrium of the Balkans and thereby would infringe upon Russian interests. He then reverted to the discussion of the note, to Sir Edward Grey's action, etc., and again suggested that he recognised our legitimate interests and wished to satisfy them fully, but that this should be done in a manner acceptable to Serbia. I rejoined that these were not Russian but Servian interests, whereupon Sazonow retorted that in this case Russian interests were identical with Servian interests. In order to find an issue from this vicious circle, I passed to another topic.

I observed that it had been brought to my notice that some apprehension was felt in Russia, because we had mobilised eight army corps for action against Serbia. M. Sazonow stated that not he but the Chief of the General Staff had expressed uneasiness, and that he himself knew nothing about it. I endeavoured to convince M. Sazonow that any unbiased person could be easily convinced that our southern army corps could not be a menace to Russia.

I pointed out to the Minister that it might be well to inform his Imperial Majesty, the Czar, of the true situation, the more so, because it is urgently necessary for the preservation of the peace that an immediate stop be put to this race in military preparations, which appeared imminent as the result of this information. M. Sazonow said in a significant manner—and his observation shed an illuminating light upon the situation—that *he would inform the Chief of the General Staff, as that officer conferred with His Majesty every day.*

The Minister also said that an Ukase was being signed to-day, ordering a somewhat extensive mobilisation. He could, however, declare in an absolutely official way that these forces were not intended for a sudden attack upon us, but would be kept under arms in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be menaced. An explanatory note, he said, would confirm this assurance that it was only a question of a precautionary measure, which Czar Nicholas had deemed justifiable on the ground that we not only have the advantage of a quicker mobilisation, but also have the benefit of so long a start. I emphatically drew Sazonow's attention to the impression which such measures are bound to create in Austria-Hungary. I expressed my doubts as to whether the explanatory note would be able to soften that impression, whereupon Sazonow reiterated his assurance that this measure is absolutely inoffensive (!).

## No. 48.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

Herr von Tschirschky has just told me that the Russian Ambassador has informed him that his Government had communicated to him the fact that the Military Districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan would be mobilised. Russia considers her honour as a Great Power to have been offended, and therefore she has been obliged to take adequate measures. The Russian mobilisation is being confirmed by our generals commanding the Army Corps in Galicia, and, according to our Military Attaché, was not denied by M. Sazonow in his conference with the German Ambassador.

You are instructed to convey the above information to the German Government without delay and to point out emphatically that for military reasons our general mobilisation will have to be ordered at once, unless the Russian mobilisation is stopped immediately.

As a last attempt to avert a European war, I consider it desirable that our Envoy and the German Representative in St. Petersburg, and if necessary also in Paris, be instructed at once to explain in an amicable way to the respective Governments that the continuation of the Russian mobilisation would provoke counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which necessarily would lead to the most serious consequences. You will add, that it is self-evident that we cannot allow any interference with our armed action in Servia.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris are being simultaneously instructed to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleagues receive the same instructions.

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 No. 49.
*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

In reply to your telegram of July 29th, I am still ready, as before, to allow you to explain to M. Sazonow the individual points in our note to Servia, which has since been superseded by events. In

this connexion I would also make a point of discussing in a frank and friendly manner the questions which directly concern our relations with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion transmitted to me by M. Schebeko. From such a discussion, it is to be hoped, may result the elimination of the unfortunate misconception in this particular matter, as well as the peaceful development of our good relations with Russia.

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No. 50.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

For your information and guidance:

I have explained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported to me that M. Sazonow was painfully impressed by my flat rejection of his suggestion of a conference between you and himself, and also because no exchange of views had taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With regard to the first proposal, I had already instructed you by telegraph to give M. Sazonow any explanation he might require concerning our note, although recent events have superseded that note. Such an explanation, however, could be confined to only belated elucidation, as we had intended never to abate any point in the note. I also stated that I had authorised you to make our relations with Russia the subject of an amicable exchange of views with M. Sazonow. The complaint that there had been no conference between myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstanding, as we—Schebeko and I—had discussed the pending questions only two days ago. The Ambassador confirmed this and said that he had sent a full report of our interview to M. Sazonow.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia had caused such anxiety in St. Petersburg. He asserted that we, as a Great Power, were taking action against the small Servian State, without conveying any knowledge of our intention at St. Petersburg, as to whether we would infringe upon its sovereignty, overthrow it, or even crush it out of existence. Being connected with Serbia by historic and other ties, Russia could not remain indifferent to Serbia's fate. Every attempt has been made in St. Petersburg to impress

upon Belgrade the necessity of complying with our demands. This, however, at a time when it could not have been known what demands we would formulate.

But even now, after the demands have been made, every influence would be exerted, I was assured, to obtain all possible concessions to our wishes. I begged the Ambassador to remember that we had repeatedly stated that we were not following a policy of conquest in Serbia, that we did not intend to infringe upon her sovereignty, but that we merely desired to attain a solution which would afford us a guarantee against further agitations on the part of Serbia. In enlarging upon the subject of our intolerable relations with Serbia, I plainly gave Schebeko to understand to what extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for this state of things, though surely against the inclination of the leading men in Russia.

In the course of our conversation I referred to the Russian mobilisation, which had meanwhile been brought to my knowledge. Since the mobilisation is restricted to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, it bears the character of a hostile demonstration against the Dual Monarchy. The cause of this measure is unknown to me, since there is no matter in dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary has mobilised her troops solely against Serbia, and not one man against Russia. The very fact that the Ist, Xth, and XIth army corps have not been mobilised, bears out my statement. Since Russia is obviously mobilising against us, we are compelled to extend our own mobilisation; I, however, wish to point out expressly, that this measure should not be considered as a hostile act against Russia, but simply as a response to the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to report the above to his Government, which he undertook to do.

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No. 51.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

I am telegraphing to Berlin as follows:

Herr von Tschirschky, acting on instructions, informed me yesterday of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lich-

nowsky, in the course of which the Secretary of State made the following declaration to the German Ambassador:

Sazonow has made known to the British Government that, since Austria-Hungary has declared war on Serbia, he was no longer in a position to treat directly with Austria-Hungary, and therefore requested Great Britain to resume her mediation. As a condition of this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile.

Commenting upon this Russian suggestion, Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain was considering a plan of mediation *à quatre*, and held such mediation to be urgent and essential for the avoidance of a general war.

You are instructed to thank the Secretary of State warmly for the communication made by Herr von Tschirschky and to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate between us and Serbia despite the changes brought about in the situation by Russia's mobilisation.

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condition that our military action against Serbia shall nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilisation directed against us. It is understood that in this case we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilisation.

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No. 52.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

Early this morning an order was issued for the general mobilisation of the entire army and navy.

No. 53.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Embassies, Legations  
and Consulates.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

For your information and for use at the respective Governments:

In response to Russian Government's order for mobilisation at our frontier we are forced to take similar measures in Galicia.

These measures are of a purely defensive character and are solely due to the pressure of the Russian preparations, which we greatly regret, as we have no aggressive intentions whatever against Russia, and desire the continuation of the same friendly relations as heretofore.

Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between the Cabinets at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, and we still hope that they may lead to a general understanding.

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No. 54.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The German Ambassador, on instructions from his Government, has made a declaration here to the effect that, if the Russian general mobilisation shall not be stopped within twelve hours, Germany also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen enquired whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. He requested an answer to this question within eighteen hours. The time-limit expires to-morrow, Saturday, at 1 o'clock p.m.

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No. 55.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

Received your telegram of the 30th inst. My telegram of the 29th inst. will have acquainted you with the fact that I had resumed

the exchange of views with M. Sazonow without waiting for instructions and practically on the basis now suggested by you, without succeeding, however, in bringing the conflicting viewpoints nearer to an agreement.

Meanwhile the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs have made it clear that Russia would not be content even with a formal declaration by Austria-Hungary that she would not reduce Servian territory, nor infringe upon her sovereignty, nor violate any Russian interest in the Balkans, or elsewhere. Moreover, Russia has, since then, ordered a general mobilisation.

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No. 56.

*Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.*

On my visit to M. Sazonow to-day, I declared that I had received certain instructions, but that I was not aware of the situation created in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation.

Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had been despatched to me before that event, I could not take into account the newly created situation. I said that the two points of your instructions dealt with the misunderstanding arising out of our refusal to discuss matters any further with Russia. As I had said even before I was authorised to do so, this conception is erroneous. I pointed out that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations with Russia on a most comprehensive basis, but even to discuss the wording of our note, inasmuch as it was only a question of interpretation.

I emphasised the point that your instructions once more bear out your good intentions; that I was still ignorant of the effect produced in Vienna by the Russian general mobilisation and that I could but hope that events might not yet have carried us too far. In any case I considered it my duty at the present momentous juncture to furnish another proof of the good-will of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

M. Sazonow, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this evidence of our good intentions, but observed that for obvious reasons the neutral ground of London would promise better success for the pro-

posed negotiations than St. Petersburg. I replied that you desired to be in direct touch with St. Petersburg, and that I was consequently unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not fail to convey it to you.

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No. 57.

*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

The Secretary of State has just advised me that no reply to the German enquiry has arrived from Russia.

Russian troops have crossed the German border near Schwiddin (southeast of Bialla). Russia has, therefore, attacked Germany. Germany consequently considers herself to be in state of war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador was handed his passports this forenoon; he probably will leave to-day.

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No. 58.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

I have just seen Sir Edward Grey. The British Government has addressed an ultimatum to Germany on the subject of Belgium. He expects reply at midnight.

Sir Edward Grey holds that, meanwhile, there was no reason for a similar communication to the Imperial and Royal Government, and no cause for a conflict with us, as long as we are not at war with France. He hoped we would not open hostilities without a previous formal declaration of war. He will not recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we enter into a state of war with France, Great Britain, as an ally of France, would find it difficult to coöperate with the latter in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.



No. 59.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 5, 1914.*

You are instructed to hand the following note to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“By order of his Government, the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honour to notify His Excellency, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows:

“In view of the threatening attitude assumed by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia, and in view of the fact that, in consequence of this conflict, and according to a communication of the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has considered it necessary to open hostilities against Germany; furthermore, in view of the fact that the latter consequently has entered into a state of war with the former Power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia.”

After having presented this note, you will ask for the return of your passports and take your departure without delay accompanied by the entire staff of the Embassy, with the sole exception of those officials who may have to remain.

Simultaneously passports are being handed to M. Schebeko.

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No. 60.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 6, 1914.*

Received your telegram of the 6th inst.

You are instructed to assure Sir Edward Grey, that we shall under no circumstances begin hostilities against Great Britain without previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect Great Britain to act on the same principle.

No. 61.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent for me and has informed me that the Innsbruck army corps has been despatched to the French frontier, according to positive information received by him. M. Doumergue urgently desires to know whether this information is correct, and in the event of the affirmative to know the Imperial and Royal Government's intentions. France being at war with Germany, such a movement of troops to the French border is, in his opinion, incompatible with the state of peace existing between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is instructed to make a similar representation to you.

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No. 62.

*Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen, Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 9, 1914.*

*Re your telegram of the 8th inst.*

On information received from General Staff I authorise you to declare to the French Government that news of participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a pure invention. I have made an identical declaration to M. Dumaine.

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No. 63.

*Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, August 10, 1914.*

Received telegram of 9th August.

Immediately communicated contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, having received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with you, is satisfied that our

troops are not on the French frontier, but says that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been transported to Germany, thus enabling the latter to withdraw her own troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces. In the Minister's view this facilitates the military operations of the Germans.

I have repeatedly called the Minister's attention to the wording of your reply; he recognises that there could be no question of an active participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but insists that the presence of our troops on German territory is undeniable and represents military support to Germany. Under these circumstances he has instructed the French Ambassador in Vienna to ask immediately for his passports and to leave Vienna with the entire staff of the Embassy, to-day.

The Minister told me that, under the circumstances, my presence here could be of no avail, but owing to public excitement, might even give rise to unpleasant incidents which he would like to avoid. He offered to have a special train ready to-night for my conveyance out of France. I replied that it would be impossible for me to obtain instructions from you by to-night, but in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I begged him to have my passports handed to me.

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No. 64.

*Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.*

*Vienna, August 11, 1914.*

The French Government has instructed its Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, thereby enabling the German military authorities to withdraw their troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces.

This move by our General Staff is considered to constitute military support to Germany.

You are instructed to assure the British Government that this French assertion, according to authentic information, is unfounded.

*Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 12, 1914.*

I have just received from Sir Edward Grey the following communication:

“By request of the French Government, which no longer is able to communicate directly with your Government, I wish to inform you of the following:

“After having declared war on Servia and having thus initiated hostilities in Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Government has, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, entered into a state of war with France.

1st: “After Germany had declared war successively upon Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government has intervened in this conflict by declaring war on Russia, which was already in alliance with France.

2nd: “According to manifold and reliable information Austria has sent troops to the German border under circumstances which constitute a direct menace to France.

“In view of these facts the French Government considers itself compelled to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that it will take all measures necessary to meet the actions and menaces of the latter.”

Sir Edward Grey added: “A rupture with France having thus been brought about, the Government of His Britannic Majesty is obliged to proclaim a state of war between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, to begin at midnight.”

*The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.*

Monsieur le Comte:

*Vienna, August 20, 1914.*

No doubt you already have been informed by Baron Müller of the nature of the communication made to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst.; but, for your personal information, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject, although I have no instruction to do so.

## (ENCLOSURE.)

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefor in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on the 15th of August, 1914:

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed.

2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without compensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau before the 16th of September, 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government has declared to the German Government that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be received before noon of Sunday, the 23rd instant, the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem necessary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should, unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese Government, the latter will be obliged to take the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude is, already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost care, the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to injure them.

No. 67.

*Count Berchtold to Count Clary, Brussels.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 22, 1914.*

I request you to inform the Royal Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs without delay, as follows:

By order of my Government I have the honour to notify you, as follows:

In view of the fact that Belgium, having refused to accept the propositions addressed to her on several occasions by Germany, is now in military coöperation with France and Great Britain, both of which have declared war on Austria-Hungary; and in view of the recently established fact that Austrian and Hungarian subjects resident in Belgium have, under the eyes of the Royal authorities, been treated in a manner contrary to the most primitive laws of humanity, and inadmissible even toward subjects of a hostile State, Austria-Hungary is necessarily compelled to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from now on in a state of war with Belgium.

I leave the country with the staff of the Legation and place the subjects of my country under the protection of the Minister of the United States of America in Belgium.

The Imperial and Royal Government has handed his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzele.

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No. 68.

*Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 23, 1914.*

The Japanese Minister here has been informed by the Foreign Office that the German Imperial Government had no intention to reply to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government has instructed its Ambassador in Tokio to leave Japan upon the expiration of the time-limit fixed by Japan for noon to-day. Simultaneously the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires is to be handed his passports.

At noon the Chargé d'Affaires received his passports; he will leave Berlin to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy.

No. 69.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Müller, Tokio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 24, 1914.*

The Commander of H. M. S. "Elisabeth" has been instructed to participate in the action at Tsingtau.

In view of Japan's action against our ally, the German Empire, I request you to ask for your passports, notify Consulates and leave Japan for America together with our colony and the staffs of Embassy and Consulates. You will place our subjects and interests under the protection of the American Ambassador. Passports will be handed to Japanese Ambassador here.





THE  
AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK  
(NO. 2)



## THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK (NO. 2)<sup>1</sup>

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### No. 1.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

On the occasion of your meeting with the Marchese di San Giuliano, which presumably will take place to-morrow, you will express yourself in this sense:

So far you had not received any precise information as to the results of the trial of Serajevo, nor with regard to the steps we propose to take in this matter at Belgrade. Nevertheless, I had acquainted you with the fact that the evidence established up to date, as well as the constant subversive Servian agitations carried on for many years past, are likely to compel us to assume a serious attitude in Belgrade. You are authorised to bring this to the knowledge of the Marchese di San Giuliano, and to add that we consider it decidedly within the range of possibilities that a peaceable issue may be reached in our undertakings in Belgrade. We are convinced that in clearing up our relations with Servia, we can rely on Italy's loyalty in fulfilment of the terms of our alliance.

Summing up correctly the international situation, the Marchese di San Giuliano has frequently remarked to you, and had also expressed to me at Abbazia, the view that Italy needs a strong Austria-Hungary. The clearing up of our delicate relations with Servia seems an absolute necessity for the preservation of the present position of the Monarchy and of the power of resistance of the Triple Alliance, which is the foundation of the peace and the equilibrium of Europe. At the present moment it is also to Italy's interest to side with us

<sup>1</sup> *Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Documents Concerning the Relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy from July 20, 1914, to May 23, 1915. Published by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Title of publication in the original text: K.U.K. Ministerium des Äussern. Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Österreich-ungarns zu Italien in der zeit vom 20. Juli 1914 bis 23. Mai 1915. Wien: Druck der K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1915.*

openly. It would therefore be of great importance, that the Minister should make timely efforts to inspire Italian public opinion in a sense favourable to our alliance in order that it may manifest itself accordingly, as soon as our demands on Servia shall be made.

In the course of a possible discussion of the subject you may, meanwhile without authorisation, express your own firm conviction, that, should all peaceful means fail, the Vienna Cabinet would not think of inaugurating a war of conquest or of acquiring any Servian territory. At the same time you may also deny the malicious invention of the *Temps*, that we intend an attack on the Lovcen. We would be greatly obliged to the Italian Government if it were to use its influence at Cetinje in an effort to persuade Montenegro to remain quiescent during our conversations with Belgrade. Montenegro certainly is at variance with the attitude of the Belgrade Government and, moreover, has had its own painful experiences with bombs imported from Servia.

I have expressed myself in the above sense in my conversation with the Italian Ambassador.

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No. 2.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, July 20, 1914.*

We must consider the possibility that the Royal Italian Government, in case of warlike complications between us and Servia, will endeavour to interpret Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty \* in a way which would conform neither with the sense nor with the wording of it, and that it will claim compensation. The enclosed note will serve for your guidance in opposing such a possible Italian interpretation of the above mentioned article which the Marchese di San Giuliano may bring forward.

\* See Enclosure I.

## (ENCLOSURE 1.)

## (NOTE.)

In possibly resorting to the necessity of declaring war against Servia, Austria-Hungary by no means intends any territorial conquest. The Monarchy aims solely at the attainment of the object as set forth in her note to the Belgrade Government, namely, freedom from a disturbance of her normal and peaceful development by a subversive agitation fostered by the neighbouring kingdom.

Even though the Dual Monarchy does not aim at territorial expansion by a war with Servia, the nature of the war would necessarily transfer the basis of operations to Servian soil. It must also be understood that a provisional occupation of Servian territory would be maintained until the required guarantees are given and until the payment of the expenses which Austria-Hungary will have incurred for the mobilisation and for conducting the war in consequence of Servia's original refusal. This applies also in the event of Servia deciding to yield, whether during the mobilisation or after the beginning of hostilities.

It would mean a complete misunderstanding of the spirit of the Triple Alliance agreement, if Article VII were to be interpreted in such a way as to make a temporary occupation of territory belonging to a neighbouring Balkan State at war with Austria-Hungary conditional upon a previous agreement with Italy based on compensations.

As far as the wording of the treaty is concerned, Article VII may give rise to misinterpretation: in dealing with a possible necessity for a modification of the *status quo* by Austria-Hungary or Italy, occurs the phrase "*dans les régions des Balcons*," which may suggest an interpretation in the sense that the provisions of the above-mentioned article should apply as much to the Balkan possessions of Turkey as to the territories of other Balkan States, no special distinction being made between the two.

The wording of our agreements shows how unjustified such an interpretation of Article VII would be.

Following the words "*dans les régions des Balcons*," the same Article VII says: "*des côtes et îles ottomanes dans la mer Egée*" (the Ottoman coast and islands in the Adriatic and Ægean Seas). This specific mention of Turkish territory implicitly excludes the

coasts and islands of other States from the provisions of that article, and must be accepted as proof that the words "*dans les régions des Balcans*" also refer solely to Turkish possessions. Otherwise, a surely unintended differentiation would arise, according to which, for instance, the provisions of Article VII would have no bearing on Montenegrin or Greek coastal territories or islands, but would apply to parts of the interior.

The particular clause of the same article which deals with a possible compensation, also shows the correctness of the view that Article VII refers solely to territories of the Turkish dominion. There can be no doubt that in the event of either of the contracting powers occupying any Turkish territory, the other would be at liberty to participate in the war, and thus have the opportunity to occupy temporarily or permanently a previously defined territory by way of compensation. It seems out of the question to apply this maxim in connexion with a war between the Dual Monarchy and a Balkan state which has no coastal territory as long as no other Balkan state, which possesses its own coast, joins Austria-Hungary's adversary and thus places Italy in a position to occupy a compensatory territory by way of the sea.

The wording of the "*Arrangement spécial concernant le Sandjak de Novibazar*" of 1909, also clearly points to the meaning of the words "*les régions des Balcans*" in Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. This "*arrangement*," which was made expressly for the purpose of defining and completing the much discussed Article VII, says that the provisions of the said article shall have equal bearing on the Sandjak of Novibazar as on the other parts of Turkey. If, therefore, the next sentence in the "*arrangement*," which begins with "*Si donc*," once more speaks of the "*maintien du statu quo dans les Balcans*" (maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans) it can be understood only in one way, namely, that in this instance, as throughout the entire agreement, the words "*les Balcans*" refer only to the Turkish possessions in the Balkans.

As to the spirit of the treaty, it should suffice to consider the words of the introduction to the agreement on the "*bienfaits que leur garantit, au point de vue politique, aussi bien qu'au point de vue monarchique et social, le maintien de la Triple Alliance*" (the benefits which the maintenance of the Triple Alliance guarantees from political as well as from a monarchical and social point of view) to make it clear that the Dual Monarchy cannot anticipate an interpretation of the agreement on the part of Italy which would hamper

our action against Servia; especially so, as the object of that action is to obtain guarantees against the continuation of a propaganda which endangers the very existence of the Monarchy.

Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that in the spirit of Article VII the maintenance of the *status quo* existing at that time, was said to be desirable, in order to prevent any territorial changes which might be of disadvantage to either Austria-Hungary or Italy. Since that time such changes have taken place in a manner decidedly unfavourable to the interests of the Dual Monarchy. Servia's aggrandisement at the expense of Turkey has accentuated the Great-Servian utopia to such an extent that the peaceful development of our territories is seriously menaced and Austria-Hungary may be compelled even to resort to force of arms to defend her possessions. An intervention on the part of the Dual Monarchy for the purpose of changing the *status quo* of the present Turkish possessions or of the territories which at the time of the treaty had been part of the Turkish dominion, undoubtedly would necessitate a previous understanding with Italy; on the other hand, it is evident that Austria-Hungary must have a free hand to protect her interests in connexion with changes of the *status quo* which have been affected without her intervention.

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### No. 3.

#### *Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 21, 1914.*

With reference to your telegram of the 20th instant.

Interview with the Marchese di San Giuliano took place this afternoon.

The Minister seemed very apprehensive of our proposed step at Belgrade. I dwelt upon the first part of the above-mentioned telegram in the sense indicated. In the course of the ensuing thorough discussion, I also found occasion to use the last paragraph.

In regard to the clearing up of our relations with Servia, the Minister, as on many previous occasions, explained in detailed arguments that we could remedy them only by adopting a conciliatory attitude but not by means of force and the humiliation of a neighbouring State. For a State of mixed nationalities like Austria-

Hungary he considers such a policy to be the only practicable one, and pointed out that it had proved successful in dealing with the Germans and the Poles. I declared that this argument, so often discussed between us, was merely hypothetical and that it was, moreover, erroneous. In reality things are different. I drew his attention to all that we have done for Servia since the Treaty of Berlin, to our conciliatory attitude during the Balkan war and to the Pan-Servian offensive, which was becoming more and more violent.

The Minister then continued by saying that Italy desired a strong Austria-Hungary, *but such as it is*, without territorial expansion. My declaration that we do not aspire to any territorial aggrandisement met with the Minister's approval, and the one concerning the Lovcen was received with evident satisfaction.

The Marchese di San Giuliano then expressed his decided intention to assist us as long as our demands were justifiable. Should this not be the case, he would be opposed by the sentiment of the entire country, which, undoubtedly liberal, remembers its own revolutionary origin and sympathises with nationalistic movements, no matter in what part of the world. He pointed out that his position would be materially stronger if our measures at Belgrade were principally, if not entirely, based upon the outrage at Serajevo, and to a lesser degree on other agitations. I argued against all these limitations, which I described as wrong in theory and in practice an indication of insufficient friendship and assistance.

In respect of the press, the Minister promised to use his influence under the aforesaid reservations, but he thought he would be unable to act until the contents of our note became known in Belgrade.

As to Montenegro, he promised to send instructions in the sense described by us this very day. He has already advised Belgrade to be conciliatory.

Finally, the Minister remarked that his confidence in our moderation toward Servia was chiefly based on the wisdom of our Sovereign. While agreeing with him on this point, I replied that for this very reason he could rest assured that our steps in Belgrade will be carefully thought out and that whatever form they might take, they would be limited to absolutely necessary action.

On the whole, the conversation gave me the impression of many friendly phrases with as many mental reservations; furthermore, that the Minister evidently does not yet believe that events will lead to war, but rather expects Servia to yield. He probably bases his



calculations on an intensive diplomatic intervention in Vienna and Belgrade on the part of the Powers.

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No. 4.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

I request you to inform the Marchese di San Giuliano in strict confidence and in pursuance of the information you have given him previously, that our decisive step in Belgrade has now been fixed for Thursday noon, 23rd inst. As to the contents of the note which Baron von Giesl will hand to the Servian Government, you will say that it contains demands dealing with the suppression of the agitation which endangers our territories. We are compelled to make these demands as a result of the facts so far disclosed by the Serajevo investigation, and because we realise that we must put an end to the subversive agitation which has been carried on for many years in our southern provinces and which emanates from Belgrade.

We have given the Servian Government a time-limit of forty-eight hours for the acceptance of our demands, as we cannot expose ourselves to the usual Servian delays. The signatory Powers will be notified on Friday, 24th inst., and on that day you will also be placed in a position to acquaint the Italian Government officially of our steps in Belgrade.

Your proceeding of to-day is limited to Berlin and Rome, in special consideration of our alliance.

I request you, if possible, to acquaint the Marchese di San Giuliano personally—and only if this be impossible, his representative—with the contents of this telegram.

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No. 5.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 22, 1914.*

(Translation from the French.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government has found itself obliged to address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Austro-Hun-

garian Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Government of Servia. (See Enclosure.)

I have the honour to request you to bring the contents of this note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited, accompanying this communication with the following comment:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities for the detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the Servian frontier.

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their membership generals and diplomats, government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of the official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent upon it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed upon it by the solemn declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, and has acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the pledges given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in the face

of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Dual Monarchy and by the hope that the Servian Government, in spite of everything, would come to an appreciation of Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing an attitude of good-will toward the political interests of Servia, the Austro-Hungarian Government hoped that the Kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of 1912, the Austro-Hungarian Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made so considerable an aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The good-will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the Kingdom, which continued to tolerate upon its territory a propaganda of which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the world on the 28th of June last, when the Heir Apparent to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched in Belgrade.

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement which is menacing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is convinced that, in taking this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon to be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Austro-Hungarian Government holds at the disposal of the Government to which you are accredited a dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the connection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to place a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

## (ENCLOSURE.)

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on instructions from the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

“Servia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such decisions as the Powers may take with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.”

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th of June, have disclosed the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declarations of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the glorification of the authors of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last demonstrated its ominous consequences to the world.

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo assassination had been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and carried out by the Chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above-mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do

not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end, the Austro-Hungarian Government finds itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy—in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it—and that it undertakes to suppress by every means at its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking, the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "Official Journal" of the 26th of June (13th of July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under any other name or form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the coöperation in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voja Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the crime of Serajevo by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Austro-Hungarian Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterance of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official positions, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally,

10. To notify the Austro-Hungarian Government without delay

of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th of July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note.

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(MEMORANDUM.)

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip and his accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28th of this year has up to now established the following facts:

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Major Voja Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammunition, which were used by the criminals, were obtained for them and handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch.

3. The bombs are hand grenades which came from the arsenal of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Toptschider, in Belgrade.

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzegovina frontier by Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez, and the smuggling in of their weapons, a secret transportation system was organised by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of the frontier Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica, and the coöperation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Groitch or Loznica, and several other persons.

## No. 6.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Instructions.)

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

When carrying out the instructions despatched herewith, further verbal comments will hardly be necessary, as you have advised the Marchese di San Giuliano in your previous interview of what he had to expect. However, it may seem opportune to you to draw his special attention to the fact that the Narodna Odbrana, which counts among its members all the Servians committed in connexion with the plot of June 28, 1914, constitutes a fighting organisation, which is scattered all over Servia. Its activities, according to the programme which we hold in its authentic form, are now solely and purely directed against the Dual Monarchy, since Turkey has vanished from the sphere of its aggressions.

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 No. 7.
*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, July 23, 1914.

To-day, at 4.45 P.M., I carried out your telegraphic instructions of yesterday in an interview with the Marchese di San Giuliano at Fiuggi. The latter expressed his inability to give an opinion without being acquainted with the demands made at Belgrade by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and without having discussed the matter with the Prime Minister. The latter will proceed to-morrow to Fiuggi, where events will be discussed between him, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the German Ambassador, who is there at present.

In terms which he distinctly qualified as both official and private, the Marchese di San Giuliano expressed his misgiving concerning Italian public opinion. Nevertheless, he at once wrote a letter to Secretary General de Martino, with the professed instruction to inspire the press with moderation when the news of the delivery of our ultimatum shall reach Rome.



## No. 8.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 24, 1914.*

Owing to absence of Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Under-Secretary of State, our note to the Servian Government was delivered to the Secretary General this forenoon.

In commencing the reading, the latter remarked that it was very clever to begin the note by citing the Servian note of 1909. In further perusal of the note he said, while laying stress on the personal character of his utterance, that it appeared to him that, in considering ourselves endangered by the agitation carried on in Servian territory we were treating Servia almost as a Great Power. This gave me the occasion to utilise the information received from you concerning the aims of the Narodna Odbrana and the wide scope of its activities.

As to the publication which we demand from Servia, he remarked that the Servian Government could and should accept this unimportant item.

Clause 4 he thought the Servian Government would find it difficult to accept.

The reading of the note concerning the result of the Serajevo investigation seemed to surprise him considerably.

In concluding the reading he remarked that we apparently had reached a turning point in history. De Martino agreed with my contention that he could not fail to admit the purely defensive character of our action and said: "*Certainement je n'aurais jamais cru que l'on puisse constater et prouver la culpabilité d'officiers et de fonctionnaires serbes dans le drame de Serajevo*" ("I certainly never would have believed that the culpability of Servian army-officers and functionaries in the drama of Serajevo could be ascertained and proved").

Finally he promised to send a copy of the note to the Marchese di San Giuliano without delay.

## No. 9.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador came here to-day and announced with regard to the conflict between the Monarchy and Servia, that the Royal Italian Government, in case this conflict should reach the stage of war and lead to the occupation of Servian soil, even provisionally, would reserve the right to claim compensation under Article VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance. He also stated that the Royal Italian Government was, moreover, of the opinion that, according to the above-mentioned article of the alliance, we should come to an understanding with Italy regarding the possible occupation of Servian territory.

Beyond this, he continued, the Royal Italian Government in the event of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, intended to maintain a friendly attitude in accordance with its obligations under the terms of its alliance.

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 No. 10.
*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Since Servia has refused to comply with our demands, we have broken off diplomatic relations with that country.

You will at once call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs or on his representative and make, in effect, the following declaration:

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the demands which we have been compelled to make for the permanent safety of our most vital interests. In so doing it has manifested its unwillingness to abandon its subversive aspirations, which aim at the constant disturbance of some of our territories upon the border and at their ultimate separation from the Dual Monarchy.

To our regret, and much against our will, we are therefore placed under the necessity of forcing Servia by the most drastic means to alter radically her hitherto hostile attitude.

## No. 11.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

In carrying out the instructions contained in to-day's telegram you will also point out to the Marchese di San Giuliano or to his representative, that the Royal Italian Government is well aware that we are far from entertaining any aggressive purpose and that it is an act of self-defence if, after many years of tolerance, we at last decide to put a stop to the Great-Servian machinations by force of arms, if need be. I must assume that no attempt will be made in Rome to deny that we have shown the utmost patience with Serbia during many years, in the face of the most serious provocations, although the Great-Servian propaganda was conducted with increasing boldness and inevitably aroused our grave apprehension. The results of the investigation prove plainly that Belgrade has not refrained even from the most violent means for the attainment of its goal, and therefore we have come to the conclusion that it is high time to use every available pressure to exact guarantees for the discontinuance of the present intolerable conditions on our southeastern border. All peaceful means to induce Serbia to alter her attitude having been exhausted, a resort to arms may be expected.

A short time ago Italy deemed it necessary to make war for the preservation of her economic interests and for her position in the Mediterranean. In the friendly spirit of our alliance we welcomed the successes of her arms and readily recognised the subsequent extension of the Italian sphere of power.

Finally, you will point out that the Duke of Avarna has officially declared that Italy, in the event of war between us and Serbia, would remember her obligations toward the alliance and that we greatly appreciate this friendly act as being in accord with the terms of our alliance.

No. 12.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

Yesterday's telegram from Count Szögény:

"Secretary of State told me to-day that my Italian colleague seemed surprised you had not earlier informed his government, as an allied power, of our steps in Belgrade.

"Von Jagow replied that Germany had not been informed by us any earlier, which he (von Jagow) considered a perfectly correct procedure because present conflict must be regarded as a matter between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

"He would also telegraph this to the Imperial German Ambassador in Rome for his guidance and instruct him to point out to Marchese di San Giuliano, if occasion should arise, that Italy had not previously informed her allies of her 48-hour ultimatum to Turkey."

No. 13.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

By instructions dated the 20th inst. you have been informed of the arguments to use if Italy should attempt to interpose obstacles to our action against Servia on the ground of an arbitrary interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty.

You are also aware that it does not seem to me desirable to create ill-feeling between Rome and Vienna by discussions which offer little hope of a satisfactory result.

On the other hand, we must be prepared for an insistent attitude on the part of the Italian Government, and, in view of the tone adopted by some Italian papers, it seems not impossible that the Marchese di San Giuliano will endeavour to present our attitude during the Lybian war as obstructive to Italian activities. He might also misuse for his purposes our reference to Article VII on that occasion.

The question whether the territories of the Balkan States come under the provisions of Article VII or not has no bearing upon the

question whether the application of Article VII would have been justified in respect of the islands under Italian occupation in the Ægean Sea.

My chief object, however, at the present moment is to refute emphatically a possible reproach by Italy that we have acted in a manner contrary to the friendly spirit of our alliance.

For this purpose it seems advisable to recall briefly to your memory our attitude during the Lybian war.

On September 26, 1911,\* the Duke of Avarna, on instructions from his government, declared that Italy would confine her activities to the Mediterranean and that she would do nothing adverse to the policy which she had hitherto followed, namely, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Balkans. Nevertheless, a month later, the Marchese di San Giuliano took up a position which he expressed as follows: “*Nous nous sommes toujours réservés la liberté des opérations militaires en dehors des côtes ottomanes de l’Adriatique et la mer Jonienne.*” “We have always reserved to ourselves a free hand to conduct military operations beyond the Turkish coasts on the Adriatic and on the Ionian Sea.”†

Thereupon Count Aehrenthal confined himself to pointing out the dangers of reaction on the Balkans in the event of Italy carrying her military activities upon the coasts of the Ægean Sea and remarked that even a temporary occupation of the islands in the Ægean Sea would be contrary to the provisions of Article VII.‡

At the same time Count Aehrenthal emphasised Austria-Hungary’s long-standing friendship.

Our further reserve in the matter of the extension of Italy’s activities was subsequently§ explained by the consideration that Austria-Hungary, by giving her consent, would have shared the responsibility which Italy would have to assume if she wished to act contrary to her declarations at the beginning of the war or disregarded her obligations to the alliance.

Count Aehrenthal’s utterance|| to the German Ambassador (at the end of November, 1911) plainly shows our friendly attitude and our endeavours to avoid any discussions which might disturb the relations among the Allies at a time when Italy was at war. On that occasion it was pointed out to von Tschirschky that we would endeavour to avoid dealing with the question concerning the exten-

\* See Appendix No. 3.

† See Appendix No. 4.

‡ See Appendix No. 5.

§ See Appendix No. 6.

|| See Appendix No. 7.

sion of Italian activities upon the Asiatic coast without, however, having any intention of causing thereby any difficulties to the Italian Government; we did not wish even to arouse her apprehension of such a possibility.

Further proof of our friendship was given when at the end of February, 1912, Great Britain advanced the proposal \* that a promise be obtained from Italy that she would refrain from any action against the Dardanelles. In compliance with Marchese di San Giuliano's wish, we rejected this proposal, and it was because of our opposition that the British project was dropped. The Dual Monarchy did more; she published denials in London and Constantinople of the circulated rumours that Italy had made promises to her concerning the Dardanelles.†

On April 6, 1912, von Tschirschky reverted once more to Italy's intention to extend her sphere of activity. It was then pointed out to him that we could not alter our attitude of unwillingness to assume a part of Italy's responsibility. At the same time he was given to understand that Italy could rest assured of our tacit passivity in the event of a proposed temporary action in territories which would not be likely to affect the Balkans. It would, however, be better to avoid ‡ going into the details of specific operations.

In order to assure the allied governments of our good-will, we declared in our conversations § with the Duke of Avarna on April the 13th and 15th, 1912, our willingness to make an exception of the islands of Rhodos and Karpathos, on the southern outlet of the Ægean Sea and geographically pertaining to the Mediterranean, as well as of the ledge of rocks, called Stampalia (Astropalia), off the Cyclades; that we would not object to their occupation. We only demanded that guarantees be given us by Italy that the proposed occupation of these islands would be temporary.

Count Szögyény reported,|| under date of May 21, 1912, that von Kiderlen-Waechter had gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of the Italian action in the Archipelago.

In the course of a conversation ¶ which took place on the following day in connexion with the occupation of Kos, which had been accomplished meanwhile, and of several other neighbouring islands by Italy, the Duke of Avarna reproached us for our "protest" against further occupations of islands. This reproach was naturally

\* See Appendix No. 8.

† See Appendix No. 9.

‡ See Appendix No. 10.

§ See Appendix No. 11.

|| See Appendix No. 12.

¶ See Appendix No. 13.

refuted and it was stated that there was no question of a "protest"; we had simply specified our legitimate claims based upon the wording of Article VII. Meanwhile, in order not to make Italy's problem more difficult, we had no intention of availing ourselves of our rights. It is clearly shown that we have specified in express terms our rights in accordance with the agreement, but have done nothing to impede Italy's activities. In order not to involve ourselves in the responsibility, we have refused our positive consent to measures which might be expected to create a reaction in the Balkans. Otherwise, we were content with having warned Italy against threatening reactions. Subsequent events have shown that those warnings were justified. All this will prove that we always have been mindful of our obligations to our allies and have shown our good-will as far as possible; we evaded useless discussions which might have disturbed the friendly relations between Vienna and Rome.

The above is exclusively for your personal information and you will avail yourself of the most suitable arguments therein contained, only in the event that the Marchese di San Giuliano should charge the Monarchy with having acted in an unfriendly manner during the Lybian war.

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No. 14.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 28, 1914.*

Have carried out your telegraphic instructions of the 26th inst., Minister of Foreign Affairs having meanwhile returned to Rome. Have added that you reserve the right to discuss the question of compensation at the opportune moment.

The Marchese di San Giuliano promised his reply for to-morrow.

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No. 15.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

On instruction from his government, the Imperial German Ambassador has requested me, if possible, to come to an agreement with

Italy concerning the interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Italy considers our procedure against Serbia as an aggression against Russia, and therefore holds that she is not compelled to join us in the struggle which may result therefrom, in view of the defensive character of the Triple Alliance.

Furthermore, Bollari, in Berlin, as well as the Marchese di San Giuliano and Salandra in Rome, have declared that Italy could assume a friendly attitude only if we accepted the Italian interpretation of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement.

Von Tschirschky was at the same time instructed to inform me that the German Government construed Article VII in the same sense as the Italian Government.

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and in behalf of his government made a statement analogous to that of my telegram of the 26th instant, to wit: Should the threatening conflict lead to war and concurrently to an even temporary occupation of Servian territory, the Italian Government, in accordance with Article VII of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, would reserve its right to claim compensation, with regard to which an agreement should be reached in advance. Furthermore, he declared that in case of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the Italian Government would maintain a friendly attitude, such as might be expected from a faithful and dutiful ally.

I replied to the Italian Ambassador that the disagreement with Serbia concerns only ourselves and Serbia; that, besides, we contemplated no territorial conquests, and that an occupation of Servian territory was therefore not intended.

The Duke of Avarna having suggested that it would impress the Powers very favourably if we were to make a formal statement to this effect, I replied that we could not do so, as it was impossible to assume that, in the course of the war, a situation would not arise which would compel us to occupy Servian territory, even against our will. Such a contingency, however, was not to be expected in the normal course of events.

I request you to communicate to the Marchese di San Giuliano the statement made by the Duke of Avarna and my reply thereto. Furthermore, with reference to the claims of compensation based upon Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, you will make the following declaration:

As already stated to the Italian Ambassador, territorial acquisitions are in no way contemplated by us. Should we, nevertheless, be



compelled to decide upon an occupation which could not be considered as merely provisional, we should be prepared to enter upon an exchange of views with Italy concerning an eventual compensation. On the other hand, we fully expect Italy not only not to impede her ally's action in the pursuance of her aims, but to maintain steadfastly the friendly attitude of an ally, in accordance with her promise.

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No. 16.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

The reply of the Italian Government which, as mentioned at the end of my telegram of the 28th instant, had been promised to me, has been handed to me by the chief of the Foreign Minister's cabinet; though it is in writing, I was requested to consider it as a verbal note.

The text of the reply reads:

(Translation from the French.)

“Animated by the most friendly feelings for Austria-Hungary, the Italian Government has exerted itself and will continue to do so in an effort to induce Serbia to accede to the demands made by the Austro-Hungarian Government in its note of July 23, 1914. The Italian Government has repeatedly counselled Serbia to pursue a policy of correct and good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary.

“The Italian Government recalls with satisfaction Austria-Hungary's friendly attitude toward Italy during the last phase of the Italo-Turkish war.

“The object of that war was a far-distant province, which could not affect the interests of Austria-Hungary. The scene of the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is in territories close to Italy; our vital interests might, therefore, become involved in the outcome of events.

“The provisions of Article VII present, in our mind, one of the main points upon which the Triple Alliance rests, and which have even been conducive to the strength of the Alliance. They apply to the whole of the Balkan peninsula; they were supplemented by the

agreement of 1909 concerning the Sandjak of Novibazar, which in its turn was confirmed when the Triple Alliance was renewed.

“The cordial coöperation of Italian and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy should be based upon Article VII and the agreements covering the Sandjak of Novibazar and Albania. Should this not be the case, said coöperation would, it is feared, not be possible. It is upon these premises that the mutual friendship and confidence between the two allied powers should rest.

“Germany concurs in our interpretation of Article VII.

“With reference to Count Berchtold’s intention to take up the question of compensation when occasion arises, it is clear that an agreement on this point is urgent. As long as an understanding has not been reached, and as long as Austria-Hungary’s interpretation of Article VII leaves room for doubt, Italy cannot pursue a policy which would, either now or at a later time, facilitate a temporary or permanent occupation by Austria-Hungary; on the contrary, Italy would have to support every measure calculated to prevent such a possible occupation, while at the same time endeavouring to harmonise as much as possible such a policy, dictated by her vital interests, with her keen desire to strengthen more and more the intimate relations existing between the two allied powers. During the last few years these relations have improved considerably and should still further develop for the strengthening of the existing amity and the adjustment of the mutual interests of the two countries.

“We therefore hope that the frank and loyal exchange of views pending among the three allied powers in Vienna and Berlin may as soon as possible be concluded in a way which will enable them to coöperate in a common policy.”

This reply fully confirms my impression that this Government is chiefly concerned in the question of compensation; that it is determined to force a solution at this time and to this end invokes Germany’s interpretation of Article VII and does not even shrink from attempts at blackmail (see penultimate paragraph). It is also worthy of note that the Italian Government desires the exchange of views to take place in Vienna and in Berlin.

## No. 17.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 30, 1914.*

Minister of Foreign Affairs spontaneously brought up to-day the question of Italy's attitude in the event of an European war.

As the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; as our measures against Servia may precipitate a European conflagration, and finally as we had not previously consulted this government, Italy would not be bound to join us in the war. This, however, does not preclude the alternative that Italy might, in such an event, have to decide for herself whether her interests would best be served by taking sides with us in military operations or by remaining neutral. Personally he feels more inclined to favour the first solution, which appears to him as the more likely one, provided that Italy's interests in the Balkan Peninsula are safeguarded and that we do not seek changes likely to give us a predominance detrimental to Italy's interests in the Balkans.

## No. 18.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, July 31, 1914.*

The statement contained in your telegram of July 28, already more than half concedes Italy's right to compensation as claimed by the Rome Cabinet. After this partial success, the blackmailing policy to extort the remaining claims is naturally further encouraged. The Minister of Foreign Affairs actually told me to-day that, in reply to your statement, he had informed Vienna that your communication is vague and unsatisfactory.

I firmly believe that, whether Italy joins in the war or remains neutral depends, not really upon the question of compensation, but chiefly upon the Italian Government's view of the international situation in Europe and upon military considerations. We are, therefore, running the risk of assuming far-reaching obligations concern-

ing compensation, without, however, being certain of attaining our object, which is to assure Italy's military coöperation.

Furthermore, the exact nature of the compensation is obviously vague, and we cannot anticipate and determine a compensation when we do not ourselves know what we might receive in return therefor. In my opinion it would be unwise for us to go any further than to declare our readiness to grant to Italy, in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, an adequate compensation after the conclusion of the war—whether localised or extending to Europe—provided Italy faithfully fulfils her duties as an ally, and also provided we occupy territories in the Balkans, either permanently, or for a period exceeding in length that of the occupation of the Dodecanesos (the Turkish islands) by Italy.

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No. 19.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

In a long interview with Duke of Avarna to-day, we reached a complete understanding concerning compensation. The German and Italian Ambassadors thereupon drafted a note based upon this interview and fully acceptable to the Duke of Avarna. The text of this note will be wired to Rome to-morrow.

I hope that this question may now be considered as settled in agreement among the parties to the Triple Alliance.

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano immediately of the foregoing and point out to him that we now confidently expect Italy to carry out her obligations as an ally, a matter about which I never have been in doubt.

For your own information I wish to state that the natural fears of Italy's possible future attempts to misuse the right to compensation for purposes of extortion have had to be relegated to the background on account of the heavy responsibility which would have attached to an uncompromising interpretation by us of Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

No. 20.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

Please inform immediately the Marchese di San Giuliano that I have made the following statement to the Duke of Avarna:

(Translation from the French.)

“I consider that a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of Article VII constitutes, with regard to our relation in the present and the future, an element of uncertainty likely to harm the close relations between the two Powers. I accept Italy’s and Germany’s interpretation of Article VII provided that Italy shall observe a friendly attitude toward the pending operations of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and that she shall carry out her duties as an ally in case the present conflict should lead to a general conflagration.”

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No. 21.

*His I. and R. Apostolic Majesty to His Majesty the King of Italy.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 1, 1914.*

(Translation from the French.)

“Russia, who assumed the right to intervene in our conflict with Serbia, has mobilised her army and her fleet and threatens the peace of Europe.

“In agreement with Germany, I am resolved to defend the rights of the Triple Alliance and I have ordered the mobilisation of all my military and naval forces. We owe thirty years of peace and of prosperity to the treaty which unites us, and I am gratified that our Governments fully agree on its interpretation.

“At this solemn hour I am happy to be able to count upon the support of my Allies and their gallant armies, and I cherish the

heartiest wishes for the success of our arms and for a glorious future of our countries.”

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No. 22.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 1, 1914.*

According to statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a meeting of the Cabinet to-day there developed a desire that in case of an European war Italy should remain neutral. The prevailing sentiment was that neither her obligations nor her interests would justify Italy's participation in the conflict. The consensus of opinion was that the Triple Alliance is purely defensive; that the war has been precipitated by us without previously notifying the Italian Government of our action; and that Italy could not be expected to sacrifice the lives of her people and their welfare and to expose her extensive coasts to the greatest danger, when the object of the war would at the very best be directly contrary to the interests of Italy, inasmuch as it would disturb the *status quo* in the Balkans in favour of Austria-Hungary, either materially or morally.

During the discussion which followed, the Marchese di San Giuliano remarked incidentally that—as no formal decision had been reached—his statement did not definitely mean that Italy would not, possibly at a later date, participate in the war. The word “compensation” was again uttered on this occasion.

My impression persists that this is a case of blackmail which already has been partly successful. It is Italy's desire, whether the war be localised or extended to the other Powers, that her attitude shall be purchased on the principle of cash payment before delivery.

No. 23.

*His Majesty the King of Italy to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 2, 1914.*

(Translation from the French.)

"I have received Your Majesty's telegram. I need not assure Your Majesty that Italy, who has done all she could for the maintenance of the peace and who will do all she can to contribute to its restoration as soon as possible, will preserve an attitude of cordial friendliness toward her allies, in conformity with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, in accordance with her sincere sentiments and with due regard to the great interests she has to safeguard."

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No. 24.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 2, 1914.*

I understand from your telegram of yesterday that the Italian Government is considering the eventuality of an active participation at a later time in the European war.

In consideration of this circumstance I made to-day the following statement to the Duke of Avarna:

"*Afin d'éviter tout malentendu je tiens à constater que les ouvertures faites le 1. ct. au Duc d'Avarna au sujet de l'interprétation de l'article VII de notre Traité d'alliance ont été faites sur la base de notre ferme conviction que l'Italie remplisse dès le début ses devoirs d'alliée conformément à l'article III.*" \* ("With a view to avoid any misunderstanding I wish to point out that our declarations of the 1st instant to the Duke of Avarna concerning the interpretation of Article VII of our Treaty of Alliance were based upon our firm conviction that Italy from the very outset would fulfil her duties as an ally in accordance with Article III \* of the Treaty of Alliance.")

\* See Appendix No. 14.

I added that the unjustified Russian mobilisation against us and Germany, and in particular the meantime reported incursion of Russian patrols across several points on the Russo-German border line, constituted an ample justification for applying the terms of the Alliance.

Please express identical views to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I add for your personal information that the Duke of Avarna gave warm expression to his conviction that, even if an intervention by Italy in our favour were not to be deducible from the letter of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Italy would be morally bound to side with her allies. He had strongly advocated this course in his reports to his government, but he did not know if his opinion would carry decisive weight.

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No. 25.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 2, 1914.*

I have carried out the instructions contained in your telegram of yesterday.

Up to 5 P.M. the Minister of Foreign Affairs had received from the Duke of Avarna no telegram with the concerted text; on the contrary, a report dated from yesterday evening had reached him, according to which you rejected the Italian interpretation.

The Marchese di San Giuliano, therefore, declined to discuss, before knowing the text, the possibility of Italy reconsidering, on the ground of our concessions, her intention to remain neutral. I naturally insisted that our concessions were wholly dependent upon the strict carrying out on Italy's part of her duties as an ally, such as we understand them.

In the course of the evening I had another conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who alleged he had just received from Vienna the text of the declaration.

Though I endeavoured to obtain a declaration from the Marchese di San Giuliano, he could not be induced to make one. He said that he would have to consider this serious matter carefully before



discussing it with the Prime Minister to-morrow; he hoped to be able to reply to-morrow afternoon.

As I further pressed for a statement, he remarked that his first impression was not favourable because we had laid down conditions. Our declaration, in any event, would be nothing more than one link in the chain, and the question of Italy's participation in the war or of her neutrality would not be decided solely by a satisfactory settlement of this matter.

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No. 26.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 2, 1914.*

The Marchese di San Giuliano has just sent me in the form of a letter his reply concerning Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance.

Its contents are as follows:

(Translation from the French.)

"Salandra and I examined yesterday evening the reply of Count Berchtold with regard to Article VII, and I hasten to inform you of the result of our conversation.

"Count Berchtold subordinates the acceptance of our interpretation of Article VII to Italy's attitude in the present crisis. Although any modification of a treaty can be subordinated to this or some other condition, its interpretation cannot be subordinated to any condition. It is not a question of expressing the present will of the contracting parties, but of determining their intentions at the time when the pact was concluded. For instance, Germany subordinates to no condition her interpretation, which is similar to ours, and this is logical.

"In the second place it must be borne in mind that the present crisis is temporary, whereas the Triple Alliance is to last twelve years and can be renewed; it is desirable, I might almost say necessary, that during this long period the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy regarding Balkan questions should be identical. It is desirable and even necessary that their diplomatic action should

develop in thorough agreement, trust and mutual friendliness. In order to attain this end it is indispensable that we should be thoroughly agreed as to the interpretation of Article VII. This necessity is clearer than ever in the present crisis, even if we do not participate in the war; we would not be able to lend an unswerving and strong diplomatic support to the military activity of our allies if we were not fully reassured as to the interpretation of Article VII by Austria-Hungary, particularly in anticipation of more complicated situations, when occasions might arise to apply Article VII.

"Furthermore, the acceptance of our interpretation of Article VII, important as it is for determining our diplomatic attitude, will in itself not suffice to eliminate all the very weighty reasons which prevent us, at least for the time being, from joining in the war.

"As a matter of fact, this general statement does not clearly and definitely settle the nature and value of compensation in all cases, nor their relation to the perils and immeasurable sacrifices to which this war might expose us; perils and immense sacrifices which are greater than those to which our allies are exposing themselves. This enormous difference between the perils and sacrifices on the one hand and the advantages on the other is, in fact, the very reason why Austria-Hungary desired a war which she could easily have avoided, whereas we did all in our power to save Europe from this fearful misfortune. Nevertheless, we hope that there will be an opportunity, without our participating in the war, of giving our allies proof of our sincere, friendly sentiments, and we count, therefore, on a settlement which will reconcile our respective interests.

"All these considerations, serious as they might be, would not prevent us from doing our duty, were such a duty incumbent upon us; but inasmuch as the '*casus foederis*' cannot apply to this war, the Cabinet yesterday evening decided upon neutrality, with the proviso that it might later on come to a decision more in accordance with the wishes of our allies, should this become our duty or should our interests make such a course advisable.

"The balance of power in Europe, in the Balkans and on the sea which surrounds Italy represents a vital interest to our country, and it is not afraid to face any sacrifice or any decision which the protection of its interests, and of its existence, should impose upon it.

"Since the day I took over the conduct of the foreign affairs of my country, one of the principal goals of my activities has been to bind ever more closely the ties of mutual friendship between Italy and Austria-Hungary. I shall continue to bend all my energies

in this direction, for I consider it essential in the interests of our two nations. In order to attain this goal, their interests must be reconciled and those of each be satisfied without harming those of the other.

"I rely upon Count Berchtold and upon you, my dear Ambassador, to assist me in carrying out this task."

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No. 27.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 3, 1914.*

The text of the Italian declaration of neutrality published to-day follows:

"Several European Powers are in a state of war, and as Italy is on terms of peace with all belligerent parties, the Royal Government and the nationals of the kingdom are bound to observe the precepts of neutrality according to the principles of international law. Whosoever violates these precepts shall bear the consequences of his action and eventually be subjected to legal punishment."

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No. 28.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 3, 1914.*

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of yesterday, I had an explanation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Marchese di San Giuliano denied that an occasion for applying the terms of the Alliance had risen for Italy and submitted arguments which my report will have meanwhile conveyed to you.

## No. 29.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

In conformity with the statements of the Marchese di San Giuliano to you, the Italian Ambassador to-day informed me, in accordance with his instructions, that in the matter of Albania Italy would adhere to the agreements made with Austria-Hungary as well as the decisions of the London Conference. He stated furthermore that Italy in no way wished to derive advantage from the fact that Austria-Hungary is at present preoccupied elsewhere, and that she wished to maintain a similar attitude regarding every situation that might arise later.

The Italian envoy at Durazzo, he stated, had been instructed to issue very stringent orders in like spirit to the consulates subordinated to him.

I request you to say to the Marchese di San Giuliano that I take note of this declaration with gratification; moreover, that I am convinced in advance that Italy will respect our agreement now, just as we respected it during her campaign in Lybia.

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No. 30.*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 4, 1914.

Acting under instructions, the Italian Ambassador notified me yesterday that, according to a circular telegram, the Italian Government had decided to remain neutral in the present conflict.

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I considered this decision as hardly friendly on the part of Italy, that it is an attitude not in accord with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and that as Germany had been assailed by Russia, and France was siding with Russia, the occasion for applying the terms of the treaty was plain.

Aside from these circumstances I should define it as an extremely unwise policy on the part of Italy to separate herself from her allies at such a momentous time in the history of the world.

This is the first time since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance that a general alignment of nations was in progress. Were Italy to remain on the side of her allies, an opportunity would offer for the realisation of her far-reaching aspirations, such as the acquirement of Tunisia, Savoy and so on; should she detach herself, then she would receive nothing. Italy was on the wrong path in allowing herself to be dominated by the fear that Austria-Hungary might extend her power in the Balkans. The Italian Government was well aware that we did not at all aspire to such an expansion but aimed solely at the maintenance of the existing situation. The outlook for Italy was, however, favourable for expansion and an increase of power. Nothing was further from our mind than to shift the balance of power. If such were really the view taken in Italy, he, as Ambassador, should dissipate such suspicions and adduce the arguments furnished by our attitude during the thirty years that our alliance had lasted. I could not believe that the Marchese di San Giuliano intended to deceive us when he repeatedly emphasised at Abbazia that Italy wanted, nay needed, a strong Austria-Hungary. How could he reconcile such statements with his present departure aiming at a policy finally directed against the maintenance of the Monarchy in its present shape? This is all the more inexplicable at a time when feeling with us is turning in favour of Italy, when a wave of warm sympathy for the allied kingdom is noticeable. He could not have failed to observe the very friendly demonstrations which had occurred here lately. The Government intended to take advantage of this improvement in public feeling to exert itself in favour of the Italian element.

When I pointed out the loyal attitude which His Majesty, my gracious Sovereign, had maintained toward Italy throughout all crises since the existence of the alliance, the Ambassador was obliged to confirm the truth of my observation.

The Duke of Avarna finally told me that he had requested the Marchese di San Giuliano to grant him a short personal interview; if the Minister agrees, he will spend a few days in Rome.

No. 31.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 4, 1914.*

The enquiry directed by the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff to Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff, regarding the execution of the measures agreed upon between the allies in case of war, has elicited the following reply:

“Meeting without object, as Cabinet has declared Italy’s neutrality.

“ ‘Moderate’ mobilisation has been ordered. If Austria-Hungary refrains from occupying Lovcen and from disturbing balance of power in Adriatic, Italy will ‘never take up arms against Austria-Hungary.’ ”

From the foregoing statement you will gather how the policy of blackmail is still being pursued.

The Duke of Avarna leaves to-day; I have requested him to tell the Marchese di San Giuliano that his letter of the 2nd inst., addressed to you, indicates that stand taken by us had been somewhat misunderstood.

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No. 32.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 4, 1914.*

Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché in Rome reports that from a conversation with Italian Chief of General Staff he understands that fears entertained by Italy concerning disturbance of balance of power in Balkans and Adriatic are ascribable to possible occupation of the Lovcen.

Please inform the Marchese di San Giuliano that we have absolutely no intention to wage war against Montenegro. We shall not invade Montenegrin territory so long as the small border kingdom shall refrain from hostile acts against the Monarchy.

You will renew suggestions to the Marchese di San Giuliano to consider advisability of repeating in Cetinje his counsel favouring neutrality.

No. 33.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 5, 1914.*

I fear that Italy will attempt to force us to continue discussions regarding compensation with the intention of demanding cession of Trentino, to the exclusion of compensation elsewhere.

Italy is likely to depart from neutrality sooner or later. If our group achieves swift and decisive success, Italy will probably join us and possibly become more moderate in her claims to compensation; in contrary eventuality she might be tempted to reinforce her moral extortion by means of military measures.

I have as yet no tangible indications to support my apprehension. But rumours of such intentions on the part of Italy reach me from different sources.

Such an interpretation of events is in complete accord with the overt references in the official press to the Trentino as compensation, the reported withdrawal of troops from Genoa and Naples, the prohibition of the export of grain and flour purchased by us, as well as the reports published in Milan newspapers regarding events in Trent.

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No. 34.

*Von Mérey to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 5, 1914.*

Minister of Foreign Affairs appeared pleased at statement I made in accordance with your telegram of yesterday and said he was quite willing once more to warn Montenegro to remain neutral.

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No. 35.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 9, 1914.*

Your telegram of 2nd instant conveyed the text of a letter from the Marchese di San Giuliano. As his letter contains many incorrect

statements, I consider it advisable to revert to them. Please bring the following to the attention of the Marchese di San Giuliano in any way you may deem suitable. I leave it to your judgment either to add complementary arguments, or to modify any passage so as to make it fit in with the situation which may prevail on your side.

The Italian contention that we wish to construe Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance according to our present convenience—"volonté actuelle"—is contrary to facts. We have always held that, in accordance with the original intent of the treaty, Article VII could not apply to a conflict such as our present one with Servia. We have nevertheless expressed our willingness to extend the application of Article VII to the present case, but we considered ourselves entitled to expect Italy to fall in with the views of her two allies regarding the interpretation of Article II of the same treaty in the case of an European conflagration.

We fully agree with the Rome Cabinet that it is highly desirable that the policy of Austria-Hungary and Italy concerning Balkan questions shall be tuned to the same key, and that the diplomacy of both countries shall be guided by principles of perfect agreement and mutual confidence, not only for the long period of twelve years during which the present treaty is to remain in force, but even with a view to its possible renewal after the expiration of that period. For this very reason, in accepting the Italian interpretation of Article VII, we did not limit our concession to the present conflict with Servia and Montenegro, but did it in a way—"pour nos relations du présent et de l'avenir"—which could leave no room for doubt that we intended that our agreement with Italy's interpretation should remain in force for the whole duration of the treaty.

We must strongly emphasise that the present great war has been forced upon us and Germany by Russia, who sought to prevent us from punishing a state, independent from Russia, for acts which roused the indignation of the civilised world and threatened our existence.

The undeniable fact that for years we have, under most difficult circumstances, sacrificed important interests solely for the sake of avoiding a conflict, is the surest proof that we did not desire war. When a settlement of our difference with Servia became unavoidable, we hoped that the conflict might remain localised. Germany supported us to the same end.

We will not question the self-evident fact that a participation in the war would involve Italy in sacrifices and expose her to dangers,



but we cannot agree with the opinion expressed that these sacrifices and dangers would be greater than those we have to face. Though Italy may be exposed to very dangerous attacks by the British and French navies, even the most fatal issue of such an engagement would not endanger her territorial integrity and her existence. On the other hand, most important advantages would accrue to Italy in the event of victory: predominance in the Western Mediterranean and the first place among Latin nations.

We note with satisfaction the suggestion expressed by the Italian Government of an eventual decision at a later date upon a course complying with the wishes of her allies, and we are willing to coöperate as far as possible in effecting such a change in the situation.

With reference to the contention that the general wording of Article VII is not sufficient and does not express clearly the nature and extent of eventual compensation, it should be recalled that we already have declared that we do not seek territorial acquisition in the Balkans. Under the circumstances we had no cause to suggest an exchange of views with Italy concerning specific compensation.

The closing words of the Marchese di San Giuliano's letter meet with our appreciative sympathy. He must be perfectly aware that the aim which he set for himself when he assumed office and toward which he has been steering his policy, are fully in accord with those which I, too, considered consistent with our policy when I succeeded Count Aehrenthal. I, too, hope that the mutual good-will and friendly spirit which inspire our recently inaugurated exchange of views will easily dissipate the difference of opinion which followed the outbreak of the present crisis. I further hope that it will prove possible to effect the desired agreement, not only as applying to the present crisis but also for the duration of the Treaty.

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No. 36.

*Count Ambrózy to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 11, 1914.*

By order of Ambassador von Mérey, I handed to-day to the Secretary General a written memorandum drafted in the sense of your telegram of the 9th instant.

After having carefully read the document he remarked that

opinions were certainly divided as to whether in our conflict with Serbia we had adhered to Article I\* of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance; that the second paragraph of this Article provides that the contracting parties are bound to mutual consultation and support in defence of their interests.

Sgr. de Martino further argued that, even conceding that we did not seek any permanent territorial acquisition in Serbia, we might nevertheless wish to seize the Oriental Railway. If such an intention existed on our side—and he would not deny that it would be legitimate—it would have been of great value to Italy to have had first an exchange of views with us, in order that we might be enabled to protect her interests in connexion with the construction of a railway from Serbia to the Adriatic. He finally requested me to consider his remarks as merely his private views, as it is incumbent solely upon the Marchese di San Giuliano to define Italy's standpoint.

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No. 37.

*Count Berchtold to Count Ambrózy.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 12, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day after his return from Rome.

The Duke of Avarna said that he had submitted a detailed report on the situation created by Italy's declaration of neutrality to His Majesty King Vittorio Emanuele, to the Marchese di San Giuliano and to the Prime Minister, Sgr. Salandra. He had emphasised the point that the position taken by the allied kingdom had impressed us very unfavourably and even had the effect of shaking our faith in Italy's loyalty and the value of her word. The explanations given to the Ambassador—Italy's political and military unpreparedness, her consideration for England, etc.—concur with the reports on the subject which already have reached us from Rome. The publication of the White Book concerning the exchange of views between us and Berlin with regard to Russia's possible intervention had caused particular dissatisfaction in Rome, as we had failed to discuss the subject with the Italian Government.

\* See Appendix No. 15.

In reply, I insisted that Italy's declaration of her neutrality had undoubtedly created ill-feeling here when it became known. Meanwhile we had learned the reasons which had impelled Italy to choose a neutral attitude, and we were inclined to view her course in another light. Considering the situation, we accepted Italy's neutrality and were convinced that she would loyally maintain it.

With regard to the publication of the White Book it should be stated that, as the Ambassador was well aware, I never had concealed from him that the investigation instituted at Serajevo might possibly lead to explanations with Servia and to our demand for guarantees; an eventuality which the Duke of Avarna fully admitted. It had always been our intention to settle the difference with Servia by ourselves and to localise the possible conflict that might ensue. All other powers, with the exception of Russia, had supported us in our endeavour. We had, it is true, received the assurance from Germany that she would stand by our side if Russia should intervene. Our action against Servia was, however, not aimed at provoking Russia.

The Duke of Avarna was gratified to find that Italy's attitude is viewed now in a more friendly way than was the case at the time of his departure for Rome.

I confirmed this in reasserting my conviction that if Italy had not wholly fulfilled her duties as an ally, this was due only to the pressure of particularly difficult circumstances. I then brought to the Ambassador's knowledge the contents of our reply to the Marchese di San Giuliano's letter of August 2nd received by von Mérey. I pointed out in particular that we had no intention whatever of disturbing the existing balance of power in the Balkans or in the Adriatic, and that we should certainly consult with our Italian ally if any modification of our position in this respect were contemplated.

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No. 38.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 16, 1914.*

Acting on instructions, the Italian Ambassador informed me yesterday that Italian War Office is concentrating troops in the Valley of Lagna and of Cornazzo, in the vicinity of Tarcento, Province of Udine, for manœuvres which had been decided upon long ago.

## No. 39.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 20, 1914.

The Duke of Avarna to-day read to me a long despatch from his Government.

The Marchese di San Giuliano first of all states that the German Military Attaché had greatly exaggerated the military preparations made by Italy on all her frontiers. Three reasons had compelled the Government to resort to these measures: the wish to appease public opinion, the necessity of preserving order at home, and finally the impossibility of otherwise keeping in check the thousands of Italian labourers who are flocking back from abroad as a consequence of the state of war.

With regard to the attitude of the Italian press, the Marchese di San Giuliano refers to his endeavour to induce it to remain impartial. His influence, however, is small as the greater part of the press is not subsidised.

While insisting upon the desirability of dispelling the existing mutual distrust, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses the belief "*que tant qu'on ne s'entend pas sur des moyens concrets à concilier les intérêts des deux Parties la méfiance réciproque persistera, bien qu'elle ne soit pas justifiée ni par les intentions du Gouvernement italien ni par celles—bien connues—de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi François Joseph et du Comte Berchtold*"; ("that the mutual distrust will continue as long as no agreement is reached concerning positive measures toward conciliating the interests of both parties; this, notwithstanding the fact that such distrust is warranted neither by the intentions of the Italian Government nor by those—so well known—of His Majesty the Emperor-King Francis Joseph and of Count Berchtold").

At this juncture the Ambassador asked me to express my opinion; I assured him that this view would meet with understanding on our side. Thereupon he asked if Baron Macchio might not receive instruction in this direction.

The Duke of Avarna added that his Minister's despatch drew attention to the news again circulating in Italy about "the concentration of large Austro-Hungarian forces on the Italian frontier" and also concerning the alleged preparations for the departure from

Riva of officers of the military and civil service and of their families.

I authorised the Ambassador to deny these rumours as wholly unfounded.

The despatch of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs closes with the assurance that he will steadfastly "persevere" in his endeavours, the object of which is that the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, if possible, shall be improved at the conclusion of the present crisis, and that under all circumstances they shall be safeguarded from further derangement. In this connexion the Marchese di San Giuliano points out that should stringent measures be adopted for the repression of "Austrian or Hungarian nationals of Italian extraction, the result might be very dangerous." As to the Italian Government, it had recently issued orders to the prefects to prevent carefully, within the limits of the law, any anti-Austrian demonstrations; and to suppress such demonstrations if they should break out nevertheless.

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No. 40.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 21, 1914.*

Minister of Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that it was a necessity for Italy to remain neutral. While frankly admitting the enticements and inducements of the Entente Powers, he assured me that they would be unavailing.

Certain military preparations, it is true, were being made—in such time of uncertainty some precautions are necessary—but a further call to arms on a large scale was not contemplated. He had besides applied to General Cadorna to furnish him with a summary of the measures already taken which would be placed at my disposal; I approved this course with satisfaction, especially on account of the news disseminated from various quarters for the obvious purpose of promoting mutual distrust; I mentioned the ridiculous rumours concerning our alleged aggressive preparations in the Trentino and elsewhere, and suggested an occasional frank explanation of such delicate matters as the safest means of counter-acting a campaign aimed at creating ill-feeling.

The Minister then also referred to the serious perplexity which hundreds of thousands of unemployed workmen were causing to Italy. The emigration to Argentine, which usually sets in in September, would be impossible this year; uncounted labourers are streaming back from other countries, and many factories in Italy had been obliged to shut down or at least to reduce their output. It is a serious matter to keep in check these people, among whom many turbulent elements are to be found; as far as I could understand him, the military measures up-to-date were to a great extent connected with that problem, though there was no question of calling all these people to arms.

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No. 41.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 21, 1914.*

When a suitable occasion offers you will show the Marchese di San Giuliano that you are conversant with the contents of the Duke of Avarna's statement which was telegraphed to him yesterday.

Should the Minister ask if you have received specific instructions, you will reply that your mission and the general instructions which it carried with it naturally predisposes you to join gladly in every conversation tending to dissipate possible misunderstandings and to consolidate the mutual relations of the two allies. Under those circumstances and in accord with instructions I sent you after my last conversation with the Italian Ambassador, you are prepared to seek, together with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, though non-committally for the time being, such concrete means as could lead to the goal which Italy, in common with ourselves, is trying to reach.

For your personal information I add that on the one hand I lay stress on not breaking off our negotiations with Italy, while on the other hand I do not wish to see Italy advance such demands as the cession of a part of the Monarchy's territory. If the Marchese di San Giuliano opens the conversation with positive proposals you will show a willingness to listen; however, if the Minister should refer to the cession of the Trentino or some other part of the Monarchy, you will point out that such a proposal could not possibly lead to the desired understanding.

As against this you might refer to a previous conversation that took place between Count Ambrózy and the Secretary General and bring up the subject of Italy's interest in the construction of a railway to connect Servia with the Adriatic, as well as of the Kingdom's important interests in the Mediterranean.

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No. 42.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 22, 1914.*

The Under-Secretary of State to-day advised me to suggest that we issue statements to the effect that we willingly recognise the Italian Kingdom's neutral attitude; this with a view to soothing Italy's guilty conscience and thus confirming her in her present attitude.

An unreserved acceptance by you of the Italian interpretation of Article VII would be welcomed here with gratification.

In the view of the German Government, Austria-Hungary and Germany should at the earliest possible date make the analogous declaration that they acknowledge the Italian interpretation of said Article, *i.e.*, that an acquisition of territory in the Balkans by Austria-Hungary would, even if Italy remained neutral, be subject to a prior understanding with and an adequate compensation for the Kingdom.

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No. 43.

*Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 23, 1914.*

You will have gathered from my statement to the Duke of Avarna (last conversation of 20th instant) that I am constantly endeavouring to soothe Italy's guilty conscience, and I request you to remind the Under-Secretary of State of this fact; you will recall that I told the Duke of Avarna on the 12th instant that, "considering the situation, we accepted Italy's neutrality and were convinced that she would loyally maintain it."

With regard to Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, I have explained that my first statement, which was to a certain degree conditional, meant that I had thought myself entitled to expect in exchange that Italy would fall in with the opinion of her allies concerning the occurrence of the "*casus foederis*." Wishing to avoid any misunderstanding, I expressly stated in a subsequent conversation with the Duke of Avarna that I had not made the acceptance of the Italian interpretation subject to any condition but had simply expressed the hope that Italy would consider the "*casus foederis*" as actually existing.

You will inform Herr Zimmermann that he may consider himself authorised by us to expressly affirm to the Rome Cabinet that the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin unreservedly accept the Italian interpretation of the words "*dans les régions des Balcons*" of Article VII, not only with regard to the present crisis, but as applying to the whole duration of the Treaty. I am sending identical instructions to Baron Macchio, should he and Baron Flotow \* have to make a similar joint declaration in Rome.

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotiations with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or permanent occupation of territory in the Balkans by us.

You will further inform the Under-Secretary of State that I should have no objection to conceding to Italy specific rights, in the form of territorial acquisitions at the expense of others, should she remain neutral or join in the war on the side of her allies at a later date.

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No. 44.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 23, 1914.*

I authorise you to declare to the Rome Cabinet, in conjunction with your German colleague, that we accept unreservedly the Italian interpretation of the term "*dans les régions des Balcons*" in Article VII, not only for the present crisis, but also for the whole duration of the Treaty.

This declaration implies our willingness to enter into negotia-

\* German Ambassador to Italy.



tions with Italy concerning compensation in the case of a temporary or permanent occupation of a territory in the Balkans by us.

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No. 45.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 25, 1914.*

My German colleague having received instructions to-day which authorise him to declare the acceptance of the Italian interpretation of Article VII, we to-day individually made to Marchese di San Giuliano an analogous verbal statement.

He appeared to be favourably impressed but stated that at the present stage of the war there was as yet no basis for entering into a conversation.

I declared that I was always ready for such a conversation, but that I understood perfectly well his wish to postpone it.

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No. 46.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 25, 1914.*

The German Ambassador to-day read to me the contents of a telegram from Baron Flotow reporting on a conversation with the Prime Minister, Salandra.

The Italian Prime Minister informed him that the majority in Parliament and almost the entire country are for the maintenance of neutrality; that the Government is determined to hold steadfastly to this attitude.

The military measures taken by Italy did not go beyond those of other neutral states, such as Switzerland, for instance.

He had formally declared to the socialists that Italy would remain neutral. He had made a similar statement to the republicans, represented in the Chamber by eight Deputies, who are said to favour war.

Salandra finally stated with emphasis that neutrality would be

maintained as long as nothing happened in those parts of Austria-Hungary inhabited by a population speaking the Italian tongue.

Sgr. Bollati is said to have expressed similar views in Berlin.

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No. 47.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, August 27, 1914.*

In complete agreement with the declarations of the Marchese di San Giuliano, Sgr. Salandra to-day laid stress upon the Italian Government's firm determination not to allow itself to be forced out of its neutrality.

The Prime Minister recounted Italy's domestic difficulties and the measures taken by him for influencing the press and the political world. He expressed a strong hope that our relations would not only not suffer from the present international crisis, but that they would grow even more intimate after the crisis.

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No. 48.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 28, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador, in accordance with instructions, informed me to-day of the declarations made by you and Baron Flotow to Marchese di San Giuliano concerning the interpretation of Article VII. Although gratified by the declaration that we agreed to the German and Italian interpretation and extended it to the full duration of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed with you and Baron Flotow that a concrete conversation on the application of said article could not well be entered into while the war situation continued uncertain.

## No. 49.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, August 28, 1914.*

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day that he had received telegraphic information from his Government, with liberty to communicate it to me, that the British and French Governments had declared, in Rome, their intention not to occupy Valona. These two governments at the same time, by means of more or less veiled references, tried hard to find out if Italy would eventually depart from her neutrality. The Marchese di San Giuliano had declared categorically that Italy would maintain her policy of strict neutrality.

I thanked the Ambassador for the information and requested him to tell his Minister that I considered this a confirmation of that loyal adherence to neutrality which I had expected from Italy.

## No. 50.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, September 5, 1914.*

The Under-Secretary of State informs me that Sgr. Bollati made a long call upon him to-day and, after remarks on the general situation, finally brought to light Italy's great desire to occupy the island of Saseno, of course only in perfect harmony with Austria-Hungary and Germany and only for the purpose of upholding the agreements concerning Albania.

Bollati said he was very much in favour of this plan, which would enable Italy to display some activity and thus divert public opinion from its attitude of hostility to the Triple Alliance. Besides, it would serve a useful purpose to state publicly that the occupation had been decided upon by the Triple Alliance; the Entente Powers would understand—probably to their discomfiture—that the Triple Alliance is still working together.

Finally, the Ambassador requested Herr Zimmermann to use his influence in Vienna in that direction.

A few hours later the Under-Secretary of State received from Bollati the following letter:

*“Au sujet de l’occupation de l’île de Saseno, il est bien entendu que cette mesure conservatoire, à effectuer par un petit détachement italien et qui devait être faite en plein accord avec l’Autriche-Hongrie, n’aurait qu’un caractère purement temporaire pendant la durée de la guerre et sans aucun but territorial. Plus j’y pense plus je crois que cette idée présente de sérieux avantages. Vous feriez, j’en suis convaincu, œuvre très utile en y obtenant aussitôt que possible l’adhésion du Cabinet de Vienne, adhésion qui serait naturellement rendue publique, et qui produirait les meilleurs résultats en Italie et ailleurs.”* (“With regard to the occupation of the island of Saseno, it is well understood that this conservative measure, to be carried out by a small Italian detachment and to be undertaken in full agreement with Austria-Hungary, would be a purely temporary undertaking for the duration of the war, without any territorial aim. The more I consider this plan, the more it seems advantageous to my mind. I am convinced that it would prove very useful if you would obtain as soon as possible the consent of the Vienna Cabinet; this consent, of course, would be made publicly known, and its publication would produce excellent results in Italy and elsewhere.”)

Herr Zimmermann has instructed von Tschirschky to discuss the matter with you.

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No. 51.

*Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, September 6, 1914.*

Herr von Tschirschky called on me yesterday; he brought up the question of the island of Saseno and asked me if the Duke of Avarna would possibly lay himself open to a refusal if he were to sound me in connexion with Italy's desire.

I replied to the German Ambassador that the Duke of Avarna had no reason to fear a refusal on my part.

I am contemplating a reply to the Duke of Avarna to the following effect:

In response to Sgr. Bollati's statement to Herr Zimmermann, and considering the assurances repeatedly exchanged between Vienna and

Rome, that our agreement with Italy and the decisions of the London Conference concerning Albania remain in force, I agree to the temporary occupation of the island of Saseno by Italian troops during this war.

We naturally must lay stress upon the occupation of Saseno by Italy as having been decided upon by the Triple Alliance and as being announced by simultaneous official publication in Vienna, Berlin and Rome. I shall also give expression to my hope that the Italian Government will appreciate our consent all the more, as public opinion in the Monarchy is particularly sensitive with regard to all questions concerning Albania.

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No. 52.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, September 8, 1914.*

The Under-Secretary of State told me that Sgr. Bollati informed him to-day that the negotiations concerning Saseno should be conducted in Berlin, and that the Duke of Avarna would not approach you on the subject. Herr Zimmermann replied to Bollati that he failed to understand this. At Bollati's request he consented to find out how the proposal would be viewed in Vienna, but ventured the opinion that, after the conciliatory reply he had received from you, he considered that the Duke of Avarna should negotiate directly with you on the matter.

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No. 53.

*Count Berchtold to Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, September 9, 1914.*

I am unable to discern the reasons for transferring from Vienna to Berlin the negotiations concerning Saseno. Since we have given our consent to the temporary occupation of Saseno we shall maintain it; we are even prepared to conduct negotiations on the matter by way of Berlin. We hold, however, that since the proposed occupa-

tion is to satisfy an Italian desire, excessive complaisance on our part might lead the Italian Government to undervalue the tokens we have so far given of our willingness to meet its wishes.

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No. 54.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, September 11, 1914.*

In reply to a despatch from the Prince of Wied appealing for his sympathy, King Vittorio Emanuele has sent him the following telegram:

*“Je remercie Votre Altesse des sentiments qu’Elle veut bien m’exprimer aussi au nom de la Princesse, et je tiens à L’assurer que je forme les vœux les plus sincères pour le succès de Sa haute mission et que mon Gouvernement continuera de faire tout ce qui sera possible pour la prospérité de l’Albanie.”* (“I thank Your Highness for the feelings kindly expressed also on behalf of the Princess. I wish to assure Your Highness of my most sincere wishes for the success of your high mission. My government will continue to do all in its power for the welfare of Albania.”)

Through the medium of the press, Italy semi-officially denies any intention to occupy Valona, although the local newspapers for the past few days have been discussing such an eventuality, and although, according to reports from Naples, troops are in readiness there for an expedition to Valona.

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No. 55.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, September 12, 1914.*

The Under-Secretary of State told me to-day that, according to reports from Rome, the Marchese di San Giuliano is said to state that the question of an occupation of Saseno broached here by Sgr. Bollati is to be ascribed to a misunderstanding and was in no way meant seriously. Sgr. Bollati, on the contrary, told Herr Zimmer-

mann yesterday that it has been decided in Rome not to occupy Saseno because it had become apparent that Greece would respect Albania's neutrality, and also because the intended diversion of public opinion from the relations with Austria-Hungary had become superfluous since these relations had become quite satisfactory.

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No. 56.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, September 29, 1914.*

I had a conversation yesterday with the Secretary General on the subject of fresh rumours about an impending Italian expedition to Valona; he renewed the statement made to me by the Marchese di San Giuliano weeks ago, that such an undertaking was quite out of the question, unless Epirote forces occupied Valona. In such a case the Italian Government would find it impossible to disregard public opinion, which is extremely sensitive on that point.

When I pointed out that this decision is likely to be known in Athens, Sgr. de Martino said that Venizelos, in spite of all his denials, had been prone to favour the activities of the Epirotes. The very reservations made formerly by Zografos that they would advance only if they were provoked by Mohammedan raids, proved, in his opinion, that such an eventuality was not excluded, since such raids can be brought about at any time.

I took occasion to emphasise our common interest in the continued existence of Albania in conformity with our agreement; I also pointed out how far we were from an expansion policy in the Adriatic, a fact demonstrated by our decision to conduct a purely defensive war against Montenegro.

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No. 57.

*Von Móricz to Count Berchtold.*

(Report.)

*Ancona, October 3, 1914.*

The editorial in to-day's issue of *l'Ordine*, the local organ of the governmental party, urges the immediate occupation of Valona by Italy.

This occupation, to be carried out by a detachment of marines, should be confined to Valona and the island of Saseno.

The necessity of such an occupation is explained by the argument that Italy should forestall Greece and Servia, who will advance claims upon Albania and have already begun underhanded military and diplomatic activities.

It is pointed out to Austria-Hungary, who may object to Italy's proposed action, that she must recognise Italy's right to proceed alone, in view of the Dual Monarchy's inability to join in an action in Albania at the present time.

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No. 58.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 5, 1914.*

According to confidential information, France has now also promised Tunisia to the Italians, if Italy places herself on the side of the Triple Entente. The aim of the Entente is evidently to check-mate the Austro-Hungarian fleet with the Italian fleet and thus release the Anglo-French naval units in the Mediterranean for use in the North Sea.

You might, in the course of conversation, pass a remark at competent quarters to the effect that the Entente is anxious to engage the Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets in a fight for their mutual destruction in order, first to destroy the German fleet by all available means, and then to obtain unlimited power in the Mediterranean.

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No. 59.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, October 6, 1914.*

Information received from Salandra quarters indicates that an occupation of Valona, limited to a detachment of marines, may take place soon. The endeavour to convince the Prime Minister that this would be a good means to divert the mind of the nationalists and their followers from the northern neighbour, has been successful. At the same time it would give an opportunity to obtain a foothold in



the Balkans with the avowed object of safeguarding the interests of the Balkan States under Italy's lead at the time of the great settlement of affairs.

On various occasions my opinion on the subject has been directly sought, and I have expressed my personal view that Italy, in consequence of her repeated declarations, stood on the same ground as to our agreement and the London decisions as we do. Even a temporary separate action, therefore, could not alter the situation but would only accentuate the necessity for the existence of an independent Albania in the interests of Europe.

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No. 60.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 7, 1914.*

Should your conversation with the Marchese di San Giuliano about the dangers of mines in the Adriatic offer an opening, I leave it to your discretion to point out that this situation constitutes a proof of the detrimental effects of the Anglo-French action in the Adriatic upon Italian interests.

This complication would surely have been avoided had the two above-mentioned powers had any reason to fear that Italy would in this case abandon her neutrality.

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No. 61.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, October 8, 1914.*

In various conversations of a general nature concerning Albania, and lastly with Sgr. Salandra, I have been unable to discover any inclination to discuss with me the possible occupation of Valona.

Should it actually be planned to carry it out in a small way, namely, without any other preparations than those which have been mentioned of late, it is possible that a *fait accompli* might be created in the belief that the Central Powers could not interfere at present;

the old song of woe would be struck up that Italy had not been notified in good time of our intentions against Servia.

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No. 62.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 9, 1914.*

Referring to your telegram of yesterday:

Separate action on the part of Italy in Albania would constitute an open breach of our Albanian agreement and would oblige us to formulate certain reservations. In any case, the contemplated step on the part of Italy would furnish us with the occasion, in the event of a successful war, either to demand at a later date the restitution of equality in Albania or else to consider the occupation of Valona as Italy's chosen measure of compensation for a possible territorial expansion on our part in the Balkans.

At the commencement of our enquiry at Serajevo, I informed the Duke of Avarna of the possibility that complications might arise with Servia. Therefore no comparison can be made between the Italian procedure in Albania and ours in Servia.

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No. 63.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, October 10, 1914.*

In a conversation dealing with the contents of your telegrams of the 5th and 7th inst., I was interested to learn from the Marchese di San Giuliano that he fully shares your views concerning the intentions of the Entente in regard to the fleets, as set forth in your first-mentioned telegram.

Only in this way, he said, could the hitherto passive and watchful tactics of the Anglo-French fleet in the Adriatic be explained.

To his mind, the Entente would not attain this object, and he would do all in his power to prevent it. This is the chief reason why he remained at his post, despite his serious illness.

I told him that you, who are well acquainted with his intentions, would receive his decision with great satisfaction. I also ventured to say that in so doing he was carrying out logically and consistently his own policy, which he had introduced on the day of his entry into the *Consulta*. The Minister replied that this would remain his policy forever, and that it was the only one which Italy could reasonably pursue.

The Marchese di San Giuliano then said that his opponents are beginning to realise that they cannot win the day. Their anger over this discovery, however, will impel them to redoubled efforts, and they will make the best possible use of every trifling incident in their attacks. The agitation should not be taken too seriously, he advised me; it would recur time after time, and the Italian Government is doing its best to counteract it as far as the liberal institutions of the country permit. In so doing, the Government must be careful not to put new weapons into the hands of the opposition. The recent arrest in Rome of propagators of irredentistic pamphlets should prove that the Italian Government is in earnest, and that it is paying due attention to the matter.

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No. 64.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 12, 1914.*

I hear from Berlin that the Marchese di San Giuliano has told the German Ambassador in Rome that should an expedition to Albania be effected, detachments would be landed from time to time, to be used according to the development of affairs. The occupation of Saseno, as originally contemplated, would be of no avail.

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No. 65.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, October 18, 1914.*

According to instructions I conveyed to-day to the Italian Prime Minister the condolences of the Austro-Hungarian Government and

the expression of your personal sympathy on the occasion of the Marchese di San Giuliano's death.

Sgr. Salandra asked me to express the sincere thanks of the Italian Cabinet to the Austro-Hungarian Government and especially to your Excellency for the kind expressions.

Subsequently the Prime Minister informed me that he had taken over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *ad interim* in order to cut short all discussions among the public and to avoid giving rise to speculations as to the possibility of a change in Italy's foreign policy as a result of the change in the person of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As long as he remained at the head of the Cabinet, the Marchese di San Giuliano's course would be adhered to, the Minister assured me.

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No. 66.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, October 19, 1914.

Secretary General informs me Italian Government has received news from French sources that Greek troops are advancing on Argyrokastro.

Simultaneous information is available, that thousand armed men with machine guns are planning to land in Albania by means of sailing vessels. Also that Essad's intentions are doubtful, and that he endeavoured to draw troops from Valona. Albania's neutrality appears, therefore, in danger. In view of these discoveries the *Consulta* intends to address a circular note to the Italian Ambassadors to the signatories of the London protocol. In that note Italy, as the only neutral power among them, will emphasise her strict adherence to the protocol and express her intention to prevent any attempts to land expeditions. For that purpose Italy would increase the number of ships in those waters.

I confined myself to the assurance that we also adhered to the terms of the London protocol and that therefore our coöperation with Italy in those regions holds good even though it may confine itself to moral action for the time being.

No. 67.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 22, 1914.*

Report from Berlin says that Italian Ambassador there has informed Under-Secretary of State of Italy's decision to have war-ships cruise off Albanian coast to prevent importation of foreign arms and ammunition.

As the other Powers who have guaranteed Albania's independence are at war, Italy considers it her duty to assume this part.

Bollati added he could confidentially inform Zimmermann that this measure involved no other purpose, but that Rome looked upon it as a welcome opportunity to divert public opinion from demonstrations hostile to the Triple Alliance.

No. 68.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, October 22, 1914.*

De Martino tells me Sir Edward Grey has called attention of the Italian Government to the great misery and famine among the Mohammedans in Epirus, and has given the Italian Government to understand that it should consider the idea of a helpful intervention. Sir Edward Grey emphasised the danger that these adverse conditions may result in a massacre of the Christian population.

The *Consulta*, therefore, is considering the idea of some minor action "*avec des gardes*" (with guards) to remedy the prevailing conditions. A military expedition, as discussed in the local press, is out of the question.

Italy would in any case adhere to the two principal points of the London decisions, namely, the neutrality and the integrity of Albania.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, October 24, 1914.*

I beg to hand you herewith copy of notes from an interview which I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna concerning an Italian action in Albania.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

The Italian Ambassador read to me on October the 23rd, a telegram from his Government, the gist of which is:

The British Ambassador, Sir J. Rennell Rodd, has called the attention of the Italian Government to the miserable conditions prevailing in Epirus and to the danger of massacres. The autonomous government would not be in a position to cope with the situation.

Venizelos could not do less than send one regiment to Argyrokastro to avert massacres, under a promise to withdraw his troops at a later date should the Powers so desire. The Greek Government would not object to an Italian occupation of Valona.

Sir J. Rennell Rodd hopes that the Italian and Greek Governments will find a way to a mutual understanding.

In consideration of this request by the British Ambassador, the Italian Prime Minister is said to have expressed the following views:

Sgr. Salandra could not accept the suggestion of a direct understanding with Greece in the matter of an even temporary occupation of Epirus by Greek troops.

He, however, appreciated the humanitarian motives invoked by the Greek Government and would not oppose the sending to Argyrokastro of one Greek regiment for police purposes, while noting Venizelos's promise to withdraw the Greek troops at a later date. Finally he reserved to himself the right to carry out at Valona such police operations and humanitarian measures as might be needed for the welfare of the refugees. The London decisions with regard to Albania would remain in force.

The Duke of Avarna, instructed to communicate to me the above

in strict confidence, added that in view of the abnormal conditions at Valona, and in order to protect for humanitarian reasons the Moslem refugees, the Italian Government proposed to undertake strictly necessary operations without giving them the character of a military expedition with the purpose of an actual occupation of the city. The London decisions concerning Albania would remain intact.

In acknowledging the Duke of Avarna's communication I laid stress upon the reservations made by the Italian Government in connexion with the character of the police and humanitarian operations as proposed by the Italian Cabinet, and especially upon the maintenance of the London decisions as the basis of the expedition referred to. I made the point that I also considered the Italian action from the point of view of our Albanian agreement with Italy, and that it must be understood that that agreement should be maintained in full vigour.

The Duke of Avarna promised me to telegraph to his government in that sense.

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No. 70.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, October 26, 1914.*

Italian battleship "Dandolo" made port this afternoon; is said to have sanitary expedition on board.

Special correspondents of leading Italian papers have arrived in Valona.

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No. 71.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, October 30, 1914.*

Italian flotilla has landed small detachment of marines on Saseno. My Italian colleague informed me of this fact without touching

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upon the question of the purpose of this measure (observation or military occupation).

On highest point of island the Italian flag has been hoisted.

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No. 72.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, October 31, 1914.*

In pursuance of my communication about the installation of an Italian sanitary station at Valona (which is already known) the Italian Embassy, acting on instructions, announced to-day that the Italian Government has proceeded to the provisional occupation of the island of Saseno for the effective preservation of Albania's neutrality.

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No. 73.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, November 1, 1914.*

Local Italian representative has verbally informed the local authorities of the occupation of Saseno and described it as a measure for the protection of Albania's neutrality and for the maintenance of the London agreement. He added that no similar measures were contemplated in respect of Valona.

I note that the provisional character of the measure has not been specifically stated.

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No. 74.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, December 12, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador called on me yesterday and gave me the following verbal information under instructions:



The military invasion of Servia by Austria-Hungary has created a new situation which demands a conversation between us and Italy in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. Under the terms of that article we were obliged to come to an understanding with Italy before our occupation of Servian territory, were it only temporary. We, therefore, should have notified the Italian Cabinet and effected an understanding before we crossed the Servian frontier.

Baron Sonnino did not wish to dwell upon this delay or to hamper our military measures; this fact, he pointed out, should be appreciated as a proof of Italy's conciliatory disposition. The Ambassador then hinted at objections on our part to various operations which Italy proposed to undertake during the Italo-Turkish war, and especially to our reservations against any action in the Dardanelles. He further declared that Italy had a vital interest in the preservation of Servia's full integrity and in her political and economic independence. Our repeated declarations to the effect that we did not aspire to any territorial acquisitions at Servia's expense, did not constitute a formal and permanent obligation. Moreover, an invasion of Servian territory—even a temporary one—is sufficient in itself to disturb the equilibrium in the Balkans and to give Italy a right to compensation. Even in the event of Austria-Hungary gaining any advantages of non-territorial nature, Italy would have that right under the terms of Article VII. In the opinion of the Italian Government it is necessary to proceed without delay to concrete negotiations, because of the new situation which closely affects most vital political and economic interests. The Duke of Avarna then referred to the uneasiness which prevailed in the Italian Parliament and to Italian public opinion, which clearly indicated the direction of Italian national aspirations and which the Italian Government would have to take into serious account. An understanding between the two governments on the basis which Baron Sonnino has in mind, would eliminate the old causes of friction and put an end to the frequent and deplorable incidents; a condition of cordial and permanent friendship would thus be established without which all official agreements are void and barren.

In conclusion the Ambassador emphasised the friendly feeling which inspired his representations.

No. 75.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, December 12, 1914.

In reply to the Duke of Avarna's communication which I transmitted to you to-day, I have expressed my surprise at his declarations; the starting point, namely, the assumption that we should have sought an understanding with Italy before we crossed the Servian border, seems unfounded in view of the actual situation. I recalled to his mind that I informed him then of our intention to face all the consequences that might result from Servia's attitude and that the Marchese di San Giuliano, at that time, gave us his formal assurances that Italy would not impede our military operations; all she desired was that we should recognise the applicability of Article VII to the present situation. We then noted the first-mentioned promise; as to the latter demand, the Italian point of view was accepted after some arguing on our part. In a letter to von Mérey at the beginning of August, the Marchese di San Giuliano referred to the circumstances which required clarification in order to put the relations of the allies upon a sound basis. Although we replied thereto in a friendly manner, the Italian Government failed to revert to the subject.

As to our reservations during the Lybian war, I must point out that Count Aehrenthal's objections to the operations on the Albanian coast were primarily based upon our Albanian agreement; that the seizure of the islands in the Ægean Sea practically constituted an occupation, as this was not a military operation in the theatre of war and was done solely because Italy wished to hold a pledge; finally, that the action in the Dardanelles endangered the *status quo* of the Turkish Empire and was therefore in conflict with the terms of the Triple Alliance agreement, which had been effected for the preservation of the Turkish possessions in the Balkans. Besides, in the matter of the last-mentioned action, we had confined ourselves to calling Italy's attention to the danger involved in it and to a refusal to share the responsibility for its possible consequences. The Ambassador also recalled our previous objection to the extension of the Lybian war to the mainland of Asia Minor; I pointed out to him the fundamental differences between the situation in those days, when Italy contemplated the creation of a new theatre of war, and the

present instance, when we are fighting on the only available battleground.

I further explained to the Duke of Avarna that there could be no question of a temporary occupation in the present case. The expression "temporary occupation" had been used in the Triple Alliance agreement in reference to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can hardly be asserted that our present military operations could be construed as an occupation of a certain territory. Moreover, I could not possibly be in a position to state with certainty at this moment that one or the other particular locality was at present in our possession, as continued changes are taking place in this respect.

As to Serbia's integrity, the Ambassador should be well aware that we never intended to interfere with it; but on the contrary that it was Serbia's lust for our territory that brought on the war. At the present time we still hold the same standpoint and desire no more than the maintenance and protection of our possessions. Should we seriously consider the occupation of some defined territory, we would acquaint the Italian Government in a loyal manner of our intention to do so, and would then broach the subject of compensation.

It is impossible to-day to foresee what turn events may take, and therefore I could not accept the view that the mere fact of our advance into Serbia has already disturbed the equilibrium in the Balkans. Any agreement presupposes a well-defined basis; but an agreement reached at this time could not provide for every eventuality, and it would be subject to daily modifications.

However much I would like to assist in the clarification of the matter, I could really find no basis for specific negotiations to-day; all the less so as our agreement clearly stipulates that the compensation should be in proportion to the advantages gained by the other party.

In concluding the conversation, I requested the Ambassador to point out to his Government the inconsistency of adopting Serbia's standpoint—as it appears to do—namely, the standpoint of a State whose foreign policy is aimed mainly at the acquisition of our possessions in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. Any unbiased judge of the present situation must realise the grave dangers which Italy would incur by adopting such a policy.

No. 76.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, December 13, 1914.

In pursuance of my telegrams of yesterday, I send you the following for your guidance:

The Triple Alliance agreement provides for the events of temporary and permanent occupations. Our advance into Serbia does not even partake of the character of a temporary one. In the course of the last few months the theatre of war has been frequently on Servian soil but at times also in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Hungary. In the nature of things it is necessary that we should endeavour to carry the war as much as possible beyond our border. But even when that has been accomplished there can be no question of an occupation. A temporary occupation would exist only if, after the termination of the war, some of the enemy's territory were held as a pledge or if for some reason beyond the purposes of the war such territory were to be kept under military occupation.

Should the Italian Government refer to a disturbance of the equilibrium in the Balkans in connexion with the provisions of the Triple Alliance treaty, you will point out that Count Aehrenthal had drawn Italy's attention at the beginning of the Lybian war to the dangers of a reaction on the Balkan peninsula, for the possible consequences of which Italy would have to bear the responsibility. In the same way I warned Italy of the dangers which an extension of the sphere of that war would involve. Events which have since then followed in quick succession have ultimately brought about a disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium, and especially a strengthening of Serbia, which considers that the time has now arrived when she may extend her aspirations to the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

If the Italian Government desires at this early stage of events to open negotiations with us concerning a possible compensation, I have no material objection to such a course, but am confronted with the practical difficulty of finding a concrete starting point for such negotiations at the present time. It is naturally out of the question to involve in such a discussion any territory belonging to the Dual Monarchy if such territory be the object of the Duke of Avarna's insinuations about national aspirations. It would rather have to

deal with the question of the islands in the *Ægean* Sea, still occupied by Italy, and the evacuation of which had been expressly promised; also with the taking possession of the island of Saseno.

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No. 77.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, December 13, 1914.*

Under instructions from his government, von Tschirschky to-day communicated the following:

The German Foreign Office has been informed that the Duke of Avarna has been instructed to open negotiations on the question of compensation in the spirit of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement. The Rome Cabinet has added to this information the request that the German Government support its proceedings at Vienna.

Von Jagow replied that the time had not yet come for a division of the spoils, whereupon Bollati explained that it was only a question of an exchange of views. The fact that his Government desired to communicate its wishes to Vienna at this time proved its intention to adhere to its agreement and to maintain its neutrality.

The Italian Ambassador decidedly rejected the objection of the Secretary of State that such a representation on the part of Italy could easily be taken as a threat.

In the further course of the conversation between von Jagow and Sgr. Bollati reference was made to the uncertainty of Italy's real desires; the Secretary of State gave the Italian Ambassador confidentially his private opinion that the word "Trentino" should not be mentioned.

The instructions to von Tschirschky express the views of the German Government in concise form that, however unpleasant the question of compensation, it appeared most advisable under the circumstances to accede to the exchange of views desired by the Italian Government.

The Secretary of State assumes that Italy has in mind the Trentino, but can hardly believe that the Rome Cabinet would dare pronounce the word. Should this, however, happen against his expectation, he would consider it advisable to avoid a harsh refusal but to

explain the reasons which make that cession by Austria-Hungary impossible.

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No. 78.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, December 21, 1914.*

The Duke of Avarna has been supplied by his government with arguments with which to reply to those that I have recently brought up in the question of compensation.

The Ambassador has consequently expressed himself on the 19th inst. in the following sense:

Baron Sonnino does not agree with the differentiation between a temporary occupation and an "*occupation momentanée dérivant d'opérations de guerre*" (momentary occupation resulting from war-like operations.) Such a differentiation would be against the spirit and wording of Article VII.

We should have sought an understanding with Italy before we crossed the border. On this point Italy had made no difficulties and thereby had given ample proof of her friendly intention to take into account Austria-Hungary's military urgencies. Nevertheless, it was Austria-Hungary's duty to come to an agreement with Italy on the matter of compensation.

Our arguments based upon Austria-Hungary's attitude during the Lybian war are being opposed by the contention that we not only impeded temporary or momentary occupations, but even the mere bombardment of coasts and so forth. The apprehension that the *status quo* may be disturbed, could not be cited by us, as at the present time, by her measures against Servia, Austria-Hungary, herself had disturbed the equilibrium stipulated in Article VII.

Italy could not be satisfied with our promise to refrain from the annihilation of Servia, as she herself had declared that she would not permit any encroachment upon Servia's integrity and independence, which would be contrary alike to Italian interests and to the provisions of the agreement. There was a wide margin between the preservation of the political and economic integrity and independence of a country on the one hand and its annihilation on the other; this margin should be the object and the basis of negotiations and an agreement.

The occupation of territory, whether partial, permanent, or temporary, as well as advantages of a non-territorial nature and even the acquisition of a merely political influence or of economic privileges, should be made the object of a previous agreement on the basis of a compensation.

Our declaration that we would seek an understanding whenever we should be about to proceed to an actual occupation was not sufficient, and the Italian Government would regret it if we held to the view that we are not yet called upon to enter into negotiations on the subject.

Finally, it was pointed out that prolonged discussions about the principles of the interpretation of Article VII, while events are taking their course and may confront Italy with accomplished facts, must be considered as decidedly prejudicial to Italian interests; and that it would be of the greatest importance to place our mutual relations upon a sound basis of permanent mutual confidence.

I gave the Ambassador the opportunity to speak without interruption and then expressed myself virtually in the following sense:

To begin with, I considered it both regrettable and unjustified that the Italian Government should qualify our attitude during the Lybian war and at the commencement of our war with Servia as unfriendly to Italy. Nothing could be more incorrect than this statement. It evidently had been forgotten in Rome that we made no difficulties about her fighting in Africa, when Italy began the military operations in 1911 without informing us; that we have repeatedly exerted our influence during the peace negotiations to induce the Porte to accede to the Italian demands, and that we had been the first to recognise Italy's new possessions. Both Count Aehrenthal and I had pointed out the dangers which the transfer of the theatre of war to European Turkey would bring about, as the *status quo* of that country would be endangered by such an action, and the maintenance of that *status quo* was the main object of the Triple Alliance. We have met Italy as far as possible in the matter of the islands of the Dodecanesos, the continued occupation of which surely represented more than a mere incident of war.

The Ambassador should not forget the many official and semi-official demonstrations which took place in Italy after the conclusion of the war—demonstrations which gave full recognition to and appreciation of our friendly attitude.

I then reminded the Duke of Avarna that not long ago it was stated on both sides, here and in Rome, that our alliance after thirty

years of existence had never been stronger than after the Lybian war; that the two governments had been in perfect harmony as to the fundamental principles of the Albanian question which had come to the fore during the Balkan war, and were brought into closer touch with each other by the daily labours in connexion with minor affairs of common interest. We should not forget the great aims for the future. Italy, as much as Austria-Hungary, has vast cultural interests to protect from common dangers which we can overcome in the long run only by our united efforts. This thought was the guiding principle of my Italian policy, and I would sincerely regret it if this were not understood in Italy.

As to the contention that we should have reached an understanding with Italy before we crossed the Servian border, I would say that this view was unfounded, because we opened war upon Servia solely to defend ourselves against Servian aggression. We at that juncture accepted Italy's interpretation of Article VII and certainly would not have refused to enter into negotiations on the basis of that article, had the Italian Government desired it.

We now still adhere to the same views, namely:

1. We do not question the claims which Italy may advance on the ground of Article VII, if the proper occasion should arise.
2. We are prepared to enter into negotiations with Italy on the question of compensation, although we realise fully that it will be no easy matter to find a stable basis for such negotiations in view of the shifting war situation, especially in the Balkans.

With regard to the distinction between temporary occupation and war operations, I called the attention of the Italian Government to the fact that this differentiation was to be traced back to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had not the character of a permanency and was taken as a precedent when the Triple Alliance agreement was drawn up. The temporary occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not under any interpretation be construed as a war operation, pure and simple. But even should the present war operations justify the claims for compensation, both governments would still find it impossible to come to an agreement even by means of an analogous interpretation of the facts, as it is impossible to foresee all eventualities connected with the military activities.

In comparing our objections to the imperilment of the *status quo* in European Turkey during the Lybian war with the dangers arising for the *status quo* in the Balkan peninsula by reason of our armed action in Servia, Italy seems to overlook the fact that in those days



the question concerned the *status quo* as defined in the Triple Alliance agreement, and which since then has been upset in favour of Serbia by the treaty of Bucharest.

With reference to the Italian contention that it would not suffice if we merely gave assurances that we did not intend to annihilate Serbia, I must fully admit that Italy's claim for compensation is not confined to this sole event; but no assertion to the contrary has ever been made by us.

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No. 79.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, December 21, 1914.*

As early as two days ago, Baron Sonnino directed a conversation with me to the subject of the discussion which the Duke of Avarna has entered into with you on his instructions. He observed that its starting point, namely, the occupation of certain parts of Serbia by Austro-Hungarian troops, must now of course be eliminated.

I was in a position to state that he already had received your reply, and had given counter-arguments thereon to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna. As neither he nor I had as yet been acquainted in what way these had been received, and as I did not wish to forestall your instructions, I confined myself to the assertion, in reply to Sonnino's statement that he was anxious to discuss that question without delay and in a friendly manner with the Austro-Hungarian Government, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to my knowledge, was willing to pursue that discussion on principle. I do not think the impression prevails here that we declined further discussion.

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No. 80.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, December 25, 1914.*

Single shots were fired this morning in various parts of the city. Italian colony took refuge at the Consulate.

Subsequently Italian ships at anchor landed 300 men with landing guns, which occupied public buildings.

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No. 81.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.) *Valona, December 25, 1914.*

After the occupation of city, Italian Consul called on me and made the following explanation:

In consequence of revolutionary feeling in neighbourhood of Valona and of to-day's incident (rifle shots) he had requested Admiral Patris for military occupation of city for efficient protection of Italian and foreign colonies. Fulfilment of this measure also involves occupation of Kanina and Svernez.

Admiral Patris moved from anchored ship to Italian Consulate. City is quiet.

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No. 82.

*Count Berchtold to Count Ambrózy.*

(Telegram.) *Vienna, December 26, 1914.*

The Duke of Avarna called on me to-day and spoke in the following sense, according to instructions:

Anarchy prevails in Albania. Under the stress of existing conditions, the Government in Durazzo unanimously decided on the 20th inst. to appeal to Italy for protection, requesting earliest possible intervention and maintenance of public order.

The Italian Government has furthermore received news from Valona in the last few days, that dangerous events with unknown aims were under way. Public feeling in Valona is intense; rifle shots have been fired; the population is restless, and the Italians who had taken refuge at the Consulate requested Admiral Patris to land marines. This request was granted.

The Italian Government informs the Austro-Hungarian Government that it will take the requisite measures to reëstablish normal conditions in the city.

Italy has no intention to proceed to further occupations beyond Valona. Even in the case of that city, the measures are provisional. The provisional character of the proceedings is evidenced by the circumstance that the measures have been taken by a signatory to the London Conference, and because Italy has great interest in the maintenance of its agreement concerning Albania.

I confined myself to the response that I noted the Ambassador's declaration and especially his assurance that Italy was acting in the interest of the decisions of the London Conference and would endeavour to enforce them.

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No. 83.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Report.)

*Valona, December 26, 1914.*

Five individuals of no particular account fired several shots in various streets of Valona at 7 A.M., December 25, without hitting anybody.

The population remained quiet; the police started in pursuit of the disturbers of the peace, several of whom fled to the Italian (!) Consulate.

The Albanian notable, Tschako, appeared at the window of his residence and declared that he had been shot at; one of his servants ran into the street and shouted the Greeks were coming.

Several Italians carrying their packed portmanteaux repaired to their Consulate, where, according to his neighbours, the Consul had been awaiting events for some time despite the early hour.

At 8 A.M. a detachment of marines was landed and occupied the cross-roads, the Albanian Government buildings and the branch office of the Banking Syndicate. Several members of the local administration (the head of which, Osuman Nuri, had been in Durazzo for several days) proceeded to the Italian Consulate, where Admiral Patris had meanwhile arrived. After apologising for their early call, they declared that the public safety was not endangered, and that they considered all extraordinary measures unnecessary.

They were informed, in reply, that the prevailing anarchy was menacing to foreign interests and that it had been found necessary to end it.

200 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

Subsequently I received a visit from my Italian colleague, who offered to me the explanation which I have reported by telegram.

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No. 84.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, December 28, 1914.*

Italian landing detachment has sent squads of fifteen or twenty men to Kanina, Djuverina and the height east of Arta. Svernez is not occupied.

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No. 85.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, December 28, 1914.*

General Italian interference with civil administration is expected. Special symptoms consist in scrutiny of financial administration of district, and an order against the delivering of moneys to Central Government in Durazzo.

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No. 86.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, December 29, 1914.*

About six hundred men of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment landed this afternoon and entered the town. Landing not yet completed; engineers and artillery are expected.

Local authorities and population (the latter in compliance with public proclamation) and students of Italian schools, with Albanian and Italian flags, went to meet Italian troops, who were objects of ovations.

The Italian and Albanian flags were hoisted over the prefecture this morning without special ceremonies, replacing the Turkish flag which was flying until yesterday.

No. 87.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Report.)

*Valona, January 1, 1915.*

The Italian troops landed in Valona consist of three battalions of the 10th Regiment of Bersaglieri, four mountain batteries and about fifty engineers.

The detachment, which has an approximate total strength of 2,000 men, is under command of Colonel Mosca.

The three commanders of battalions are at Valona, Kanina, and on height of Asna (No. 241 north of Valona).

Companies of the two detached battalions are at Djuverina, Kishbardha and in the vicinity of Risili.

Moreover, Krionero is held by sixty marines, the harbour by twenty, and Porto Nuovo by one company of landing troops.

The presence of two officers of Carabinieri and of a police official, the latter already coöperating with the local police, points to a project for the reorganisation of the native gendarmerie and police.

No. 88.

*Count Berchold to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, January 4, 1915.*

The German Ambassador, in conformity with his instructions, to-day read to me two long reports by Prince Bülow from Rome. They referred to his conversations with Baron Sonnino and Giolitti on Italy's attitude toward the Dual Monarchy.

The contents of these reports may be condensed as follows:

Both the Italian statesmen reaffirm their friendly attitude toward the Triple Alliance and regret that Italy was not in a position to enter the war on the side of her allies. It should not be forgotten that the war had taken Italy by surprise; that Austria-Hungary failed to communicate with the Italian Government before she addressed her note to Servia; that the note was couched in aggressive terms which produced a bad impression in Italy; and finally that the view generally prevailed in Italy that Austria-Hungary, in view

of her present internal situation, could not conduct a war and that the Dual Monarchy was doomed to destruction. Moreover, the general situation in Italy should be remembered; the profound public irritation, the inability of the Dynasty to maintain its throne if Italy should fail to obtain territorial advantages from the general conflagration, and the consequent necessity of making preparations for war.

The Trentino was named as the territorial compensation, with a hint that many considered this as insufficient, as their aspirations extended even to Trieste.

Many Italian circles certainly desired the preservation of the peace and deprecated the idea of any departure from neutrality. On the other hand a minority of war agitators clamoured all the more. Notoriously it is the spouters who for the most part come to the surface in Italy.

In connexion with the communication, the Ambassador was instructed to emphasise the importance of not dropping the thread of the negotiations on the question of compensation and of reaching a timely and friendly understanding.

I remarked to von Tschirschky that negotiations on the question of compensation had been initiated, as he was aware; it now rested with Italy to express her views.

With particular reference to the cession of the Trentino, I deemed it necessary to draw von Tschirschky's attention to the fact that it appeared very doubtful whether even in this manner a guarantee could be obtained that Italy would remain inactive to the end. I asked whether Prince Bülow's conversation contained any reference to Italy's action in Albania. The Ambassador replied that the reports before him included nothing of that kind, but suggested that this might be a subject for interchanges between Vienna and Rome.

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No. 89.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, January 5, 1915.*

The Albanian officials are still at their posts, but Italian control of the civil administration has been allotted as follows:

The superintendency of the prefecture and the supreme com-

mand of the police and gendarmerie, in charge of Carabinieri officers, to Captain Castoldi; the post of adviser to the municipality, to Naval Lieutenant Pericone.

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No. 90.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, January 6, 1915.*

During my visit to-day, Baron Sonnino discussed the general situation and led the conversation to the question of compensation. He expected that we would soon resume our advance into Servia, and that thereby the formal basis for entering into negotiations would be restored. Therefore he thought it expedient to take advantage of the present lull until the next meeting of the Italian Parliament, to discuss the matter frankly and without reserve, and to analyse the viewpoints of both sides; possibly even to determine the main points for an agreement, as far as it may be possible to do so in a general way before the outcome of the world-war is known.

He then outlined the obvious difficulties of Italy's internal situation; the necessity, which was equally ours, of supporting the existing order in Italy and not exposing ourselves to the adversities that the existence of a Republican country on our border would imply; vigorous efforts which the Entente was making to bring Italy over to her side by all sorts of promises; finally, the dangers which any Italian Government would have to face should it fail to produce tangible results at the conclusion of the great crisis. Not only would the Anglo-French efforts collapse completely, but the maintenance of the Triple Alliance on principles adapted to the modified situation would appeal strongly to the country, if the Government were in a position to point to an existing and acceptable basis for the conclusion of an agreement, instead of talking of an empty willingness to discuss the principle of compensation.

Only in the interest of safeguarding the old alliance, which he thought the only suitable arrangement for Italy's interests, had he decided to enter these delicate negotiations; he had accepted his portfolio with the understanding that he would attempt such an agreement in order to remove the old causes of friction and to bring

about a sounder basis for our relations. If he were to fail in this, he would resign.

We then broached the subject of the various modes of compensation and of the difficulty of anticipating a solution to the numerous alternatives, which would meet all the possibilities that later developments might bring about. When I expressed the wish that the Italian aspirations for territorial compensations be specified, and referred to Albania, I found Baron Sonnino adverse to that question, as he does not at all approve the Albanian adventure. He held that Italy's interests in Albania consisted solely in preventing others from gaining a foothold there, but not in establishing herself on Albanian soil.

Without pronouncing the word "Trentino," he hinted that Italy's territorial aspirations could be satisfied in *one* direction only.

After this I turned the conversation to more hypothetical discussions of the give-and-take principle and the like; I encouraged the Minister in his views upon the expediency of these negotiations. Thereupon he expressed his intention to instruct the Duke of Arvana to continue the discussions with you, as negotiations could be carried on simultaneously in Vienna and here. Particularly should the mediation of a third party be avoided, he thought; the conversations should be conducted directly, so as to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

Moreover, I gathered from Baron Sonnino's utterances, that, judging from the tone of the press and from all indications in political circles, he did not consider the situation in Italy any worse than it was two months ago.

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No. 91.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, January 7, 1915.*

Baron Sonnino's deprecatory utterance with respect to Albania may be explained, to my mind, by the fact that Italy since her occupation of Valona is in possession of the locality most valuable to her and on the other hand because it is obviously in the interest of the Italian Government to assume now toward us the appearance of attaching but little value to Albania in general.

For that reason I think it desirable that you should not permit



yourself to be diverted by that assumption of indifference from persistently reverting to the Albanian matter in your conversation on the compensation question. You might base an argument as to Albania's value to Italy not only upon Italy's own attitude on the Albanian problem but also upon the disturbing effect which the despatch of a Greek man-of-war to Albanian waters has notorically produced in Italy.

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No. 92.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, January 8, 1915.*

I note with satisfaction that you have succeeded in having an extended amicable conversation with Baron Sonnino on the question of compensation, despite the delicate nature of the subject. I can but agree with the Minister, that misunderstandings and misconstructions may best be avoided by a direct explanation.

To my mind mediation by a third party should be invoked only if a deadlock should be threatened.

In pursuing the negotiations, it would appear desirable to treat the Italian claims for compensation not as the main theme but rather as a secondary item in the aggregate of all the questions referring to the alliance.

I consider it most important that it be made clear to the Italian statesmen that their claims are derived from the provisions of an article of the treaty of alliance, to the maintenance of which—I am glad to say—they adhere; and that the spirit and wording of that article require at this time a continuous keeping in touch and the pursuance of negotiations on the give-and-take principle.

Inasmuch as we recognise in principle Italy's right to eventual compensation and are willing to conduct friendly negotiations on that subject, Italy on her part must also remember her obligations to the alliance. Having admitted the merits of the Italian interpretation of the *casus foederis*, we are entitled to demand Italy's benevolent neutrality on the ground of the agreement. Although this has not always been the case (as for instance in economic questions) we have made no complaints, giving due consideration to the difficulties that confront Italy. On the other hand we cannot fail to note that the

Italian statesmen in their utterances in Parliament have maintained a silence on the existing alliance and that they have made little use of their possibilities to create a friendly feeling in the country by means of the press.

In this connexion attention should be drawn to the mobilisation and to the at least striking coincidence of the concentration of troops exactly on our border, which we have been observing without excitement or recrimination, in view of the existing alliance. These measures, however, have not failed to produce an effect upon public feeling in Italy itself, and have been regarded by foreign countries as directed against us. Our attitude in the matter of the Italian landing at Valona has been in full accord with our alliance; we have viewed Italy's military preparations in precisely the same spirit.

It appears to me desirable to lay stress upon these matters in discussing the question of compensation, without, however, making any recrimination in the sense above indicated; also to suggest to the Italian statesmen that, in negotiations purporting to be based upon the agreement, we expect an endeavour on Italy's part to give us tangible proof of her professed desire to maintain and intensify the friendly spirit of our alliance.

The attainment of Italy's territorial aspirations is a matter of Italian interest, and it should therefore be left to the Rome Cabinet to take the initiative in this respect.

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No. 93.

*Von Mayrhauser to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, January 11, 1915.*

Italian Consul informed me in course of conversation, that Italian customs officers would arrive soon for organisation of customs service.

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No. 94.

*Baron Macchio to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, January 12, 1915.*

In connexion with the despatch of a Greek war-ship to Durazzo, I took occasion on my visit to Baron Sonnino to-day to express my

astonishment at the fact that the Minister now seemed so little concerned about Albania, an attitude which is contrary to all previous impressions and to the former moulding of public opinion in Italy. Seeing that the value which Valona represents to Italy has been appreciated by us for a long time, and in view of the fact that we also held to the axiom that no other Great Power should be allowed to obtain a foothold there, our readiness now to consider such a possibility must be regarded as a great concession.

The Italian uneasiness about the Greek ship also is in contradiction with the disinterestedness which Italy now professes.

Baron Sonnino retorted that we had both overestimated the value of Albania. He realised that an intervention in Albania involves the intervening power in the danger of being drawn into all Balkan affairs. He still adhered to the London agreement and therefore looked upon the present occupation as provisional; especially since the public at present was not interested in Albania and—so to speak—prevented the Government from going too far.

It was, therefore, not possible to make any successes in Albania palatable to the public.

My remark, that public opinion should be directed by the Government and that I had seen to my regret that for many months it had been left entirely to itself, was answered by the frank admission of my statement. The Minister described this situation as being a deplorable consequence of local conditions and of the lack of information since the outbreak of the war.

I emphasised the point that we had met the wishes of the Italian Government also on these questions by having consented in the meanwhile to the occupation of the Dodecanesos; by so doing we had made an advance compensation to Italy. I also resorted to the arguments you suggested in the telegram of the 8th instant and impressed upon the Minister our expectation that Italy should prove by actions what she always expresses in words, namely, her desire to consolidate our alliance, as a response to our generous interpretation of the terms of the alliance on all the issues involved.

Baron Sonnino had little to reply to this. As to the concentration of troops upon our border, he endeavoured to justify it in the usual way by referring to our own measures. I had no difficulty in pointing out the inconsistency of this argument, by saying that our territories bordering upon Italy could not be exempted from the general mobilisation, and that our troops in those localities had subsequently been removed to the theatre of war.

No. 95.

*Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, January 12, 1915.*

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on an interview which I had yesterday with the Italian Ambassador on the question of compensation.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

The Italian Ambassador read to me on January 11th a telegram from his Government with the following contents:

In the course of a conversation which took place on December the 19th last, between Baron Sonnino and Baron Macchio, the former remarked: "Although the situation in the Balkans, where Austria-Hungary has embarked on a war likely to modify the equilibrium," justified a discussion about the applicability of Article VII, the withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops from Servia divested such a conversation of its actuality and urgency.

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino holds that the logical and political reasons remained unchanged and retained their original importance.

The logical reasons which required discussion, consisted in the fact that the war had been started from the very first with an object entirely at variance with the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans.

The political reasons which favoured a similar discussion were to create a basis of thorough good faith between the two Powers, to eliminate the continuous friction between them and to render possible their coöperation toward the common aims in matters of general policy. Any alliance which is not based upon friendship and does not tend to enhance that friendship, cannot be successful and is doomed to remain barren and useless.

In order to reach a relation of that kind it is necessary to possess the courage and the calm judgment to broach at the proper time the subject of compensation provided for in Article VII—a delicate question dealing with the possible cession of territory at present pertaining to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

Baron Sonnino put the question whether the Austro-Hungarian Government felt inclined to enter upon negotiations on that basis and pointed out that Italy as a neutral power could not at present consider a discussion which may involve territories belonging to other belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the conflict from now on.

When the Ambassador had finished reading, I reaffirmed our desire to consolidate and develop the friendly relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy and to take Article VII as a starting point for the conversations on the subject of the compensation question referred to in that article. While reserving the right to give a definite answer later on, I expressed to the Ambassador my astonishment and my regret that the Italian Government should have placed itself upon a ground which will hardly make it possible for us to enter upon negotiations. Moreover, the Italian viewpoint was at variance with the fundamental stipulations of the Triple Alliance agreement, which distinctly states that the alliance is designed to safeguard the absolute maintenance of the political status of the contracting parties and to protect them from any dangers that might threaten their safety.

"It is clear," I added, "that the proposition made by the Italian Government would involve an encroachment upon the fundamental idea of our alliance." Neither was that proposition in conformity with the spirit of Article VII, as the compensation provided for in that article could refer solely to territories on the Balkan peninsula. In fact, the equilibrium in the Balkans and the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Near East having been the point of departure of Article VII, the occupation of a territory on the peninsula by one of the contracting parties would necessarily give the other party the right to a compensation in the same region. Compensation beyond these limits could never have been contemplated at the time when the alliance was perfected.

I protested emphatically against the assertion by the Italian Government that the war against Servia had, from the very first, been started for a purpose adverse to the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans, and pointed out again that the war had been resorted to for the sole purpose of maintaining our *status quo*. This purpose not only did not militate against Italian policy in the Balkans but was essentially in accord with the spirit of that policy as sanctioned by the Triple Alliance Treaty.

Before closing our conversation, I drew the Ambassador's atten-

tion to the fact that the occupation of Valona by the Italians gave us the right to compensation from Italy on the ground of Article VII. The Duke of Avarna did not attempt to deny this.

Finally, I expressed the opinion that it seemed desirable to proceed to a general clearing of the ground for our future relations. In this connexion it appeared to me necessary to call the attention of the Italian Government to the almost daily advices of difficulties which Italy was putting in the way of the transit and the importation into Austria-Hungary of merchandise consigned to us, although she was bound by the terms of Article VII to observe a benevolent neutrality toward us. Aside from the above-mentioned circumstances, it must be noted that the fact of Italian troops having been massed quite close to our border for many months past, is incompatible with a benevolent neutrality.

The Duke of Avarna admitted the last contention but observed that the principle of give-and-take should apply to the exchange of merchandise, but that it would appear to him opportune if we were to lodge a complaint in Rome concerning the concentration of troops on our border.

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No. 96.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, January 14, 1915.*

In anticipation of later instructions I request you to remain merely receptive during the conversation you may have with Italian statesmen on the question of compensation.

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No. 97.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, January 19, 1915.*

Von Tschirschky read a telegram to me from Prince Bülow to Foreign Office, dated 18th inst. Prince Bülow urged Italian Foreign Minister to conduct discussions with us for clearing of our relations

and solution of pending questions with full consideration of our position and of our integrity as a Great Power. On that occasion he left no doubt in Baron Sonnino's mind that should he not succeed in keeping the peace with Austria-Hungary, Italy would find Germany with all her might at our side.

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No. 98.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, January 20, 1915.*

I beg to transmit to you for your information the enclosed notes on my interview with the Royal Italian Ambassador which took place on the 7th inst., on the question of compensation.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

*Vienna, January 17, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day to resume the conversation on the topic of compensation, which had been interrupted after his discussion with Count Berchtold on January the 11th.

After having agreed to conduct an entirely friendly and therefore more frank exchange of views, the Duke of Avarna proceeded to reiterate Baron Sonnino's instructions, which were known to me from Count Berchtold's notes. These instructions show with complete clearness that the aim of Italian policy is the acquisition of Austro-Hungarian territory.

The Ambassador having carried out his mission, a conversation ensued in the course of which we considered each individual point.

The Duke of Avarna, first of all, explained that the Italian Government, as well as the great majority of the Italian people, were inclined to a conservative policy, including the preservation of our alliance, "*mais avec la superposition de quelque satisfaction des aspirations nationales*" ("but with the presupposition of some satisfaction of the national aspirations"). Without such a success their efforts would be unavailing, and moreover, the dynasty and the existing order would be endangered.

I replied with hearty assurances of our sincere desire to meet all acceptable conditions for the preservation and consolidation of our close relations with Italy; at the same time I was in doubt as to whether Italy was at present on the right path to the goal at which we both aimed. I noted with great regret that strong popular tendencies were at work in Italy toward contestable aspirations and that still more extremist political factions threaten a general disruption in the event of a disappointment in their now awakened purposes of greed. Nevertheless, I was considerably surprised that Italy should expect us, her ally, to sacrifice our territory in order to assist Italy in the suppression of a dangerous internal turbulence.

The Duke of Avarna replied that he recognised the great difficulties which would present themselves to the solution of the problem of Italian desires, and he would not conceal this fact from his government. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in assuming that the Italians of the Dual Monarchy could not be regarded in the same light as the other nationalities, as they were not as numerous and therefore were of no great importance to the Monarchy; moreover, they were unable to resist attacks on their nationality and had no support. I took a stand against this differentiation with the obvious arguments, whereupon we dealt with the individual point of his instructions.

First of all I objected to the assumption that "Austria-Hungary had engaged in a war likely to modify the equilibrium in the Balkans," upon which Baron Sonnino based his justification of a discussion of compensation even at the moment when our retreat from Servia is divesting it of its actuality.

I reiterated our readiness to discuss at any time with Italy the question of compensation on the basis of Article VII, even in an academic way. Yet, we could no more accept the above-mentioned motive than the subsequent assertion in the instructions: "*que le guerre avait été initiée dès le premier jour avec un but tout contraire aux intérêts de la politique italienne dans les Balkans*" ("that the war had been started from the very first with a purpose totally adverse to the interests of Italian policy in the Balkans"). Italy must be aware that the war was undertaken solely for defence against the Servian machinations which threatened our integrity.

The two above-quoted contentions were explained by the Ambassador to mean only that the natural consequences of the war were bound to encroach upon the Italian sphere of interests, and that claims for compensation would arise from this fact.



It stands to reason that the part of the instructions which deal with the Italian desire to strengthen and consolidate our alliance by the elimination of all causes of friction developed no difference of opinion between us. We then took up the delicate point wherein Italy's desire for a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory based upon the claims derived by Italy from Article VII, was enunciated in the following words: "*qu'il faut avoir le courage et le calme d'aborder à l'occasion la discussion au sujet de cette question délicate*" ("it is necessary to possess the courage and the calm judgment to broach at the proper time that delicate question").

I did not conceal from the Ambassador the fact that I was dumbfounded at so bold an inference from the premises of the situation.

We had already conceded the reasons which prompted Italy to declare her neutrality, to the amazement of our public opinion. We had also accepted the interpretation of Article VII as Italy has chosen to construe it.

We were then confronted with the fact that Italy was determined to regard the invasion of Servian territory in the course of the military operations as a "provisional occupation" within the meaning of Article VII. These preposterous assumptions had given us ample occasion to give proofs to Italy of our conciliatory spirit and of our friendship in accordance with the alliance. Nevertheless, the first concrete formulation of Italy's desires in the way of compensation has exceeded all expectations. I now found myself under the necessity of reserving the right to examine whether Article VII referred in any way to compensation elsewhere than on the Balkan peninsula. I took positive exception to the reason given in the instructions as to why no claims for compensation could be based upon territories belonging to other belligerents; namely: "*Comme Puissance neutre, l'Italie ne pourrait pas accepter aujourd'hui une discussion sur la base éventuelle concernant des territoires possédés par d'autres belligérants, attendu que cela correspondait à participer dès à présent au conflit*" ("Italy as a neutral power could not at present consider a discussion which might involve territories belonging to other belligerents, as this would mean a participation in the conflict from now on"). To put it in another way, this would mean that Austria-Hungary, though also a belligerent power, was entitled to worse treatment at the hands of Italy, although and because she was her ally! The scruples of neutrality in this instance were taking a queer turn, which suggests the following reflection: how can the remedy which Italy had devised for her protection at our expense

against internal crises, possibly be brought into harmony with Italy's own conception of her alliance with us, for which new guarantees are to be created for the future? I repeated to the Duke of Avarna the contention which Count Berchtold had put to him once before, that the Italian demand was in contradiction with the fundamental principles of the Triple Alliance, which primarily purported to safeguard in every respect the integrity of the allies.

The Ambassador was visibly impressed by my explanation. As we both were guided by the desire not to drop the thread of our conversation, we refrained at this time from a further polemic. I therefore made a résumé of our conversation in the sense that our Governments were as one in their desire to place their alliance upon a new and solid foundation; that we considered the friendly continuance of our conversation as useful and necessary, and that we were both willing to pursue it. The differences between us consisted at present in Italy's preference for the acquisition of territory belonging to Austria-Hungary, while we proposed to choose the object of compensation in other countries.

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No. 99.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, January 29, 1915.*

On receipt of new instructions, the Italian Ambassador yesterday reverted to the question of compensation:

Considering that it was, even in our opinion, Italy's business to define the compensation she aspired to on the ground of Article VII, in order to counterbalance the advantages which we may gain by our renewed invasion of Servia, the Ambassador has been instructed to explain to me that no compensation could be considered at present by the Kingdom save the cession of a part of the Austro-Hungarian possessions, which was the sole proposal of his government. Baron Sonnino had instructed him to urge me "*d'accepter la discussion sur la base d'une cession de territoire*" ("to accept discussion based on a territorial cession"). No reference could be made to territories of other belligerents, as this would constitute a breach of neutrality. We were at liberty to cede voluntarily some of our own territory. By this odd declaration Baron Sonnino evidently wishes to get around the

contention I raised the other day to the effect that we were also belligerents and that this would be no reason why we should be treated worse than others by an ally.

Baron Sonnino in his instructions to the Duke of Avarna, which was read to me, stated that time was pressing and that he was very anxious to be in possession of our virtual acceptance by the time of the opening of Parliament. Against this preposterous presumption, I pointed out to the Ambassador that I could hardly accept Italy's contention that she is entitled to obtain a definite advance compensation for the mere possibility of a future acquisition on our part, especially if such compensation was to consist in a slice of our own flesh—an idea which Italy deduces from the right provided in the agreement, to obtain adequate advantages in the Balkans or elsewhere in the event of Austro-Hungarian acquisitions in the Balkans. Nevertheless, I was willing to enter into a discussion of that subject in order to give proof of our serious intention to come to a satisfactory understanding with Italy.

For the present I requested Baron Sonnino to be content with a declaration to the effect that we consent to discuss the question on the basis of a territorial cession; this would be equivalent to a virtual acceptance and to a concession of the main point. There would remain only a discussion as to the mode and time. The Italian Government was at liberty to advance any proposal regarding compensation, however extensive it might be; but, on the other hand, we should have an opportunity to examine and consider it carefully. The Ambassador should appreciate that the task was an exceedingly difficult one under the existing conditions, and that it was in the interest of the continuance of our negotiations that Italy should not press for a quick reply.

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No. 100.

*Von Mayrhauser to Baron Burián.*

(Report.)

*Valona, January 29, 1915.*

Sgr. Devoto, *Commissario del esercito* (Captain of the Italian commissariat), who had been connected with the financial administration of Skutari, assumed control of the financial administration of the Kaza of Valona to-day.

In compliance with a decree issued to-day and signed by Colonel Mosca, the commander of the Italian forces of occupation, criminal jurisdiction will be exercised henceforth by a military Court of Justice (with its seat at the prefecture) according to the provisions of the Italian military penal code.

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No. 101.

*Von Mayrhauser to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, February 1, 1915.*

Italian customs officials (two officers and eight men) have arrived.

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No. 102.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 2, 1915.*

The Prime Minister in conversation to-day expressed the conviction that the relations between Italy and Austria-Hungary would not be injured by the present crisis. He had noted with interest the commencement of the negotiations and hoped that means would be found to meet the national aspirations of Italy. I replied by calling attention to the discussions which were progressing between you and the Duke of Avarna, and expressed the hope that, in the course of time, means would be found to attain results satisfactory to both parties.

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No. 103.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 4, 1915.*

Baron Sonnino spontaneously told me to-day that Prince Bülow, obviously for the purpose of maintaining the conversations between

Vienna and Rome, had advised him to specify more closely his desires. To this suggestion he had replied that it was impossible for him to do so as long as he did not know whether you considered his initial suggestion about the cession of Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis for further negotiations, as at all acceptable.

The Minister then said that he had hoped to be in a position, when Parliament meets, to submit a basis for an accord. I responded that the fact that the friendly conversations were in progress bore evidence of the good intention on both sides to come to an understanding, and that this may possibly be of use to him.

Finally Baron Sonnino told me that Parliament would have its hands full, as sufficient matter for debates was furnished by the bills introduced in connexion with the earthquakes, with the provisions for the regulation of grain supply, and lastly by the budget.

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No. 104.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, February 11, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador called on me the day before yesterday and brought up the question of compensation, in behalf of his Government.

He read to me his instructions from the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. They contained no fundamentally new items, but betrayed a slightly increased impatience and laid stress upon the necessity of reaching a palpable progress in our conversations before the meeting of Parliament.

I replied that the Italian Government, if pressed, should simply declare that it is in friendly negotiation with us on all pending questions; more than that we were unable to say at present.

With reference to the matter itself I recalled to the Duke of Avarna my previous statement that I was so deeply concerned about reaching an understanding satisfactory to both sides, that I would bring the suggestion of a territorial cession to the attention of the other competent authorities of the Dual Monarchy, however great the difficulties; but I had no power to accept or reject it on my own initiative.

This exchange of views was still in progress, but we did not wish to lose time in the meanwhile. The starting point of the Italian demands for compensation was the express desire that the alliance between us and Italy should be consolidated, that all causes of frictions should be eliminated and that real friendship should develop from it. This again demanded a settlement of all existing questions and difficulties. As we were guided by the same sincere feelings, I considered it most expedient to discuss simultaneously with the Italian claims for compensation our own claims, to which we are undoubtedly entitled by the clear wording of Article VII. In this way we would avoid the necessity of raising another question after having cleared the one which is now the subject of our discussions.

The temporary occupation of Valona, as well as of the Dodecanesos, gives us the full right to compensation under the provisions of Article VII, a right in any case more tangible than the one claimed by Italy, in view of the fact that the latter has effectively taken possession of those localities, whereas our position in Servia, which according to Italy calls for compensation, constitutes no more than a future possibility.

I therefore begged to announce our claim to compensation for the temporary Italian occupation of the eight islands of the Dodecanesos, which are in the Ægean Sea, as well as for Valona, in the same cordial and friendly spirit which Italy professed in her case.

The Duke of Avarna was somewhat perplexed by this newly raised question. He also failed to find a reply about the Dodecanesos, concerning which I recalled to him that we had already stated our claim under Article VII and had added that we would enforce it "*à un moment donné*" ("when occasion should arise").

As to Valona he attempted to prove that this was no occupation in the real sense of the word. Order had to be restored there and Albania's integrity had to be protected. Italy, in view of her neutrality, had been the only Power who could accomplish that task in behalf of Europe. Italy had done nothing there for her own benefit.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that Article VII did not deal with the cause, object, extent or duration of the occupation and that the Italian action in Valona, to which we had raised no objection, was subject without doubt to the definition of an "*occupation temporaire*" as given in that article. When Italy filed her claims for compensation on account of our invasion of Servia, and did so even at a time when we had again evacuated that country, she admitted

neither the latter reason nor the fact that we had invaded Servian territory solely in the course of pending military operations and therefore by force of circumstances. Italy had taken the ground that Article VII allowed no exception. We now apply the same interpretation.

When I stated that Italy's measures in Valona had already considerably overstepped what she had then declared to us to be her purpose, the Duke of Avarna refrained from further polemic and only expressed his fears that this announcement would be construed in Italy as an indication of ill-will on our part.

I assured him that this was, of course, not the case. The two discussions could be conducted in equally friendly terms and independently of each other. If I have chosen this moment to advance our justified claims, I have done so with the sincere desire to do all in my power in order that our mutual relations might be cleared all the earlier of all causes of friction and of unsolved questions, in exactly the same spirit which had guided the Italian Government when it started these negotiations.

The Ambassador promised to bring my declaration to the knowledge of his Government and asked me to give it to him in writing. I sent him to-day a personal memorandum, a copy of which I enclose.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

(MEMORANDUM.)

*Vienna, February 11, 1915.*

At the beginning of the negotiations which for some time past have been in progress between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the subject of compensation which Italy may claim on the ground of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement in the event that Austria-Hungary derives any territorial or other advantages from her action against Servia and Montenegro, the Royal Italian Government has advanced the opinion that the political reasons in favour of such a discussion were: to create complete confidence between the two Powers, to eliminate the constant friction between them and to render possible

a mutual coöperation toward the common aims of our general policy.

Guided by the same sincere feelings, the Austro-Hungarian Government also realises the advantages of clearing the ground at once of all matters which might impede the future development of the thoroughly cordial relations between the two Powers. In this sense it considers it necessary, first of all, to bring about an understanding on all questions concerning our mutual rights deriving from Article VII of our treaty of alliance. This applies especially to two questions, one of which dates back several years, while the other has arisen more recently, and both of which concern our most vital and fundamental interests. Reference is made here to the question of the islands in the Ægean Sea, occupied by Italy, and to Italy's action in Albania.

As to the first of these questions, it seems needless to recapitulate at this time the different phases of the *pourparlers* on that subject; they were conducted in 1911 and 1912 between Vienna and Rome and are still fresh in our minds. Besides, they are filed, in all probability, in the archives of the *Consulta*. It will suffice to state the following points:

1. Regardless of the obvious danger that the modification of the *status quo* as a result of Italy's occupation of the islands of the Dodecanesos would sooner or later exert a disturbing effect upon the Balkans, Austria-Hungary, guided by her desire not to hamper in any way the military operations of her ally, has not formally opposed it.

2. Nevertheless, the Government of the Dual Monarchy, on the occasion of the occupation, referred to Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement and in several instances (on November 6, 7, and 14, 1911; on April 13, 15, and 20, 1912; on May 20, 21, and 31, 1912, and on June 5, 1912) declared to the Italian Government that Austria-Hungary's right to a previous accord based on the principle of compensation as stipulated by said article, had been put into effect by Italy's occupations which have been declared to be temporary; furthermore, we reserved the right to apply those provisions at a proper time.

3. Concerning the duration of this occupation—a question in fact immaterial to the validity of the right to compensation—Italy has repeatedly and most categorically assured the Austro-Hungarian Government that this occupation was only temporary and would be terminated after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey.



Discussions were even conducted concerning a written declaration which the Royal Italian Government would hand to the Austro-Hungarian Government in this matter, although no agreement was reached as to the wording of such a note. Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes to reproduce herewith the following text of that declaration, *such as it was proposed by the Royal Italian Government*:

*“Il est entendu que dans la pensée du Gouvernement Royal italien l’occupation effectuée jusqu’à ce jour ou qui pourrait s’effectuer dans la suite des îles de la mer Egée (Archipel) a un caractère provisoire et que lesdites îles seront restituées à la Turquie après la cessation des hostilités entre l’Italie et la Turquie et, par conséquent, après l’évacuation de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrénaïque de la part des troupes et des officiers ottomans et aussitôt que la réalisation des conditions indiquées dans le note italienne du 15 mars 1912, aux Grandes Puissances aura été obtenue. Il est également entendu que la présente déclaration qui découle des dispositions de l’article VII du Traité de la Triple Alliance sera considérée par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ainsi que par le Gouvernement italien comme strictement secrète et confidentielle, car si elle était connue par la Turquie elle n’atteindrait pas le but commun aux deux Puissances que est de hâter et de faciliter la paix.”* (“It is understood that the Royal Italian Government considers the occupation of the islands in the *Ægean* Sea (Archipelago) as effected up to this day or which may be effected later to be of a provisional character and that the said islands will therefore be restored to Turkey after the evacuation of Tripoli and of the Cyrenaica by the Turkish troops and officers, and as soon as the conditions indicated in the Italian note to the Great Powers dated March 15, 1912, shall be carried out. It is also understood that this declaration, which derives from the provisions of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement, will be considered by the Austro-Hungarian Government, as well as by the Royal Italian Government, as strictly secret and confidential. For, should this become known to Turkey, it would no longer serve the common purpose of the two Powers, namely, to accelerate and facilitate peace.”)

It appears clear from the above text that the conditions to which the Royal Government had subjected the evacuation of the Dodecanesos no longer exist and that Italy, nevertheless, has not restored those islands to Turkey, although almost three years have elapsed since then. On the other hand the above-mentioned text proves that

Italy has recognised the bearing of Article VII of the Triple Alliance agreement upon those occupations.

It seemed, therefore, obvious that if the Royal Government wishes to discuss at this time the compensation to which Italy would be entitled by virtue of Article VII in the event of a future and at least uncertain Austro-Hungarian occupation, Austria-Hungary can demand, with all the more reason, the discussion of compensation which is already due to her by the fact of the prolonged occupation of the Dodecanesos by Italy.

Proceeding to the question of Italy's recent action in Albania, the Austro-Hungarian Government wishes to state that it has received but two communications on that subject from the Italian Government. On October 23rd last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that Italy had found herself obliged, in view of the penury among the refugees at Valona and of the anarchy which prevailed there, to provide by means of a small sanitary expedition for "*des opérations de police et mesures humanitaires nécessaires, en faveur des réfugiés, sans donner à ces opérations un caractère d'expédition militaire constituant une occupation, dans le sens propre du mot, de la ville de Valona*"—"police operations and humanitarian measures in behalf of the refugees without, however, giving those operations the character of a military expedition representing an occupation of the city of Valona in the proper sense of the word"). The Duke of Avarna was instructed to add that Italy, in conformity with her declarations made at the beginning of the present war, would adhere to the Italo-Austro-Hungarian agreement now in force with regard to Albania; she would also respect and maintain the decisions of the London Conference, and especially those of them which provided for the neutrality and the territorial integrity of Albania. The Austro-Hungarian Government took note of that communication. On December 26th last, the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that the Royal Italian Government had found it necessary to land a detachment of marines at Valona in order to put an end to the anarchy which existed there. This would constitute a purely provisional measure, which would not be extended beyond the city of Valona.

The declarations referred to above were renewed on that occasion. Count Berchtold confined himself to the acknowledgment of the communication.

Since then, Italy's activities in Albania have been gradually extended and intensified. The landing of a detachment of Italian marines at Valona was followed by the arrival of a transport of

Italian troops (infantry and artillery) and of a considerable quantity of war material. The city of Valona, as well as Kanina and Svernez, were occupied by military. The number of Italian war-ships in Albanian waters has been constantly increased. At the time when an invasion by Essad Pasha's enemies was feared at Durazzo, one of those war-ships fired upon the besiegers—the very thing which the Royal Italian Government last year considered itself bound to refuse to do jointly with the Austro-Hungarian Government on a far more serious occasion. In addition to these military activities Italy has also—to a certain degree—taken over the civil administration of Valona, where the prefecture, the financial administration, the police, the gendarmerie and the municipality are actually under the control of Italian Government officers, some of whom have been designated "Royal Commissioners." A similar measure has recently been applied to the Customs office at Valona. Another regulation of the Italian Government demands that all persons entering Valona must be provided with passports bearing the Italian visé.

Notwithstanding the fact that these measures, from our point of view, are not in harmony with either the words or the sense of the repeated declarations of the Royal Italian Government, the Austro-Hungarian Government refrains from any complaint for the time being. However, it finds itself compelled to state that the Italian action undoubtedly comes under the definition of a "temporary occupation" according to our joint interpretation of Article VII and, as in the case of the occupation of the Dodecanesos, gives us the immediate right to a compensation. The fact that the Italian occupation of Valona ceased to be absolutely temporary, is immaterial to the issue. It is self-evident, however, that even this latter alternative, being incompatible with the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord about Albania and constituting a disturbance of the equilibrium in the Adriatic, which Italy has so often invoked, confers upon Austria-Hungary an additional right to adequate compensation.

As a résumé of the foregoing, the Austro-Hungarian Government holds that the amicable negotiations now in progress would be still more useful if they included the question of the compensation which Austria-Hungary is to receive for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and for the Italian occupation of Valona—even should the latter be only temporary.

## No. 105.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 15, 1915.*

On the occasion of to-day's diplomatic reception, Baron Sonnino made no mention whatever of your last conversation with the Duke of Avarna.

On the other hand he made the spontaneous observation that to his mind the present session of Parliament would deal but little with foreign politics. After conferences with the leaders of various factions he was under the impression that the latter had realised that it was premature to go into such matters in view of the present war situation.

## No. 106.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, February 15, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He had received detailed instructions from his Government, in which Baron Sonnino first of all endeavoured to invalidate my counter-claim to compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and of Valona.

His argument in regard to the Dodecanesos consisted in a recapitulation of the entire diplomatic procedure since 1912, and culminated in the assertion that we had then actually referred to our claim for compensation according to Article VII, but had subsequently dropped it with a protest against any further extension of the occupations. Italy, in consequence of this objection, refrained from occupying Chios and Mytilene.

I replied that there was no record of the sort among our documents, but that only the assertion of our claims to compensation was discoverable—claims which would be advanced "*à un moment donné*" (at a suitable occasion).

As to Valona, Baron Sonnino stated again what the Duke of Avarna had already said, namely, that Italy had not sent forces there

for her own benefit, but in order to uphold European interests and to protect the *status quo*—but not to modify it.

I repeated the explanation I gave the Ambassador the other day, that Article VII dealt solely with the fact of the occupation, without any reference to its purpose, extent or duration. Italy herself enforced this interpretation toward us. Article VII by no means prevented the two Powers from taking whatever steps either might consider necessary. It acknowledged their right to act, in the event that they saw themselves compelled to alter the *status quo*, but stipulated the right to compensation for the preservation of the mutual equilibrium.

I could, therefore, not agree with Baron Sonnino's conclusion and insisted upon the validity of our full title to compensation.

The Italian Ambassador then broached the second and most astonishing part of his instruction, and said:

Two months have elapsed since the Italian Government had first introduced the question of Article VII and had asked us for a friendly discussion about the compensation to be given Italy in consideration of the disturbance of the equilibrium in the Balkans.

Although we had never declined to enter into such a discussion, weeks and months had elapsed and Italy had not yet succeeded in obtaining even as much as our reply to the fundamental question, whether or not we were willing to discuss the matter on the basis of a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory. We had brought up new questions and arguments with the sole intent of evading the issue and of prolonging the negotiations. In the meanwhile, preparations were being made by us for a renewed expedition in the Balkans. In view of this attitude toward Italy, the Italian Government could no longer entertain any illusions as to the practical result of these negotiations.

The Italian Government, therefore, is compelled, for the protection of its dignity, to withdraw all its proposals and suggestions and to abide by the clear provisions of Article VII. The Italian Government declares that it would consider any Austro-Hungarian step, whether against Servia or Montenegro or any other Balkan State, as being in plain violation of the said article, provided no previous arrangement to that effect has been made in accordance with Article VII.

Should Austria-Hungary evade this obligation, serious consequences may result, for which the Royal Government in advance announces its refusal to bear the responsibility.

I expressed my regret to the Ambassador that Baron Sonnino seemed to have become impatient, although our negotiations could not possibly have been accelerated. The Minister might have realised how very difficult the ground is on which he had based the compensation question. We might surely have reached a speedier solution had Baron Sonnino accepted my suggestion and sought the object of compensation in other regions. Even so, I have taken great pains to deal thoroughly with the matter and to examine it jointly with the other competent authorities of the Government, with the firm intention of arriving at a friendly agreement with Italy. Baron Sonnino knew that I was engaged in assiduous negotiations between the two Governments. On his own initiative he has declined to await a reply and now has put an end to our conversations.

All I could do now was to take cognisance of this fact and to consider more closely the standpoint which the Italian Government is taking.

This being based upon Article VII, I should have no difficulty in following the Italian Government on that ground, as we also adhere to the interpretation of that article as accepted by both Powers.

The "previous understanding" requisite for every occupation, could, within the meaning of the article, only apply to the initial stages of a military action, the results of which cannot be gauged beforehand, and for which therefore no "adequate" compensation can be determined according to the agreement.

The Duke of Avarna agreed with me on this point without hesitation.

I further explained that it was an absolute impossibility, in the case of our war with Servia, to await the conclusion of negotiations with Italy before invading Servia, as these negotiations might be prolonged indefinitely and to no purpose, to the detriment of our military operations. The Duke of Avarna admitted that such a proceeding would have been out of the question, and held the opinion that our obligation was limited to giving previous notice to Italy of a prospective resumption of our activities against Servia, and in opening without delay negotiations concerning compensation.

Thereupon I gave him the following assurance, which seemed to satisfy him: "*qu'à la veille de l'éventuelle reprise de notre action militaire contre la Serbie nous tiendrons présente la situation de droits et d'obligations que nous crée l'article VII de notre Traité d'alliance*" ("that on the eve of a possible resumption of our military operations

against Serbia we shall keep in mind the rights and obligations created by Article VII of our treaty of alliance'').

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No. 107.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 17, 1915.*

The recent emphatic declarations by prominent journals of Vienna, in opposition to every territorial concession, are said to have created a profound impression in journalistic circles in Rome, especially because of the fact that they have been passed by the censor.

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No. 108.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 19, 1915.*

Yesterday's first meeting of parliament was calm. Commemoration of earthquake disaster, formal questions, reading of bills, and interpellations.

Salandra's speech contained references to foreign situation framed in the vague phrase, that the fatherland expected from its sons a confidence that its destiny will not be confined to its present interests, but also involves the glory of the past and the hopes and ideals of the future.

I am informed that the feeling in parliamentary circles is calm and collected, indicating a growing sense of responsibility; an attempt to provoke sentimental manifestations in parliament failed.

In the same way little notice was taken of the street demonstrations which some hired youths had started in favour of intervention before the opening of the session, and against which large contingents of troops had been kept in readiness.

The information I received that the Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet had decided five days ago to venture war if it should be unable to secure territorial concessions, though supposed to be authentic, is in striking contrast with the above-mentioned observations.

No. 109.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, February 23, 1915.*

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation yesterday with the Duke of Avarna on the question of compensation.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

*Vienna, February 22, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador to-day acquitted himself of his mission from Baron Sonnino to me. The method now adopted by the Italian Government to induce us to cede Austro-Hungarian territory is marked by a notable advance upon any preceding action.

The Duke of Avarna was instructed to declare to me, in contradiction to his personal opinion as expressed at our last interview, and which coincided with mine, that Baron Sonnino has placed the following interpretation upon the "previous understanding" provided by Article VII of the treaty:

The understanding must not only be initialed, but must also be perfected before the commencement of the military action which it must precede—and not accompany or follow it—and which it is destined to sanction under the obvious meaning of Article VII, unless the other party has consented to another mode of procedure.

This consent being out of the question under the existing circumstances, the communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government is equivalent to a veto by the Italian Government upon all military measures by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the understanding provided for by the agreement has been perfected.

Any mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government other than the above-mentioned, would be regarded as a flagrant violation of our treaty of alliance and as an open manifestation of its intention to resume its freedom of action. In such an event the Italian Government would consider itself likewise at liberty to resume its entire freedom of action for the conservation of its interests.



To this enunciation of his own views the Italian Minister adds that the Italian Government intended to follow the precedent set by us at the time of the Lybian war in 1912 with regard to the islands already occupied provisionally; in the same way as we, at that time, renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of the Dodecanesos, the Italian Government now renounces all discussions concerning our operations in Servia prior to this date. But from now on an absolute veto would be imposed upon any similar move, unless a previous understanding has been signed and initialed.

At this juncture I interrupted the Ambassador by declaring categorically that his Minister was grossly mistaken if he believed that we have renounced our rights to compensation for the occupation of the Dodecanesos. The circumstance mentioned by Baron Sonnino could only refer to our friendly attitude at the time of the occupation of the Dodecanesos, when we renounced the immediate *enforcement* of our right to compensation, in order not to hinder Italy's military operations. We have always expressly asserted that right, while reserving its application for a later date. Only in the event that Italy had extended her occupations beyond the Dodecanesos, as she had shown an inclination to do, especially with regard to Chios and Mitylene, did we intend to demand *immediate* compensation, which in any case was due to us. We have never signed a document, nor have we ever made a declaration equivalent to a renunciation of that kind—a renunciation which would have been in no way justified.

Quite on the contrary, I formally announced to the Duke of Avarna, on February 9th last, our demand for the compensation which was undoubtedly due to us by virtue of Article VII, both for the occupation of the Dodecanesos and for Valona. Moreover, I declared to the Ambassador to-day, that I persisted in that demand in its full force and to its entire extent.

As to Baron Sonnino's interpretation of the "previous understanding" stipulated in Article VII, I first pointed out to the Duke of Avarna that the Italian Minister's interpretation constituted no law to us and that mine was equally authoritative; furthermore, it appeared to me inadmissible, because of the existence of a difference of opinion, to resort at once to the extreme measure of a violation of the Treaty which we have always taken the utmost care to respect scrupulously.

To my mind it is evident that Baron Sonnino's interpretation oversteps the mark, and if put in effect would place us in an impossible position. Discussions for the purpose of an understanding

with Italy, conducted on the eve of our resumption of hostilities with Servia, would deprive us of our freedom of action and thus place us hopelessly at the mercy of our enemy, if, against our will, the negotiations should be protracted, in the event, for instance, of Italy choosing a ground where it would be difficult for us to follow. In these negotiations we would be subjected to intolerable pressure from two directions.

Besides, there is another matter to be considered. The compensation, as provided for by Article VII, must be proportionate and equivalent in the plain sense of the words. Hence it will be impossible to perfect an arrangement for compensation at a time when the advantage subject to compensation is non-existent and depends entirely upon the future. It would be unthinkable to specify and define a compensation so long as the point of comparison is still completely lacking.

We fully and loyally acknowledge the obligation which Article VII imposes upon us and we do not mean to evade it. Yet, if we do not wish to reach an absurd situation, the references to compensation in Article VII can be interpreted only in the following sense: Each of the contracting parties is obliged to give timely notice to the other party and to open negotiations without delay on the subject of compensation. It will always be possible to fix the general basis of the accord in a short time; the details and concrete stipulations on the appraising of values, however, are inevitably subordinated to the possibility of comparing the advantages to be compensated for. This implies that the activities referred to must take their course without awaiting an adjustment of counter-proposals—a delay which at the present juncture could be nothing less than fantastic.

We applied the logic of such a situation when, in order not to hamper Italy's military activities in the *Ægean* Sea, we confined ourselves to an assertion of our rights to compensation, while renouncing their enforcement *for the time being*.

The Duke of Avarna took note of my statement and then communicated to me a hint, which he had also been instructed by his Minister to give me.

Baron Sonnino does not conceal his conviction that it would be useless to open negotiations on the subject of eventual compensation on the grounds which have been discussed in the course of the negotiations interrupted by him on February 14th, unless such negotiations are based on the cession of territories at present belonging to Austria-Hungary. As for the chances of reaching an understanding,

any negotiation conducted on any other basis than the aforesaid would necessarily be futile.

In reply to this plain talk I told the Duke of Avarna that I was justifiably surprised at the renewed introduction of this topic after the formal withdrawal of Baron Sonnino's previous proposals.

I would confine myself to-day to the assurance that, if occasion should arise, we would inform the Italian Government at an opportune time of our intention to enter into negotiations with Italy on the subject of a previous understanding, in compliance with Article VII; this, however, without binding ourselves as to the basis of compensation which Baron Sonnino had asserted, because I do not admit the tenability of his assertion.

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No. 110.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, February 27, 1915.*

I observed that even in parliamentary circles here the incorrect assumption still prevails that no direct discussions have yet taken place between Vienna and Rome. For my guidance and for the reason that all referential information hitherto received from you was only destined for my personal cognisance, I request you for telegraphic instructions whether I shall continue the silence I have accordingly maintained or whether I may divulge the facts that negotiations have been in progress and that they have been brought to a stop through no fault of ours.

For months past I have not regarded myself as authorised, in my talks with Italians outside of Government circles, to go beyond the statement that we always have shown our readiness for negotiations, provided these were not based upon unacceptable premises.

As affairs are at present, I fear that before long the entire blame will be put on us, as the Government here evidently persists in its assiduous silence. This may result in an adverse change of sentiment on the part of the political factions which favour a compromise with the Government.

No. 111.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, March 1, 1915.*

I beg to transmit to you the enclosed notes on a discussion on the compensation question which took place between me and the Royal Italian Ambassador on February 26th last.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

*Vienna, February 26, 1915.*

Baron Sonnino endeavoured to invalidate my objections to his interpretation of Article VII and to the considerations he had proffered in rather spirited terms. He sent me a short reply thereto which the Ambassador conveyed to me to-day.

The Minister reiterates his assertion that the "previous understanding" concerning compensation must not only be initiated but also terminated before the commencement of any military action on our part. He persists in his two standpoints: that there must exist a complete previous understanding before we begin our action and that no discussion could promise practical results unless it were based on the principle of a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory.

Baron Sonnino attempts once more to justify his view-point on the first question by the contention that Italy would incur the danger of delays in our negotiations until we had secured all the desired advantages in Servia; she might find herself thwarted of all compensation if she consented to our resumption of hostilities against Servia prior to the completion of an agreement between us.

I observed to the Duke of Avarna that a danger of that nature, if it existed at all, would be far greater in our case, as the Italian interpretation of Article VII would expose us to the possibility of being prevented indefinitely from resuming military activities by a protraction of the negotiations; thus we would be deprived of any possibility of defending ourselves against the attacks and operations of our southern enemy—a situation unacceptable for a belligerent Power.

The Ambassador replied that his latest instructions contained

a clause concerning a possible modification of the method of procedure in our future discussions, and which, he thought, met my contentions to a certain extent. Baron Sonnino had suggested to him that the two parties might come to an understanding outside of the strict sense of Article VII, special circumstances made it advisable that the "*accord préalable*" concerning compensation be framed on an adjustable scale, which would allow such compensation to be fixed in proportion to the possible and future results of the military activities upon which it is based.

I received the Italian Minister's suggestion favourably and acknowledged that in my opinion it indeed tended to facilitate our future exchange of views in an advantageous and expedient manner.

To my mind a special effort should be made to determine as quickly as possible the principles of the understanding and to direct the negotiations into the proper channel, without, however, making it necessary to postpone our military action until the details of the agreement have been definitely settled. The completion of the understanding in detail would in any case be impossible as long as no basis was available for the valuation of the advantages to be compensated for.

On the other hand nothing would prevent us from dealing conditionally with the specific details of the agreement if it were understood that certain concessions would become valid only if we actually acquired or definitely secured a certain advantage in the course of events.

Baron Sonnino's presumption, "*si des circonstances spéciales le conseillent*" ("if special circumstances made it advisable"), seems to be an existing situation in the full meaning of the term, in view of the fact that we are actually at war with Servia and that consequently every military measure which we might find it necessary to take against her will always bear the character of urgency. Therefore, I do not hesitate to accept sympathetically Baron Sonnino's idea regarding conditional arrangements.

The Ambassador again reverted to his intimation of the 22nd inst. that future discussions could be conducted profitably only if based upon a cession of our territory. I replied that I could not abandon my former standpoint, namely, that, as the negotiations were interrupted by the Minister's own desire, I could not at present bind myself as to the basis of our future conversations, and that this question had consequently no actuality.

The Duke of Avarna endeavoured to convince me of the existence

of a prospective actuality, which surely justified our discussing the subject. I recalled to him that I had adapted myself and adhered to the programme as set up by Baron Sonnino, who had stipulated for the opening of our negotiations at the time when we should resume our campaign against Servia.

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No. 112.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 2, 1915.*

Please do not generally abandon your adopted reserve on your own initiative. Only in the case of direct enquiries, or if in the course of conversation you have occasion to do so, you may say that the two Governments are now, as before, in direct negotiations of a frank and friendly nature, concerning questions of mutual relations and interests.

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No. 113.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, March 4, 1915.*

I beg to hand you the enclosed notes on a discussion concerning the compensation question, which took place between me and the Italian Ambassador on the 2nd instant.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

*Vienna, March 2, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador's visit to-day served no other purpose than the enquiry in behalf of his Government, as to whether I had not yet reached a decision concerning the basis of negotiations which had been designated by the Italian Government as the only profitable one.

I pointed out the present stage of the negotiations, which had been brought about by Baron Sonnino himself, in suspending the conversation for the time being, to be resumed only when, because of a prospective resumption of military activities in Serbia, we shall have to seek an understanding with Italy on the "previous understanding," in conformity with Article VII. Hence, the issue lacked actuality; nevertheless, we would avoid delaying our decision unnecessarily.

The Duke of Avarna still holds that the question is an actuality because it could not be withdrawn from the programme owing to the sentiment prevailing in Italy and also because a settlement may become more and more difficult.

He then repeated Baron Sonnino's stale and familiar statements, adding to them a new item in the shape of a denial of my assumption of the other day. The "special circumstances" which may occasion a conditional discussion of the compensation question were not applicable in this case on the grounds which I had proffered, because the war against Serbia had been started without Italy's knowledge and against her advice and her interests. Besides, the main point was the determination of the basis of the negotiations, and a certain minimum of compensation was due to Italy for the very fact of our military action. This in any case should be fixed immediately, even if further arrangements may possibly be governed by the actual results of the campaign at a later date.

I maintained my standpoint, that naturally the basis of the negotiations had to be settled first, but that it always would be impossible to decide upon the extent of the compensation so long as our acquisitions or advantages could not be ascertained.

Baron Sonnino was insistent for action on account of the difficulties arising from Italy's political situation; but I pointed out that he should also consider somewhat the difficulties he was causing us.

Finally I reminded the Ambassador that we maintained in their entirety our claims to compensation for the seizure of the Dodecanesos and of Valona.

No. 114.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, March 6, 1915.*

Résumé of my last week's reports, to my mind, involves two important phases in the progress of Italian situation:

(1) Elimination of internal political difficulties. Action of Cabinet Sonnino-Salandra will henceforth alone direct further development, all the more so as Parliament realises heavy responsibility and on every occasion and with utmost unanimity emphasises its confidence in Government. Thereby it shows disposition to leave it in Government's hands to find issue compatible with Italy's interests.

(2) Increasing anxiety about possibility that Turkish problem be brought to an issue by attack on Dardanelles, which may be expected to kindle general Balkan conflagration.

Considering general aversion to a great war, country's majority may still prefer victory of Central Powers for Italy's future, provided an understanding with us may be reached which would consist of minimum that Government could declare in parliament as advantageous.

In this respect I expect further attempts, which in view of general situation will probably be the last.

Above résumé of present situation appears to me *more serious than ever*.

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No. 115.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 9, 1915.*

I declared to-day to the Italian Ambassador, who had come to see me, that we had decided to accept the principle of a cession of Austro-Hungarian territory as a basis for discussions in compliance with his Government's demands in the negotiations on the compensation question. This decision, however, did not involve any specific obligation on our part and we reserved to ourselves the definition



of the conditions under which a territorial cession may be effected. This concession makes possible the resumption of negotiations.

I told the Duke of Avarna that I had already informed the German Government of our attitude, and through it also the *Consulta*. My action was based, I explained, upon the desire that in future negotiations I should be guided by the wishes which the Italian Government has previously expressed and which I fully share, that the sacrifice we are about to make shall serve to enhance the interests of our future relations with Italy and of the continuance of the policy of the Triple Alliance.

In the course of the conversation the Italian Ambassador expressed the wish that the negotiations on the compensation should be conducted separately between us and Italy, to which I assented.

Finally I mentioned to the Duke of Avarna that I would esteem it a favour if the Italian Government should come to a previous agreement with us on the wording of any declaration which it might feel desirable or necessary to make at this time in parliament on the prospective negotiations with us.

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No. 116.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, March 10, 1915.*

Prince Bülow informs me that Baron Sonnino has received our declaration with thanks and said he would make an announcement in parliament only after the conclusion of the preliminary negotiations. He thought it better to come forward with an accomplished fact, in order to avoid all interference from Italian politicians.

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No. 117.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, March 13, 1915.*

I beg to send you the enclosed copy of notes on a conversation I had yesterday with the Duke of Avarna on the subject of compensation.

(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

*Vienna, March 12, 1915.*

In reply to my declaration of the 9th instant, the Italian Ambassador to-day communicated to me the following instructions from his Government:

The Austro-Hungarian Government having assented to the question of compensation as proposed by the Italian Government, the latter agrees to open the discussions on that subject. For the time being, it has no intention to make any declarations in parliament or to publish anything concerning the impending negotiations. The accord being once concluded, the two Governments would easily agree on the form of its publication.

Baron Sonnino hopes that the task will be begun without delay and that the conversations will be conducted speedily in order to arrive as soon as possible at the agreement which must be concluded before any Austro-Hungarian military action is undertaken in the Balkans.

These conversations should be conducted directly between us, without the intervention of a third party.

Baron Sonnino desired to make clear the following starting points:

(1) Absolute secrecy of the fact and of the progress of the negotiations. Any indiscretion would compel the Italian Government to break off the negotiations at once.

(2) The agreement once concluded, must be perfected immediately. Otherwise, the Italian Government would not have sufficient political power to obtain the ratification indispensable for the enforcement of the agreement.

(3) In order to prevent the raising of any new question or contention, as well as any recurrence of adverse incidents between the two parties; and also in order to assure to the Imperial and Royal Government the freedom necessary for the continuance of the war, the agreement should extend over the entire period of the war and cover all possible references to Article VII.

When Austria-Hungary shall have accepted these formal points, Baron Sonnino will be ready to specify his demands. He will confine them to what he considers to be the minimum necessary to reach the

aim of the accord, which consists in the elimination of all causes of friction between the two Powers and the creation between them of an atmosphere of confidence which will allow of their coöperation toward their common aims in international politics.

The two parties are equally interested in a speedy conclusion of an understanding which will eliminate all suspicions of procrastination. For that reason Baron Sonnino proposes to limit the time for the negotiations to a fortnight. Should no agreement have been reached at the end of that period, both parties would withdraw their proposals as null and void and would resume their freedom as before the commencement of the conversations.

I told the Duke of Avarna that I noted all he had said at the end of his communication but at the same time maintained my interpretation of the expression, "previous agreement," as against the one Baron Sonnino reiterated in his message. As I have amply explained before, the latter would make it impossible for us even to defend ourselves against attack.

I added that I raised no objection to the Italian Minister's proposal that the negotiations should be carried on directly between our two Governments and without the intervention of a third party. Yet, it was understood that we mutually agree to keep Germany informed of all the phases in our negotiations, as befits the spirit of our relations as allies.

Commenting on the three points proffered by Baron Sonnino, I remarked to the Ambassador in respect of No. 1 that I recognised the justification of his contentions and coincided in the Minister's desire for the strictest secrecy in the conduct of our negotiations, with the sole exception of Germany. For the reasons given above, it is indispensable that the latter should be taken into our confidence. Point 2 is absolutely unacceptable for us. If Baron Sonnino, according to the Ambassador, reasons that the agreement which must precede the realisation of the advantage to be compensated for, in virtue of Article VII, must consequently be put into effect at once, I must state in return that this would involve too great a violation of the text. It is the *agreement* that must be "previous," but *not its fulfilment*. It would be positively impossible for us to transfer any territory before the conclusion of the peace, for various reasons which in themselves are imperative and which we could not possibly disregard.

I hoped the Italian Government would not decline to reconsider this demand.

I unreservedly subscribed to the considerations contained in Point 3.

I finished by saying that I was guided by the same desire as Baron Sonnino, to arrive as quickly as possible at a happy conclusion of our prospective negotiations; if the period of a fortnight stipulated by him was the expression of his unalterable desire, then I would gladly accept his opinion; yet it seemed to me difficult to fix a definite number of days for negotiations of such importance.

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No. 118.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, March 15, 1915.*

I beg to send you the enclosed notes of my conversation to-day with the Duke of Avarna on the question of compensation.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

*Vienna, March 15, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that he had received Baron Sonnino's reply to his report on our last conversation, however, without instructions to convey it to me. Nevertheless, he did not wish to conceal from me that the Minister was not satisfied with the way in which I had received his latest propositions.

Baron Sonnino did not wish to attach too much importance to my aversion to his interpretation of the term "previous agreement." If we agreed upon the principles, this question would become a mere matter of form.

Our opposition to the principle of immediate transfer would, on the other hand, represent an insurmountable obstacle to any understanding. The execution of the agreement immediately after its conclusion would be the *conditio sine qua non*, without which it would be of no avail to enter into any discussions. Without that condition

the Italian Government could give no guarantee for the acceptance of the prospective agreement by public opinion.

Furthermore, my persistence in maintaining our claims to compensation for the Dodecanesos and for Valona indicates strong desire on my part to carry on our negotiations to a happy conclusion.

I asked the Duke of Avarna first of all to reassure the Minister on the score of the apprehensions which he seems to entertain in regard to our military operations in the course of our prospective conversations. Once the discussions are well under way we certainly shall refrain from any action which might retard their progress or endanger their happy conclusion.

It is rather Baron Sonnino's persistence in his demand for immediate execution that I consider at this moment the only, and I hope ephemeral, impediment to a happy issue of our problem.

I refrained from repeating what I had said before: if the reaching of an agreement had to be "previous," it was impossible to derive from the text of Article VII that its execution had to be equally "previous." At the very least the advantage to be compensated for should be simultaneous with the transfer of the compensation.

Leaving aside the formal part of the question, the Italian Government should realise the difficulties which the Dual Monarchy would have to face in order to comply with that demand.

Public sentiment should also be considered, and the transfer could be perfected only when the aggregate results, probably more satisfactory in other directions, should be determined at the end of the great present crisis. Last, but not least, it would be impossible to change the fate of a province while its sons are bravely fighting with all the other soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for the integrity of their country. Therefore, the Austro-Hungarian Government, though it has assumed the responsibility of an eventual territorial sacrifice, remains firm in the conviction that it is its duty to postpone its execution until the end of the war.

We have accepted in principle the basis proposed by Baron Sonnino, and have done so with the best intention to resume the conversations immediately and to reach an amicable and complete understanding with Italy. Yet the great sacrifice we are ready to make should not be rendered more difficult by the introduction of new demands.

Baron Sonnino has construed my repeated assertion of our right to compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos and of Valona as an indication of insufficient enthusiasm on my part to

come to an understanding. He was wrong. In the face of the Italian Minister's constant denial of our right, I am obliged to persist in its incontestability. Our right is as clear as the one which Italy derives from Article VII for her own benefit; as I have not specified our demands, I can not admit the imputation that I intend to impede the negotiations. On the contrary, I have only one desire, namely, to see them continued and carried to a conclusion.

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No. 119.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 17, 1915.*

You will have noted from the conversations I have had with the Italian Ambassador, the gist of which I have given you, that Italy's demand for a territorial cession has not yet been specified. On the other hand the fundamental demand has been laid down that the territory eventually to be ceded should be actually transferred to Italy immediately after the conclusion of the prospective agreement.

Should you, in the course of your conversation, get the impression that this contestable Italian demand was prompted by the apprehension that we might change our minds in the event of a successful issue of the war and refuse to transfer the territory ceded to Italy, you will combat such an assumption, not only on the ground that the very fact of our eventual cession being binding would make such a fear baseless, but also by suggesting that definite guarantees for our adherence to our obligations may be discussed.

As the Entente Powers now appear to be making steadily augmented offers to Italy, I request you also to explain to the Italian Government—without, however, mentioning this circumstance—that we would include in our calculations a far-reaching participation of Italy in the advantages that would result from the conclusion of peace, in the event of Austria-Hungary and Germany being victorious.

No. 120.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, March 19, 1915.

I gather from your reports that Baron Sonnino desires a closer intercourse with you on the subject of our relations with Italy.

I entirely share this wish. Although it appears necessary that the principal negotiations, which have been initiated in Vienna, be concentrated here, it will be desirable to give you a possibility to maintain our closely defined position while affording Baron Sonnino an opportunity to convey his ideas to me chiefly by consecutive and direct discussions between you.

I therefore request you to place yourself, when the next occasion arises, at the disposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and possibly of the Prime Minister.

No. 121.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, March 19, 1915.

I had occasion to-day to discuss the compensation question with Baron Sonnino.

The Minister reiterated his demands exactly as set forth in your notes. He referred without any curtness to the difference of opinion on the question of the immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded. He said Prince Bülow had suggested leaving this phase of the question open and proceeding meanwhile to negotiations on the concrete points. Baron Sonnino expected little from such a procedure, which would increase the difficulties and, in a way, make the prospective discussions problematic. Nevertheless, he was prepared to accept this *modus procedendi* if you approved it, so as to avoid giving me the impression that he was creating difficulties.

In the course of the conversation it became clear that two contentions had particularly prompted Baron Sonnino's demand:

(1) Public feeling, which, as on various previous occasions during this war, might take a dangerous turn if those who by virtue of

the accord have become Italian subjects, were to shed their blood for a foreign cause. Notwithstanding this contention, he did not seem unresponsive to our reasoning from the military standpoint and was rather inclined to put this matter in a secondary place.

(2) The ratification of the territorial cession by parliament. He calculated upon the necessity of submitting the eventual accord for acceptance immediately after its conclusion. In that event Italy would be bound definitely, while we would still have a loophole in the possibility that the Houses of Representatives might withhold their consent if the accord is not submitted to them until after the conclusion of peace. The consent of a Government could be binding only upon itself; in the event of a parliamentary refusal, it would have to resign. In this case Italy would have fulfilled her engagements resulting from the agreement, and yet the cession would be void. He failed to see what guarantees could be given. I told him that you surely would be prepared to discuss this matter of guarantees.

Otherwise, the conversation was conducted on friendly terms. The Minister also reiterated his desire that the matter be brought to a speedy conclusion and suggested "*un palo di settimane*" ("a couple of weeks"). This, however, he did not regard as a fixed period, but his only desire in specifying a time-limit was to remove any suspicion of an intention to procrastinate on either side.

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No. 122.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 19, 1915.*

I observe that a misunderstanding has arisen which has made an unfavourable impression upon the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

In my last conversation with the Italian Ambassador, in rejecting the demand for an immediate transfer of the territory to be ceded, I said, among other things, that as our possible future acquisitions in the Balkans will definitely materialise only after the conclusion of peace, the taking possession by Italy of the territory to be ceded could also be effectuated only at that time. It now appears that Baron Sonnino interprets this utterance as a design to connect the



transfer to Italy of the territory to be ceded with the question as to whether, and what kind of, acquisitions in the Balkans would fall to us at the end of the war. This is by no means my intention. Quite on the contrary, my standpoint is that our territorial cession to Italy should in no way depend upon the circumstance whether, and what kind of, territorial or other advantages we would gain by availing ourselves of the freedom of action in the Balkans which Italy would concede to us for the entire duration of the war. My utterance to the Duke of Avarna was misconstrued by error. I only meant to say that the territorial cession to Italy could be definitely effected only at the conclusion of peace, in the same manner as would our eventual acquisitions in the Balkans.

With the above explanation I request you to clear up, without delay, the misunderstanding referred to, and to convey simultaneously to Baron Sonnino my willingness to enter forthwith into negotiations.

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No. 123.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, March 20, 1915.*

On receipt of your telegram of yesterday, I called on Foreign Minister and elucidated the misunderstanding. Baron Sonnino listened to explanation with visible satisfaction. To make case more clear, I summed matter up by saying you regarded eventual territorial cession to Italy and the advantages which accrue to us from eventual freedom of action in Balkans, as two independent issues, both of which, however, would only become effective after the conclusion of peace.

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No. 124.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 21, 1915.*

I also explained the misunderstanding to the Duke of Avarna yesterday, and said we did not subject the later fulfilment of the

“previous agreement” to the circumstance, whether, and what kind of, advantages we would acquire in Servia. As a starting point for our negotiations Baron Sonnino has offered us unlimited freedom of action against Servia and Montenegro for the entire duration of the war, in return for a territorial cession. On our part I took this under consideration, without, however, binding myself in any direction, as neither have the Italian desires been specified as yet nor have we had an opportunity to define our conditions.

In any case, it would then be our business to see what advantages we might derive from our freedom of action, and that the fulfilment of our agreement shall not be governed by the extent of our acquisitions.

According to his instructions, the Duke of Avarna further endeavoured to advance more arguments in an endeavour to show that it could make no material difference to us whether we effected the cession at once or after the conclusion of the peace. After an agreement has been perfected it would be necessary to make some statement to the public. From such a disclosure all concerned would learn of the change in their destinies; moreover, the political and moral effect which the event might produce in the Dual Monarchy would likewise be immediate and could not be postponed till the time of the actual cession.

I explained in detail to the Ambassador that his remarks in no way invalidated any of the arguments which render it impossible for us to carry out the eventual cession before the end of the war.

The Ambassador then informed me that Baron Sonnino did not wish to assume the initiative any longer and that he left it to us to make acceptable proposals. I replied that the Minister had reached that decision under the impression of a misunderstanding which has since been cleared up, and that he would, therefore, most likely abandon this view. On my part, I now propose to commence negotiations without delay and shall expect definite proposals from Baron Sonnino, to which we will at once give our reply and state our conditions.

The Duke of Avarna also mentioned Baron Sonnino's concern about the possibility that we might contest an agreement which was not immediately carried out, and about the risk which Italy might run thereby. I reassured him on that score by referring to Austria-Hungary's word and seal, which never yet have been broken.

No. 125.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 21, 1915.*

I share Baron Sonnino's doubts as to the advisability of your proposal contained in your telegram of the 19th inst., namely, to defer a decision on the Italian demand for immediate transfer to Italy of the territory to be ceded, until the conclusion of the negotiations with the Italian Government. Such a procedure would subject our understanding on all material points in the transaction to the final outcome of the negotiations on an important, fundamental, primary question.

I request you to discuss the matter in this sense with the Italian Minister.

In reply to Baron Sonnino's query about guarantees which may possibly be given for the adherence to our promise, you will tell the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this matter might be discussed in the course of the negotiations; I had primarily in mind Germany's guarantee for the fulfilment of our obligations, a guarantee which Germany is willing to give.

No. 126.

*Von Mayrhauser to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Valona, March 22, 1915.*

The office of harbour captaincy under Italian supervision was established at the port of Valona on the 19th inst.

Lieutenant-Commander A. Puliti acts as chief of that authority, a lieutenant being his assistant; both are officers of the Italian Navy.

No. 127.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 23, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador told me to-day that Baron Sonnino has expressed to him his satisfaction with the explanation by which I have dissipated the misunderstanding concerning the question whether or not the obligations to be entered into by the future agreement between us would be independent of the eventual results of our activities in the Balkans.

The Italian Minister also has been pleased to note my good disposition to open negotiations without delay and has authorised the Duke of Avarna to lend his assistance to that end. Baron Sonnino now awaits my specific and exact proposals toward the understanding we both desire to reach.

He still maintains the view that the execution of the agreement should follow immediately upon its conclusion, as it would be impossible for any Italian Government to take upon itself serious engagements before the country and parliament—engagements which would bind Italy's freedom of action for an unlimited period—on a mere promise on the part of Austria-Hungary.

I replied to the Duke of Avarna that I would not decline to consider Baron Sonnino's new proposition to take the initiative in specifying the subject of our negotiations; I would inform him of my decision as soon as I have had an opportunity to reach it.

As to the question whether the execution of the agreement should be immediate or deferred, I regretted my inability to share Baron Sonnino's view, as, to my mind, an agreement duly concluded and signed by two Governments with all the formalities required to give that act the character of an international convention, could not be qualified as a "simple promise." No more could I agree with the idea that it was only the Italian Government that would take a serious engagement binding its freedom of action. Austria-Hungary, by signing the agreement, would undertake engagements at least equally serious which, by the very fact of their being generally known, would be equally binding upon her, regardless of all measures which might be considered suitable and practicable in the course of the negotiations.

No. 128.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, March 23, 1915.*

In to-day's conversation with Baron Sonnino, he still adhered to his established standpoint concerning the immediate, actual transfer of the territory to be ceded. I gave him a detailed explanation of the practical impossibility of his proposal.

Baron Sonnino admitted my contentions to be very justifiable, but argued that this question was no mere matter of form for him; he was guided by the apprehension that the Government would not be strong enough to convince parliament of the absolute certainty of the deferred cession.

I referred to your willingness to discuss the question of guarantees and emphasised Germany's promise of her guarantee.

In compliance with your telegraphic instructions of the 21st inst., I informed Baron Sonnino of your doubts about the advisability of my suggestion to defer decision on time of cession.

Baron Sonnino reiterated his doubts, but declared his readiness to discuss concrete questions in order to show his good intentions and to avoid loss of time. Yet, he was unable to define his claims so long as this preliminary question was not settled; he could only receive your proposals with the chief object of keeping up the negotiations.

He regarded this course as positively non-committal and without prejudice, so that neither party can, at a later date, inject suggestions which the other party had not agreed to.

I do not doubt Italian Government will in both cases endeavour to put on us the blame of a possible failure, whether you or Baron Sonnino comes forward with specific proposals.

However urgent the talk here about accelerating matters, I cannot help suspecting that the inclination prevails to gain time before engaging anywhere in any way.

No. 129.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Report.)

*Rome, March 24, 1915.*

Summing up the impressions I have gathered in all circles from the time when the public here began to glean some information about the change of attitude on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government, I have come to the conclusion that this news has been received here with a sigh of relief. I mean to say that the great majority of so-called serious political and intellectual circles—with the exception, of course, of professional agitators—consider an understanding with the Dual Monarchy as most desirable for Italy's interests. Yet, intimidated and confused as they have been by an intense internal and external pressure, they no longer entertained any hopes of success unless advances emanated from Vienna which would afford them a moral support against adverse currents and furnish them with sufficient excuse to stand by the Central Powers.

Despite the continuance of military preparations, the anxiety of the past weeks has subsided.

They seem to realise that intervention would be unreasonable under existing conditions, and a general feeling of relief on that score may be perceived. All this, without any knowledge as to what Austria-Hungary's advances really were, and how far they would go! The country's enthusiasm for war may be gauged by this circumstance. It is evident that the public, including the politicians, would be content even with comparatively unimportant gains, if they could only escape the present intolerable uncertainty. It is obvious that the other side has realised this situation promptly. Consequently the press of the Entente has lost no time in inaugurating a new campaign to eliminate the possibility of an understanding by any available means. In this campaign, of course, the best is made of everything. More than ever does it enlarge on our unfavourable situation, hoping thus to prompt the Italians to increase their demands, in order to prevent a conclusion of our negotiations. New reports are being launched that Roumania had been induced to align herself against us, and rumours are being circulated of a change of régime in Sofia, and of Bulgarian aspirations to Constantinople—rumours which have been contradicted since—and all this in an attempt to make Italy believe her interests in the East could be

conserved solely by her entering the war on the side of the Entente. Finally, efforts are made to organise an imposing demonstration in the shape of a great meeting of the *Associazione Trento-Trieste* which would culminate in the usual rhetorical feats of Bissolati, Barzilai, Federzoni, Chiesa and others.

In this way all the old and tried devices are availed of in the attempt to nip in the bud any amelioration which may take place in public opinion and to confuse the always wavering and aimless Government by the spectre of non-existent dangers. This design is made all the more feasible by the undoubted fact that there are persons in the highest Government posts who lend their aid to these activities.

Basing a conclusion upon the above-mentioned observations, the whole weight of the situation rests now, since the adjournment of parliament, solely upon the Government, and therein lies the danger of future unfavourable developments.

The attitude of these gentlemen strongly indicates that they do not seriously mean to come to an understanding. In contrast to this indication, due weight must be given to the feeling of relief which the hope for an amicable settlement has produced among the general public.

It is likely that Salandra and Sonnino are coquetting with the influences emanating from the various camps; in this manner they can follow the war situation for some time yet, taking advantage of opportunities, and eventually secure for themselves the best possible results.

I do not think it impossible that this policy may lead even to a mobilisation if a fairly plausible excuse can be found.

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No. 130.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 25, 1915.*

Yesterday I declared to the Italian Ambassador my willingness to accept Baron Sonnino's latest suggestion. I shall consequently make him a specific proposal, to serve as the starting point for negotiations toward a "previous agreement" on the basis we have already assented to in principle.

No. 131.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 28, 1915.*

Yesterday I made a proposal to the Italian Ambassador in the matter of an agreement to be concluded between our two Governments on the following terms:

Italy shall bind herself to observe toward Austria-Hungary and her allies throughout the duration of the present war a benevolent neutrality in matters political, military and economic.

Within the meaning of this pledge, Italy shall undertake to leave to Austria-Hungary full and unrestrained freedom of action in the Balkans for the entire duration of the present war, and shall renounce beforehand all further claims to compensation for territorial or other advantages which Austria-Hungary may eventually derive from that freedom of action.

This stipulation, however, shall not extend to Albania, in respect of which the existing agreement between Austria-Hungary and Italy, as well as the decisions of the London conference of Ambassadors, shall hold good.

Austria-Hungary on her part will assent to a cession of territories situated in southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent. The details of delimitation shall be defined in such a manner as to comply with the strategic exigencies created for us by a new frontier, and with the wishes of the population.

This territorial cession on the part of Austria-Hungary shall imply an obligation on Italy's part to take over the proportionate share of the Austrian public debt incumbent on these territories, as well as their provincial, municipal and other liabilities, inasmuch as the latter are guaranteed by the State. Italy shall also pay to Austria-Hungary a lump sum as an indemnity for all investments made by the State within the territories to be ceded, independently of the purchase of the railroads pertaining to that territory and of collective and individual indemnification for Church properties, entails, pensions of former public officials, etc.

As soon as the fundamental points of the agreement shall have been determined on the above-mentioned basis, Austria-Hungary and Italy will proceed to the discussion of details.



The final agreement resulting from this discussion shall be embodied in a secret convention between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The transaction referred to will also necessitate the revision of certain treaties which exist between the two Powers, such as those concerning the new junction of railroads, the arrangements relating to border transit trade, navigation on Lake Garda, etc., etc.

The Duke of Avarna observed that Baron Sonnino might find the designation of the object of cession a little vague. I replied that the indication of southern Tyrol, including the city of Trent, showed clearly the extent of the sacrifice we were prepared to make.

The border-line could not be defined in this initial verbal communication as made to-day, but I was prepared to do so at our next meeting.

The Ambassador further observed that Baron Sonnino would not assent to the condition of secrecy on the agreement to be concluded; he had expressed the desire for secrecy pending the negotiations, but he intended to make the agreement public as soon as it was perfected.

I asked the Duke of Avarna, nevertheless, to communicate my proposal to the Minister, who had promised to confer with me about the declaration he would make in parliament concerning our prospective arrangements. Besides, we could take up this phase of the question in the course of the negotiations.

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No. 132.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, March 31, 1915.*

Not until to-day have I had an opportunity to discuss your proposals with Baron Sonnino.

He declared them to be very insufficient and insisted especially that they were vague. Thereupon I explained, according to my instructions, that you had only meant to sketch the outlines of an agreement and that you intended to offer more detailed proposals before long.

Baron Sonnino told me that he had conferred on the matter with Salandra yesterday, but not yet with the King; he hoped to be able to despatch his reply to-night or to-morrow.

He refrained from discussing the individual points of the proposal with the exception of the one relating to the obligation into which Italy would enter, to maintain a *benevolent neutrality* on *economic* matters among others.

His desire to avoid misunderstandings compelled him to state in advance that in this respect Italy could not engage herself any further than to a strict and impartial neutrality. England's pressure was so heavy that any suspicion of a preferential treatment of the Central Powers would lead to immediate reprisals, which may even include the closing of the Straits of Gibraltar to Italian supplies. Many Italian industries depended entirely upon Great Britain for their supply of raw material, and therefore would run the risk of being compelled to close. This would mean the dismissal of thousands of workmen, which in its turn would create most serious problems.

While admitting Italy's peculiar geographical position, I took occasion to describe her attitude up to this time as one of benevolent neutrality toward the Entente Powers.

I also cited instances where export matters were strangely held up after they had already been decided upon in our favour on principle.

Baron Sonnino refused to admit any bad intent in that respect and ascribed it all to the terrible pressure from England.

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No. 133.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 1, 1915.*

Latest news bears out reports that large transports laden with troops have been converging during the past few days from various directions to Udine and right up to our border. This operation is equivalent to a secret deployment, whereby eventual mobilisation is considerably facilitated.

To-day's situation may be summarised as follows:

Alleged offer by Great Britain to provide for war expenses; territorial inducements, which cannot exactly be defined; constant fear of missing opportunity in the East; underhand pressure, as exerted by Free Masons and Republicans, simultaneously with similar

work of Entente, in which Cabinet Minister Martini is taking the leading part; and above all, the daily tightening fist of England, against which Italy is developing no energy of opposition. All this would explain possible failure of weak Italian Government to resist any longer.

Baron Sonnino's further attitude in the present negotiations will best show whether the Italian Government wishes to procrastinate or to overstep the mark by exorbitant counter-proposals and thereby to shift the blame of an eventual breach upon the Austro-Hungarian Government, which is bound by its pledge of secrecy; or whether the Italian Government intends to use the pressure of military preparations in conducting the negotiations.

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No. 134.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, April 2, 1915.*

I beg to send you the enclosed notes on my conversation with the Italian Ambassador yesterday.

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(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

*Vienna, April 1, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador to-day brought me Baron Sonnino's reply to my proposals of March 22nd, concerning the basis of the agreement to be negotiated.

Referring to the benevolent neutrality which we demand from Italy, the Minister had given instructions that I be informed that Italy would have no objection to assuming that obligation for the entire duration of the war, provided Austria-Hungary understood the term neutrality to mean a complete and sincere neutrality, such as Italy has observed up to this time toward both belligerent parties; but Italy's geographical position in the Mediterranean prevented her

from adopting a neutrality inclined to favour us, as such a step might provoke reprisals from the other side.

I replied that we demanded a benevolent neutrality in the sense of Article IV of our Treaty of Alliance. It is obvious that we would not think of demanding anything that might expose Italy to justifiable reprisals from any party. Yet, a neutral country has at its disposal numerous legitimate means to be of assistance to a belligerent neighbour and ally.

As to the freedom of action we were compelled to demand for our activities in Servia—a freedom which was understood not to apply to Albania, in the face of the further validity of our special agreement—Baron Sonnino's attitude has taken an astounding turn: he informed me that Italy could not possibly consent to Austria-Hungary's unlimited freedom of action in the Balkans without obtaining Austria-Hungary's renunciation of her interest in Albania.

I pointed out to the Duke of Avarna that this was an entirely new pretension, which I must decidedly oppose as being adverse to our unchangeable interests in Albania, which Italy has always recognised. We have entered into mutual engagements with Italy, and mean to maintain them. Our demand for compensation for the occupation of Valona is a consequence of that occupation.

I found no difficulty in accepting Baron Sonnino's view that the questions concerning the carrying out of a territorial cession are subordinated to the solution of the fundamental issue. This phase would be discussed in detail in due time, and the Italians would certainly present no obstacle to an understanding.

As to that fundamental issue, the Minister characterises my proposals as insufficient and vague. He holds, "that in order to create a cordial relation between the two Powers, which will eliminate all causes of friction in future, and to make possible a collaboration toward common political aims, it is necessary to establish conditions of greater equality and security on the frontiers and in the Adriatic—conditions which would prevent new and frequent irredentistic movements. For the accomplishment of such an end the cession of a strip of land in Tyrol would certainly not be sufficient."

To this enigmatic, yet very clear statement, I replied that the aims to which Baron Sonnino referred now, as he had done previously, were in entire accord with my frequently expressed views. On the other hand I found it hard to understand just what was meant by the reference to irredentistic movements and to conditions of equality and security between the two Powers. Whatever the phrases

may mean, our offer of all the districts which constitute what is commonly called the "Trentino" could certainly not be spoken of as the "cession of a strip of land in Tyrol."

The Italian Minister had qualified my first proposal as vague. To-day, having examined the situation, I am in a position to specify it. The territories which Austria-Hungary would be prepared to cede to Italy under the conditions indicated would comprise the districts (*politische Bezirke*) of Trent, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (with the exclusion of Madonna di Campiglio and its surroundings), and the district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige, the frontier line would run to Lavis, which place would fall to the Italian side.

I expressed my hopes to the Duke of Avarna, that Baron Sonnino, after having familiarised himself with the extent of the proposed cession, will change his mind as to its importance.

The Minister did not fail to remind the Ambassador, at the beginning of his instructions, that serious differences still existed as to the time when the agreement should be put into effect; but he advised him not to insist at this time, so as not to complicate the negotiations.

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No. 135.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 2, 1915.*

I have received from a reliable source an exposition of the present state of our negotiations with Italy. It emanates from an official of the *Consulta* and corresponds exactly with the facts, though it does not include the merits of your proposals. This shows what secrecy here means.

Official referred to adds that there will be no hurry in replying as it is necessary to see first when and whether the Russians will invade Hungary and the allies will take the Dardanelles.

There is no doubt that systematic endeavours are being made to learn the truth about Austria-Hungary's power of resistance and about her general situation. This is borne out by the fact that the Italian Consul General in Budapest has been sent for. It is significant in this connection that the newspapers, ever-ready to follow the Government's hints in their leading editorials, have published

during the past few days a particularly large number of articles on the economic misery, the discouragement, dissatisfaction, and the craving for peace in various parts of the Dual Monarchy. These articles, together with contemptuous remarks, chiefly emanating from military circles, on the chances of an attack upon us, evidently serve the purpose of stimulating their own courage and of justifying an opportune attempt to secure a share in the booty as a legitimate undertaking.

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No. 136.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 2, 1915.*

From the notes which were attached to my communication of yesterday you will have gathered that Baron Sonnino's reception of my proposals is unsatisfactory.

In view of this attitude of the Italian Government, as well as of various still more unfavourable news received lately, it would be of great value for my future action to obtain the best possible information concerning the real aims of the Italian Government in this entire question, and to discover whether it is in earnest about its professed endeavour to reach an understanding with us.

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No. 137.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 3, 1915.*

For many months past the conviction has been taking root in Italy that the Kingdom could not emerge from the general crisis without acquiring a territorial expansion, as otherwise the maintenance of her position as a Great Power—an idea cherished with increasing jealousy—would be menaced. By repeated utterances in parliament the Government has anticipated this aspiration and has reserved to itself the right to decide how, when and to what extent it may be realised.

England's entrance into the war brought Italian sympathies from the very start to the side of the Entente, whose power was expected to be overwhelming.

For many years past a cleverly conducted press campaign, coupled with the intense activities of the Free Masons, has directed the eyes of the nation to the northeast and has thus kindled the glowing irredentism.

Out of weakness at first, and later as a matter of internal party politics, the Government may have looked upon these activities as a means to divert the population from the unpleasant questions at home.

Then, humiliated by her complete military impotence at the beginning of the war, Italy endeavoured to relieve this situation by extensive armaments.

Incidentally, Salandra is entertaining the idea of acquiring the laurels of a great statesman by making best use of this opportunity, which never will recur, when all her great neighbours are engaged in other directions.

The slow progress of the war, the increasing exhaustion on both sides, the economic situation, and lastly her gradually enhanced military preparedness, accentuated more and more Italy's importance as the only undamaged Great Power. These considerations have aroused in Italy the highest imaginable ambitions to be satisfied with as little sacrifice as possible.

For Italy the aim is, first of all, territorial conquest at Austria-Hungary's expense; a fact which has been expressed in all circles openly or under cover.

For the Entente, however, the aim is war itself—to increase the numbers of enemies ranged against the Central Powers. It is said that at the beginning of March the Entente had reckoned with certainty on Italy's entrance into the war, basing its confidence upon the presumption that the Austro-Hungarian Government would prove stubborn. Our acceptance of the Italian basis of negotiations was a heavy blow to the Entente. The Entente is now endeavouring to represent the situation in the Dual Monarchy as becoming daily more desperate. Sgr. Martini is said to have succeeded lately in obtaining an audience with Baron Sonnino for Barzilai.

On that occasion Barzilai is said to have explained to the Minister that his followers would not accept an arrangement with us without provoking disturbances, unless such arrangement included a satisfactory settlement of the Adriatic aspirations. Under the pressure

of all these influences the Italian Government is augmenting its pretensions; all the more so as the daily Russian reports of victories lead it to the belief that Austria-Hungary's power is broken.

Just now the papers announce quite seriously that the Russians have invaded the Hungarian plains and give the most incredible details about the invasion.

On the other hand, the Government is anxious to avoid making permanent enemies of the Central Powers, and especially of Germany, in the event that their collapse should not materialise as it has been imagined here. At the same time the Government also fears to be left to the mercy of the Entente, as it realises that the greater part of the country is opposed to war, and would only accept it if the goal of its aspirations could not be reached otherwise. Furthermore, the Government hesitates at the dubious chances for success and at the material sacrifices. For the above-mentioned reasons the Italian Government probably will attempt to postpone the weighty decision which would bind her definitely to either side.

In the aforesaid I have purposely ignored the ethical points like loyalty, faithfulness to the alliance, etc., as they do not apply in this case; the whole matter may be viewed only according to Italian mentality, intensified by the general conflagration. It stands to reason that under such conditions there can be no question of arguing, but simply of discussing adverse contentions.

Nevertheless, I fear that an eventual declination to pursue the negotiations may lead to dangerous consequences.

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No. 138.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 6, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador called on me to-day and I asked him whether he had yet received his Government's reply to my last proposal.

On his negative reply I asked the Duke of Avarna to telegraph to Rome asking Baron Sonnino to be so kind as to let me know in his turn the proposition he had to make, since he considered my



first proposal as insufficient and vague and had given no reply to my subsequent specific proposal; then each of us could try and find an acceptable agreement on the matter of territorial cession. I added that my request was inspired by the desire to see our negotiations speedily nearing a happy conclusion to the mutual and urgent interest of our respective countries to establish our future relations on a more definite and cordial footing.

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No. 139.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 7, 1915.*

Baron Sonnino told me to-day he had been informed by the Duke of Avarna of your request as contained in yesterday's telegram.

Without discussing your latest proposals, the Minister told me that he would confer again to-night with Sgr. Salandra about it, and he hoped to be able to formulate his specific counter-proposals either to-morrow or the day after.

I emphasised the point that he could once more see from your expressed desire that the good intention still prevails in Vienna to come as soon as possible to an understanding which would secure the good relationship between the two neighbouring Powers for the future.

I made a special effort to emphasise your friendly attitude in order to counteract the Minister's boundless innate distrust, which is stimulated daily by the Entente.

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No. 140.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Report.)

*Rome, April 7, 1915.*

Aside from the powers and factors which are well known to you and which work on parallel lines toward the incitement to action in this country, the psychological moment also deserves consideration.

Personal and national vanity is deeply affected by Italy's enforced idleness in the gigantic struggle between the Great Powers, regardless of the fact that the main reason for this inaction is to be found in local conditions.

The Italians consider it unendurable that they should have no hand in the game which might set them up as a Great Power and give them the satisfaction of being appreciated at their full value. This feeling is so intense that I do not doubt many still wish that some action be taken, no matter for or against whom. Such feelings may lie dormant in the ordinary man, but combined with other motives, are active forces in the minds of those who think.

It is easy to build on a foundation of that sort, and the Entente has been enabled, through England's agency, to keep Italian sympathies on its side by exploiting in the most contemptible way the alleged violation of little Belgium and of her neutrality; also by exerting England's economic pressure daily and most inconsiderately upon Italy, who has little disposition to heroism.

In this way it was easy for our enemies to enmesh the Kingdom more and more in their artful network of lies, and even to disseminate doubts as to the invincibility of Germany, which has always been so much admired in this country.

A few years ago it would have been considered an act of madness to incur the wrath of Germany; now, this danger seems to fade away in the presence of the false reports on the real situation. In their blind hatred against Austria-Hungary the Italians willingly believe what they wish to believe.

It would seem that a serious Government would in the first place listen to its own most competent sources of information: to its own representatives. It is significant that most Italian Ambassadors advise the maintenance of neutrality; I believe I may say this with certainty of the Ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Yet, all this good advice is cast to the winds.

On a contrary assumption, it would be impossible to explain the Government's calm toleration of the utterances of all the newspapers which are within the scope of its influence; and, despite all assurances to the contrary, there are a good many of them. To my mind this represents an ominous symptom, or at least a dangerous playing with fire.

As long as the Government had to reckon with the attitude of political parties in domestic affairs, greater reserve toward the press might have been explicable. But now, since the majority in parlia-

ment, with the exception of the interventionists, has adopted a programme of cautious reserve and is unmistakably in favour of the maintenance of neutrality, it is the Government itself that keeps up the agitation alive in the press, and thereby betrays the duplicity of its policy. This is all the more obvious, in view of the fact that just at present the existing severe restrictions would make it particularly easy to give a desired direction to political discussions.

I have gained the impression that the Government's policy in press matters is aimed at arousing public feeling against the Dual Monarchy as a factor in its dealings with us, and at the same time at discrediting our internal situation in order to encourage the agitators in Italy and to create sentiment for an attack upon us if such a step should appear desirable.

The Government's game with the press seems to me doubly dangerous as the war preparations are now nearing completion. This latter development represents the great difference between the present situation and that of last autumn.

In any case the Government is assuming incalculable risks. Whether these activities must be ascribed to Sgr. Salandra or to Baron Sonnino remains to be seen.

The late Macchiavelli may be proud of his disciples. Yet, neither of these gentlemen seems to have considered the question as to whether any one will consider Italy's friendship worth seeking after this episode.

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No. 141.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 11, 1915.*

The Duke of Avarna called on me yesterday. After having enlarged on many points of historical, ethnographical and military nature, as well as on Italy's alleged secondary position in the Adriatic, the Ambassador proceeded to read a memorandum to me. That document, written in answer to my request, comprises eleven articles enumerating the conditions and stipulations which the Italian Government considers indispensable to the establishment of an agreement and a permanent understanding between the two Powers.

The memorandum, which the Ambassador subsequently handed to me, is framed in the following terms:

#### ARTICLE 1.

Austria-Hungary shall cede to Italy the Trentino with the boundaries defined for the Regno Italico in 1811, or, in other words, according to the Treaty of Paris, February 28, 1810.

The new boundary line shall diverge from the present frontier at Monte Cevedale and shall follow for a certain distance the mountain range between Valle Venosta and Valle del Noce; it shall then come down to the Adige at Gargazone, situated between Meran and Bolzano; from there it shall run to the top of the plateau on the left bank of the river, divide the Valle Sorentina in two halves and cross the Eisack Valley at Klausen; then it shall lead across the Dolomites on the right of the river Avisio, exclusive of the valleys of Garden and Badia and inclusive of the region of Ampezzo (Ampezzano) until it rejoins the present boundary line.

#### ARTICLE 2.

The eastern boundary shall be rectified by Austria-Hungary in Italy's favour, to include the cities of Gradisca and Goricia.

Starting from Tragkofel, the new boundary line shall diverge from the present frontier by running westward to Osternig, whence it shall follow the slope of the Carnic Alps to Saifniz. It shall then run to the Wiseberg by the mountain range between Seisera and Schliza; subsequently it shall merge into the old boundary until it reaches Sella di Nevea. Therefrom it shall follow the banks of the Rombone to the Isonzo, leaving Plezzo to the west. The boundary shall then follow the course of the Isonzo as far as Tolmino. Leaving the Isonzo, it shall assume a more easterly direction, passing the eastern side of the plateau of Pregona-Planina and following the track (*solco*) of the Chiappovano. It shall then run east of Goricia and across the Carso di Comen and reach the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nebresina.

#### ARTICLE 3.

The city of Trieste, with its territory extended northward to Nabresina inclusive (thus making it adjoin the new Italian border—Art. 2) and southward, comprising the present administrative dis-

tricts of Capodistria and Pirano, shall be constituted into an autonomous and independent state in matters political, international, military, legislative, financial and administrative. Austria-Hungary shall renounce all rights of sovereignty over that state, which shall remain a free port. Austro-Hungarian and Italian troops shall not enter that territory.

The new state shall assume a proportional share of the Austrian public debt.

#### ARTICLE 4.

The groups of islands called Curzolari, including Lissa (with the adjoining isles of Sant' Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with the isles of Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the adjoining isles and ledges), Cazza and Meleda, as well as Pelagosa, shall be ceded to Italy by Austria-Hungary.

#### ARTICLE 5.

The territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall be occupied immediately by Italy (Art. 1, 2 and 4). On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian authorities and troops shall evacuate Trieste and its territory (Art. 3) and all natives of those territories in military service, whether in the land or sea forces, of Austria-Hungary shall be discharged at once.

#### ARTICLE 6.

Austria-Hungary shall recognise Italy's unrestricted sovereignty over Valona and its bays, including Saseno and as much territory in the hinterland as may be required for the defence thereof.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Austria-Hungary shall unreservedly renounce all her interests in Albania, as defined by the London Conference.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Complete amnesty and immediate release shall be granted by Austria-Hungary to all persons belonging to the ceded (Art. 1, 2, 4) and evacuated (Art. 3) territories, who have been condemned or are committed to trial for reasons either political or military.

## ARTICLE 9.

In order to relieve the ceded territories (Art. 1, 2, 4) of their proportional share in the Austrian and Austro-Hungarian public debts, as well as of the liabilities in connexion with the pensions of former Austro-Hungarian officials; furthermore, in exchange for the immediate and integral transfer to the Kingdom of Italy of all state property, movable and immovable, with the exception of arms, which may be within those territories; also in lieu of compensation for the necessary rights connected with the territories in question as they apply to the present and the future—without any exception—Italy shall pay to Austria-Hungary the sum of Two Hundred Million Italian lire in gold.

## ARTICLE 10.

Italy shall pledge herself to maintain absolute neutrality toward Austro-Hungary and Germany throughout the duration of the present war.

## ARTICLE 11.

Italy shall renounce for the entire duration of the present war her right to invoke afterwards for her benefit the dispositions of Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, and Austria-Hungary shall make a similar renunciation in respect of the effected Italian occupation of the islands of the Dodecanesos.

I did not conceal from the Duke of Avarna the painful impression which Baron Sonnino's excessive pretensions had made upon me while I listened to the reading of his proposals. I informed him that I would examine each point in his communication with all due care and that I would convey to him my reply with as little delay as possible.

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No. 142.

*Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, April 12, 1915.*

The Secretary of State agrees with you that Italy's demands are unacceptable, but he presumes that they have been made merely for

the purpose of negotiations and in order thus to make sure of obtaining a part of them.

General Pau is said to have greatly influenced the Italian demands during his stay in Rome, by declaring that our military power of resistance has been broken and by telling wonders about the Russian reserves still to be expected.

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No. 143.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 14, 1915.*

Prince Bülow has given me the following information on a conversation he had yesterday with Baron Sonnino:

The two gentlemen went over each individual article of the latest Italian demands together. In the matter of the Trentino, Baron Sonnino admitted that he had included purely German districts but endeavoured to excuse this by saying that you in your proposal had retained purely Italian districts for the Dual Monarchy.

Prince Bülow gained the impression that the Italians would be open to negotiations as to the extent of territory to be ceded as well as on the question of the Isonzo border.

Prince Bülow considered the stipulations about Trieste to be entirely obscure in their disclosures of Baron Sonnino's real aspirations. When Baron Sonnino explained that he had in mind a status similar to that of Hamburg, Prince Bülow retorted that Germany was a confederation of states and that therefore an analogy between the two situations could hardly be established. Moreover, he recapitulated with all his available energy all the reasons why Austria-Hungary could not renounce Trieste.

The most heated conversation ensued on the subject of the Dalmatian group of islands. Baron Sonnino admitted that this phase of the proposed cessions involved the entire so-called Adriatic question. The Italian coast in the Adriatic, from Venice to Tarent, did not afford a single suitable port (read: Naval port!). On this account the Italian Navy is in a position of inferiority in the Adriatic Sea. The Minister of Marine and his entire department had exerted pressure upon him on that score and the whole country expected him to bring about an improvement of the situation. The Minister added

in a most cynical manner that the present opportunity must be availed of to the best advantage as it would never occur again.

Prince Bülow asked how these exorbitant demands could possibly be brought into harmony with Sonnino's repeatedly asserted desire to create a better basis for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. To this question the Minister replied that it was precisely by the most radical extermination of irredentism that he meant to serve that end!

Referring to Albania, the German Ambassador pointed to the repeated Italian declarations concerning the maintenance of the London decisions and the provisional character of the occupation of Valona. Baron Sonnino became visibly embarrassed as he replied that that matter was only a proposal, open to discussion.

Toward the end of the conversation Baron Sonnino had become more tractable, and in parting said: "*Je vous promets, je vais discuter et je serai très raisonnable.*" ("I promise you I shall discuss it and shall be very reasonable.")

The chief elements which dominate the Italian Government still remain the same: Fear of England, fear of revolution—and at Court revolution seems to be feared even more than war—and on the other hand the uncertainty as to the relative power of the two camps.

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No. 144.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

Vienna, April 16, 1915.

I intend to hand this day to the Italian Ambassador the following reply to Baron Sonnino's latest proposal:

The Austro-Hungarian Government has carefully examined the proposals which the Duke of Avarna has made in the name of the Italian Government in connexion with the agreement to be concluded between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

To its sincere regret the Austro-Hungarian Government has found a great part of those proposals, and especially those embodied in Articles 2, 3 and 4, unacceptable for political, ethnographical, strategic



and economic reasons, which it would be of no avail to enlarge upon. These proposals in their entirety would place the Austro-Hungarian Government in a position incompatible with its vital interests, and are not calculated to answer the purpose which the Italian Government has always proffered, namely, the consolidation of the mutual relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy, their establishment on a basis of perfect good faith, and the elimination of all causes of friction between them to the end that their collaboration on questions of general policy might be made possible. Sincerely concerned about these considerations, and desiring to prove to Italy its wish to arrive at a definite and permanent understanding up to the highest admissible limit, the Austro-Hungarian Government is prepared to augment the territorial cession in southern Tyrol which it had consented to in its communication to the Duke of Avarna, dated April 1st. Under our new proposal the future boundary-line would diverge from the present frontier in the vicinity of the Zufallspitze and would follow for a certain distance the boundary between the district of Cless on the one side and the districts of Schlanders and Meran on the other, coinciding with the watershed between the Noce and Adige rivers as far as the Illmenspitze. The boundary-line would then run west of Proveis in such a manner that this district would remain a part of Tyrol; then join the Torrente Pescara and follow its course up to its confluence with the Noce. Thence it would run along the course of the Noce as far as a point south of Tajo; whence it would lead up the Corno di Tres; the new boundary-line would subsequently be identical with the northern boundary of the district of Mezzolombardo and cross the Adige south of Salurn. Thence it would lead up the Geiersberg, would follow the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige, passing by the Castion and taking a direction toward the Hornspitze and the Monte Comp. There it would turn southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei to Tyrol, and would then run upward to the Pass of San Lugano. Subsequently the new boundary-line would be formed by the boundary between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese, marked by the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige; it would pass by the Cima di Rocca and the Grimm-Joch as far as Latemar. From Pass Carnon it would follow the slopes down to the Avisio, would cross that river between the districts of Moena and Farno and would then rise to the watershed between the valleys of San Pellegrino to the north and the valley of Travignolo to the south. It would rejoin the present boundary-line east of the Cima di Bocche.

The Austro-Hungarian Government consequently could not accept the boundary-line as described in Article 1 of the Italian proposals and which would include the cession to Italy of districts with a German population.

As to the proposal contained in Article 5, which provides that the territories ceded by Austria-Hungary shall be transferred to Italy immediately, the precipitate measures which such a proceeding would involve, technically impracticable for many reasons of general administration and on other considerations, even in time of peace, would be all the more so in time of war.

Without wishing to cite any more instances in history, it will suffice to recall the mode of procedure applied at the time of the cession of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, when even after the conclusion of peace a certain number of months elapsed between the conclusion of the convention and the actual transfer of the ceded territories.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has no objection to the proposal contained in Article 8, referring to an amnesty to be granted to all persons belonging to the territories ceded to Italy who are either condemned or committed for trial for military or political offences.

With regard to the question of Albania in general, and of Valona in particular, the Austro-Hungarian Government is compelled to state that it seems difficult to bring into harmony the proposals made by the Italian Government in Articles 6 and 7 with the engagements into which Italy has entered on four occasions—namely: by the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord of 1900-1, by the decision of the London Conference, by its declaration of August 4th of last year, to remain true to its engagements toward Austria-Hungary as well as to the decisions of the London Conference, and not to take advantage in Albania of the fact that Austria-Hungary is at war; finally, by its formal and clear declarations on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Valona. On the other hand the Austro-Hungarian Government, in full consciousness of the necessity to uphold the mutual rights and obligations resulting from the arrangements now in force, and to maintain the attitude it always has held on the Albanian question, could not renounce its interests in Albania—a country so very close to the sphere of Austria-Hungary's most vital concerns. Moreover, the Dual Monarchy has, in conjunction with Italy, contributed to the creation of Albania, not only politically, but also by considerable sacrifices of a military nature (partial mobilisation of 1913), as well

as economically and financially. Besides, in consequence of the decisions of the London Conference, the Albanian question has become a European question and neither one individual Power nor several Great Powers may, single-handed or by virtue of an agreement, interfere with Albania, whose existence and neutrality have been guaranteed by Europe. Only by the concordant will of the Great Powers could the political situation of Albania be modified—an eventuality impossible during the present war.

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government adheres to the spirit of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord about Albania and recognises that this very Albanian question constitutes a problem of general policy, in the solution of which Austria-Hungary and Italy may profitably coöperate in the future. The Austro-Hungarian Government, therefore, declares itself ever ready to discuss with the Italian Government our respective interests in Albania, either on the basis of the present situation or in whatever way political changes in the future may make it incumbent for either party to subject our arrangements to a revision.

Proceeding to the examination of the engagements which Italy would have to take, the Austro-Hungarian Government would point out that Turkey, by her entrance into the war, has joined Austria-Hungary and Germany; consequently, the neutrality which Italy would be bound to observe until the end of the war toward Austria-Hungary and Germany should also include the Ottoman Empire.

As to Article XI of the proposal we would be prepared to accept it, provided that the phrase: "*et relativement aussi aux avantages territoriaux ou autres qui résulteraient pour l'Autriche-Hongrie du traité de paix terminant cette guerre*" ("and also in respect of the territorial and other advantages, which may accrue to Austria-Hungary by virtue of the peace treaty terminating this war") be inserted after the words "*guerre actuelle*" ("present war").

Our renunciation of a compensation for the occupation of the islands of the Dodecanesos would also be subject to this condition.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is not yet prepared to state the precise figure which would correspond to the proportional share of the territories to be ceded to Italy in the public debts nor of the lump sum to be demanded from Italy as an indemnity for all investments made by the State in the territories referred to; but it can state at the outset that the figure proposed by the Italian Government would be absolutely inadequate and would not by a considerable margin constitute an equitable indemnification. To cite only one

item here, the value of military structures alone within the territories to be ceded to Italy would considerably exceed the sum total proposed by the Italian Government.

Yet, the Austro-Hungarian Government does not wish to prevent the conclusion of the agreement by differences of a purely financial nature and declares itself willing, in the event of a disagreement with the Italian Government, to submit the question of monetary indemnification to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

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No. 145.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 16, 1915.*

The Entente Powers, and especially France, have disseminated the news of an alleged possibility that the conclusion of a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia may be imminent.

We are informed that this news has caused an unfavourable impression in Italy as in other countries. I therefore have ordered a denial to be published in to-morrow's issue of the *Fremdenblatt*.

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No. 146.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 17, 1915.*

I gave my reply to the Italian Ambassador yesterday; its text has been communicated to you.

I told the Duke of Avarna that although I was unable, for imperative reasons, to consider demands which would involve the renunciation to [of] some of our most important interests, our offer, on the other hand, was of so great a value and was so much in excess of all that Italy used to describe as the most important of her national aspirations, that the Italian Government could not fail to recognise

in it a conspicuous proof of our active desire to create a relation of cordial friendship with Italy, free from all causes of friction and such as Baron Sonnino, agreeing with us, had professed to be his desire from the beginning of the negotiations.

The Ambassador refrained from comment and confined himself to an expression of his apprehension that my reply may be unfavourably received, as it would probably be considered in Rome as too far short of what the public is clamouring for.

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No. 147.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 18, 1915.*

On the occasion of my call at the *Consulta* to-day, I first of all urged Baron Sonnino to construe your reply and the important concession the Austro-Hungarian Government had decided to make in southern Tyrol, as proof that we have done all in our power to show our serious desire to arrive at an understanding calculated to place the relations between the two Powers on a sound footing also for the future—a wish which must coincide with the intentions of the Italian Government as indicated by its repeated assurances.

The Minister agreed with me; so I continued by saying that to that end all obstacles must be removed which might eventually bar the way; therefore it did not seem consistent with this intention to place before us demands which are unacceptable because they are incompatible with our most vital interests, as, for instance, the rectification of the frontier on the Isonzo, the creation of the free state of Trieste and the cession of the Dalmatian islands.

I then enlarged upon the political and economic necessity for an inland country to have a free outlet to the sea and pointed out that Austria-Hungary, even under existing conditions, was confined in this respect to a small part of the Adriatic. To Austria-Hungary it would be like depriving a human being of air if the Italian border were to be pushed to the very gates of Trieste, if a free state were to arise which would cut off our access to the sea, and would in time become an even worse focus of irredentism than any now existing, and shortly would succumb to the national agitation and join the Kingdom of Italy. Dalmatia would be in a similar position if its

most important group of islands were to become the possession of a foreign country; the defence of the country against any enemy whatsoever would thus be rendered impossible and the valuable port of Spalato would be barred from traffic on the seas.

I finally called the Minister's attention to the fact that Italy was thus attempting to strangle Austria-Hungary, with her population of fifty millions, by shutting her off from the Adriatic, which would become an Italian sea; and pointed out that Italy was trying to do this while she herself was complaining of the closing of the Mediterranean by Great Britain.

Baron Sonnino retorted that the present Isonzo border was for strategical reasons absolutely unsatisfactory for Italy, and that its rectification was imperatively necessary. Speaking of Trieste, he said he only contemplated making it a free port; about Dalmatia he referred to the open Italian coast on the Adriatic which afforded no naval base whatever. When I mentioned Ancona and Brindisi, he insisted that Ancona had now been declared an open seaport because its harbour was absolutely useless, but he found himself obliged to admit that the construction of Brindisi might be completed so as to make it serve the purpose of a base. The very poor way in which he defended his demands gave ground for the suspicion that he had never studied the matter seriously, and I am more than ever convinced of the truth of the assertion that he has been egged on by the General Staff in the matter of the Isonzo border, by the Minister of Marine in the matter of the islands, and by Barzilai in the matter of Trieste.

Concerning Albania, the Minister presumed that he had been misunderstood, as it had never entered his head to ignore our existing agreement; he had only meant to replace it by another; this, he thought, could be done without prejudice to an eventual decision by the Great Powers on the final destiny of Albania.

He regarded our acceptance of the article on the amnesty as a natural consequence of the cession. The same applies to the mutual renunciation of a further invocation of Article 7, inclusive of the phrase you desired in regard to eventual advantages at the conclusion of peace. Although the Minister at first had observed that the reply did not appear satisfactory to him, and that, besides, he had not yet read it carefully, he was not at all disturbed; his replies to my arguments betrayed little enthusiasm or conviction. On his own accord he said it would be necessary to confer with Sgr. Salandra and with His Majesty before he could give a reply. Nothing what-

ever in his words or bearing suggested that he had no intention to continue the negotiations.

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No. 148.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 18, 1915.*

Should Baron Sonnino still insist upon immediate occupation of territories ceded to Italy, you may state that we would be willing to adopt certain measures, such as the convening of mixed commissions for the settlement of questions arising from the cession. By this means every doubt would be removed as to the earnestness of our intention to carry out our obligation. Besides, our sincerity is made evident by the very fact that we propose an eventual decision by an international court—namely, The Hague Court of arbitration—in the matter of the extent of [pecuniary] indemnification.

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No. 149.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Translation from the French.)

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 19, 1915.*

The Italian Ambassador told me very confidentially to-day that he had heard from a reliable source that I manifested an intention to take up, in subsequent discussions, a standpoint completely at variance with the one indicated in the memorandum of April 16th, and that I would make concessions exceeding all those demands which we have qualified as unacceptable. I am represented as having suggested that I was unapproachable in the matter of the Isonzo, that I would permit an extension of the autonomy and of the Italian institutions of Trieste, cede to Italy some port or island in Dalmatia to accept the proposals concerning Albania.

The Duke of Avarna added that he could not disclose the origin

of that information, but that it had reached even his government. He had come to tell me that, in order to forestall erroneous impressions in Rome—impressions likely to influence the reply we expect from Baron Sonnino—he would be obliged if I stated to him myself whether this information is correct or wrong.

I deemed it unnecessary to enter into details with the Duke of Avarna on the meaning of this strange move. However, I grasped this opportunity to explain to the Ambassador the serious considerations which prevented Austria-Hungary from discussing demands which so closely touch the problems of our very existence. I once more assured him that Italy would find us ever ready to examine carefully any proposal she may put before us; to further to the utmost her interests in the questions which particularly concern her, and to come to an amicable understanding with her on any point where our interests run on parallel and conciliable lines. Accordingly, we would be willing to accept the change of conditions in Albania; and although it would be impossible for us to renounce our interests there for reasons which the Italian Government would not fail to find justifiable, Italy on the other hand would find us inclined to enter into the merits of her actual position in Albania and to harmonise it with our own interests in that country by means of a revision of the existing agreement.

The Duke of Avarna was pleased with my explanation, which confirmed the anticipations so clearly referred to in the memorandum concerning the possession of Valona. He was surprised to learn from my demonstrations on a map what an infinitesimal part the watchword “national aspirations” really played in the proposed rectification of the Isonzo border and how very far purely German and Slav territories would be penetrated by a boundary line which would be strategically advantageous to Italy, yet impossible for Austria-Hungary.

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No. 150.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 20, 1915.*

Had extensive conversation with Sgr. Salandra to-day.

The Prime Minister particularly dwelt on the question concerning Trieste. He explained that Italy meant to meet Austria-Hun-



gary half-way by proposing to make that city a free port, as Italy realised that the Dual Monarchy could not afford to cede it. Italy's chief object was to secure the national existence of the Italian majority in Trieste, which, in the view of the wildly aroused national sentiment here, appears impossible under Austro-Hungarian rule. In opposition to this I endeavoured to prove that the forcible creation of a free port at Trieste would necessarily lead to its ultimate junction with Italy, an eventuality which he himself had just admitted as impossible as far as Austria-Hungary is concerned; and that any new arrangement of that description would also constitute an unbearable hindrance to our outlet to the sea.

I then enlarged upon the historical, material, technical and commercial importance which Trieste represented to us. I endeavoured to disprove his contentions that the Italian aspirations were prompted by the requirements of the economic welfare of the greater part of the population, and not by selfish ambitions of individuals; such aspirations, I pointed out, develop even more relentlessly in a free state and would eventually lead to the annexation and material ruin of the city.

Sgr. Salandra, though appreciating our far-reaching concession in Tyrol, asserted that this particular question was so thoroughly inherent in the national sentiment that he would not dare to submit to parliament an arrangement which in no way responded to that feeling. He thought that in such an event he would then have to resign. This, however, would be the lesser evil; the real danger consisted in the imminence of general disturbances, and he could therefore not recommend such an arrangement to the King. The dynasty is not on a firm foundation and His Majesty would run the risk of unpopularity, if not worse. When I expressed my doubts as to the validity of all this buncombe he admitted his belief that the majority of Italians desired an amicable settlement. This led back to the old and worn subject of the inspiration of public opinion by the government.

With regard to the islands Sgr. Salandra expressed the same view as Baron Sonnino did yesterday. I laid particular stress on the circumstance that in maritime matters in the Adriatic, Italy would be better off if the agreement desired by both parties were to be concluded on a sound basis, enabling Austria-Hungary and Italy to establish joint mastery of the Adriatic and coöperation in its defence.

The Minister's remark concerning Albania is significant. He

said that this question was only of secondary importance to him; Albania could not become the cause of a conflict between us. He admitted that the other Powers had also a word to say in that matter. He would have preferred to keep Valona, but felt confident that some understanding about Albania's future may be found, possibly upon the basis of spheres of interests; but he emphasised his viewpoint that this was a matter of secondary importance.

It also was interesting to hear him say, in the matter of Tyrol, that Italy did not wish to acquire any German subjects, but that the ethnographical limits should be adhered to as closely as possible.

I finally pointed out that you felt sure the Italian reply would be drawn up with due consideration of all the reasons which arise from the necessary protection of our vital interests; I also suggested that a certainty always appeared to me preferable to a doubtful chance. Sgr. Salandra quite followed my argument and answered that this too would certainly have to be considered.

In conclusion he said that the entire subject had to be examined carefully and he would have to confer with the Chief of the General Staff and with the other ministers.

The conversation was carried on in the most friendly terms.

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No. 151.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 21, 1915.*

I share your opinion that continuance of negotiations by Italy is by no means out of question.

Referring to Trieste, you will maintain refusal of territorial or constitutional concessions, but you will point out specifically in reply to Sgr. Salandra's references to the national sentiment, that that independent city in any case enjoys a broad autonomy; that her municipality enjoys the functions of "Landtag" (provincial diet), and that the national existence, as well as the cultural and economic life, of the Italian element there is safeguarded by the very fact of its numbers and its economic importance.

No. 152.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 22, 1915.*

I called on Baron Sonnino to-day, and enquired whether he had received your reply. He stated that he had studied the entire subject, but refrained from entering into the merits of it. He told me that you had sent him a message through the Duke of Avarna, and that he would reply before long.

I asked for an explanation of this utterance, which I found hard to follow. To my surprise I learned that the Italian Ambassador had been instructed to hand you yesterday what Baron Sonnino called his "observations" to your reply of the 16th, and that you had promised your speedy reply, according to a telegram which arrived here to-day.

He also mentioned that those "observations" had been couched in the spirit of our previous conversation. I could obtain from him no further information on the subject; he ostentatiously refused a further discussion.

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No. 153.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 22, 1915.*

Baron Sonnino has brought to the knowledge of the Duke of Avarna his observations on my reply of the 16th inst. Without being specifically instructed to do so, he has communicated them to me.

According to the Italian Minister my reply does not afford a proper basis for the good understanding and the permanent harmony we strove for.

He admits that we have made some new concessions in Tyrol, but to his mind they were not sufficient for a satisfactory settlement of the military and ethnographical questions in those parts, as they do not include certain territories of Italian speech, such as a part of the val di Noce, the val di Fassa and di Ampezzo.

Against his demands in respect of Albania I had referred to our previous arrangements. The precise meaning of his proposition was a modification of those arrangements by a mutual agreement wherein we would avow our complete disinterestedness in all new arrangements which the Royal Government might enter into with the other Powers concerning Albania, in the same way as Italy would have no further interest in whatever arrangements Austria-Hungary might be able to make on her part with regard to the Balkans.

As to Article IX, Baron Sonnino admits that the amount of the proportional share in the public debts of the State devolving upon the ceded territories and to be paid by Italy may be made a subject for negotiation.

In regard to the valuation of the investments made by the State, the Minister refers to his observation in reply to our first proposal on that point.

He is willing to accept the amendment to Article XI as proposed by me, relating to our freedom of action in the Balkans. This, he said, would entirely correspond with his ideas.

Baron Sonnini again insists upon the necessity of the immediate execution of the cession and in this connexion refers to his previous explanations and especially to the impossibility of any Italian Government submitting an accord without that particular clause.

The Minister concluded his observation by saying that I had replied to all his other demands by a plain refusal, paying no attention to the motives he had proffered in support of his contentions.

I took cognisance of the Ambassador's communication, and told him of my intention to give him my answer with as little delay as possible.

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No. 154.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 22, 1915.*

The stubborn persistence of the Italian Government in all its demands, as well as the deficient and stale arguments it invariably advances in their support in almost the identical phrases, brings to

the fore the question whether Italy is really aiming at an understanding with us, possibly at the price of more extensive sacrifices on the part of Austria-Hungary, or whether she is continuing the conversations only for the sake of appearances and with the concealed motive either to gain time for a later definite decision, or else to join soon the camp of the Entente after having ascertained what our highest offer would be.

In any case you will keep up your conversations with Baron Sonnino by reverting in the most friendly manner to the arguments against the various Italian demands and by endeavouring to explain and rectify any erroneous views entertained by the Italian Government.

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No. 155.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 26, 1915.*

I learn from reliable source that some time ago a scheme was worked out in the *Consulta*, which contemplates the acquisition of the territory between the rivers Skumbi in the north and Vojussa in the south—the latter is said to be considered as future boundary of Greek Epirus—as the hinterland of Valona.

That strip of territory, which comprises roughly the part of Albania inhabited by the Toscs, is supposed to extend as far as Lake Ochrida. According to that project the northern part, which is occupied by the Ghegs, is expected to constitute independent Albania, with the exception of the outlet on the Adriatic which is to be given to Servia in that region.

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No. 156.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 26, 1915.*

Pepino Garibaldi, the leader of the lately dissolved Garibaldi Legion in France, was recently clandestinely received by the King.

The fact, however, was so sensational that naturally it could not be kept concealed in this country.

There is no doubt that this audience was not granted without the advice of the Government.

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No. 157.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 27, 1915.*

It may further the conclusion of our accord with Italy and—as I understand—it would also please Baron Sonnino, if a prominent political personage of Austria-Hungary were given an opportunity to enter into extensive discussion of our mutual interests as a whole with the Italian Ministers in Rome. In such an event an explicit explanation should be made of our views and of the reasons why we cannot accept certain points of the Italian pretensions.

Count Goluchowski, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and now a member of the Upper House, is intimately conversant with my views and would be willing to pay a short visit to Rome. He could undertake the task of such an explanation with Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra on political matters and more especially on the future development of our relations with Italy.

I ask you to bring this confidentially to the knowledge of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and to find out whether he would be favourably inclined to a similar conference. Should the answer be in the affirmative, I would acquaint Count Goluchowski with the details of the present status of our negotiations with the Italian Government.

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No. 158.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, April 28, 1915.*

I intend to give to the Italian Ambassador to-morrow my reply to Baron Sonnino's observations, which the Duke of Avarna conveyed to me on the 21st instant. The text of the reply is contained in the enclosure.

(ENCLOSURE.)

(Translation from the French.)

To judge from the Duke of Avarna's last communications, Baron Sonnino's observations on Baron Burián's reply of the 16th instant refer primarily to the general trend of that reply, which the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs considers not "*comme une base propre à assurer la bonne entente et l'harmonie durable que nous avions en vue*" ("a proper basis to assure the good understanding and the permanent harmony we aimed at").

Baron Burián, on his part, wishes to observe that his sincere desire, so often manifested by him, to reach a definite understanding with Italy has met with serious obstacles, inasmuch as several of the Italian propositions touched to the quick the most vital interests of Austria-Hungary. The renunciation of these interests would create for Austria-Hungary a position which would impair considerably her participation in the political collaboration which Baron Sonnino contemplates for the future, not only so far as Italy is concerned, but also in respect of the other Powers.

Baron Sonnino also asserts that Baron Burián had not taken into account the motives he had proffered in support of several of his proposals. Although the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome already has had occasion to explain our viewpoint to Baron Sonnino, as well as to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Burián is quite ready to enlighten them further on these questions.

As to Trieste, it must be stated first of all that that city enjoys an extensive autonomy under the Austrian constitution. Trieste represents an individual territory and her municipality is simultaneously vested with the prerogatives of a provincial diet. The Italian element is extensively represented in the autonomous administration of the city. In addition to the constitutional guarantees, the numbers, as well as the cultural level and economic position, of this element safeguard its satisfactory existence in every respect. By separating Trieste and her environments from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and by making her an independent state, a death-blow would be struck at the economic prosperity of that city. Once deprived of her hinterland, she would lose all importance, and not even an eventual annexation by Italy, of which she would be no more than a superfluous port on her outskirts, could alter that fact.

Trieste has always been the object of particular care on the part of the Austrian Government, which will continue in the future, for the sake of the state itself, to favour the material and moral progress of the municipality in conformity with the desires of the population whose prosperity depends entirely upon the ties which bind it to the Dual Monarchy. Austria-Hungary on her part, while demanding the allegiance of her citizens, has never done anything that might encroach on their national character. Baron Burián will readily discuss with Baron Sonnino all questions on which he may seek enlightenment in regard to the real interests of Trieste.

The proposition to cede the Curzolari Islands to Italy equally meets with insurmountable difficulties. Aside from the fact that these islands have a purely Slav population, they would in the hands of Italy constitute a strategic position which would command the upper part of the Adriatic, thus putting an end for Austria-Hungary to the balance of power in that sea, and would be a menace to our possession of the adjacent coast.

The proposed territorial cession in Austrian Friuli would deprive Austria-Hungary of a boundary line indispensable for the defence of the coast, as well as of several central provinces, while it would push the Italian frontier still nearer to her principal port. Besides, the Italian element is little represented in the greater part of that region, which is inhabited by Slavs.

If the last Austro-Hungarian proposal has delimited the Tyrol in such a way as to exclude from the proposed territorial cession the val di Noce and the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, this was certainly not done with the intention on our part of retaining some territories of Italian tongue. Such a charge in any case would not apply to the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, where the population is "Ladinian" (Grison) and desires intensely to remain united with Austria-Hungary; all its interests also gravitate exclusively toward the north. Nobody in Italy has ever considered the Grisons in Switzerland to be Italians, and Italy has likewise no reason to reclaim the Grison population of the two valleys in question, whose existence is completely identical with that of the inhabitants of the adjoining Pustertal.

Imperative strategical reasons compel Austria-Hungary to retain the eastern part of Val di Noce, as otherwise the heights protecting the environments of Bozen would be poorly defensible.

Presuming that Italy will, in the case of the one or the other of the above-mentioned localities, advance more or less analogous



arguments against our reasons of defence, it should not be forgotten that Austria-Hungary is offering an amicable cession of a part of her territorial possessions; it stands to reason that the arguments of the giver, who in this instance relinquishes a safe frontier, must have precedence over those of the acquirer.

As to the persistence in the demand for immediate execution of the territorial cession, Baron Burián does not abandon hope that Baron Sonnino will himself, on renewed and close investigation, realise the material impossibility of such a measure. The strict secrecy which both parties are observing, at Baron Sonnino's own suggestion, both on the fact and on the different phases of the negotiations, would prohibit, until after the conclusion of the accord, all preparations, military, administrative and otherwise, that should precede the transfer of the ceded territories. All these preliminary measures require time and can hardly be improved at the last minute. Besides, Austria-Hungary would be placed in a more than abnormal position if Italy were to take possession of the territories referred to at a time when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is engaged in a gigantic war and when consequently the greater part of her territory is deprived of all means of defence, as her armies are concentrated in the various theatres of war.

Notwithstanding the above, and in order to ameliorate as much as possible the Italian Government's position toward Parliament and public opinion, measures may be considered which would, at the proper time, demonstrate before the whole world our loyal and serious purpose to faithfully carry out the engagements entered into. To that end mixed commissions may be detailed immediately after the conclusion of the agreement, for the purpose of settling the numerous minor questions involved in the territorial cession. The establishment and the deliberations of these commissions would remove every doubt as to the complete and definite execution of the cession. Should Baron Sonnino on his part wish to propose other measures for the same purpose, Baron Burián would not fail to examine them with the best intention of adopting them as far as possible.

Although it can be proved easily and conclusively that the sum offered by the Italian Government for the proportional share in the public debts and for indemnification is considerably below the value of public property ceded to Italy, Baron Burián's view coincides with Baron Sonnino's, that this question should not prevent the conclusion of the accord, once an understanding has been reached

on all other matters. It is exactly in this spirit, and as another proof of his desire to assure the territorial cession by outward and definite guarantees, that Baron Burián suggests the submission of the financial controversy to an international tribunal, namely, The Hague Court of Arbitration, if occasion should arise.

Baron Burián reiterates the expression of his friendly desire to discuss with Baron Sonnino the respective interests of the two Powers in Albania with due consideration of the changed conditions since the present war began, and to arrive at a new understanding with Italy in this respect. The Albanian question would thus be placed once more in the hands of Europe, while Austria-Hungary might even renounce her interests there provided that Italy would likewise renounce her interests in Albania with the exception of Valona and the sphere of influence of which Valona is the centre; provided, also, that adequate guarantees be furnished against any operations and the establishment of other Powers in Albania—an eventuality equally menacing for the political and maritime interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy.

This represents the outlines of a basis for negotiations and could be worked out in the course of the discussions with such modifications as might be proposed, and which might be made acceptable to both sides.

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No. 159.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 28, 1915.*

I informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs confidentially and without delay of Count Goluchowski's possible visit to Rome, according to my instructions.

Baron Sonnino will, of course, gladly receive him; yet, I easily discerned some suspicion on the part of the Minister, that this proposal may mean another delay.

He expressed the view that special missions, as a rule, have little value. Thereupon I endeavoured to explain that Count Goluchowski would arrive here without delay. I emphasised the great advantage that might accrue from a conversation with a personage who is not dependent upon written instructions, as I am, but who

has conducted our foreign policy for so many years, and who is more fully acquainted with your intentions and ideas by means of recent and detailed discussions with you.

Baron Sonnino seemed gradually to realise the force of my representations.

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No. 160.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 28, 1915.*

Sgr. Tittoni arrived here yesterday and had long interview with Baron Sonnino and was received by the King.

I understand that Tittoni in behalf of France made many promises of no specific nature. In return for these he demanded an Italian army for assistance in France. It is said that France has offered Djibuti, a part of Tunisia and a rectification of the border in the *Département des Alpes Maritimes*—all within her own territories—besides several offers at the expense of others. Only the latter constitute new offers, as the cessions in Africa are said to have been offered some time ago.

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No. 161.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 29, 1915.*

You reported by telegram of the 28th that Baron Sonnino would, of course, gladly receive Count Goluchowski and that the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed himself on that occasion as being sceptical as to the value of special missions.

To-day the Duke of Avarna informed me in conformity with a telegram from Baron Sonnino, that the latter had no particular reason against receiving Count Goluchowski, but that he failed to see what good it would do to use a third mediator, in view of the good relations existing between me and the Italian Ambassador here, as well as between himself and you.

In view of this information from the Duke of Avarna, the tone of which somehow differs from your report, I request you to ask Baron Sonnino confidentially to tell you quite frankly whether Count Goluchowski's visit to Rome would appear to him agreeable or undesirable.

At the same time you will once more explain that in sending Count Goluchowski I would be chiefly guided by the desire to offer to the Italian Government a new proof of my friendly intentions and of my earnest wish to reach an understanding with Italy.

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No. 162.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burján.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, April 30, 1915.*

All my information and observation lead to the conclusion that the negotiations with the Entente Powers are conducted now at a feverish pace. The initiative is not, in all probability, emanating from the ever undecided Baron Sonnino. M. Barrère visits him daily. Constantly the same offers are mentioned to me, including a more important cession in Tunisia, if Alsace-Lorraine should become French. The French offer concerning the rectification of the border near Ventimiglia is said to comprise only a few square kilometers of territory.

British Ambassador is said to offer loan of two billions, at low rate, also realisation of Italian aspirations in Asia Minor and the Dodecanesos, and the discontinuance of Senussi movement.

I believe the Italian Government is availing itself of the double negotiations primarily to exert pressure on either side in order to increase bids as much as possible while reserving its own decision.

It is not likely that the tension which the Government has created upon the public mind by the secret mobilisation, may be kept up much longer without leading to an explosion in one way or the other.

Cadorna's entourage is exploiting the view that war against Austria-Hungary must be waged now, as it is unavoidable in any event.

A voluntary cession, it is pointed out, would soon bring in its wake a war of "*revanche*"; Italy would then stand alone, while she

can now rely on the assistance of the Entente. I also hear from well-informed quarters that the present military Attaché in Vienna represents the situation in Austria-Hungary to be such that the war would merely be a military excursion; this, of course, is like pouring oil on the fire and consequently favours Cadorna's policy.

Considering that Italy's ambitious monomania has swelled to extreme proportions in consequence of the courting she receives from all sides, such military self-deception finds most fertile soil and the influence of the General Staff is ominous.

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No. 163.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 1, 1915.*

I addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the alternative question concerning Count Goluchowski's visit according to your telegram of the 29th instant. He replied that Count Goluchowski's mission seemed to him inopportune at this moment and therefore could hardly be of any use.

In addition to the reasons given by the Duke of Avarna, Baron Sonnino also expressed his apprehension that Count Goluchowski's presence here, which could not be concealed, might create an undesirable sensation and give rise to all kinds of comments.

The Minister was pleased with the message contained in the last paragraph of your telegram. Lastly, he requested that you inform him of your decision in this matter.

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No. 164.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 1, 1915.*

In my conference with Baron Sonnino to-day the conversation led up to the reply he had received from you last night.

In reply to the Minister's remark that the answer was certainly more detailed but scarcely contained anything new, I pointed to

the last sentences in lines 2 and 5, as well as to the decided approach toward the Italian point of view contained in the clause which refers to Albania. I pointed out that every sentence breathed our sincere effort to come to a lasting and complete understanding. At the same time, I suggested, he would surely admit the validity of the Austro-Hungarian standpoint as to the vital questions involved, after the conclusive proof we had proffered.

I presumed that he would find in it sufficient ground for further discussions. Baron Sonnino replied that he would have to examine the question in detail with Sgr. Salandra and the ministry (should probably read: General Staff).

Then he complained of the restricted position into which the Government here had been placed by the general crisis and by internal difficulties and tendencies, and observed that our opinions were still far asunder.

I observed that negotiations as a rule make good progress only when both parties make concessions, and I had not noticed any step in that direction on the part of Italy up to this time. Baron Sonnino replied that the Italian demands in any case were very small, and that it would be difficult to curtail them.

I indicated my surprise at this view and retorted that in this case there could hardly be a question of negotiations but rather of dictation on Italy's part, which was not apt to advance matters.

The Minister declared this to be incorrect, without, however, losing his temper, and subsequently resumed his habitual taciturnity.

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No. 165.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 2, 1915.*

Please inform Baron Sonnino that, in consideration of his views, I shall refrain, for the time being, from sending Count Goluchowski to Rome. Yet, I reserve the privilege of reverting to the matter at an opportune moment. You may also suggest that I had all the more reason to expect that Baron Sonnino would accept my proposal, as he had recently come into touch with the former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Hanotaux, during that gentleman's visit to Rome.

No. 166.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, May 2, 1915.

I consider it highly important that you should maintain the negotiations with the Italian Government in their full vigour and to that end you will not only enter into the minute details of each Italian demand but will also discuss the political situation that may result therefrom. Should Baron Sonnino show a disposition to confine himself once more to short utterances, you might stimulate the conversation by pointing out our repeated and detailed explanations and arguments, and in return urge that, in the name of fairness, an effort be made on the part of Italy to explain and justify her standpoint and her demands.

Among the subjects which would especially lend themselves to thorough discussion, the Albanian question certainly stands to the fore. In connexion with this matter, you could point to the fact that not only do we not protest against the Italian occupation of Valona, but would even be prepared to cede to Italy an additional sphere of interest, with Valona as its centre. This alone constitutes a far-reaching concession. As to our objection to declaring a complete disinterestedness in Albania on the part of Austria-Hungary, we are impelled by the consideration that we could not be indifferent to the fate of a territory so close to our Adriatic dominion.

This question, and possibly the creation of spheres of influence in Albania, may be the subject of a discussion with the Italian Government in which I am always ready to participate and which could prove advantageous to both parties.

In your conversations with the Italian statesmen you should make a particular effort to find out what degree of importance is attached to the cession of territory on the Isonzo among the various Italian demands.

It would be of importance to me to know whether special importance is attached in Rome to that demand, inasmuch as concessions on that point may help to eliminate the other difficulties and thereby facilitate the agreement with Italy.

Should you reach the conclusion that such is the case, you will tell the Italian Minister, on your own responsibility, that you will enquire in Vienna and ascertain whether we would feel inclined to

bring about an understanding with Italy by a concession on this point.

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No. 167.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 2, 1915.*

The Chamber of Deputies is to meet on May 12, but only for the purpose of a vote of confidence in the Government. It is believed that Sgr. Giolitti has no intention to take advantage of this occasion to cause any difficulties to the Government in the Chamber of Deputies.

In order to win public opinion, which is three-quarters opposed to war, it is necessary for the Government to foster the belief, under cover of the promise to keep the negotiations secret, that we are offering nothing or so little that war is imposed upon the Government as the only means of attaining the justified aspirations.

The negotiations, therefore, are serving no other purpose than to put things off until the most suitable moment shall come for Italy to show her cards.

In political circles the opinion prevails that only an authentic publication of what we are prepared to cede to Italy, could create such an impression as would be likely to frustrate the designs of the Government. It certainly would be difficult to determine when we might consider ourselves absolved from the promise of secrecy; we must, also, consider the fact that the time may come when such publication may be made in Vienna, but would no longer find its way into the Italian press.

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No. 168.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 3, 1915.*

From my telegram of yesterday, you will have concluded that I consider the situation very grave and that the beginning of the crisis is imminent.

Since then, I have learned from reliable source that the nego-



tiations with the Entente have practically reached maturity and are ready to be closed.

If it be a fact that all competent quarters have already accepted Cadorna's conception—a preventive war—the conclusion of an agreement can no longer be thought of.

Yet, it is possible that the Government has not yet come to a definite decision, and we should leave nothing undone in an attempt to reach an understanding at the last moment. In this connexion, Baron Sonnino's character, which I have so often analysed, deserves particular consideration. On account of his very suspicious nature his first thought is always a presumption that we wish to dupe him and Italy, as I often have had occasion to state. Therefore the idea of "*revanche*" has easy access to his mind. His mental state is aggravated by the great advances made to him by the Entente. As soon as he definitely loses his last grain of faith in our earnest intentions, he will sign the agreement with the other side. To my mind there is no hope of success in promising small concessions step by step. We should try to attain as quickly as possible at least the basis for an accomplished fact.

To this end it will be necessary for us to offer something in the region of the so-called vital interests; I here refer to the Isonzo, in regard to which I deduce from your telegram of yesterday a certain receptiveness on your part; then to Trieste, where some assurances might perhaps be given with regard to the extension of the municipal autonomy, after the style of the self-government of Hamburg, and possibly including the establishment of a Faculty of Laws.

With reference to Albania, an agreement will hardly be difficult; the Dalmatian Islands being in my opinion the most difficult point.

With respect to carrying out of our pledges, some effective guarantee in addition to the guarantees of the two governments and of the mixed commission should be offered.

My appointment with Baron Sonnino to-day was deferred by his unexpected summons to the King; I shall see him to-morrow morning and will make every effort to induce him to state definitely, clause by clause, what settlement really would be accepted here as satisfactory; in other words, in what way the Italian demands might be drawn closer to the Vienna offer.

My suggestions mean another attempt; but, as I said before, in my judgment of the situation and of the personalities involved, it is the only one that might still lead to the goal.

No. 169.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 4, 1915.*

Referring to your yesterday's telegram.

With reference to the cession on the Isonzo you may concede a boundary beginning at the coast near the mouth of the Isonzo (Sdobba), following the course of the river upward to a point north of Gradisca (leaving this city to Italy), and running thence in a northwesterly direction to Medea on the Judrio, which would represent the border line from this point.

In respect to Trieste, you may express our willingness to concede in principle the establishment of a university, inasmuch as this would correspond with the wishes of the population; also to submit the municipal statute to a revision by which the national and cultural existence of the Italian-speaking population would be safeguarded.

As to Albania, our disinterestedness may be declared in the case of extreme necessity, with the reservation that guarantees must be provided against the establishment there of a third power.

With reference to the Italian demand for immediate occupation of the ceded territories, you may, in addition to the guarantee of Germany and the mixed commissions, mention the possibility of a manifesto which would remove every doubt as to the execution of the territorial cession.

I request you to make use of this maximum of concessions as soon as possible.

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No. 170.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 4, 1915.*

Under instructions from his Government, the Italian Ambassador has communicated to me the following note, and has handed me a copy of it.

(Translation from the French.)

The Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy has been instructed by his Government to make the following communication to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to hand him a copy of it.

The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proved itself, from the beginning, an element and a guarantee of peace and was directed primarily to the principal end of mutual defence. In view of later events, and of the new situations which resulted therefrom, the Governments of the two countries were obliged to seek another aim no less essential, and in the course of successive renewals of the treaty they addressed themselves to safeguarding the continuity of their alliance by stipulating the principle of previous agreements regarding the Balkans, to the end of conciliating the divergent interests and tendencies of the two Powers.

It is absolutely clear that the loyal observance of these stipulations would have sufficed to furnish a solid basis for common and effective action.

On the contrary, Austria-Hungary, during the Summer of 1914, without any agreement with Italy, without even letting her have the slightest notification of her intentions, and without taking into account the counsels of moderation which were addressed to her by the Italian Government, addressed to Servia on the 23rd of July the ultimatum which was the cause and the starting point of the present European conflagration.

Austria-Hungary, in ignoring the obligations existing under the treaty, profoundly disturbed the *status quo* in the Balkans, and created a situation from which she alone was destined to profit, to the disadvantage of interests of the greatest importance, which her ally had many times affirmed and proclaimed. So flagrant a violation of the letter and the spirit of the treaty, not only justified the refusal of Italy to place herself on the side of her allies in a war provoked without her knowledge, but at the same time deprived the alliance of its essential meaning and of its reason for existing.

Even the pact of benevolent neutrality provided for by the treaty was affected by this violation. Reason and sentiment alike are repugnant to the view that benevolent neutrality can be maintained when one of the allies takes up arms for the realisation of a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the

other ally, interests the safeguarding of which constituted the principal reason of the alliance itself.

Notwithstanding this, Italy has endeavoured for several months to create a situation favourable to the reëstablishment between the two states of those friendly relations which constitute the essential foundation of all coöperation in the domain of general politics.

To this end, and with this hope, the Italian Government was disposed to enter upon an understanding having as its basis the satisfaction in an equitable manner of the legitimate national aspirations of Italy, and which would have served at the same time to reduce the existing inequality in the reciprocal situation of the two states in the Adriatic.

Nevertheless, these negotiations did not lead to any appreciable result.

All the efforts of the Italian Government encountered the resistance of the Austro-Hungarian Government, which, after several months, decided only to acknowledge the special interests of Italy in Valona and to promise an insufficient concession of territories in the Trentino—a concession which cannot be considered a normal settlement of the situation, either from the ethnical, political, or military point of view.

Furthermore, this concession was to be put into effect only at the end of an indeterminate period, that is, only at the end of the war.

In this state of affairs, the Italian Government must renounce the hope of reaching an agreement, and sees itself constrained to withdraw all its propositions for an accord.

It is equally useless to keep up an appearance of formal alliance, which would only help to disguise the existence of a continuous distrust and of daily disagreements.

Accordingly Italy, confident in her good right, affirms and proclaims that from this moment she resumes her entire freedom of action, and declares her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary to be void and henceforth of no effect.

I expressed to the Ambassador my perplexity at this manifestation, which does not seem to me justified, especially at a moment when we are in the midst of negotiations which we on our part have conducted in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit. I declared to the Duke of Avarna that I henceforth declined all

responsibility for the consequences which might result from the situation created by Baron Sonnino's step.

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No. 171.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 4, 1915.*

I had a conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day lasting one hour and a half. By way of an introductory remark, I said I felt convinced of the possibility of reaching an understanding between the two countries which are so dependent upon each other; especially so, as the Italian Government itself had so often, and only recently, expressed the desire to attain that end. I added that I not only presumed, but knew for certain, that my Government too is guided by this sincere desire. The Minister then surprised me with the remark that he had entertained the same wish, but had scarcely any hope left on account of the dilatory policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government and that he had therefore telegraphed yesterday to the Duke of Avarna in this sense, with the addition that in view of the vague replies from Vienna he could offer no more proposals and withdrew those he had hitherto advanced.

I then tried to impress upon Baron Sonnino the enormous responsibility which a breach would involve and denounced, as a chimera, the idea of an Austro-Hungarian *revanche*, as propagated here; war was more likely to breed such a tendency, which would logically be out of the question in the event of an agreement. The Austro-Hungarian Government had accepted the Italian basis for negotiations for the very purpose of creating a sound relation of friendship for the future.

The Minister was disposed to admit that your propositions were showing some improvement, but these also were couched in general phrases, which invariably gave them the appearance of precarious prospects for the future instead of affording a practical basis for an agreement. After five months of discussion hardly any progress had been achieved, and he could not escape the impression that the matter would once more be involved in delays. I specified the reasons on both sides which had hampered the negotiations. I gave him to understand that it was time to be more precise, and asked

him to convince himself that a greater approachment has taken place than he wished to admit, by recapitulating all the points in question.

First of all I explained the Trentino boundary, which you had suggested, and I used maps and arguments to carry my point. The Minister observed that an agreement may be reached on this point. With respect to the Isonzo, I declared that I could take it upon myself to induce my Government to grant some further concession despite the serious objections which had hitherto existed. A more detailed discussion ensued on the subject of Trieste. He holds that his aim of suppressing irredentism could solely be attained by his scheme of a free state which should coöperate commercially with the Austrian hinterland, as it would otherwise be unable to exist. Trieste would then have no reason for drawing further toward Italy. I made use of all conceivable arguments to demonstrate the indispensability of Trieste for the Monarchy and the inability of a state thus created to exist. He admitted that the main object was to secure incontestably the national independence of the people of Trieste, and that this was considered here as indispensable. I pointed to the phrase in your last reply which expresses your readiness for further discussion. Baron Sonnino remarked that he could not conceive what arrangement might be devised which would prevent subsequent encroachments upon the administration of Trieste, upon its educational and other matters. He failed to see what proposal he could proffer, but would be glad to consider any suggestion Vienna could make, provided that it deserved consideration.

Nevertheless, I obtained the impression in this matter that a course similar to the one suggested by us would be feasible and that the creation of a free state would not be insisted upon here.

We then talked of Albania. The Minister admitted that we had made advances, but said that he looked upon the disinterestedness of the Dual Monarchy in Albania as a counterbalance to the free hand which Italy was to grant us in the other parts of the Balkans.

Even so, it appeared to him necessary to define more precisely the advances you had suggested, in order to formulate the integral parts of Italy's desires, many of the details of which may be reserved for a separate agreement.

The question of islands, now as before, proved to be only strategical. After having enlarged on the well-defined respective standpoints, I asked the Minister whether he thought it justifiable to

jeopardise the conclusion of the agreement on account of a single question, although an understanding could be reached on all other points. With greater emphasis than ever he then defended his pet idea, namely, the time of putting our cessions into execution.

He declines to see in the mixed commissions anything more than merely advisory bodies, which could decide nothing and therefore could have no value whatever. He particularly enlarged with much verbiage on his topic that all the guilt may be taken from the accord by the continuous stirring up of animosity by the anti-Austro-Hungarian agitators—an agitation which would last to the very end of the war, possibly for many months after its conclusion.

The retention at the front of soldiers who in virtue of the agreement would have become Italian subjects, every punishment of such soldiers, every case of desertion and numerous other imaginable incidents, would operate to prevent the subsidence of the existing hatred. Thus the purpose of the new agreement would be jeopardised in advance. He readily admitted the difficulties of the question; but here too, he thought, means should be found to carry out the cession in the same way as means exist for the cession of territories which have been occupied by an enemy during a war, and have not subsequently been evacuated. I need not mention that on this point also I employed all available arguments for the defence of our position.

Nevertheless, Baron Sonnino announced his willingness to consider any new proposals you may proffer, if they are specific, and to submit them to the Cabinet, provided that they would not be such as to give rise to protracted interpretation; he, on his part, had no further proposals to make.

The situation, he added, is such that it is necessary to acquaint the Cabinet with the progress of these negotiations, which can no longer be delayed in view of the public being in so high a state of tension.

I do not entertain any illusions; the situation has become still more unfavourable by the withdrawal of the Italian propositions, as it leaves the Italian Government a perfectly free hand in dealing with our new proposals. On the other hand I have gained the impression that the agreement with the Entente, though not yet perfected, may be signed by the Italian Government at any time.

If we are anxious to make another and final attempt to come to an understanding, only quick action in drafting new and sufficiently extensive proposals can serve the purpose. Considering

Baron Sonnino's character and temperament, any new suspicion in his mind would inevitably put an immediate stop to the negotiations.

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No. 172.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 5, 1915.*

I approve the position you have taken in your conference with Baron Sonnino as reported in your telegram of yesterday. Accordingly I inform you of the furthest limits of our concessions:

1) Trentino:

Baron Sonnino's statement that an understanding on this point might well be possible, indicates that Italy does not consider an extension of our concessions as hitherto proposed as a condition *sine qua non* for the conclusion of the agreement.

2) Isonzo district:

Concerning this point you already have been authorised by my telegram of yesterday to make a concession which represents to us a considerable sacrifice.

3) Trieste:

While emphasising once more, that Trieste is a sovereign city and enjoys a far-reaching municipal and provincial autonomy—the municipal council being vested with the functions of a provincial diet—the establishment of a university and the revision of the municipal regulations for the purpose of safeguarding the Italian character of the city may be promised.

4) Albania:

Renouncing all reservations and restrictions, we are ready to declare our complete disinterestedness in Albania.

5) Immediate occupation of the ceded territories.

The physical impossibility of this demand should be demonstrated once more by the basic arguments which we have hitherto employed. Baron Sonnino's contention that territories occupied by



the enemy in war and subsequently not being evacuated may yet eventually be receded, may be met with the statement that this method of solving the problem would be one-sided, compulsory and catastrophic, but certainly not peaceful and friendly, such as he and I had intended it to be in the course of our negotiations.

The Italian Minister's tendency to minimise the importance of the mixed commissions, should be opposed with the arguments that the activities of these commissions would not be of a merely advisory scope but that their work would mean the beginning of the execution of the cession; that these commissions would have authority to reach decisions, subject only to sanction by the Government, a sanction which can hardly be questioned. In addition to the solemn declaration of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the guarantee by the German Government, as well as to the operations of those commissions, another proof may be given of our honest and earnest intention to fulfil our obligations after the conclusion of peace, by our promise not to engage at the front any persons belonging to the ceded territories, once the agreement with Italy has been perfected.

I request you to communicate the above concessions to Baron Sonnino as soon as possible. They are, of course, conditional upon the fulfilment of the Italian obligation (neutrality until the end of the war, consent to our freedom of action in the Balkans, with the exception of Albania, in conformity with the project previously agreed upon, discharge of financial liabilities and indemnification). You will endeavour to convey to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs the impression, amply borne out by the actual facts, that our concessions come very close to the realisation of his demands in their entirety, both as to individual points and collectively. Should Baron Sonnino appear inclined to conclude an agreement based on the above-mentioned points, you are authorised to proceed with the Italian Foreign Minister to the drafting of the text of the agreement—possibly in conjunction with Prince Bülow.

If Baron Sonnino should lay particular stress upon some specific demand, while otherwise indicative of a perceptible inclination to reach an understanding, or else should introduce new or somewhat modified demands, you will note them *ad referendum* and report them to me by telegram.

## No. 173.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 5, 1915.*

As a result of the tearing up of the treaty of Triple Alliance, which Baron Sonnino had not mentioned to me, a critical moment seems to have arisen. After the Ministry had induced the King to promise to attend the Quarto festival, the whole country has been plunged into feverish excitement by the sudden withdrawal of his acceptance, which was accompanied by the announcement that neither King nor Government could leave Rome even for two days, in view of the gravity of the moment.

The Ministry realises that this awkward proceeding has weakened its position and is now apparently trying to precipitate a decision and possibly to confront the coming man (Giolitti) with an accomplished fact. Salandra and Baron Sonnino are striving to achieve a great success or else make their fall brilliant.

In *the very next days*, therefore, the decision must come; it is possible that the situation can still be saved by making immediate and most extensive concessions, and especially by submitting our offers in definite form, adapted to the prompt conclusion of an agreement.

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No. 174.*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 6, 1915.*

I employed the contents of your telegram of yesterday in my conversation with Baron Sonnino to-day.

I conveyed to the Minister our concessions in detail, and endeavoured particularly to emphasise the newly added points, in conformity with your wishes. I recapitulated also the counter-obligations expected from Italy and reiterated the belief of the Austro-Hungarian Government that its present propositions satisfy many of Italy's former contentions and that they come as close as possible to meeting her demands in their entirety.

Baron Sonnino noted minutely all my propositions and observations and made the following remarks:

The last phase of the negotiations is terminated by the withdrawal of the former Italian demands and by the cancellation by Italy of the treaty of Triple Alliance in Vienna. Italy has resumed complete freedom of action. He particularly mentioned that the linguistic boundary in Trentino still excludes the three aforementioned valleys, that the proposed change of frontier along the Isonzo is insufficient and that the revision of the municipal statute of Trieste was likely to be rendered ineffective at any moment by the dissolution of the municipal council and by the appointing of a Governmental Commissioner, a proceeding which is not unusual in political life. With respect to the time of putting the cessions in effect, the Minister still retains his former scruples. He did not refer to the question of the islands; neither, of course, did I.

Baron Sonnino promised to submit the propositions I had proffered to the council of ministers for their approval, and to obtain its opinion thereon. Asked if he had any special and modified wishes, he answered in the negative. I can explain this non-committal attitude by the assumption that he is now entrenching himself entirely behind the decisions of the Cabinet. With the object of attempting once more to disarm his notorious distrust, I again pointed out that you had authorised me to proceed immediately to the drafting of the text of the agreement, if the present concessions should be accepted as a basis thereto, and laid stress upon the fact that this represented a new proof of the Austro-Hungarian Government's firm desire for a speedy understanding. Baron Sonnino noted this remark as well, for reference at the council of ministers.

I immediately communicated the gist of the above-mentioned conversation to Prince Bülow. The main point gained is that the negotiations are not suspended and that time is gained by the reference of the matter to the council of ministers. On the other hand, the rejection of our terms by the latter body would create a deadlock. My German colleague, who has been authorised to offer Germany's mediation in the event that direct negotiations can not be continued, will announce this to Baron Sonnino this afternoon and hopes by that means to tide over these critical days.

No. 175.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 6, 1915.*

It may be expected almost with certainty that the council of ministers will reject the propositions I communicated to Baron Sonnino to-day as insufficient to justify new negotiations with Austria-Hungary.

If, therefore, the imminent conclusion of the agreement with the Triple Entente—which means war—is to be averted at this last moment, the assent in principle to Baron Sonnino's original demands as a basis of negotiations would appear to me the only means of accomplishing that end. By that means we would gain more time.

If you desire that this experiment be made, I ask for authority to communicate this to Baron Sonnino in case of extreme necessity.

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No. 176.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 9, 1915.*

In our negotiations with Italy there has been a dominant suspicion at Rome that we would offer far-reaching concessions solely under the present pressure of events, but with the mental reservation to ignore them as soon as the occasion should present itself. A means which may possibly serve to dispel this distrust, may be found in the declaration to Italy of our own and Germany's willingness to inaugurate a new and closer political relation with her, at any time and independently of the object of the present negotiations. The German Government has offered to approach the Italian Government in this direction.

No. 177.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 10, 1915.*

In your next conversation with Baron Sonnino you must keep in mind, and be guided by the necessity of making the most strenuous effort to prevent a suspension of the negotiations with Italy.

If Baron Sonnino in no way agrees with our last offer, and, of his own accord neither reverts to former demands nor brings forth any new ones, but confines himself to the rejection of our proposals, you may advance the proposal suggested in your telegram of May 6th, namely, the acceptance in principle of Italy's former propositions as a basis for negotiations with the suggestion that still further concessions might be made on one point or another.

In the following I give you the extreme limit of concessions which we might still consider. You are authorised even to draft the text of a preliminary agreement on this basis:

1) Southern Tyrol:

On this point the Italian Government seems to be more or less satisfied with our offer.

2) Isonzo:

An extension of the concessions, as hitherto made, to wit: Along the western bank of the Isonzo to a point on the boundary between the German and Italian speaking population; consequently, including the cession of Carmons.

3) Trieste:

The granting of a title, such as "Free City," may be considered.

4) Islands:

Pelagosa may be ceded in consideration of its proximity to the Italian coast.

5) The putting into execution:

The suggested division of points may be effected on any reasonable basis and the execution of the proposals affecting Albania, Trieste and Pelagosa may be made immediate.

No. 178.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 10, 1915.*

It appears that the King as well as most of the members of the Cabinet have been systematically misinformed by Baron Sonnino, both as to our concessions and as to the state of feeling in the country. I have heard in particular that the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a very incomplete report to the council of ministers concerning my explicit communication (see my telegram dated May 6), although he had written them down, had read them to me and then had promised expressly to submit them to the council of ministers. For instance, he omitted mention of the concession in regard to the time of putting the concessions into effect.

For the purpose of enlightening the influential personages, of whom some at least are friendly disposed to the Triple Alliance, although they may be influenced by the general distrust, it now seemed necessary to furnish them immediately with a list of the Austro-Hungarian concessions, authenticated by Prince Bülow and myself. In this manner it might be possible to block the political intrigues of Salandra, Sonnino and Martini. This list had to be supplemented so as to leave a margin for further concessions in the spirit of the original Italian demands.

After having drafted the following document with the German Ambassador's assistance, I assumed, in view of the urgency of the situation, the responsibility of signing it jointly with Prince Bülow and to submit it to Sgr. Salandra, Baron Sonnino and other political personages.

(Translation from the French.)

Austria-Hungary is willing to make the following concessions to Italy:

- 1) The entire Tyrol of Italian nationality.
- 2) The entire western bank of the Isonzo of Italian nationality, including Gradisca.

3) Complete municipal autonomy, Italian university, a free port in Trieste, which will be a free city.

4) Valona.

5) Complete disinterestedness of Austria-Hungary in Albania.

6) Guarantee for the national interests of Italian inhabitants of Austria-Hungary.

7) Amicable examination of demands which Italy may yet propose in connexion with the entirety of the questions which form the object of the negotiations (especially Gorizia and the Islands).

8) Germany assumes full responsibility for the correct and faithful execution of the agreement to be concluded between Austria-Hungary and Italy.

The Ambassador of Austria-Hungary and the Ambassador of Germany guarantee the authenticity of the above-mentioned propositions.

From the drafting of Article III you will see that the idea of granting a suitable title to the city of Trieste has been taken under consideration. Moreover, Articles VI and VII are drafted in a manner suggesting our willingness to give further consideration to Italy's wishes.

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No. 179.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 10, 1915.*

Have just received your telegram of to-day.

Under the present conditions you will adhere to the following points whenever you discuss this list of concessions:

1) Southern Tyrol. Apart from the fact that the Italian Government does not seem to insist absolutely upon an extension of our concession concerning the Trentino, the proposition referred to could not include the valleys of Ampezzo and Fassa, both of

which are Ladinian, nor that part of the Val di Noce, the possession of which we could not relinquish for vital strategical reasons.

2) Isonzo. Concession may be made in conformity with my previous telegram of to-day.

3) Trieste. It must be noted that we have by no means considered making Trieste a free port, and that there has been only a question of conferring upon it the title of a "Free City," but not the functions of such a municipality.

6) Position of citizens of Italian nationality. This concession, under which the wording of a definite agreement might prove extremely precarious, should at all events be considerably modified.

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No. 180.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 12, 1915.*

Meanwhile I do not propose calling on Baron Sonnino. Dissensions among the Ministers and a gradually dwindling confidence in his foreign policy in certain parliamentary circles, can no longer be concealed from him and he feels the ground tottering under him. He is accordingly in a precarious frame of mind and may in his stubbornness contemplate some desperate move which might be precipitated by my calling. Besides, he, as well as Sgr. Salandra, is in possession of the propositions signed by Prince Bülow and myself; and it is therefore left to his discretion to reply or not.

Should he reject them, either here or in Vienna, there would still be left a resort to your telegram of the 10th instant, and the proposal of the original Italian demands as a basis for negotiations, as mentioned therein.

I may reiterate once more my last report by saying that there is no further doubt as to Baron Sonnino's disloyal intention to make war in any event.



## No. 181.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 13, 1915.*

I agree with your decision not to call on the Italian Minister for the time being.

Should he in the further course of events reject the list of concessions referred to as inadequate, you will merely take note of his action and proffer no further proposal until you receive new instructions.

I also must draw your attention to the fact that naturally all our concessions are conditional upon the full observance of the counter-obligations assumed by Italy.

## No. 182.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 13, 1915.*

Council of Ministers was in session all day yesterday, and considerable differences of opinion seem to have developed. I shall report on the subject as soon as I receive reliable information.

Baron Sonnino positively urges war, but can not at present count upon the unanimous support of his colleagues; therefore the possibility of various eventualities must be considered.

The fact that Baron Sonnino will still have the opportunity to bring his views before the public by means of the press or in parliament, must also be reckoned with.

My attention has been called from various quarters to the possibility that Baron Sonnino may, for instance, in some way or another, endeavour to describe the Austro-Hungarian Government's policy of deliberation as incompatible with Italy's dignity or else he may take the ground that Italy had entered into negotiations solely for the sake of complying with our desire, but had repeatedly dropped them because the offers of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been inadequate.

No. 183.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, May 14, 1915.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.

In reply to the assertion that Italy had entered into negotiations solely in compliance with our desire, you will point out that, on the contrary, it was the Italian Government that had already initiated the discussions with my predecessor and subsequently with me, basing its claims for compensation on Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance. Should Baron Sonnino also endeavour to prove a policy of procrastination on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government, incompatible with Italy's dignity, you will meet this charge by saying that the Italian Government on its part had declined for a long time to specify its demands. It demanded from us the acceptance of the vague, and therefore, doubly precarious, basis of negotiations involving the cession of some of our own territories; it had subsequently rejected our successive offers as inadequate and had only at a very much later stage of the negotiations, and only at our specific request, advanced her own very far-reaching demands. Baron Sonnino has consequently no cause to reproach us with a certain hesitation; his part as demander was infinitely easier than ours, considering that we were expected to make sacrifices which were hard to submit to. Besides, Baron Sonnino contradicts himself if, while qualifying our tactics as procrastinating, he states in the same breath that he has himself repeatedly dropped the negotiations—a proceeding which could surely not facilitate their smooth and speedy progress.

On the whole you will hardly find it difficult to combat effectively any possible animadversions by Baron Sonnino, in an adequate manner, as you are thoroughly in touch with all the stages and details of our negotiations.

No. 184.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, May 14, 1915.

The Agenzia Stefani announces:

“The constitutional parties having been unable to give their undivided support to the trend of the Government’s foreign policy at a time when the seriousness of the situation makes such support imperative, the council of ministers has decided to hand its resignation to His Majesty.”

Seven ministers are said to have taken sides with opposition at Cabinet meeting two days ago, and I have been told action is imminent and is not likely to be confined to the Chamber of Deputies; decision is considered all the more desirable as disturbances are steadily increasing since the arrival of d’Annunzio.

Reports are already coming in from all larger cities about demonstrations by the hired mob, and for two days past Rome has been actually as in a state of siege. One-half of the garrison is on duty; traffic and freedom of movement are likewise suspended or hampered by the closing of streets on an extensive scale. The insulting of politicians who adhere to the Triple Alliance and similar incidents are the order of the day.

The King has not reached a decision yet on the resignations. All indications point to a reconstruction of the Cabinet under the presidency of Salandra as the most likely solution.

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 No. 185.
*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, May 15, 1915.

In my opinion it would be advisable to decide as quickly as possible upon the text of an eventual agreement with Italy, so that we could, if circumstances permit, approach a new Ministry with a ready proposal. Protracted negotiations, or to wait for Italian proposals, would mean a change that the distrust, which it has

been so difficult to dispel, would break forth again with elementary violence and upset everything at the last moment.

I have therefore drafted the following proposal; which I have discussed with Prince Bülow, who has signified his approval:

(Translation from the French.)

Inspired by a sincere desire to consolidate the mutual relation between Austria-Hungary and Italy, to place them upon a foundation of absolute good faith, to eliminate every cause of friction between them, and to reach a final and lasting understanding, the Austro-Hungarian and the Italian Governments have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I.

In compliance with the wish expressed by Italy to take possession of those parts of Tyrol, the inhabitants of which are of Italian nationality, Austria-Hungary accepts a new boundary line which shall diverge from the present frontier near the Zufallspitze and shall follow for a distance the frontier between the districts of Cles on the one side and those of Schlanders and Meran on the other, *i.e.*, the watershed between the Noce and the Adige as far as the Illmen-Spitze. It shall lead to the west of Proveis, so that this district shall remain a part of the Austrian Tyrol, and then join the Torrente Pescara and follow the latter's course up to its mouth in the Noce. It shall follow the course of the Noce as far as south of Tajo, then ascend the Corno di Tres, follow the northern boundary of the district of Mezzolombardo and join the Adige to the south of Salurn. It shall ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige, crossing the Cassion toward the Nornspitze and Mount Comp. It shall then turn southward, describe a semicircle, leaving the district of Altrei in the Austrian Tyrol and ascend up to the pass of San Lugano. It shall follow the boundary between the districts of Bozen and Cavalese, *i.e.*, the watershed between the valley of the Avisio and that of the Adige, and extend to Latemar across the Cima di Rocca and the Grimm-Joch. From the Carnon pass it shall descend to the Avisio, cut across that river between the districts of Moena and Forno and ascend again toward the watershed between the valley of San Pellegrino to the north and that of Travignolo to the south. It shall rejoin the present boundary to the east of the Cima di Bocche.

## ARTICLE II.

Austria-Hungary further agrees to cede to Italy the territories on the west bank of the Isonzo, inasmuch as their inhabitants are of Italian nationality.

Starting at the mouth of the Isonzo (Sdobba) the boundary shall follow the course of that river upstream beyond the town of Gradisca, which will be included in the territory ceded to Italy. Above Gradisca it shall depart from the Isonzo and running in a northwesterly direction toward Medea follow up to the Judrio a line to be drawn in accordance with the nationality of the inhabitants. The new boundary shall then follow the course of the Judrio.

## ARTICLE III.

The title "Kaiserliche Freistadt" shall be conferred on the city of Trieste. It will have a university and receive a new municipal regulation which, while maintaining its present full autonomy, will furnish absolute guarantees that the predominance of the Italian element shall not be modified.

The present zone of the free city will be maintained and, if need be, extended.

## ARTICLE IV.

Austria-Hungary recognises Italy's unrestricted sovereignty over Valona and its bay, as well as over the sphere of interest surrounding it.

## ARTICLE V.

Austria-Hungary renounces all her interests in the future fate of Albania within the boundaries of that country drawn by the London Conference.

## ARTICLE VI.

Although after this agreement the subjects of Italian nationality in Austria will be considerably diminished, the Austro-Hungarian Government will conserve their national interests with special care.

## ARTICLE VII.

All natives of the territories thus ceded to Italy who, for political or military reasons, have been condemned or are being prosecuted will be set free immediately and a general amnesty will be granted.

ARTICLE VIII.

Italy undertakes to maintain absolute neutrality toward Austria-Hungary and Germany and Turkey as long as this war lasts.

ARTICLE IX.

For the whole duration of the present war, and also with regard to territorial and other advantages which Austria-Hungary might derive from the treaty of peace at the conclusion of the war, Italy renounces any and every claim to invoke subsequently in her favour former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to the Balkans, with the exception of Albania.

ARTICLE X.

Concerning the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos Islands, Austria-Hungary renounces on her side the claim to invoke in her favour former stipulations applying to this matter with regard to the Balkans.

ARTICLE XI.

Italy agrees to indemnify all possible claims arising from the cession to herself of the above-mentioned territories by the payment of one lump sum. A mixed commission shall be appointed to define the mode of payment and the amount to be paid; in case of disagreement the commission will submit the matter to the decision of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

ARTICLE XII.

Mixed commissions shall be appointed in the districts affected by this agreement with powers to effect decisions which will be put into effect as the work proceeds. The detailed powers of these commissions will be defined in a supplementary protocol.

ARTICLE XIII.

Military persons born in the territories ceded to Italy shall cease serving at the front in the Austro-Hungarian army as soon as the agreement shall have been concluded.

ARTICLE XIV.

The German Empire undertakes to guarantee the faithful and loyal execution of this agreement.

ARTICLE XV.

A solemn declaration shall be issued to the above effect by the Austro-Hungarian Government immediately after the agreement will have been signed.

This draft deals only with the questions concerning us and Italy, as I do not know if tripartite agreement would be preferred in Vienna and Berlin.

In the latter case the concessions to be granted by Germany would have to be added.

Considering the great importance which is attached here to the time and method of putting our cessions into execution, I think it indispensable that you should include the respective proposals in the agreement, all the more so as Germany's guarantee is already provided for in the document signed here previously.

I considered it important to omit none of the questions which appear in that document; though drafted only in general outline, it constitutes the basis of our proposals. Article VII of that document has, of course, been omitted; it stipulates only a willingness to examine and its text therefore can not be drafted before a discussion of the subject. Regarding this discussion, I intend to try and offer Carmons instead of Goricia and—if the Italian demand concerning the islands is not withdrawn—to remove the difficulties by offering Pelagosa; I have so far mentioned neither Carmons nor Pelagosa.

Remarks concerning the draft:

ARTICLE I.

The new boundary corresponds exactly with your former proposal; if the Italian Government should revert to the central Noce valley, and to the Fassa and Ampezzo valleys, I would object to this on the grounds already indicated, and report on the subject.

ARTICLE II.

This article mentions neither Carmons nor Goricia.

ARTICLE III.

The title "Kaiserliche Freistadt" implies the same basis of freedom as that of Fiume. The wording of the last paragraph repre-

sents an attempt to place the question of the free port within reasonable limits.

#### ARTICLE V.

The expression "future fate" is used to emphasise the purely political character of our renunciation.

#### ARTICLE VI.

As some kind of statement in this direction will be insisted upon, the proposed wording is the least dangerous of those among which we would have to choose.

#### ARTICLE IX.

Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance has intentionally not been referred to, as it is uncertain whether the new Cabinet will consider the situation from the point of view of the Triple Alliance, or from that of a settlement on another basis. The same considerations apply to Article X.

#### ARTICLE XII.

With regard to the execution of the agreement, I think that the greatest importance should be attached to giving the mixed commissions as extensive powers as possible, as this would, in my opinion, best demonstrate our intention to carry out the cession at the earliest possible date. The agreement should provide for the immediate convention of that commission, which would define and lay down in writing its programme and its powers.

The commission's programme ought, I believe, to provide for the demarcation of a neutral zone as an initial measure to avert possible conflicts.

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No. 186.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 15, 1915.*

More particulars of the game prearranged between the Government and the representatives of the Entente Powers are gradually



becoming known. I have previously reported that one is here apparently at a loss how to construe the *casus belli*. According to information from reliable sources, the moving spirit, the Colonial Secretary Martini, who calls every morning on the British Ambassador for orders, at first proposed to organise an incursion with Garibaldian irregulars or with regular troops; Baron Sonnino had under consideration a plan to stun Vienna by the issuance of some new document as astounding as the recent abrogation of the Alliance, or to combine this action with the step proposed by Martini.

The General Staff having recommended a postponement of the decision for a few days, Sgr. Martini suggested, as a first step, the cancellation of the treaty of Lausanne on the ground of the alleged presence of Turkish officers among the Lybian rebels; he hoped by this method to involve the Central Powers in the controversy and thus to gain the days required by the General Staff.

In agreement with the Entente Powers, this day, May 15th, had been selected for the decisive step. When these proposals were made, the unanimity of the Cabinet had already vanished and the final acceptance of the plan was still blocked.

Though the final break may be inevitable, it has at least been postponed.

Meanwhile the formation of the new Cabinet seems to meet with difficulties.

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No. 187.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 15, 1915.*

Information reaches me to-night from several sources that the resignation of the Cabinet may not be accepted. The main object of the street demonstrations, partly organised, partly favoured by the Government in coöperation with the Entente Powers, is to influence and to mislead the King as to the true feelings of the country, which are essentially in favour of neutrality. This apparently has been successfully accomplished, and the King seems to accept the explanation that the street demonstrations must be regarded as the preliminaries to a revolution and that the throne can only be saved by adhering to the present policy.

Should this information prove accurate the decision against us might be taken as early as to-morrow or on one of the succeeding days; it is true that the Cabinet crisis possibly might be taken advantage of to reënforce the blackmailing of the Entente Powers with a view to extorting the maximum of concessions obtainable from that side before a final understanding is reached.

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No. 188.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, May 16, 1915.

I concur in the view that the prompt drafting of an eventual agreement with Italy is desirable; an agreement only between us and Italy should be sought, and not a tripartite one.

I approve on the whole the text proposed by you, and I also assent to the endeavour to substitute Carmons for Goricia and to offer Pelagosa if the question of the islands is raised, in case Italy should insist upon the exemplifications added in parenthesis to paragraph 7 in the document drafted on the 10th instant by you and your German colleague.

I communicate to you herewith my comments on the separate items of the drafted agreement and the modifications which must be made.

There is no objection to the introduction and to Article I.

ARTICLE II.

In the first sentence, the following should be added after the word "Isonzo": "*en tant que la population est purement de nationalité italienne.*" ("As far as their population is of purely Italian nationality.")

The sketch of the boundary-line in the second paragraph should read after the word "Isonzo": "*Ensuite elle se tournera au nordouest vers Medea et rejoindra le Judrio dont le talweg continuera à former la frontière.*" ("It will then turn to the northwest toward Medea and meet the Judrio, the course of which will continue to be the boundary-line.")

## ARTICLE III.

In the first sentence "*Le titre de ville libre Impériale*" ("Imperial free city") should take the place of "*Le titre 'Kaiserliche Freistadt.'*" After the word "*actuellement*" the second sentence should read "*assurera en plus le caractère italien de cette ville.*" ("Will besides insure the Italian character of that city.")

The paragraph concerning the free port zone is approved.

## ARTICLE IV.

Inasmuch as Italy has so far not proclaimed her sovereignty over Valona, it should read: "*L'Autriche-Hongrie est prête, en ce qui la concerne, à reconnaître, etc.*" ("As far as she is concerned, Austria-Hungary is prepared to recognise, etc.")

## ARTICLE V.

Should read: "*L'Autriche-Hongrie déclare son désintéressement politique concernant l'Albanie comprise entre les frontières tracés par la Réunion de Londres.*" ("Austria-Hungary proclaims her political disinterestedness with regard to Albania as comprised within the borders drawn by the London Convention.")

## ARTICLE VI.

This article should read: "*Un certain nombre de sujets de nationalité italienne se trouvant encore en Autriche-Hongrie après la conclusion de cet accord, les Gouvernements autrichien et hongrois veilleront tout particulièrement à la sauvegarde de leurs intérêts nationaux.*" ("As a certain number of subjects of Italian nationality will still remain in Austria-Hungary after the conclusion of this agreement, the Austrian and Hungarian Governments will devote special attention to safeguard their national interests.")

## ARTICLES VII AND VIII.

Meet with no objection.

## ARTICLE IX.

Since Italy has abrogated the treaty of Triple Alliance in our relations with her, not only a specific but even a hypothetical reference to any of its provisions must be avoided; as we have further-

more to forestall possible future chicaneries on the part of Italy in the event of territorial acquisitions by us in another direction, for instance, in Russian Poland, this article should read: "*L'Italie déclare son désintéressement au sujet de tout avantage territorial ou autre résultant pour l'Autriche-Hongrie, soit du cours de la guerre actuelle, soit des traités de paix qui la termineront.*" ("Italy declares her disinterestedness in any territorial or other advantage that might accrue to Austria-Hungary as a result either of the present military operations or of the treaties of peace that shall mark their end.")

## ARTICLE X.

The proposed wording of this article should be replaced by the following: "*L'Autriche-Hongrie renonce pour sa part à toute prétention se basant sur le fait de l'occupation italienne des îles du Dodecanèse.*" ("On her part, Austria-Hungary waives any claim to be based on the fact of the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesos.")

## ARTICLE XI.

Remains unchanged.

Since the solemn proclamation of the Austro-Hungarian Government would apply only to the carrying out of the territorial cessions, whereas Article XV in its proposed wording and by its place at the end of the agreement would apply to all the clauses, this provision should be inserted as Article XII and should read: "*Le Gouvernement I. et R. procédera aussitôt après la conclusion de cet accord à une manifestation solennelle relative aux cessions territoriales.*" ("The Austro-Hungarian Government will issue a solemn proclamation concerning the territorial cessions immediately after the conclusion of this agreement.")

## ARTICLE XII OF THE DRAFT BECOMES ARTICLE XIII.

Instead of the first paragraph read: "*Des commissions mixtes seront instituées sur les lieux pour régler les détails relatifs à la cession des territoires en question. Ces commissions seront autorisées à prendre des décisions qui seront soumises à la ratification des Gouvernements.*" ("Mixed commissions will be appointed on the spot to settle details in connexion with the cession of the territories in question. These commissions will be authorised to reach decisions that will be submitted to the ratification of the Governments.")

The second paragraph to remain unchanged.

ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT, NOW ARTICLE XIV.

In order to avoid misunderstandings this Article should read:  
*“Dès que cet accord aura été conclu, les militaires originaires des territoires cédés à l'Italie seront retirés des lignes de combat de l'armée Austro-Hongroise.”* (“As soon as this agreement will have been concluded, military persons born in the territories ceded to Italy will be withdrawn from the fighting lines of the Austro-Hungarian army.”)

ARTICLE XIV OF THE DRAFT, NOW ARTICLE XV.

The following wording should be used in this article:  
*“L'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Italie acceptent la garantie assumée par l'Allemagne pour l'exécution fidèle et loyale de cet accord.”* (“Austria-Hungary and Italy accept the guarantee assumed by Germany for the faithful and loyal execution of this agreement.”)

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No. 189.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, May 16, 1915.

Royal decree issued to-day states that His Majesty has not accepted the resignation of the Cabinet.

It must be taken for granted that Baron Sonnino's and Sgr. Martini's foreign policy will be continued.

The street demonstrations here and in the provinces against Sgr. Giolitti and in favour of war have assumed more serious proportions in the last few days. There are indications that this was part of the political activity of the resigned Cabinet with a view to influencing and intimidating the King on the one hand and the members of Parliament supporting Sgr. Giolitti on the other. Both ends have been attained and Sgr. Salandra has become popular over night.

I am informed that the King continues to waver and cannot take it upon himself to decide the issue of war or peace. He is said, in particular, still to entertain misgivings as to the chances of success in a war, misgivings which have been strengthened since General Cadorna, who resents the assistance demanded from the

allies, has offered to resign. This would confirm the widely accepted belief that the King wishes to leave the decision to the Parliament and has verbally prevailed on Sgr. Salandra not to create a *fait accompli* before Parliament so decides.

If these reports are correct, it would mean a brief postponement of the decision. I must say, however, that the majority, which so far has stood for neutrality, is undergoing a change ascribable to Salandra's machinations. A renewed vote of confidence would thus be secured for Sgr. Salandra in the Chamber of Deputies.

I intend to-morrow, when the Cabinet will have been re-organised, to ask Baron Sonnino to appoint a meeting, for I wish to avoid everything that might enable him to assert that I have avoided meeting him.

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No. 190.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 17, 1915.*

The resignation of the Salandra Cabinet having been rejected, I instruct you to act in coöperation with Prince Bülow and communicate immediately to Baron Sonnino the draft of the agreement with Italy as drawn up in my telegram of yesterday.

Should Baron Sonnino describe as inadequate, or reject the concessions contained in the draft, then the instructions sent you in my telegram of the 10th instant will again apply.

In such an eventuality you will receive in a friendly way and, without committing yourself, immediately submit to me such modified or new wishes as the Italian Government may propose either spontaneously or at your suggestion.

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No. 191.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 17, 1915.*

In reply to my request for an interview the Minister of Foreign Affairs has asked me not to call until to-morrow morning. It

thus becomes clear that the same Baron Sonnino who charged us with procrastination is constantly postponing meetings. I shall hand him the draft of the agreement in the wording prescribed by you, and shall endeavour to find out from his attitude if an outbreak of war is imminent.

The meeting of the Cabinet this morning may already have come to some decision in this matter.

The public manifestations continue here and throughout Italy under various aspects; they assume more and more the character of national and patriotic demonstrations, though they are palpably artificial.

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No. 192.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 18, 1915.*

Since the Italian Government has persistently remonstrated against the remoteness of the actual transfer of the ceded territories—any form of military occupation being, however, absolutely excluded—you will, if this can influence the situation favourably, be prepared to make the concession set forth below and which could be incorporated in the draft of the agreement after Article XIII, which deals with the commissions.

(Translation from the French.)

The mixed commission mentioned in the preceding Article shall begin work immediately after the conclusion of this agreement.

The transfer of the ceded territories will take place as soon as the decisions taken by aforesaid commissions shall have been satisfied; it will be completed within one month.

You are empowered, in coöperation with Prince Bülow, to communicate immediately to Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra the draft agreement thus extended.

No. 193.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 18, 1915.*

The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies here have been convened for the 20th instant. Order of the day is hearing of declarations by the Government.

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No. 194.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 18, 1915.*

I have just seen Baron Sonnino. I opened the conversation by telling him that you had instructed me to hand him a draft agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government based on our last proposals. This should convince him that you are ever willing to come to terms with Italy, and the fact that the various clauses for the proposed agreement are already worked out is a new proof of our sincere desire to avoid all that could cause unnecessary delay. Baron Sonnino asked if he could keep the document, and I acquiesced. He accepted my offer to read the contents to him. I wished to induce him to talk and to remind him of our former conversations in the course of the reading.

The conversation, however, remained a monologue.

When I was through, he only enquired whether the boundary-line in the Trentino was the same as that designated in the former proposals from Vienna.

I replied in the affirmative and added that my Government was still prepared to consider in a most conciliatory way any new Italian proposals, remarks, wishes or amendments of whatever kind.

I could see that Baron Sonnino also took serious note of this statement. To my question whether I could report to Vienna that he had received the draft and would submit it to the Cabinet, he replied affirmatively and observed this might be done to-night; that the Chamber would certainly meet on the 20th instant, and that it had been agreed to let the Chamber decide the whole question.



Baron Sonnino could not be induced to express any opinion on the draft agreement. Former experience suggests that we must view the future discussion with the utmost scepticism. He has for the time being avoided everything that might resemble a break. It is most likely, however, that on the 20th instant the decision of the Chamber will be against us and then matters will progress rapidly. The fact that the Senate is to meet two hours after the opening of the Chamber indicates that there is no expectation of any further action than a mere vote on a prepared declaration by the Government; if, as everything points, this be a vote of confidence, adjournment and the break with us are likely to follow simultaneously.

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No. 195.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 19, 1915.*

I immediately communicated in writing to Baron Sonnino and Sgr. Salandra the text of the concessions to be inserted as a new article in the draft agreement in accordance with your telegram of yesterday.

Reports in the newspapers state that at to-morrow's meeting the Chamber will take cognisance of and approve the declaration of the Government without further debate.

I take a sceptical view of the demonstrations planned for to-day by the socialists in favour of neutrality; experience shows that the Government has always suppressed such demonstrations far more effectively than the riotous scenes staged by its protégés, the so-called interventionists.

The report of Giolitti's departure is confirmed.

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No. 196.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 19, 1915.*

The King reviewed the garrison to-day and then received d'Annunzio in private audience. The press does everything to arouse

enthusiasm and reports patriotic demonstrations and alleged wholesale applications from volunteers who want to join the colours.

The Agenzia Stefani published our concession concerning the putting of the cessions into effect and most of the newspapers have reproduced it with invidious comments. The conviction prevails here generally that Italy's entanglement with the Entente is already advanced to such a point that nothing can be done to prevent it.

The first intoxication that had seized everybody on the occasion of the street demonstrations of the 14th, 15th and 16th, is nevertheless beginning to evaporate; a more earnest and calm state of mind prevails now that more than one man views the outlook with doubt and that the horrors of war are almost beginning to be felt. Some people express regret at Sgr. Giolitti's departure, but they hardly raise their voices to an audible pitch.

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No. 197.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 20, 1915.*

Up to this hour I have not received a reply from either of the two Ministers to my written communication concerning our concession as to the putting of the cessions into effect.

I am therefore reduced to draw conclusions from indirect indications as to the way in which the Italian Government has received the concession. For instance, the absence so far of a reply to my letters is such an indirect indication, as is generally the passive attitude of the Government, which contrasts with the unfavourable press comments already reported.

This morning's "Popolo Romano" is the only newspaper which still has a friendly word for the Triple Alliance, but its utterances are resigned.

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No. 198.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 20, 1915.*

An eye-witness gives me the following report on to-day's session of the Chamber.

Sgr. Salandra read a Government bill demanding extraordinary powers in the event of war. After the speaker had said a few words, the urgency measure was put to vote. It was passed without debate by 377 against 54 votes. Forty-eight socialists and six deputies from Southern Italy voted against the bill. A number of deputies were unable, it is stated, to obtain access to the Chamber. My informant also professes to have heard several deputies asking to be heard; their voices were, however, silenced by the shouts of the majority. Before the opening of the session, when the poet d'Annunzio appeared on the scene, a demonstration against him was tentatively undertaken, but it was overwhelmed by the applause of the majority and the cheers of the spectators.

The introductory sentence of the bill refers to the Triple Alliance which had stood for the European balance of power and the maintenance of peace. To that end Italy is represented as having set aside the insecurity of her frontier districts and her national aspirations; she has even had to witness with concealed distress the systematic attempts to suppress the Italian character of certain districts.

The bill then proceeds to state that the Triple Alliance was disrupted through the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia—outwardly in that Austria-Hungary omitted to inform Italy beforehand, and inwardly in that she intended to disturb the *status quo* and the spheres of influence in the Balkans. In any event, however, the spirit of the treaty has been violated, for the precipitation of the European war is contrary to the sentiments and interests of Italy and constitutes a disturbance of the European balance of power which the Treaty of the Triple Alliance was designed to preserve. The Italian Government had, nevertheless, pursued for months a policy of patience and tried to come to an agreement. These negotiations were subject, however, to a limit with regard both to time and to Italy's dignity. For that reason the notification was issued in Vienna on May 4th withdrawing all previous proposals, cancelling the treaty and asserting Italy's freedom of action. On the other hand it was no longer possible to leave Italy isolated, without security and without prestige at a decisive moment in history.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the seriousness of the international situation, the Government was obliged to formulate a policy which might lead to the ultimate test of force.

The Government, it was declared, is conscious of having taken the measures imposed by the noblest aspirations and the most vital interests of the country. Then follows a warm appeal for the union

of all classes and parties for the attainment of the ideal goal: *La fortuna e la grandezza d'Italia*.

The final sentence refers to the army and the navy, as well as to the King, who will lead them in the achievement of the destinies of the new history.

The foregoing indicates that the King was not placed to the fore, that a war against the Dual Monarchy was only alluded to, in the same way as an agreement with the Entente Powers was only hinted at.

After the Cabinet had introduced the bill in the Senate, the Ministers appeared once more in the Chamber of Deputies. The speaker, Roselli, in a passionate speech urged the passing of the bill; while he talked the enthusiasm rose and belligerent cries, such as: "Long live Italian Trieste!", "Long live the avengers of Lissa!", etc., were applauded, even from the Government benches. After him Barzilai addressed the House and then the socialist Turati, whose speech against war visibly caused some impatience. After Colojanni, the reform socialist Ciscoti spoke and in spite of his socialistic theories declared himself in favour of the war because "it is a war for the protection of civilisation against barbarism."

After almost all the deputies had obtained access the vote stood 407 for and 74 against the Government.

The Chamber adjourned *sine die*; the Senate will meet again to-morrow.

The socialist bodies, which are said to have prepared various plans for making themselves conspicuous, were prevented from carrying out any demonstration by the stringent measures of the Government and by numerous arrests.

Feeling in the street was to-day more calm; the demonstration in the Chamber by the scum of the populace, obviously hired for the purpose, was directed solely against Sgr. Giolitti.

It may be that the Government will make use of its powers to-morrow, without delay, to complete the military measures by further calls to the colours. We must be prepared for a rupture of relations at any moment.

No. 199.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 21, 1915.*

I deem it desirable that you call on Baron Sonnino and represent to him in a friendly way that, though you are cognisant of yesterday's tumultuous session of Parliament, you must call his attention to the fact that the Italian Government still owes you a reply to your last communications.

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No. 200.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 21, 1915.*

I gave, this afternoon, to the Italian Ambassador my reply to his communication of the 4th instant concerning the cancellation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and I handed him a written copy of it.

The reply reads as follows:

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister has had the honour to receive the communication concerning the cancellation of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which the Italian Ambassador made on the 4th of May by order of his Government.

With painful surprise, the Austro-Hungarian Government takes cognisance of the decision of the Italian Government to put an end in such a summary manner to a treaty which was based on a community of our most important political interests, which has guaranteed security and peace to our respective States for so many years, and which has been of obvious benefit to Italy.

This surprise is all the more justified since the facts invoked in the first instance by the Italian Government in justification of its decision date back more than nine months and since the Royal Government in the meantime has repeatedly asserted its desire to maintain and even to strengthen the bonds of the alliance between our two countries, a desire which has always found a favourable reception and a cordial echo in Austria-Hungary.

The reasons which compelled the Austro-Hungarian Government in July of last year to send an ultimatum to Servia, are too well known to require repetition here. The aim of Austria-Hungary was purely and simply to safeguard the Monarchy against the subversive machinations of Servia and to prevent the continuance of an agitation which aimed at the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and which had led to numerous outrages, culminating in the tragedy of Serajevo. This aim could in no way affect the interests of Italy, for the Austro-Hungarian Government never has supposed and considers it out of the question, that Italy's interests could in any way be identified with criminal intrigues against the security and territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary, unfortunately tolerated and encouraged by the Belgrade Government.

The Italian Government, moreover, was informed and knew that Austria-Hungary had no purposes of conquest in Servia. It was expressly declared in Rome that if the war remained localised, Austria-Hungary had no intention to encroach upon the territorial integrity of Servia.

When, in consequence of Russia's intervention, the purely local conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia, contrary to our desires, assumed a European character, and Austria-Hungary and Germany found themselves attacked by several Great Powers, the Italian Government proclaimed Italy's neutrality, without, however, making the slightest suggestion that this war, which had been provoked and planned far in advance by Russia, could deprive the treaty of the Triple Alliance of its *raison d'être*.

It suffices to recall the declarations made at that time by the late Marchese di San Giuliano and the telegram which His Majesty, the King of Italy, on August 2, 1914, addressed to His Majesty, the Emperor-King, to establish the fact that the Italian Government saw nothing at that time in Austria-Hungary's proceeding which was in conflict with the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance.

Attacked by the Powers of the Triple Entente, Austria-Hungary and Germany were obliged to defend their territories; but this defensive war was in no wise directed toward "the realisation of a programme opposed to Italy's vital interests." These vital interests, or what we could know of them, were in no way menaced. If, moreover, the Italian Government entertained apprehensions in this direction it could have given expression to them and would certainly have found both in Vienna and Berlin the best will to protect these interests.

The Royal Government at that time held the view that neither of its allies, considering the situation, could invoke the *casus foederis* as affecting Italy, but it made no communication which could justify the belief that it regarded the proceeding of Austria-Hungary as a "flagrant violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Alliance."

The Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin, even though deploring Italy's resolution to remain neutral,—a resolution which in our view was hardly compatible with the spirit of the treaty,—nevertheless loyally accepted the view of the Italian Government, and the exchange of views which then took place established the maintenance of the Triple Alliance.

Precisely with reference to this treaty, and especially to Article VII, the Royal Government presented its claims, which aimed at securing certain compensation in the event of Austria-Hungary obtaining territorial or other advantages in the Balkan Peninsula from the war.

The Austro-Hungarian Government accepted this standpoint, and declared itself ready to consider the question, at the same time pointing out that, as long as the eventual advantages accruing to Austria-Hungary remained unknown, it was difficult to specify such compensation.

The Italian Government acceded to this view, as is shown by the declaration of August 25, 1914, by the late Marchese di San Giuliano, who said: "It would be premature now to talk of compensation," and by the remarks of the Duke of Avarna after our withdrawal from Serbia: "At present there is no object of compensation."

Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian Government has always been ready to enter into negotiations on this subject.

When the Italian Government, while still repeating its wish to maintain and strengthen the alliance, presented certain demands which, on the plea of compensation, referred to the cession of territories constituting integral parts of the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian Government always showed that it was guided by a sincere desire to reach an understanding with Italy, and although for ethnical, political, and military reasons, which have been amply explained in Rome, it was impossible to accede to all the demands of the Italian Government, the sacrifices which the Austro-Hungarian Government was prepared to make were so important that they were only justified by its desire to continue an alliance which had

existed for so many years to the mutual advantage of both countries.

The Italian Government contends that the concessions offered by Austria-Hungary were to be realised only at an indefinite time, namely, at the end of the war, and seems to conclude that these concessions would therefore lose their entire value.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, while emphasising the material impossibility of an immediate surrender of the ceded territory, showed itself none the less ready to offer all necessary guarantees for the purpose of preparing for and insuring this transfer at no distant date.

The obvious good-will and conciliatory spirit of which the Austro-Hungarian Government has given proof in the course of the negotiations seem in no way to justify the opinion of the Italian Government that every hope must be abandoned of reaching an agreement.

Such an agreement, however, can be reached only when both sides are animated by the same sincere desire to reach an understanding.

The Austro-Hungarian Government cannot take cognisance of the declaration of the Italian Government that it desires to recover complete freedom of action, and to consider the Treaty of Alliance with Austria-Hungary henceforth null and void, as such a declaration by the Italian Government is in absolute contradiction with the solemnly undertaken obligations which Italy assumed in the treaty of December 5, 1912, and which fixed the duration of our alliance to July 8, 1920, with a right to cancel it only on one year's notice, and with no provision for cancellation or abrogation of the treaty before that time.

The Royal Italian Government having in an arbitrary manner freed itself from all its obligations, the Austro-Hungarian Government declines the responsibility for all consequences that may arise from this procedure.

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No. 201.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 21, 1915.*

To judge from newspaper reports, to-day's debate in the Senate exceeded in patriotic superlatives yesterday's proceedings in the



Chamber of Deputies. The speaker, Don Prospero Colonna, Sindaco of Rome, gave the impetus to the enthusiasm and earned a storm of applause. The order of the day as proposed by Canevaro and seconded by Vice-President Torrigiani, was unanimously accepted by the 281 Senators present.

It read as follows:

“After the hearing of the Governmental declarations which emphasised Italy’s good right and the will of the nation with so much firmness, the Senate shall proceed to take a vote.”

To-night a great war manifestation is to take place on the Capitol. For that reason the massing of large bodies of troops and the closing of streets which have extremely impeded traffic and communication during last week, are still in progress.

It is said that 240 socialists were arrested yesterday, with the result that to-day a meeting of socialist deputies has already advocated a change of front by their party in favour of war.

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No. 202.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 22, 1915.*

In order to save our respective countries from a senseless war, I authorise you to make a final effort with Baron Sonnino and to ask whether he would be prepared to sign the agreement in conformity with the entirety of our last proposal if we met Italy still further on the question of the putting of the cessions into effect, without, however, conceding immediate military occupation.

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No. 203.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 23, 1915.*

In compliance with your telegram of yesterday I reminded Baron Sonnino in a friendly manner that he had not yet sent me his reply

to your latest proposals, which he had promised to submit to the Cabinet. Sonnino referred to the demonstrations of the past few days and to the decisive vote in Parliament, which in accord with previous meetings of the Cabinet had pronounced those latest proposals too tardy.

In the spirit of your telegram to-day, I responded that I had always been anxious to further the understanding up to the very last, and that I was still prepared to make another proposal to that end. I would undertake to induce my Government to take another step forward in the matter of putting the cessions into effect, notwithstanding the latest and very precise definition of time, provided he would agree to accept the last draft of the accord as a whole.

The Minister replied *that it was too late*; he had from the very first looked upon the time of putting the cessions into effect as the pivot of the entire agreement; yet even the latest proposal, where the time was to begin with the ratification of the agreement, was calculated to postpone everything indefinitely.

All my endeavours to continue the discussion were met with the ever-recurring phrase: "It is too late."

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No. 204.

*Baron Burián to Baron Macchio.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, May 23, 1915.*

The Duke of Avarna this afternoon handed to me the following declaration of war:

(Translation from the French.)

In compliance with the orders of his noble Sovereign the King, the undersigned, Royal Italian Ambassador, has the honour to communicate the following to his Excellency, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Government was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of being in the right, declared that her alliance with Austria-Hungary was null and void, and without effect in future, since this alliance had been violated by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that

Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully determined to protect Italian rights and interests with all the means at its disposal, the Italian Government cannot evade its duty to take such measures as events may impose upon it against all present and future menaces to the fulfilment of Italy's national aspirations. His Majesty the King declares that from to-morrow he will consider himself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.

The undersigned has the honour at the same time to inform his Excellency, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that to-day the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he would be grateful if his Excellency would hand him likewise his own passports.

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No. 205.

*Baron Macchio to Baron Burián.*

(Telegram.)

*Rome, May 23, 1915.*

Passports received; departure of both Embassies to-morrow (Monday) night.

## APPENDIX

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No. 1.

### ARTICLE VII OF THE TREATY OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

(Translation from the French.)

Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that the territorial *status quo* in the near East be maintained as much as possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all territorial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they shall communicate to one another all such information as may be suitable for their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well as those of other Powers. Should, however, the

*status quo* in the regions of the Balkans, or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas in the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third Power or otherwise, to modify that *status quo* by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the present *status quo*, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate interests and aspirations of both parties.

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No. 2.

*Instructions of Count Guiccardini to the Duke of Avarna, Dated Rome, December 15, 1909, Handed by the Latter to Count Aehrenthal on December 19, 1909.*

In the conversations which have lately taken place between Count Aehrenthal and yourself with a view to specifying and perfecting Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, you have firstly agreed that, Austria-Hungary having renounced the rights which the Treaty of Berlin had conferred upon her in respect of the Sandjak of Novibazar, the provisions of the aforesaid article of the treaty of Triple Alliance apply equally to the Sandjak as to other parts of the Ottoman Empire. If, therefore, Austria-Hungary, in consequence of the impossibility of maintaining the *status quo* in the Balkans, shall be compelled by force of circumstances to proceed to a temporary or permanent occupation of the Sandjak of Novibazar, that occupation shall only be effected after a previous agreement has been reached with Italy, based on the principle of compensation.

Faithful to the spirit which has inspired the Treaty of Triple Alliance, and with a view to defining exactly and by mutual consent the mode of procedure which the two allied cabinets intend to adopt in certain eventualities, you have also arranged with Count Aehrenthal as follows:

Each of the two cabinets binds itself not to effect with a third Power any agreement whatsoever concerning the Balkan question without the participation of the other cabinet on a footing of absolute equality. The two cabinets also bind themselves to communi-

cate to one another all propositions which may be made to the one or to the other by a third Power, contrary to the principle of non-intervention and referring to a modification of the *status quo* in the regions of the Balkans or of the Turkish coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas.

It is understood that Article VII of the treaty of Triple Alliance, which is defined and completed only by the aforesaid provisions, shall remain in force in its entirety.

As to the duration of the obligations which the two cabinets assume by virtue of the aforesaid, it is understood that it shall coincide with that of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in such a manner that these obligations will be implicitly renewed with the renewal of the Triple Alliance.

Conforming with the analogous provisions of this Treaty, the two cabinets mutually promise secrecy on the obligations thus entered into. Only the Berlin Cabinet, in its capacity as an ally, shall be informed by the two governments without delay.

In order to define exactly all that has been agreed upon in the conversations I have conducted through your mediation with the Austro-Hungarian Government, I request you to communicate this telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to leave with him a copy thereof.

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### No. 3.

*Count Aehrenthal to Baron Ambrózy.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, September 26, 1911.*

The Duke of Avarna told me to-day, in accordance with instructions, that the Italian Government had resolved to bring the question of Tripoli to an issue. As motives to such action the Ambassador cited the circumstance that the situation had been constantly growing worse, despite Italy's endeavours for many months past to establish better relations with Turkey, and that affairs in Tripoli had now become absolutely intolerable. On the other hand the Duke of Avarna pointed to the international situation and more especially to the relations between Italy and France. The latter Power was on the eve of a very considerable territorial aggrandisement and was at present bound by an agreement not to put any obstacles in the

way of Italy's action in Tripoli. It could not be foreseen whether a modification in the European situation would not, at a later date, render the consent of France less certain. Once the problem of Tripoli is solved in accordance with the Italian aspirations, the Ambassador continued, Italy will represent a perfectly contented and therefore all the more reliable member of the Triple Alliance.

The Marchese di San Giuliano had considered in detail the contentions which I had proffered as early as June against an Italian action in Tripoli on account of a possible reaction in the Balkans. Yet, the Minister thought that there was no such danger, *especially as Italy would make it her duty to confine her action to the Mediterranean*. The present moment was very favourable even from that point of view, because an extension of the conflict to the Balkans was least likely to occur during autumn and winter. Moreover, Italy's policy *had always aimed at the maintenance of the "status quo" in the Balkans, and Italy would certainly do nothing that could interfere with this policy, now any more than ever before*. The Duke of Avarna then added that Italy will be in a better position to coöperate in the preservation of the *status quo* in the Balkans, after the question of Tripoli has been solved.

In conclusion, the Italian Ambassador explained that his Government, in advising the Austro-Hungarian Government at so late a date of its decision, had been guided solely by its desire to spare it the certainly inconvenient duty of taking a stand in the matter.

I thanked the Duke of Avarna for this very important communication, which called for very minute consideration on my part. I informed him that I would report thereon to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and that I would let the Ambassador know the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government in a few days. For the time being I expressed to him, in accordance with our well-known friendly feelings toward Italy, my first impression that it should be left to her own discretion to decide how to protect her own interests, and that in such action she could rely upon our friendly benevolence; yet, I inclined to my former contention on account of the possibility of the extension of the conflict to the Balkans.

## No. 4.

*Von Mérey to Count Aehrenthal.*

(Telegram.)

Rome, October 21, 1911.

Have just received the following reply from Foreign Minister to my latest representations.

(Translation from the French.)

We have always reserved our freedom of military operations outside of the Turkish coasts in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. We would be delighted if we should not be compelled to take advantage of that freedom, but nevertheless we reserve it in its entirety.

## No. 5.

*Count Aehrenthal to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, November 6, 1911.

In handing to me the circular telegram concerning the annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, the Duke of Avarna denied the news that Italian men-of-war were cruising off Salonica.

I replied that I took cognisance of his communication with all the more satisfaction as I had actually received various reports from the Austro-Hungarian Consulates during the past few days which pointed to warlike operations in that vicinity on the part of Italy.

I drew the Duke of Avarna's attention to the fact that Italy was bound by the Treaty of Triple Alliance to avoid all that may menace the *status quo* in the Balkans. That an Italian attack upon Salonica may involve *a considerable menace to the peace of the Balkan Peninsula*, was apparent, among other reasons, from the fact that the Bulgarian revolutionary organisation has declared in a recently published circular that it would carry on the fight for obtaining the autonomy of Macedonia with all available means.

Austria-Hungary, as well as Germany, had adopted a most friendly attitude in the matter of the Italian action in Tripoli, which in any case constituted an encroachment upon the principle of the

integrity of the Ottoman Empire. But Austria-Hungary in particular is not in a position to accept calmly an eventual military action of Italy upon the coast of the Aegean Sea, in view of the above-mentioned apprehensions.

The Duke of Avarna took my contentions as perfectly natural *and added, in an enquiring manner, that a temporary occupation of the islands in the Aegean Sea would also be in contradiction to Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance!* In answering this hint I left no doubt in his mind that my previous declaration applied likewise to this eventuality.

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No. 6.

*Count Aehrenthal to von Mérey.*

(Instructions.)

*Vienna, November 15, 1911.*

The Duke of Avarna yesterday conveyed to me a series of communications from the Marchese di San Giuliano, among which were his thanks for our having refused to answer the two notes of protest from the Ottoman Government.

The Ambassador then read to me a telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the possible extension of hostilities to the Aegean Sea.

In reply, I requested him to report again to his Government that, for reasons well known to him, I must dissent from such an undertaking. I once more emphasised the friendship and benevolence which we surely have abundantly manifested toward Italy, and declared that—setting aside the duties of neutrality—I would overstep the mark which I had been obliged to define for myself, if I embarked upon renewed discussions of that topic; if I were to do so, I would assume a share in the responsibility which Italy would have to assume if she were to depart from the declarations made by her at the beginning of the war, or from her treaty obligations.



## No. 7.

*Count Aehrenthal to Count Szögyény.*

(Instructions.)

Vienna, November 29, 1911.

Von Tschirschky informs me that Italy has expressed a desire in Berlin to ascertain what warlike operations on her part would be admissible upon the Asiatic coast of the Aegean Sea, in the view of the Berlin Cabinet.

Without basing his step upon any intimation from the Rome Cabinet, the German Ambassador asked for my opinion in the matter, under instructions. I replied to von Tschirschky that I made it a point not to discuss the extension of Italian operations to the Asiatic coast of Turkey, without, however, intending to make any difficulties for the Italian Government, or even to incur the appearance of such a possibility. In closing my explanations, I said that I was guided by the consideration that it would be unwise for us as well as for Germany to embark upon a similar negotiation, as a subsequent military operation of that sort would then necessarily be considered as being performed with our consent.

## No. 8.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, March 1, 1912.

Expected British representations were made yesterday in the form of the following memorandum:

(Translation from the French.)

It is certain that international commerce would suffer considerable losses if the Ottoman Government decided for reasons of self-defence to close the Dardanelles by means of mines. Consequently, Sir Edward Grey desires to know whether or not the Austro-Hungarian Government would deem it expedient that the Powers approach the Italian Government with the query whether it would be willing to give assurances that no military operations of any

description will be undertaken in the Dardanelles or in the adjacent waters.

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No. 9.

*Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Constantinople, London, Paris, Rome and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, March 3, 1912.*

Sir F. Cartwright called on me yesterday and reiterated verbally the proposal made by the delivery of the *Aide-Memoire*.

I told the Ambassador that, in my opinion, the Italian Government would not entertain the demand for a declaration that she will not undertake any warlike operations in the Dardanelles and the adjacent waters; it was our duty as neutrals to avoid all that might give the appearance that we wish to impede the freedom of action of either of the belligerent parties.

In support of his representations Sir F. Cartwright asked whether the Italian Government had not previously made to the Vienna Cabinet a declaration coinciding in principle with the one which the five Powers were to demand now from Italy on Sir Edward Grey's initiative. I replied to the Ambassador that I had never heard of such a declaration by Italy.

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No. 10.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, April 6, 1912.*

Acting on instructions, von Tschirschky made to me the following declaration:

In consequence of the long duration of the Italo-Turkish conflict, the situation is beginning to become serious for Italy, and both military circles and public opinion urge that a decisive blow be delivered. It is not a question of action in the Aegean Sea, but in the Dardanelles.

The Ambassador added in strict confidence that the King of Italy had approached Emperor William on the subject at Venice.

The question now arising for Germany is, what attitude the Allies will take up toward these intentions of Italy.

You will please seek an occasion to converse with the Marchese di San Giuliano and tell him that you have perceived, from information received from Vienna, that it was a matter of great surprise to me to learn that von Tschirschky had been instructed by his Government to make the aforesaid intimation. In consideration of our alliance, as well as of the friendly manner in which I have met Italy heretofore, I would have thought a direct discussion more natural and more expedient. At the same time you will hint that for conspicuous reasons I was obliged to adhere in principle to the standpoint which my predecessor had taken up in respect of an eventual extension of the hostilities. Von Tschirschky explicitly designated an Italian action in the Dardanelles; the apprehension is easy to understand, that such action might find its echo in Constantinople and in the Balkans, the consequence of which may not be gauged to-day, but which would be diametrically opposed to the maintenance of the *status quo*—the policy pursued by both Italy and Austria-Hungary. Should, nevertheless, the Italian Government find an extension of the region of her warlike operations indispensable, then I would certainly consider a direct discussion of the matter the most natural course to take. Without obtaining a decided consent from me, which would to a certain extent imply our participation in the responsibilities for the consequences, Italy may secure our tacit passivity in the event of an intended temporary warlike action, confined to such territories as would not involve the danger of a reaction in the Balkans.

If the Marchese di San Giuliano enters upon a discussion of any specific Italian operation, you will lead the conversation into other channels with the intimation that you consider such discussion inopportune. In fact, we must positively avoid every appearance that any specific warlike action had received our previous consent.

## No. 11.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, April 15, 1912.

The Duke of Avarna again broached the subject of a possible extension of the Italian naval operation, though pointing out with emphasis that he spoke without instructions.

I pointed out in the first place that, to my mind, an action by the Italian Navy outside of the north-African war theatre could accomplish its purpose only if it caused a strong enough impression in Constantinople to be felt in the Balkans. Such reaction, however, could not leave us, Italy's allies, indifferent. A minor operation and a less extensive reaction would bring Italy no nearer to her aim, while it would still create a feeling of uneasiness with us if the scene of action comprised the territories referred to in Article VII of the Alliance Treaty.

Under these circumstances I could not *give my express consent to any similar action* whatsoever. The Duke of Avarna had not asked me to give such consent; but I, on my part, was determined to leave the responsibility for the consequences upon Italy's shoulders.

Concerning the islands of Rhodos, Karpathos and Stampalia, I expressed my willingness to consider it disputable whether or not they pertain to the islands of the Aegean Sea. The Duke of Avarna replied that he felt convinced that his Government would give us its express assurances, in the event of their occupation, that such occupation would be only temporary.

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 No. 12.
*Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.*

(Telegram.)

Berlin, May 21, 1912.

Von Kiderlen-Waechter assured me that he gratefully acknowledged our conciliatory attitude in the matter of Italian action in the Archipelago. He still entertained hopes that the occupation of several islands in the Aegean Sea by Italy would not provoke a dangerous reaction in the Balkans.

## No. 13.

*Count Berchtold to von Mérey.*

(Telegram.)

Vienna, May 23, 1912.

The question of occupation of islands in Aegean Sea has repeatedly been the subject of conversations between me and the Italian Ambassador in the last few days.

The Duke of Avarna resumed the discussion yesterday. He especially expressed the apprehension that the decision we had promised in respect of the occupation of several unimportant islands (he referred to Chios and the isles whence the Turkish officials had first been removed) might be such as to arouse profound ill-feeling in Italy.

He further observed that it impressed him strangely to see that of all Europe, including Germany, it was Austria-Hungary, Italy's ally, who caused her the greatest difficulties in the attainment of her aim, which consisted in a speedy conclusion of the war.

I pointed out, that in this case we were in a peculiar situation in two respects: Firstly, because we had entered into bilateral agreements with Italy concerning the matter in question; secondly, because we were directly adjacent neighbours of Turkey, and consequently were the most closely concerned of all. Besides, I failed to understand his apprehension, inasmuch as there never had been a question of a "protest" against the occupation of the islands referred to. Yet, we were compelled to specify our legitimate claim at this time in order to avoid possible future misunderstandings.

I finally specified our standpoint on this question as follows:

We have been painfully impressed by the news of the occupation of additional islands by Italian troops. Because of the consequences to be feared from such operations, we are compelled to express our most serious misgivings. At the same time it is our duty to point out that in our opinion the occupations in question are contrary to the provisions of Article VII of the Treaty of Triple Alliance, and give us the right to demand compensation on our part. *True, for the time being we do not wish to make use of this right,* out of a desire to avoid complicating Italy's position. However, we must declare emphatically that if Italy perseveres in this policy the responsibility for it will rest with her, while we would be constrained to reserve the right to compensation which we are at liberty to use according to our own judgment.

No. 14.

ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

(Translation from the French.)

If one or two of the high contracting parties should be attacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war with two or several Great Powers not signatory to this Treaty, the *casus foederis* shall apply simultaneously to all the high contracting parties.

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No. 15.

ARTICLE I OF THE TREATY OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

The high contracting parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed against any one of their respective States.

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political and economic questions of a general nature as may arise; and, moreover, promise their mutual support within the scope of their own interests.

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No. 16.

ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY OF TRIPLE ALLIANCE.

In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this Treaty should menace the safety of the States of one of the high contracting parties, and that the menaced party should be forced to make war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should consider it appropriate to make common cause with her ally.

THE  
BELGIAN GREY BOOK  
(NO. 1)





## THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 1)<sup>1</sup>

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### No. 1.

*Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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### ENCLOSURE IN No. 1.<sup>2</sup>

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

“On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

<sup>1</sup> *Miscellaneous. No. 12 (1914). Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War, published by the Belgian Government. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, October 1914. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914. [Cd. 7627.] Translated and published by the British Government. No English translation was published by the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: *Royaume de Belgique. Correspondance Diplomatique Relative à la Guerre de 1914 (24 Juillet-29 Août). Septième Edition. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79, Boulevard Saint-Germain; Londres, 18, King William Street, Strand, 1915.**

<sup>2</sup> This note is not printed in *Miscellaneous, No. 12 (1914)*, which merely refers to No. 4 of *Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)*. The translation as here reproduced is taken from the latter source.

“ ‘Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.’ ”

“ ‘The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. ”

“ ‘Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. ”

“ ‘This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. ”

“ ‘It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. ”

“ ‘The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer ”

the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

“To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

“In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their ‘Official Journal’ of the 13/26 July the following declaration:—

“ ‘The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“ ‘The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“ ‘The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.’

“ ‘This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army.

“ ‘The Royal Servian Government further undertake:—

“ ‘1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

“ ‘2. To dissolve immediately the society styled “Narodna Odbrana,” to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

“ ‘3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

“ ‘4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

“ ‘5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

“ ‘6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

“ ‘7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

“ ‘8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

“ ‘9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June

to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

“‘10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.’

“The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

“A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.”

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has

left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Serbia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Serbia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

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ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voija Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms dépôt of the Servian army at Kragujevać.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topshider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

No. 2.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 24, 1914.*

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 2.

Sir,

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.



Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

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No. 3.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 25, 1914.*

I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany become imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments

of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon telegraphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall request you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will inform you of the date to be given to the circular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclosure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 3.  
(See ENCLOSURE in No. 2.)

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No. 4.

*M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July.

MICHOTTE DE WELLE.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 4.<sup>1</sup>

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are

<sup>1</sup> This note is not printed in *Miscellaneous*, No. 12 (1914), which merely refers to No. 39 of *Miscellaneous*, No. 6 (1914), where it is printed. The translation as here reproduced is taken from the latter source.

convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be

published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceed-

ings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good

as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime and which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

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No. 5.

*Communication made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not

having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock.

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## No. 6.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

According to a telegram from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, the Servian Government have given way on all the points on the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of international law. The British Chargé d'Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor.

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## No. 7.

*Count Errembault de Dudzele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.

No. 8.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Sir, *Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

DAVIGNON.

No. 9.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir, *Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said:—

“I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in



the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 10.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered, and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 11.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it:—

“In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it.”

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain

our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 12.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had undertaken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 12.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, May 2, 1913.*

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

“A member of the Social Democrat Party said: ‘The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension

in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.'

"Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: 'Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.'

"A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 13.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 1, 1914.*

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.

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No. 14.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has been instructed to enquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany

would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

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## No. 15.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir,

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

“I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

DAVIGNON.

## No. 16.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 24th July.

DAVIGNON.

(See No. 2.)

No. 17.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

Carry out instructions contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

DAVIGNON.

(See No. 3.)

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No. 18.

*M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

EYSCHEN.

## No. 19.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Basompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

DAVIGNON.

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## No. 20.

*Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Imperial German Legation in Belgium.—Brussels, August 2, 1914.

(Very Confidential.)

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success

to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in coöperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessities for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.



## No. 21.

*Memorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 a.m., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

At 1.30 a.m. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France.

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## No. 22.

*Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).*

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse viâ Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the

ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

## No. 23.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburg, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

At 7 p.m. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time-limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 24.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 3, 1914 (12 noon).*

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultimatum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject:—

“Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal

to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that,—unless of course exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance.”

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 25.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

ALBERT.

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No. 26.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 3, 1914.*

I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany.

COMTE DE LALAING.

(See No. 23.)

## No. 27.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(The original is in French.)

Sir, *Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 a.m.).*

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view of the menace of France.

VON BELOW.

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No. 28.

*Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at  
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

No. 29.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 4, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, however, given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

BARON FALLON.

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Note enclosed in No. 29.

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying

upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships "Wielingen" and "Wandelaar" is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Government would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to withdraw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

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No. 30.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 31.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 32.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have entrusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague.

VON BELOW.

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No. 33.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

DAVIGNON.



## No. 34.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The German Minister is leaving to-night; you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 35.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality:—

“We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law.

“Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

“Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria.”

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

BARON BEYENS.

No. 36.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read:—

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum presented to the Belgian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich, a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers:—

“Please dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory.

“Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality.

“It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland.

“Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not

be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information.

“Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.”

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 37.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alliance to the said Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.

COMTE DE LALAING.

## No. 38.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal communication according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power.

In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this communication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem possible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power.

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independence and our frontiers.

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation

with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added: "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Germany intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time-limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amazing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said:—

"Although in view of the rapid march of events I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that—unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence—the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal

at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.

Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the question of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

DAVIGNON.

No. 39.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

COMTE DE LALAING.

(See No. 37.)

No. 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French,  
and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 41.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 5, 1914.*

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 42.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, Belgium appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their representatives at Brussels, to coöperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

DAVIGNON.

## No. 43.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to inform you of the sequence of events which had attended the international relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.)

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of attitude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Germany a time-limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brussels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to coöperate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

DAVIGNON.



## No. 44.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

DAVIGNON.

No. 45.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 5, 1914.*

I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 46.

*Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914.*

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian interests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin.

BARON GRENIER.

(See No. 33.)

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No. 47.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 5, 1914.*

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day.

BARON GUILLAUME.

## ENCLOSURE IN No. 47.

*Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris.*

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May 1867, and of Convention V. of The Hague, 18th October 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of the above Convention of The Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of Belgium that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of

392 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN WAR

the Third Convention of The Hague of the 18th October 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to. . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.

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No. 48.

*Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

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No. 49.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 5, 1914.*

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the provisioning of Antwerp.

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 50.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 5, 1914.*

The war buoying is about to be established.

BARON FALLON.

(See No. 29.)

## No. 51.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,  
Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government.

DAVIGNON.

(See No. 46.)

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## No. 52.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to coöperate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

DAVIGNON.

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## No. 53.

*Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 6, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the "Staatscourant," containing the declaration of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Belgium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

JONKHEER DE WEEDE.

ENCLOSURE TO No. 53.

LAWS, DECREES, NOMINATIONS, &c.

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*Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies.*

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by Her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Netherlands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view to the observance of this neutrality, the following dispositions have been taken:—

ARTICLE 1.

Within the limits of the territory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations.

ARTICLE 2.

Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or convoys of munitions belonging to the belligerents, nor is the passage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted.

ARTICLE 3.

Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be immediately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of Articles 2, 4, or 7, will not be permitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war.

## ARTICLE 4.

No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

## ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of Article 4 do not apply to:—

1. Warships or ships assimilated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circumstances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or over-sea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or humanitarian mission.

## ARTICLE 6.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities.

## ARTICLE 7.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the moment of the publication of this declaration.

## ARTICLE 8.

If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different belligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in Article 5, in the same part of the world and within the territory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship.

Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which flies the flag of another belligerent.

ARTICLE 9.

Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which Articles 5 and 7 are applicable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State.

ARTICLE 10.

A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist.

Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize.

ARTICLE 11.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to form a corps of combatants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the belligerents.

ARTICLE 12.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto.



## ARTICLE 13.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.

## ARTICLE 14.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to supply arms or ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner whatsoever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment.

## ARTICLE 15.

It is forbidden, in State territory, failing previous authorisation by the competent local authorities, to repair warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.

## ARTICLE 16.

It is forbidden, in State territory, to take part in the dismantling or repairing of prizes, except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

## ARTICLE 17.

The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude.

## ARTICLE 18.

Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section 1, and 205 of the Penal Code; "Indisch Staatsblad," 1905, No. 62; Article 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality, and respecting domicile ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the status of Netherlands nationality ("Nederlandsch Staatsblad," 1910, No. 55;

“Indisch Staatsblad,” 1910, No. 296; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Surinam; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Curaçoa).

Similarly, the attention of commanding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for belligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other transport services.

Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts, and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government.

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No. 54.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 6, 1914.*

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands Government:—

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

DAVIGNON.

(See No. 50.)

## No. 55.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 6, 1914.*

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you particularly anxious to have Bath?

BARON FALLON.

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## No. 56.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agreement with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the extent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hansweert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

DAVIGNON.

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## No. 57.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at Paris and London.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instructions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim

the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with Article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi.

DAVIGNON.

No. 58.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 7, 1914.*

With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Government the following information:—

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisation in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Government share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of Article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are contained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London [Paris].

DAVIGNON.

## No. 59.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering.

M. Poincaré has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 60.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 9, 1914.*

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so:—

The fortress of Liége has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liége as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has

upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

BARON FALLON.

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No. 61.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Paris, August 9, 1914.*

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

BARON GUILLAUME.

(See No. 59.)

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No. 62.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 10, 1914.*

In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his colleague at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these matters, Herr von Müller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the intermediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation.

BARON FALLON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 62.

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Government's attitude towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any

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compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels.

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No. 63.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

DAVIGNON.

(See No. 62 and Enclosure.)

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No. 64.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word "*Auseinandersetzung*," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dispute between France and Germany.

DAVIGNON.



## No. 65.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See Enclosure in No. 62.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication:—

“The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal formulated in their ultimatum of August 2. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3 her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.”

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 66.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 10, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the departure of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation:—

"Your Excellency,

*"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

"In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg.

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Plötz at Coblenz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except *viâ Trêves-Coblenz*.

(Signed) VON BUCH."

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms:—

"Sir,

*"Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure.

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions.

(Signed) EYSCHEN."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intention towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for requesting the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires to leave Belgium.

DAVIGNON.

## No. 67.

*Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, consented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the protection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

BRAND WHITLOCK.

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No. 68.

*Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

I have telegraphed to Sir E. Grey the German communication and the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow discord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany.

F. H. VILLIERS.

(See No. 65.)

No. 69.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 11, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

(See No. 65.)

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No. 70.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.) *The Hague, August 12, 1914.*

The German text contained a mistake: instead of "*seine Auseinandersetzung*," it should read "*ihre*," and thus be translated "their conflict with France."

BARON FALLON.

(See No. 64.)

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No. 71.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.) *Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.”

DAVIGNON.

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No. 72.

*M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*St. Petersburg, August 13, 1914.*

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at the firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated.

SAZONOF.

(See No. 65.)

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No. 73.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*The Hague, August 13, 1914.*

I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

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His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith.

BARON FALLON.

(See No. 71.)

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No. 74.

*Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 16, 1914.*

In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant.

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer.

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident.

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain.

BARON GUILLAUME.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

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No. 75.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 17, 1914.*

In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Belgian

proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have destroyed the wireless telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of German activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

COMTE DE LALAING.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

No. 76.

*M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies.*

(Telegram.)

*Elizabethville, August 26, 1914.*

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

TOMBEUR.

No. 77.

*Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 28, 1914.*

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Excellency as follows:—

“Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity and inadmissible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele.”

CLARY.

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No. 78.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following:—

“Belgium has always entertained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinction. She has scrupulously fulfilled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she has not been able to accept Germany's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She had been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yielding to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, before appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria-Hungary, to coöperate in the name and in virtue of the



treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of Article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers.

“Germany herself has recognised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests.

“Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suffered treatment in Belgium contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity.

“The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property.”

DAVIGNON.

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No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers abroad.*

Sir,

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book recently published by the British Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited.

DAVIGNON.

## ENCLOSURE 1 IN No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 17, 1914.*

The Blue Book [No. 1] recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs:—

“It appears from what he [His Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already.”

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as an hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the *Moniteur belge* the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transshipped in our port, were in reality only in *transit*. Herr von Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the following day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instructions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as showing

any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 79.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the export of grain, but of grain in *transit*, the goods in question having been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the *Moniteur* of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible convenience, I have, &c.

VON BELOW SALESKE.

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ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von  
Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July concerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE 4 IN No. 79.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. Moreover, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consumption, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, &c., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August.

DAVIGNON.

THE  
BELGIAN GREY BOOK  
(NO. 2)



## THE BELGIAN GREY BOOK (NO. 2)<sup>1</sup>

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### PART I.

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#### No. 1.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, February 22, 1913.*

In the course of the interview which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, formerly French Minister in China and Assistant to the Director-General of Political Affairs, he questioned me on the passing of our military law, its importance, its significance, its object, and its chances of success in Parliament.

I gave a suitable reply, remarking, with all necessary reservations, that the close relations into which Great Britain had recently entered with certain Great Powers did not leave her in the same position towards us which she had formerly occupied, although the existence of a free and independent Belgium continues to be a vital necessity for her policy. Our wish is, if possible, to prevent Belgium from again becoming the battlefield of Europe, as she has been too often in the past.

I added that it was the intention of Belgium to possess an army which should be strong enough to be taken seriously and which would allow her to fulfil completely her duty of safeguarding her independence and neutrality.

“That is excellent,” M. de Margerie replied, “but are not your new armaments actuated by the fear that your neutrality might be violated by France?” “No,” I replied, “they are no more directed against France than against Germany; they are intended to prevent anyone, whoever he may be, from entering the country. M. Poincaré has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violat-

<sup>1</sup> *The Second Belgian Grey Book.* London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915. No English translation was published by the Belgian Government. Title of publication in the original text: *Royaume de Belgique. Correspondance Diplomatique Relative à la Guerre de 1914-1915, II, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 79, Boulevard Saint-Germain; Londres, 18, King William Street, Strand, 1915.*

ing our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back, the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French territory, either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff thought it more expedient, to advance to meet the Imperial armies.

"I cannot," I added, "doubt M. Poincaré's word. I place every trust in his statements, and I am even bound to say that in my humble opinion, and I only speak now as a private individual, it seems to me that strategically it would be more advantageous to Germany to make use of Belgium as a road whereby a blow could be struck at the heart of France not far from the capital, than it would be for the armies of the Republic to go and attack the German frontier in the neighbourhood of Aix-la-Chapelle. But, as I have already said, we are not relying on any balancing of probabilities; besides what may be true to-day may not be so to-morrow, since new circumstances may arise, and our sole object is to prevent, so far as our strength allows, any violation of our neutrality."

M. de Margerie showed sustained interest in our conversation as to the defence of Belgium. I have no doubt that he will repeat what I said to those whom it concerns.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 2.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, April 2, 1914.*

The French Ambassador this morning communicated to me in confidence a conversation which he had had quite recently with Herr von Jagow after a private dinner at which he was the guest of the latter.

During a recent absence of M. Cambon, the Secretary of State for the Colonies met the French Chargé d'Affaires at an evening party and, a few days afterwards, the Naval Attaché, and said to them that Germany and France ought to come to an understanding as to the construction and linking-up of the railway lines which those countries proposed to build in Africa in order that these lines should not compete with one another.

M. Cambon asked the meaning of these overtures. Herr von



Jagow replied that the question was still under consideration, but that he, as well as Herr Solf, thought that an understanding between the two countries and also with England would be very useful. "In that case," replied the Ambassador, "it would be necessary to invite Belgium to confer with us, for that country is building new railway lines in the Congo, and in my view it would be preferable that the conference should take place at Brussels."

"Oh no!" replied the Secretary of State, "for it is at the expense of Belgium that our agreement would have to be reached."—"How would that be?"—"Do you not think that King Leopold has placed too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develop this vast domain. It is an enterprise which is beyond her financial means and her power of expansion. She will be obliged to give it up."

M. Cambon thought this view altogether exaggerated.

Herr von Jagow did not consider himself beaten. He developed the view that only the Great Powers are in a condition to colonise. He disclosed even what was at the bottom of his mind, arguing that in the transformation which was going on in Europe to the advantage of the strongest nationalities, as a result of the development of economic forces and means of communication, small States could no longer lead the independent existence which they had enjoyed up to the present. They were destined to disappear or to gravitate into the orbit of the Great Powers.

M. Cambon replied that these views were by no means those of France nor, so far as he knew, those of Great Britain; that he still thought that certain agreements were necessary for the proper development of Africa, but that on the conditions set out by Herr von Jagow no understanding was possible.

On receiving this reply Herr von Jagow hastened to say that he had only expressed his personal views and that he had only spoken in his private capacity and not as Secretary of State addressing the French Ambassador.

M. Cambon, none the less, takes a very serious view of the opinions which Herr von Jagow did not hesitate to disclose in this conversation. He thought that it was in our interest to know the views with which the official who directs the German policy is animated in respect to small States and their colonies.

I thanked the Ambassador for his confidential communication. You will certainly appreciate its full gravity.

BARON BEYENS.

## No. 3.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

I have the honour to lay before you the information which I have been able to collect on the question of the relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Ten days ago the attitude at the Ballplatz was very warlike. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and his principal advisers used very aggressive language. They appeared determined to give to the *démarche* about to be made at Belgrade a very energetic character and, foreseeing a refusal on the part of the Serbian Government to submit to all the conditions which were to be imposed, they showed no hesitation in admitting the necessity for armed intervention. Already the numbers of the eight army corps to be used for the invasion of Serbia were mentioned, and people talked of nothing less than applying to this kingdom the treatment formerly inflicted upon Poland by dividing her territory between the neighbouring states. It seemed that Count Berchtold intended at one blow to take his revenge for the successive checks which his policy has suffered during recent years. It was the practical application of the theory dear to those who have been preaching for long "that the Serbian question must be dealt with once and for all."

In the inner circles of the Austrian Government there does not appear to have been any protest against such designs, and if the same view had been taken at Budapest it would not have been impossible that the Emperor, in spite of his leanings to peace, should have ranged himself with the unanimous opinion of his advisers.

It is the Prime Minister of Hungary, who has twice visited Vienna, who tried to rein in these warlike ardours. As a prudent and far-sighted statesman, Count Tisza pointed out the great danger which lay in the Austro-Hungarian Government committing itself lightly to such an adventure, and insisted vigorously on the adoption of a more moderate attitude.

Indeed, it seems very difficult not to come to the conclusion that an armed conflict between the Monarchy and her neighbour would contain at least the germ of a European conflagration. It is true that the Austro-Hungarian press, which talks every day of war with Ser-

bia as not only possible but probable, affects to prophesy that the war would remain localised between these two Powers. "We should have the moral support of Germany," they say. "England and France will not be interested in the question, and Russia far from intervening will on the contrary advise Serbia to give us full satisfaction." This reasoning is evidently the fruit of a very exaggerated optimism.

I cannot admit for a moment that the Serbian Government and the enlightened party in that country have any reason to reproach themselves for the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, as many people here allege. On the contrary I am convinced that this unhappy event must have produced a painful impression in Serbia, since people there were in truth very anxious to maintain good relations with Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna, who goes away to-day on leave but declares himself ready to return to his post at the least alarm, declares that the Czar's Government will invite King Peter's counsellors to accept every demand addressed to them in courteous terms, and having a direct bearing on the murder. The same course would be taken with respect to the dissolution of certain societies whose irredentist tendencies are too much accentuated. "But," says M. Schebeko, "we should not allow Serbia to be made the subject of a general attack intended to discredit her."

I have every reason to believe that M. Pashitch will follow the first part of this advice, but that he will show himself very determined if there should be any question of conditions which he could not fulfil legally or which would inflict a direct blow upon the national pride. In particular, so far as the dissolution of societies is concerned, it is worthy of remark that the Serbian constitution, which is very liberal, guarantees the right of association and in addition it is not a few societies only which take the reconstitution of "Greater Serbia" for their political programme, but the whole population of the country cherishes this dream.

What is more, the Prime Minister at Belgrade certainly takes into consideration that the whole of the mixture of jougo-Slavs who inhabit the south of the Monarchy is composed of Serbians, Bosnians, Slovenes, and Croates who are favourable to his cause. The latter, in spite of their difference of religion, are greatly dissatisfied with the régime to which Hungary subjects them, and the great majority of them, in spite of what is alleged here on the subject, extend their full sympathies to Serbia.

Apart from the possible intervention of Russia and the uncertain part which might be played by Roumania, there is in this state of things a very real danger for Austria-Hungary, and Count Tisza's moderating words show it sufficiently. Will his influence prevail to the last? Count Berchtold has just gone to Ischl to report to the Emperor; it seems that the present uncertain situation cannot continue for long, and that an early decision must be taken.

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 4.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

The publication of the ultimatum addressed yesterday by the Cabinet of Vienna to that of Belgrade goes far beyond anything that the most pessimistic anticipations of which I informed you in my report of the 16th of this month had anticipated. Evidently Count Berchtold and Count Tisza, the responsible authors of this sudden blow, have come under the influence of the military party and the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. The result of such a lack of moderation and discretion will inevitably be to attract the sympathies of the great mass of European public opinion to Serbia, in spite of the horror caused by the murders of Serajevo. Even at Berlin, to judge by the Liberal papers, one has the impression that the Austro-Hungarian demands are considered excessive. "Austria-Hungary," says the *Vossische Zeitung* this morning, "will have to prove the grave accusations which she brings against Serbia and her Government by publishing the results of the judicial enquiry held at Serajevo."

Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann had assured us last week that they did not know the decisions taken by the Vienna Cabinet, nor the extent of the Austro-Hungarian demands. How can we believe in this ignorance to-day? It is improbable that the Austro-Hungarian statesmen should have made up their minds to such a step, the most dangerous stroke which their diplomacy has ever ventured against a Balkan State, without having consulted their colleagues at Berlin, and without having obtained the assent of the Emperor William. The fact that the Emperor has given a free hand to his

allies in spite of the risk of bringing on a European conflict, is explained by the fear and horror which he has of regicides.

"What is Serbia going to do?" was the question which the majority of my colleagues were asking this morning; "Will she turn to Russia and beg for her support by telegram?" If she does so, she cannot receive any reply before the expiration of the time-limit in the Austrian ultimatum. Russia will be obliged as a preliminary to concert measures with France and, very astutely, the Cabinet of Vienna has postponed the outbreak of the storm until the moment when M. Poincaré and M. Viviani are on their voyage between St. Petersburg and Stockholm. The threatening tone in which the Austro-Hungarian note is couched is all the more unfortunate because the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, I learn, had recently informed Count Berchtold that his Government would support the Austro-Hungarian demands with the Pashitch Cabinet if those demands were moderate.

To-day a new crisis has begun, recalling the crisis of 1909 after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The best we can hope is that it will not develop in a more tragic manner, in spite of the bellicose wishes of the Austrian General Staff, which are perhaps shared by that at Berlin. The best advice to give to Serbia would be to invite the mediation and intervention of the Great Powers.

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 5.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The situation has suddenly become very serious. It was obvious that an early *démarche* by Austria-Hungary to Serbia was to be expected. But the note delivered on the 23rd of this month by a representative of the Monarchy at Belgrade to Dr. Paccu, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, puts forward demands which are more excessive and imposes conditions which are harder than I had foreseen.

The press here is unanimous in stating that the conditions imposed on Serbia are not of such a nature as to wound her national pride and dignity and that, therefore, Serbia can and ought to accept them. But at the same time the press implicitly admits the

rigorous nature of these conditions, since it expresses only a very faint hope that King Peter's Government will submit to them. Not to mention the humiliating declaration to be inserted in the Official Journal and the Order of the Day to the Army, paragraph 5 would evidently constitute an excessive interference with the internal affairs of the country. It would amount to a complete delivery of Serbia to the suzerainty of the Monarchy.

Certainly, a refusal might have the gravest consequences from the international point of view. It may provoke a European conflict and cause enormous economic losses. In a few hours the purport of the Serbian reply will be known, but it is extremely improbable that it will be of such a nature as to give satisfaction. Besides, King Peter and his Government would provoke a revolution in the country if they showed any tendency to make such concessions. This fact must clearly have been taken into consideration at the Ballplatz, and it also appears as if such hard conditions had only been imposed because it was hoped that they would be refused, because it was wished "to have done with Serbia once and for all."

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 6.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The situation has grown no worse since yesterday, but this does not mean that it has grown any better.

As unfavourable symptoms, mention must first be made of the language used at the Wilhelmstrasse to the members of the diplomatic body: The Imperial Government approves the *démarche* made by the Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade, and does not consider it excessive in form. An end must be made of the murder plots and revolutionary intrigues which are hatched in Serbia. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann would not talk in this way if they had not received orders to this effect from the Emperor, who has determined in the interests of dynastic friendship to support Austria-Hungary to the last, and who is susceptible to the very legitimate fears inspired by outrages against Royal personages.

It should, further, be remarked that the German press, with the exception of course of the Socialist papers, appears to have recovered from first astonishment caused by the Austro-Hungarian note. It plays the part of chorus to the press of Vienna and Budapest, and contemplates coolly the contingency of war while expressing the hope that it will remain localised.

Finally, the view gains ground more and more among my colleagues—and I believe it to be well founded—that it is not so much a desire to avenge the death of the Hereditary Archduke and to put an end to the pan-Serbian propaganda, as an anxiety for a personal rehabilitation as a statesman which has induced Count Berchtold to send to Belgrade this incredible and unprecedented note. From the moment when his personal feelings and reputation are at stake it will be very difficult for him to draw back, to temporise and not to put his threats into execution.

The favourable signs are less evident. However, they deserve to be pointed out. Not to mention European public opinion, which would not understand the necessity for taking up arms to determine a dispute whose settlement is undoubtedly within the sphere of diplomacy, it appears impossible not to notice the general movement of reaction and disapproval which manifests itself outside Germany and Austria-Hungary against the terms of Count Berchtold's ultimatum. The Vienna Cabinet, which was right in substance, is wrong in form. The demand for satisfaction is just; the procedure employed to obtain it is indefensible.

Although Count Berchtold has skilfully chosen his moment to act—the British Cabinet being absorbed in the question of Home Rule and Ulster, the head of the French State and his Prime Minister being on a journey, and the Russian Government being obliged to put down important strikes—the fact that the Austrian Minister has thought himself bound to send to the Great Powers an explanatory memorandum, gives to those Powers, and particularly those of the Triple Entente, the right to reply, that is to say, to open a discussion and intervene in favour of Serbia, and enter into negotiation with the Cabinet of Vienna. If it is done at the earliest moment possible, a great gain in favour of the maintenance of European peace will result. Even a hasty military demonstration by the Austro-Hungarian army against Belgrade, after the refusal of the Serbian Government to accept the ultimatum, might, perhaps, not produce irremediable consequences.

Lastly, the three members of the Triplice are not in perfect agree-

ment in the present dispute. It would not be surprising if the Italian Government should determine to play a separate part and seek to intervene in the interests of peace.

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 7.

*The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that Russia will not permit Austria-Hungary to crush Serbia, to whom, however, moderating advice has been given, counselling her to give way on the points of the ultimatum which have a judicial and not a political character. The Russian Government thinks that the situation is very serious.

BARON DE L'ESCAILLE.

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No. 8.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for  
Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, July 26, 1914.*

What I have to tell you on the subject of the crisis is so serious that I have decided to send you this report by special messenger. The reports which I have committed to the post, with a fear lest they should be read by the German *cabinet noir*, necessarily contained opinions of a much more optimistic nature.

Repeated conversations, which I had yesterday with the French Ambassador, the Dutch and Greek Ministers, and the British Chargé d'Affaires, raise in my mind the presumption that the ultimatum to Serbia is a blow prepared by Vienna and Berlin, or rather designed here and executed at Vienna. It is this fact which creates the great danger. The vengeance to be taken for the murder of the hereditary Archduke and the pan-Serbian propaganda would only serve as a



pretext. The object sought, in addition to the annihilation of Serbia and of the aspirations of the jougo-Slavs, would be to strike a mortal blow at Russia and France, in the hope that England would remain aloof from the struggle.

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which prevails in the German General Staff that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near—*an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share*. Such a war, warmly desired by the military and pan-German party, might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again present themselves for some time: “Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and on the other hand she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The *Wehrbeitrag* has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her military reorganisation. That strength will not be formidable for several years; at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency in guns of large calibre; but apparently it is this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels.”

In the eyes of my colleagues as well as in my own, the existence of a plan concerted between Berlin and Vienna is proved by the obstinacy with which the Wilhelmstrasse denies having had knowledge of the tenor of the Austrian note prior to Thursday last. It was also only on Thursday last that it was known at Rome, from which circumstances arise the vexation and dissatisfaction displayed here by the Italian Ambassador. How can it be admitted that this note, which, owing to the excessive severity of its terms and the shortness of the period allowed to the Cabinet of Belgrade for their execution, is destined to render war immediate and unavoidable, was drafted without consultation with and without the active collaboration of the German Government, seeing that it will involve the most serious consequences for that Government? An additional fact, which proves the intimate coöperation of the two Governments, is their simultane-

ous refusal to prolong the period allowed to Serbia. After the request for an extension formulated by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna had been refused yesterday at the Ballplatz, here, at the Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Jagow evaded similar requests presented by the Russian and English Chargés d'Affaires, who, in the name of their respective Governments, claimed the support of the Berlin Cabinet for the purpose of inducing Austria to grant Serbia a longer interval in which to reply. Berlin and Vienna were at one in their desire for immediate and inevitable hostilities. The paternity of the scheme, as well as of the procedure employed, which are, on account of their very cleverness, worthy of a Bismarck, is attributed here, in the diplomatic world, to a German rather than to an Austrian brain. The secret had been well guarded, and the execution of the scheme followed with marvellous rapidity.

It should be observed that, even if the secret aim of the statesmen of the two empires is not to make the war general and force Russia and France to take part, but merely to destroy the power of Serbia and prevent her from carrying on her clandestine propaganda, the result is the same. It is impossible that that result has not been perceived by the far-seeing rulers of the German Empire. On either of these assumptions, the intervention of Russia would appear inevitable; they must have deliberately faced this complication, and prepared themselves to support their allies with vigour. The prospect of a European war has not caused them an instant's hesitation, if, indeed, the desire to evoke it has not been the motive of their actions.

Diplomatic relations between Austria and Serbia have been broken off since yesterday evening. Events are developing rapidly. It is expected here that the Serbian King, together with his Government and the Army, will withdraw to the newly-annexed territories, and allow the Austrian troops to occupy Belgrade and the country abutting on the Danube, without offering any resistance. Then, however, arises the painfully acute question: what will Russia do?

We too must put this disquieting question to ourselves, and hold ourselves in readiness for the worst eventualities, for the European war, of which people were always talking on the agreeable assumption that it would never break out, has now become a threatening reality.

The tone of the semi-official German press is more moderate this morning and suggests the possibility of a localisation of the war, only however at the cost of the *désintéressement* of Russia, who is to content herself with the assurance that the territorial integrity of Serbia will be respected. Is not the aim of this language to give some satis-

faction to England and also to German public opinion, which, in spite of yesterday's Austrophile demonstrations in the streets of Berlin, is still pacific and alarmed? In any event the *dénouement* of the crisis, whatever it may be, is apparently to be expected soon.

I am, &c.,

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 9.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

As I foresaw, the Serbian Government's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note has been found insufficient by the representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Belgrade. General Baron von Giesl left immediately with all his staff: mobilisation has been ordered on both sides, and war appears imminent.

The very severe terms of the above-mentioned note, the refusal to enter into any discussion upon them, and the brevity of the period given, seem to show clearly that the position arrived at is precisely that which was desired here. It is evident that the action undertaken by the Austro-Hungarian Government had been fully approved in Berlin. Some persons go so far as to maintain that Count Berchtold adopted this course under both the encouragement and the pressure of the German Government, who would not shrink from the danger of a general conflagration, and would prefer now to come into conflict with France and Russia, where preparations are insufficient, whilst in three years these two powers would have completed their military reorganisation.

Yesterday the Austrian papers reproduced a communiqué published by the telegraphic agency of St. Petersburg to the effect that Russia could not be indifferent towards the events which had supervened between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Yesterday, on the other hand, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires made an official *démarche* at the Ballplatz with the object of gaining an extension of the time-limit for Serbia, and received a polite refusal.

These facts in themselves do not enable us to predict with absolute assurance that the Czar will take up arms on Serbia's behalf. On

the other hand, however, it seems very difficult to assume that Russia will remain as a passive spectator of the crushing of this Slavonic state.

At Belgrade, where an unqualified submission would very probably have provoked a revolution and endangered the lives of the Sovereign and his ministers, the object will have been to gain time. It is to be supposed that the reply handed by Mr. Pashitch to General von Giesl made important concessions as regards a large number of the conditions demanded, especially in relation to those referring to the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and the possibility of arriving at a compromise need not be despaired of if the Powers, animated by a sincere desire for the maintenance of peace, made all possible efforts to attain that result. It is highly desirable that this solution should be found. Unfortunately, however, the very resolute attitude of Austria-Hungary, and the support accorded to her by Germany, permit of but faint hopes on this head.

I am, &c.,

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 10.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

The contradictory opinions which I have gathered to-day in the course of my conversations with my colleagues, render it difficult for me to form a precise opinion on the situation as it presents itself at the end of the third day of the crisis. I thought that it would be safest to speak to the Under-Secretary of State himself, but I did not succeed in seeing Herr Zimmermann until 8 o'clock in the evening, and immediately on my return to the Legation (without even leaving time to take a copy of it, for I wish that this letter may go by the last train this evening) I am sending you a memorandum of our conversation.

The Under-Secretary of State spoke to me as follows:—

“It is neither at our instigation nor by our advice that Austria has made the *démarche* which you know of to the Cabinet of Belgrade. The reply has not been satisfactory and

to-day Austria is mobilising. She will carry the matter through. She cannot draw back without losing all her prestige both within and without the Monarchy. It is now a question of existence for her, to be or not to be. She must cut short the audacious propaganda which aims at her internal disintegration, and at the rebellion of all her Slavonic provinces in the Danube Valley. She must also avenge, in a striking manner, the assassination of the Archduke. For that a severe and salutary lesson must be administered to Serbia by means of a military expedition. A war between Austria and Serbia cannot then be avoided.

"England has asked us to combine with her, and with France and Italy, with a view to preventing the extension of the conflict and the breaking out of hostilities between Austria and Russia, or rather the British proposal contemplates a peaceful settlement of the Austro-Serbian dispute so that it may not spread to other nations. We have replied that we desired nothing better than to aid in circumscribing the conflict by making representations in that sense to St. Petersburg and Vienna, but that we would not press Austria not to inflict an exemplary punishment on Serbia. We have promised our support and assistance to our allies, if any other nation puts obstacles in the way of this. We shall keep our promise. If Russia mobilises her army, we shall immediately mobilise our own, and war will then become general; it will be a war involving the whole of central Europe and even the Balkan peninsula, for the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Turks will be unable to resist the temptation to take part in it, one against another.

"Yesterday I said to M. Boghitschewitsh (the former Serbian Chargé d'Affaires, who was highly esteemed at Berlin but who was unfortunately transferred to Cairo; he is on a short visit here) that the best advice that I could give to his country, would be not to oppose Austria otherwise than by a pretence of military resistance, and to conclude peace at the earliest possible moment by accepting all the conditions demanded by the Cabinet of Vienna. I added that if a general war breaks out and results in a victory for the armies of the Triple Alliance, Serbia will practically cease to exist as a nation, she will be erased from the map of Europe. She had better not expose herself to such a risk.

"In the meantime I do not wish to conclude this conversation on too pessimistic a note. I have some hope that a general conflagration can be avoided. We are informed by telegraph from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonow is more disposed to consider the situation calmly. I hope that we shall be able to dissuade him from intervening in favour of Serbia, whose territorial integrity and future independence Austria is determined to respect, once she has obtained satisfaction."

I represented to Herr Zimmermann that, according to certain of my colleagues who had read the Belgrade Cabinet's reply, this was a complete capitulation to the Austrian demands, to which satisfaction had been given subject to merely formal limitations. The Under-Secretary of State replied that he had no knowledge of the reply and, moreover, that nothing could prevent a military demonstration by Austria-Hungary. Such is the situation.

I am, &c.,

BARON BEYENS.

No. 11.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, July 27, 1914.*

I have received your report of the 25th inst. Please telegraph what stage the mobilisation has reached and when hostilities may be expected to begin. Your colleague in Berlin writes on the 26th that in his opinion Germany and Austria-Hungary have taken stock together of all the consequences which might follow from the ultimatum addressed to Serbia and have decided to go to any lengths. We ought to be properly informed with a view to our own course of action.

DAVIGNON.

No. 12.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

Events are moving so rapidly that one must be on one's guard against making predictions, especially too favourable ones, in case they are falsified by facts. It is more profitable to seek to unravel the causes of the present crisis in order to understand its development, as far as possible, and forecast its conclusion.

This is what I tried to do in my report of the 26th July. The opinion which I expressed in the first part of it still seems to me the soundest. I am bound, however, to submit to you to-day a divergent opinion because it comes from a man who is in a position to form a good judgment on the situation, the Italian Ambassador, with whom I had a conversation yesterday.

According to M. Bollati the German Government, whilst agreeing in principle with the Vienna Cabinet as to the necessity of striking a blow at Serbia, was ignorant of the purport of the Austrian Note, or, in any case, did not know that it was couched in terms so violent and so unusual in the language of diplomacy. At Vienna, as at Berlin, they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of the official assurances recently exchanged between the Tsar and M. Poincaré on the subject of the full preparedness of the two armies of the Dual Alliance, was incapable of engaging in a European War and would not dare to launch herself upon so formidable an adventure—disquieting internal situation; revolutionary intrigues afoot; military equipment incomplete; means of communication inadequate; all these reasons must force the Russian Government to be an impotent spectator of the execution of Serbia. The same low estimate is taken, not indeed of the French army, but of the spirit which prevails in Governmental circles in France.

The Italian Ambassador believes that a great mistake is being made here as to the steps which the Government of the Czar will decide to take. According to him, the Russian Government will find itself forced to the necessity of making war, in order not to lose all authority and all prestige in the eyes of the Slavs. Inaction, in the presence of Austria's entry into the field, would be equivalent to suicide. M. Bollati has given me to understand that a European war would not be popular in Italy. The Italian people has no interest in the destruction of the power of Russia, who is Austria's enemy. They need at the present moment to remain quiet and aloof (*se-recueillir*) in order to solve at their leisure other problems which are of more urgent concern to them.

The impression that Russia is incapable of meeting the strain of a European war prevails not only within the circle of the Imperial Government but amongst the German industrials who specialise in the production of material of war. One of these, whose opinion carries the greatest authority, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, has assured one of my colleagues that the Russian artillery is far from being good or complete, whilst that of the German army has never been of a finer

quality. It would be madness, he added, for Russia to declare war on Germany under these conditions.

The Serbian Government, taken by surprise at the suddenness of the Austrian ultimatum, has nevertheless replied, before the expiry of the time-limit, to the demands of the Vienna Cabinet, and has agreed to give all the satisfactions asked for. Its answer has been badly presented, in too voluminous a text, accompanied by too many corroborative documents; it constitutes a bulky document, instead of being in short, precise form. It would appear, nevertheless, to be very conclusive. It has been communicated to all the Cabinets interested—yesterday morning to that of Berlin. How comes it that no German newspaper has published it, whilst they almost all reproduced an Austrian telegram declaring that the Serbian answer is quite inadequate? Is not that a new proof of the inflexible resolution, formed both here and at Vienna, to go ahead, at whatever cost?

BARON BEYENS.

No. 13.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. le Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, July 28, 1914.*

Be so good as to telegraph if measures have already been taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Keep me informed by telegraph of all that you may learn on this subject.

DAVIGNON.

No. 14.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

I take the opportunity offered me of a safe channel to transmit to you impressions which I would not trust to the post.

The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Serbia has been



judged by public opinion to be an event tending dangerously to compromise the peace of Europe. This is the way in which the Cabinet at Vienna responds to the attempts at conciliation made in London and Petersburg; it breaks down the bridges behind it, so as to prevent all possibility of retreat. There is a fear that this declaration of war may be considered by the Czar as a challenge.

Hostilities are bound then to commence, but they might be of short duration, if Germany would consent to use her influence upon her ally, or if, on their side, the Serbs would yield to the advice given them, and would retire before the invader, without giving him the opportunity to perpetrate any useless bloodshed. By occupying Belgrade, without striking a blow, Austria would have at the same time a moral and material satisfaction and a pledge—both which things would permit of her not showing herself too obdurate. An intervention might then perhaps take place with some chance of success.

Unhappily these are only suppositions inspired by the desire to prevent a European catastrophe. But here is a fact, which might possibly influence the measures taken by the Cabinet of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey declared yesterday to Prince Lichnowsky that if a European war broke out, none of the six Great Powers would be able to keep out of it. At the same time the German papers announced that the British Fleet had been put onto a war footing.

It is certain that these warnings will dissipate an illusion which everyone at Berlin, both in official circles and in the press, found a pleasure in creating for themselves. Articles in papers, published during these last few days, even after the opening of the conflict, breathed the greatest confidence in the neutrality of England. There can be no doubt that the Imperial Government had reckoned upon it, and that it will have to modify all its calculations. As in 1911, the Berlin Cabinet has been deceived by badly informed agents; to-day, as then, it sees England, in spite of all the advances, in spite of all the diplomatic caresses with which Germany has been lavish these two years past, ready to go over to the camp of its enemies. The reason is that the British statesmen are well aware of the dangers which the absolute hegemony of Germany on the European Continent would entail for their country, and they attach a vital interest, not from sentimental motives, but from considerations of the Balance of Power, to the existence of France as a Great Power.

The German papers to-day at last publish the answer of Serbia to the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government, with the Austrian commentary. Its late appearance is to a large extent the fault of the

Serbian Chargé d’Affaires; he had omitted to have the document type-written in order to send copies to the press. The impression which it will make in Berlin, where people persist in looking only with the eyes of Austria and where, up till now, with a quite inexplicable compliance, they approve everything which Austria has done, will be practically *nil*.

In your telegram of the 28th inst. you ask me to keep you informed of the measures taken with a view to the mobilisation of the German army. Happily, up till now, we have not to do with mobilisation, in the strict sense. But, as a military attaché said to me yesterday evening, every State before mobilising takes within its territory certain preparatory measures, without exciting attention—recall of officers and men from furlough, purchase of horses for the artillery and ammunition wagons, which are not completed unless war breaks out, preparation of shells, ammunition, &c. There can be no question that these measures of precaution have been taken in Germany. It is no less necessary to keep a cool head than it is to be on the alert. We ought to do nothing rash; to recall, at the moment when desperate efforts are being made to preserve peace, three classes of our army would seem here to be premature, and there is a risk of its producing an unfortunate impression.

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 15.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

I have to advise you that the negotiations which had taken place at St. Petersburg between the Austrian Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs have been broken off for two days. Mobilisation is proceeding on both sides. The rupture appeared imminent, but after a long and friendly conversation, which took place yesterday between the Russian Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a basis has been found for the resumption of negotiations.

COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

## No. 16.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

My reports of the last few days have sufficiently shown that I was not successful in getting precise information as to the intentions of Russia, with regard to which country the Austro-Hungarian press moreover observes, by order, a complete silence. I was wondering whether the Government of the Czar would not maintain an expectant attitude and would ultimately intervene only if Austria-Hungary made what was in their eyes an extravagant use of the victories she was about to gain.

At last, yesterday evening, I succeeded in gathering from a sure source some authentic data.

The situation is almost hopeless, and the Russian Ambassador was expecting at every moment to be recalled. He has made one last effort which has succeeded in warding off the immediate danger. The conversation of His Excellency with Count Berchtold has been long and absolutely friendly. The Ambassador and the Minister have both recognised that their Governments had given orders for mobilisation, but they parted on good terms.

On leaving the Ballplatz, M. Schébéko repaired to M. Dumaine's, where Sir Maurice de Bunsen was also present. This interview was profoundly moving, and the Russian Ambassador was congratulated warmly by his colleagues on the success which he had gained so cleverly.

The situation continues to be grave, but at any rate the possibility of resuming negotiations has been given, and there is still some hope that all the horrors and all the ruin which a European war would necessarily cause may be avoided.

I am astounded to see with what recklessness and at the same time with what egoism people here have rushed upon an adventure which might have the most terrible consequences for the whole of Europe.

I commit this report to a compatriot recalled to military service, and I take the opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, of telling you that, whether rightly or wrongly, the Austrian post has the reputation of being indiscreet. Under these conditions, and in view of present cir-

cumstances, you will be good enough to excuse me if I sometimes find myself obliged to write less openly than I should like to do.

COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 17.

*The Belgian Minister at St. Petersburg to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

On arising this morning at St. Petersburg I went to see the French Ambassador; M. Paléologue spoke to me to the following effect:—

“The mobilisation is general. So far as France goes it has not yet been notified, but there can be no doubt as to the fact. M. Sazonof is still negotiating. He is making the utmost efforts to obviate a war and has shown himself ready for all concessions. The German Ambassador has also, personally, worked his hardest in the direction of peace. Count de Pourtalès called on M. Sazonof and entreated him to use his influence with Austria. The Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to him more than once: ‘Give me some means of doing so: cause some word of conciliation to be addressed to me, which makes it possible for me to open conversation with Vienna. Tell your ally to make some concession, however small, to withdraw those points only in the ultimatum which no country could possibly accept.’ The German Ambassador has always replied that his country was no longer able to give any counsels of moderation to Austria. It is probable that at Vienna it is not admitted that the German Empire is lending to its ally anything but an unconditional support.

“More than once,” continued M. Paléologue, “the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count de Portalès ‘Have you any communication to give me from your Government?’ The German Ambassador was obliged to answer on each occasion in the negative, insisting over again that the initiative must come from St. Petersburg. At last M. Sazonof asked for an interview with the Austrian Ambassador, and told him that he accepted everything, either a conference of Ambassadors at London or the conversation ‘of Four,’ undertaking not to interfere in it, and promising to adopt the opinion of the other Powers. Nothing had any effect; Vienna has consistently refused to discuss: Austria has mobilised eight army corps; she has

bombarded Belgrade. Italy, it appears, is to be expected to maintain an attitude of reserve.

“The Russian patriotic press and the military element are both maintaining a notable calm. It would not appear to be the case that any pressure exerted upon the Emperor by his military entourage has determined the attitude of the Russian Government. Confidence is felt in M. Sazonof. It is the extraordinary attitude of Germany which is preventing the efforts of M. Sazonof from having any result.”

I have also just had a talk with the British Ambassador. He tells me that M. Sazonof had tried from the outset to ascertain the intentions of the London Government, but, up till now, in spite of the mobilisation of the British Fleet, Sir George Buchanan has not yet been instructed to make any communication of this kind to the Pont des Chantres. The instructions of the Ambassador are to explain to St. Petersburg that if Russia desires the support of Great Britain, it must carefully avoid even the appearance of any aggressive step in the present crisis.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian means of mobilisation are much slower than those of Austria. Bukovina is named as the point at which the Russian Army might attempt to enter upon Austrian territory.

COMTE C. DE BUISSERET STEENBECQUE DE BLARENHIEU.

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No. 18.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Paris, July 31, 1914.

I have just had a long conversation with M. de Margerie. He is very much disturbed by the situation. Baron von Schön had promised to communicate the reply given to the overture made in Vienna. He has heard nothing. Nevertheless touch is being maintained everywhere between the chancelleries; conversations are going on everywhere, but without result.

M. de Margerie gave me the following military information, which I telegraphed to you immediately: Germany is putting her army upon the footing of *Kriegsgefahr*; that implies a notable aggravation of the measures already taken. Russia has taken important decisions, in

the matter of its railways. All this does not amount to *mobilisation* in the strict sense, but it comes near to it.

I asked M. de Margerie what the French Government were going to do; he would answer nothing further than that they would not mobilise before Germany, but certain measures might be deemed imperative.

Time does not allow of my writing more. We are being besieged by Belgians recalled to Belgium, by those who seek various kinds of information, &c.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 19.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

The *Neue Freie Presse* of this evening publishes a telegram from Berlin which, coming immediately after the announcement of general mobilisation, has produced a great sensation. It says that Germany has asked Russia for explanations as to the motives of her mobilisation and that she demands an answer within twenty-four hours.

I went to the British Ambassador's, whom I found very much astonished at the double news. He had no information tending to confirm the latter statement. His Excellency had had this morning a conversation with the second Departmental Chief in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the course of which the latter had given him the same comparatively reassuring explanations which Count Berchtold had given the evening before to M. Schébéko, declaring especially that the general mobilisation decreed in Austria-Hungary had no aggressive character against Russia.

The question now is, is Germany in her turn going to mobilise? If that were so, the situation would take a turn of extreme gravity, since this measure would, I am assured, be immediately imitated in France.

At the Embassy of the French Republic the prevailing impression this evening is pessimistic, and the staff are making arrangements with a view to a speedy departure, which appears to these gentlemen more and more probable.

I write you these lines in great haste, in order to be able to entrust them to a compatriot who is leaving for Belgium to-night.

COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 20.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

I take the opportunity of a safe channel in order to write to you and give you certain confidential information as to the latest developments.

At 6 P.M. no answer had yet come from St. Petersburg to the ultimatum from the Imperial Government. Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann went to the Chancellor and to the Emperor, in order to secure that the order for general mobilisation should not be issued to-day, but they were met by the inflexible opposition of the Minister for War and the Chiefs of the Army, who must have represented to the Emperor the fatal consequences of a twenty-four hours' delay. The order was immediately issued and brought to the knowledge of the general public by a special edition of the *Lokal-Anzeiger*. I telegraphed it to you immediately.

The official and semi-official papers, the brief pronouncements of the Emperor and of the Chancellor, and all the official Proclamations which are to appear, will seek to throw the responsibility of the war upon Russia. In governing circles there is still an unwillingness to doubt the good faith of the Emperor; but it is said that he has been got round and skilfully led to believe that he had done all that was necessary for the maintenance of peace, whilst Russia was resolved absolutely on war.

I wrote to you that the Ambassador of the Czar had not received any official confirmation of the general mobilisation in Russia. He was informed of it at 1 o'clock yesterday by Herr von Jagow; but having received no telegram communicating the news to him, he formally threw doubt upon it. Is it possible that Count Pourtalès took for a complete mobilisation what were only preparatory measures of war? Or can it even be that this mistake has been voluntarily made in Berlin? One loses oneself in suppositions.

It was impossible for Russia to accept the German ultimatum, presenting as it did so short a time-limit, one almost insulting, and the obligation to demobilise, that is to say, to cease all measures preparatory to war, both on the Austrian and on the German frontiers, at the very time when Austria had mobilised half her forces. As for the Government of the French Republic, they had no intention of returning any answer to Germany, not being bound to give account of their conduct to any save their allies—so the French Ambassador expressed it to me.

With a little good-will on the side of Berlin, peace might have been preserved and the irreparable catastrophe prevented. The day before yesterday the Austrian Ambassador declared to M. Sazonof that his Government were willing to discuss with him the basis of their note to Serbia; that they undertook to respect the territorial integrity of their adversary, that they did not even cherish any ambition to regain the Sandjak, only they would not allow any other Power to take its place in dealing with Serbia. M. Sazonof replied that on this basis it was possible to come to an understanding, but that he preferred that the negotiations should be conducted in London under the impartial direction of the British Government rather than at St. Petersburg or at Vienna. At the same time, the Czar and the German Emperor were exchanging friendly telegrams. The German Government seem to have arranged this scenario in order to lead up to the war, which they seek to render inevitable, but the responsibility for which they desire to throw upon Russia.

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 21.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

In the course of a conversation which I had yesterday evening with M. de Margerie, he said to me: "The situation is certainly very grave, but it would not be considered hopeless if we could have more confidence in the attitude of Germany. The British proposal, by virtue of which the Great Powers would engage to demobilise under certain conditions, has been warmly accepted by France, Russia, and Italy;



Austria would come into line, but the Berlin Cabinet gives no answer."

The military measures which Germany has taken against Russia are much less severe and less complete than those taken against France. One asks why. I said again to-day to Baron von Schön: "Are you trying to fasten a German quarrel upon us? Relations between the two countries have been good for a fairly long time and there is no incident between us. That being so, why does your Government act in this fashion, if it has no *arrière-pensée*? Why have you yourself been ostentatiously packing up for several days?"

M. de Margerie, to whom I had made the communication prescribed in your telegram of the 1st August (see *First Grey Book*, No. 16), has repeated to me what the French Minister told you as to the intentions of the Government of the French Republic with regard to us.

M. de Margerie said to me yesterday evening that it was part of the programme of the French Government not to decree mobilisation before Germany had done so, but that the neighbour on the East was taking measures which were equivalent to a state of mobilisation without pronouncing the word, and that under these conditions the dangers were becoming too great for them to refrain from acting without delay. "All Europe would laugh at our *naïveté*," said he in conclusion of this friendly conversation.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 22.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to confirm my telegram of to-day:—

"I have executed the instructions contained in your telegram of yesterday. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked me for this communication, of which he has kept a copy and taken note (see *First Grey Book*, No. 16)."

I learnt to-day, by the indiscretion of a General Officer, belonging to the Emperor's Household, that Luxemburg would be occupied to-night. Whether it was a question of the Grand Duchy or of our Province, I was not able to elicit clearly. The Grand Duchy was oc-

cupied to-day. Will our Province be occupied to-night? If the news is official to-morrow morning, I shall immediately protest to Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann. I shall call their attention to the disastrous consequences of such an action, but I shall wait for your instructions before asking for my passports. I telegraphed to you in my state of uncertainty:

“Rumours portending danger to us. I consider that the Belgian Army ought to be ready immediately for all eventualities.”

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 23.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, August 2, 1914.

I had the honour to receive this morning your telegram of August 1st. (See *First Grey Book*, No. 16.) I immediately communicated with the Imperial and Royal Department for Foreign Affairs, and at 1 o'clock, after having read to the Minister the note with regard to our neutrality which you have addressed to me, I handed a copy of it to His Excellency, which he was good enough to acknowledge.

Count Berchtold expressed his astonishment at Holland having also mobilised. He seemed unable to understand what reasons could have induced the Government of Queen Wilhelmina to take this precautionary measure at the present stage.

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 24.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, August 2, 1915.

The die appears to have been cast and the universal war seems to have become inevitable. Germany has ordered mobilisation, and the

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me an hour ago that Russian patrols had crossed the frontier of the German Empire.

The news, which came yesterday afternoon from Berlin, and the article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* have produced a great sensation. The Czar is reproached in lively terms in that he asked the intervention of the German Emperor in favour of the maintenance of peace, giving his word that the mobilisation would not take place, and then proceeded all the same with this operation, whilst attempting to keep it secret. Viennese papers declare that such a way of acting is unworthy, that it is playing the part of a traitor, and it is now proclaimed more loudly than ever that if the war becomes general Russia alone will be to blame.

Following upon the assassination of M. Jaurès, a rumour was spread here yesterday evening that a revolution had broken out in Paris and that the President of the Republic had been killed. The French Ambassador, whom I saw at 11 o'clock, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had received me at 1 o'clock, had had no confirmation of this news, no doubt circulated by those who hoped that the French Socialists would oppose the war. On the contrary, the news has come that France in its turn has mobilised.

Vienna is very much preoccupied about the decision which England will take. From the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, I imagine that, after having kept up their efforts for conciliation till the last minute, the English Government will maintain at the outset a waiting attitude. This is what Count Berchtold also told me to-day.

Public opinion here counts much upon England standing completely out, and the newspapers are continually publishing articles calculated to corroborate this view. I am afraid that on this matter they labour under too many illusions. The Ambassador said to me the day before yesterday: "No one in England can yet say at this moment what we are going to do. We shall be guided by events, but we should not allow France to be crushed without intervening."

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

## No. 25.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

I was received this morning at 9 o'clock by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me: "We have been obliged by absolute necessity to address to your Government the request of which you are aware. For Germany it is a matter of life and death. In order not to be crushed, she has first to crush France and then turn against Russia. We have learnt that the French Army was preparing to pass through Belgium, in order to attack our flank. We are bound to forestall it. If the Belgian army abstains from blowing up the bridges, allows us to occupy Liège and retires upon Antwerp, we promise, not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the life and property of its inhabitants, but also to pay you an indemnity. It is only with the utmost anguish (*la mort dans l'âme*) that the Emperor and the Government have seen themselves obliged to come to this decision. For me it is the most painful one that I have ever had to make in the course of my career."

I answered that the Belgian Government could only return to this proposition the reply which they had made without hesitation. What would you say of us, if we yielded to a similar threat on the part of France? That we were cowards, unable to defend our neutrality and to live in independence. All Belgium will approve the action of its Government. France, in spite of what you say, has promised to respect our neutrality, if you respect it.

In return for our loyalty, you make Belgium the field of battle between France and yourselves. Europe will judge you, and you will have against you England, the guarantor of our neutrality. Liège is not quite so easy to take as you imagine.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when pressed by me, acknowledged that we could not have replied to the German demand otherwise than we had done, and that he understood our answer. He repeated more than once the expression of his grief that it had come to this. "It is," he said, "a question of life-and-death for Germany."

I answered that a people, like an individual, cannot live without honour. I then declared myself ready to leave Berlin with my staff.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not wish to break off diplomatic relations with us.

I said: "It rests with my Government to make a decision, and I await their orders before asking you for my passports."

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 26.

*The Belgian Minister in London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 5, 1914.*

You will perhaps be interested to know the views of the French Embassy on the situation, and I think it is worth while for me to give you a summary of the conversations which I have had during these last few days with Monsieur de Fleuriau, Councillor of the Embassy:—

The French concentration begins to-day, and has been arranged to take place behind the covering troops which are massed upon the frontier. The Generalissimo is absolutely decided, if necessary, to allow the troops of the first line to be crushed, in order to leave time for the army to take up the positions which have been assigned to it in the strategic plan, in which the Generalissimo does not intend to make any modification. Only the event of the British army not co-operating would oblige him to extend the French left. That is why M. Cambon is exerting himself at the present moment to obtain from the British Government a speedy decision as to the despatch of a British expeditionary force to the Continent. This would require from twelve to fifteen days to be in a position to take part in the military operations. Everything is ready, the Councilor of Embassy repeated to me, for the transport of British troops to the French ports, and thence to the Belgian frontier. "But we must act quickly, because it would never do for the British to arrive after it is too late."

M. Cambon, in an interview which he had yesterday with Sir Edward Grey, begged him to note that England had decided to go to war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. "But how will you carry on war," he said, "if the German fleet, as appears very likely, refuses battle and remains in the Baltic? You ought then to send the expeditionary corps to the Continent immediately."

Sir Edward Grey did not answer, but perhaps the decisive refusal of Germany to respect Belgian neutrality will give the Cabinet in London food for thought, and will enlighten it as to German tactics, which consist in acting with an overwhelming rapidity and in adopting the most daring plans.

I learn that Sweden and Norway have promised Russia, France and England to remain neutral.

My telegram of to-night asserted that it was Germany which had declared war on England. This information was first telephoned to me from the Foreign Office and then confirmed by a circular letter. But shortly afterwards the Minister for Foreign Affairs took pains to rectify this version, which represented the matter somewhat incorrectly, and he supplied me with the following communication:—

“A summary refusal having been given by the German Government to the British demand for an assurance concerning the respect of Belgian neutrality, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports, and the British Government has announced to the Imperial Government that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 p. m. on August 4th.”

I have summed up this second version in my telegram of to-day.

I remain,

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 27.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

London, August 5, 1914.

I have handed in to Sir Edward Grey Belgium’s appeal to the three Guaranteeing Powers. Great Britain will naturally answer it warmly. Sir Edward will read to-day in the House of Commons a despatch of this morning from Sir F. Villiers containing the text of that appeal. The fine resistance of Belgium, said the Minister to me, will render easier the task of the British Cabinet with regard to public opinion. Great Britain will help you with all her might. Sir Edward Grey told me that you had asked him to assure the provision-

ing of Antwerp by way of the Scheldt, and that he had for that reason asked the Dutch Minister to come to see him soon, to whom he will explain that for Belgium this is necessary under the circumstances, and that he did not expect any difficulties concerning the free passage of mercantile vessels. In any case the British First Lord of the Admiralty has told Sir Edward Grey that Belgium could rely on it that the British fleet will keep good guard at the mouth of the Scheldt.

I remain,

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 28.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, August 6, 1914.

I have urged at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that French military action should be accelerated. I was answered that considerable forces have already gone; several detachments are already in Belgium.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 29.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

London, August 7, 1914.

I have the honour to confirm the fact that Parliament has voted £100,000,000 war credits and a levy of 500,000 men.

The French and Russian Ambassadors have come to congratulate the King's Minister on the heroic conduct of the Belgian Army, which, by delaying the advance of the Germans, compelled them to modify their original plans, and allowed the enemies of Germany time to concentrate their forces for the general defence.

The despatch of the Expeditionary Force is being actively prepared. The first transports with provisions and ammunition will leave for France on Sunday, August 9th. The troops will then be

embarked, and it is expected that by the end of next week, that is, about August 15th, the 100,000 men of the Expeditionary Force will assemble on French soil; according to what I have been told by the French Ambassador the landing is to be effected at four different points, after which the troops are to be assembled.

The Prime Minister analysed yesterday in the House of Commons the Blue Book which I had the honour to send you on August 6th. He has branded the insidious proposals made to Great Britain by Germany with a view to obtaining her neutrality.

"Besides matters concerning France and Holland," said Mr. Asquith, "they wanted us to barter away to the Imperial Government our obligations towards Belgium, and that without her knowledge. Had we accepted those *infamous* proposals, what reply could we have given to-day to the moving appeal which that country has addressed to us, when she asked us in these last few days to guarantee her neutrality? I do not envy the man who can read with an unmoved heart the appeal of the King of the Belgians to his people. Sir, Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. Had we listened to Germany and betrayed our friends and our duty, what would now be our position? In return for our dishonour we would have received promises from a Power which not only has violated its own promises but asks you to do the same. We are going to fight, first of all in order to fulfil our international obligations, secondly in defence of the small nations. The country will understand that our cause is just, and I ask the House to vote a credit of £100,000,000 and to increase the army to 500,000 men."

The House voted the war credits and the men in the same sitting. Public opinion has moved at last and the change has come in a most startling way. Europe had realised that a small nation has given an example of honour and honesty without considering the consequences. The adherents of peace at any price were beaten. Then, people learned that the enemy had crossed the frontier, that fighting had begun, and that the Belgians had resisted the German colossus. The speech of our King was read, everyone at last realised the seriousness of the situation, and even the most pacific Englishman has scrutinised his conscience. He said to himself, "Can we abandon a nation which gives us such an example of loyalty?" Then came the news of the German atrocities and of the heroic defence of Liège. That was decisive. The whole of England asked for war, and was no longer satisfied with the naval support which the Cabinet favoured at first. The sending of the Expeditionary Force was demanded. The Government



waited to be given that order by the people. It obeyed. Two Ministers who differed resigned office, and their resignations were immediately accepted. Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and mobilisation was ordered.

To-day the admiration of this country for Belgium has no limit. In the military clubs the health of the brave Belgians is drunk, newspapers of all shades praise our nation. We are receiving numbers of congratulatory letters and telegrams. If the King came over here, he would be carried in triumph through the streets of London.

I have opened a subscription for the families of the Belgian soldiers, and for the sick and wounded of our army; Her Grace the Duchess of Vendôme is its Honourary President, and I shall hold the funds at your disposal.

I am, &c.,

COMTE DE LALAING.

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No. 30.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Paris, August 8, 1914.*

The President of the Republic has done me the honour to announce that he conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liège. I thought this a good opportunity for seeing him, and have asked for an interview in order to thank him. He received me and the interview lasted three-quarters of an hour, and only ended when the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked to speak to him.

He did not want to accept my thanks, declaring that it was he who had to thank me and to congratulate me. I did not hide from him my view that France owed to us the value of four days' delay in the German mobilisation. He is convinced of that. I pass over all the flattering things which he said to me about our country and our valiant army.

The French army is in Belgium; but those are only the vanguard; before four days are passed the bulk of the French army will be at our side. He expects that the French army has already joined battle with the Germans on our territory. The English will also be soon at the front; they need about four more days. A hundred thousand men will land and will be joined by another fifty thousand.

BARON GUILLAUME.

No. 31.

*The Belgian Minister at Paris to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 19, 1914.*

The day before yesterday I asked for and obtained an interview with the President of the Republic to thank him for having conferred the Legion of Honour on the town of Liège. I have sent you account of that interview. I could not take a similar step to-day on the occasion of the Military Cross being conferred on the King. I, therefore, abstained.

M. de Margerie has just told me that the Austrian Ambassador will leave Paris to-night. It is not yet announced, in order to avoid demonstrations. M. Doumergue told him during the day that as the explanations given by his Government concerning the movements of troops towards the French frontier were not considered satisfactory, M. Dumaine had received orders to return to Paris. Count Szeesen answered that, in these circumstances, he asked for his passports.

BARON GUILLAUME.

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No. 32.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please communicate the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The necessities of the defence of Antwerp give the military authorities an incontestable right to remove strangers from the fortified district. A great number of foreigners and even of nationals have consequently been asked to leave the place where Austrian and Hungarian subjects have been able to remain. Nevertheless, the Consul-General did not telegraph on the subject either to the Austro-Hungarian Minister or to me. I am told by the Military Governor of Antwerp that the Consul-General was warned to be prepared to leave the fortified district (but not Belgium), just as were his compatriots in his district.

At his own request he was conducted to the Dutch frontier, and he was accompanied by an officer whom he thanked."

DAVIGNON.

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No. 33.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

Vienna, August 18, 1914.

I had the honour to speak to Count Forgach about the alleged hardship inflicted on Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium. Our conversation was conducted in a friendly manner, and the words of His Excellency can be summed up as follows:—

"Our Consul-General at Antwerp arrived here a few days ago. He says that he has been sent in a discourteous manner, and under disagreeable circumstances, to the Dutch frontier, with many Germans and Austrians resident at Antwerp. The military Commander of the fortress seems rather to have lost his head. We have received from our Minister at Brussels a report concerning those events which seems to confirm the statements of Herr von Sponer."

I think that the regrettable incident can, fortunately, be considered as closed.

COMTE ERREMBULT DE DUDZEELE.

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No. 34.

*Monsieur Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

(Telegraphic.)

August 21, 1914.

The British Minister has been authorised to make the following declaration to the King:—

"His Majesty's Government will give during the war all possible military support to Belgium and, after the war, its diplomatic support. The example of patriotism given by the Belgians has impressed us all and will never be forgotten. At the

conclusion of peace, the Government will do its best to get for Belgium compensation for the sufferings through which she had passed.”

DAVIGNON.

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No. 35.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Minister at Vienna.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, August 22, 1914.*

All measures have been taken to secure that no Austrian subject should be molested. The President of the Council has himself asked the Austrian Minister to let him know of any regrettable incident so that the guilty might be punished.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 36.

*The Russian Minister in Belgium to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Antwerp, August 27, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you of the following:—

“His Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to order me to declare to His Majesty the King that at the end of the war, Belgium may count on the fullest diplomatic support of Russia.”

PRINCE KOUDACHEFF.

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No. 37.

*The Belgian Minister at London to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*London, August 28, 1914.*

The day before yesterday, Mr. Asquith announced to the House of Commons that at the next sitting an address to His Majesty the

King will be moved, asking him to transmit to the King of the Belgians the sentiments of sympathy and admiration with which the House has been inspired by the heroic resistance offered by the Belgian army and nation to the brutal invasion of its territory, and the assurance that Great Britain was determined to support by every means the efforts of Belgium to defend her independence and the public law of Europe.

Yesterday, in fact, Mr. Asquith delivered a speech in the House in which he rendered signal homage to the Belgian King and Nation. Never has similar praise of a foreign State been heard in the English Parliament. The Prime Minister added that Belgium can count on Great Britain to the very end.

Mr. Bonar Law, in the name of the Opposition, and Mr. Redmond, in the name of the Irish Nationalists, spoke in the same sense.

In the House of Lords, the Marquis of Crewe, in the name of the Government, and Lord Lansdowne, as spokesman of the Unionists, warmly praised Belgium and her King.

Time does not allow me to sum up these speeches, the tribute of England's gratitude to a country which has rendered an inestimable service to Great Britain and to the whole of Europe.

COUNT DE LALAING.

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No. 38.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Koudacheff,  
Russian Minister in Belgium.*

Sir,

*Antwerp, August 29, 1914.*

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 27th, in which Your Excellency kindly informed me that His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, had asked Your Excellency to assure my august Sovereign that, after the war, Belgium will be able to count on the diplomatic support of His Government.

I thank Your Excellency for that gracious communication.

DAVIGNON.

No. 39.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir, *Antwerp, August 29, 1915.*

Under date of August 26th, the Vice-Governor of Katanga telegraphed to the Minister for the Colonies that on August 22nd the Germans attacked the harbour of Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake Tanganika.

My colleague, M. Renkin, addressed, on August 28th, the following instructions to M. Tonbeur:

“In view of the direct attacks by the Germans against the colony of the Belgian Congo, and specially against the harbour of Lukuga, the Government instructs you to take all necessary military measures for the defence of Belgian territory.

“You may therefore authorise the entry of British troops into Belgian territory, accept the offer of a free passage for Belgian troops into Rhodesia, and undertake in coöperation with British troops, or by means of Belgian troops alone, any offensive action required for the defence of the integrity of our colonial territory.

“Identical instructions have been addressed to the Governor-General of the Congo, at Boma, regarding a possible coöperation with the French troops on our frontier in the Basin of the Ubanghi for similar defensive measures.”

I have communicated to the ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia the telegram of the Vice-Governor of Katanga and the answer sent to him.

DAVIGNON.

(Cf. *First Grey Book*, No. 57.)

No. 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.) *Antwerp, August 30, 1914.*

The Viennese newspapers, especially the *Neue Freie Presse*, publish alleged accounts by German and Austrian subjects expelled from

Belgium, stating that our population committed the greatest atrocities against them under the eyes of the Belgian authorities. A man called Weber is alleged to have been massacred by the mob at Antwerp, whilst at Ostend the baker Bichof is alleged to have been beaten to death, and his hands and feet cut off.

The Government protest indignantly against these accusations, and formally deny that outrages were committed on the persons of German or Austro-Hungarian subjects. With the exception of the breaking of the furniture of some coffee-houses, the perpetrators of which have been severely punished, no German or Austrian property has been damaged.

Please ask the Spanish Government to transmit our protest to the Austro-Hungarian Government.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 41.

*The Belgian Minister at Luxembourg to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Antwerp, August 30, 1914.*

You asked me for an account of the conditions under which I was obliged to leave my post at Luxemburg, although the most friendly relations still existed between the Grand Duchy and Belgium.

On Saturday, August 8th, at 3 P. M., M. Eyschen came himself to hand to me the letter of which I enclose a copy, together with a copy of a letter which he had received from Herr von Buch, the German Minister (see *First Grey Book*, No. 66).

Saying how much he regretted to have to perform such a mission, the Minister of State asked me to let him know my intentions as soon as possible.

I immediately addressed to His Excellency the answer given below:

Sir,

*Luxemburg, August 8, 1914.*

"Your Excellency has just given me notice that the German military authorities demand my departure.

"Whatever the courtesy with which the communication was de-

livered, I must bow before a wish which is nothing but the expression of force.

"Your Excellency's letter says that the military authorities advise me to travel by railway rather than by motor-car. I conform to that suggestion, and I am prepared to leave Luxemburg to-morrow, at the hour which will be indicated to me, and to go by train to Coblenz, provided, however, that from there I may be authorised to return immediately to Belgium by whatever route may seem possible, and that diplomatic immunities be guaranteed to me whilst on the territory of the Empire.

"I cannot cease to take an interest in the fate and security of the numerous Belgians who inhabit the Grand Duchy, and I ask Your Excellency kindly to take measures for their protection, as well as for care of the building of the Legation.

"It is especially painful for me to have to leave the territory of Luxembourg without having offered my most respectful homage to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess in acknowledgment of the kind reception which the Sovereign to whom I had the honour of being accredited has always been pleased to give to me. I hope that Your Excellency will kindly express my regrets.

"Taking the opportunity of repeating to you, Sir, my most sincere thanks for the very friendly way in which you have, in all circumstances, been at pains to facilitate my mission,

"I remain, &c.,

"COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY."

Having again seen Herr von Buch, M. Eyschen came back to tell me that the Officer then Commanding Luxembourg could not give any undertaking except for the journey from Luxemburg to Coblenz, and that in that town it would fall to General von Ploetz to instruct me as to what I shall have to do. Such an answer did not seem satisfactory to me, and I declared that under these circumstances I would remain at my post whatever should happen.

Thereupon it was decided to ask at Berlin for instructions.

On Sunday, August 9th, at 9.30 A. M., M. Eyschen came personally and brought me a passport conforming entirely to the wishes which I had expressed. It was signed by the German Minister, and by the General Commanding the 8th Army Corps. A saloon carriage was put at my disposal, and the train which I was asked to take was to leave at 12.18 P. M.

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess kindly sent to the sta-



tion her Chamberlain and Secretary, M. de Colnet d'Huart, to bid me farewell; he told me that he was sent to transmit to me as well as to my wife the farewell of the Grand Duchess, and to assure me of the very sincere way in which Her Royal Highness sympathised with our feelings. There were also at the station M. Eyschen and Major van Dyck, A.D.C. of the Grand Duchess and commander of the armed forces.

The line being blocked by military trains, the journey proceeded slowly, but without any incident. At Trèves, an A.D.C. of the General commanding the town came to ask me very politely whether I had any wish to express. The same happened at Coblenz. I was brought by a special train to Granemburg, the last station of the German railway system on the line Clève-Nimegue.

I remain, &c.,  
COMTE F. VAN DEN STEEN DE JEHAY.

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No. 42.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Heads of Belgian Missions abroad.*

Sir, *Antwerp, September 4, 1914.*

The German and Austrian press is spreading through the whole world the most misleading rumours concerning the attitude of the population of our large towns towards the German and Austrian subjects resident in Belgium at the beginning of the present war. A considerable number of them are said to have been molested, women and children to have suffered the worst outrages; at the cemetery of Antwerp the German graves are said to have been plundered.

The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, after having published these alleged acts of hostility on the part of our population in the official and semi-official press, have invoked them as a justification, the one for the atrocities committed by the German troops in our country, the other for its declaration of war against Belgium.

In order to throw full light on those allegations the Royal Government has ordered the most minute enquiry into the subject and this has been carried out with the greatest impartiality by the Court of First Instance at Antwerp.

You will find enclosed the report addressed by the *Procureur du*

*Roi* on this subject to the *Procureur-Général* of the Court of Appeal.

As you will see, the population of Antwerp has pillaged certain coffee-houses and shops belonging to Germans and Austrians, but it has not committed any act of aggression against their persons and no damage has been committed on German graves, which remain at present as well looked after as before the war.

Please bring this report to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited and communicate it to the press.

I remain, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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*Appendix to No. 42.*

*Court of First Instance at Antwerp. No. 81,909.*

*Antwerp, August 25, 1914.*

To the *Procureur-Général*.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you this report on the events which occurred on August 4th and 5th last, after the population had learned of the determination of Germany to invade our territory, concerning which there recently appeared in the *Kölnische Zeitung* an account wholly at variance with the facts.

At the news of the imminent invasion, the population became very much excited, and its irritation was increased by the fact that German and Austrian subjects had always been treated in our town with the greatest regard and the greatest friendship. The anger of the people was such that in the afternoon of August 4th huge bands of demonstrators began to move through the different parts of the town, singing the *Brabançonne*, and hooting in front of the shops and houses occupied by German subjects.

The demonstrators, among whom were many young people, began by pulling down German flags in various places, including the German school in the Rue Quellin.

Towards night the bands constantly increased in numbers, and soon a considerable number of small retail shops and public-houses owned by Germans were pillaged, the windows smashed, and the furniture thrown into the street and trampled upon.

Certain evil-doers did not miss the opportunity of appropriating the belongings of other people.

The police and the civic guard intervened as promptly as possible and order was soon reëstablished; but the demonstrations had broken out so suddenly, and simultaneously at so many different points, that it was physically impossible to prevent a certain amount of destruction and even some thefts.

Numerous arrests were, however, made, and I felt it my duty to ask for warrants of arrest in all cases which seemed in the least serious. The breaches of the law were made at once the object of a thorough investigation and the guilty persons brought before the competent courts with as much despatch as possible.

I got in touch with the President of the Court of my department in order urgently to arrange for extraordinary hearings, so as to be able to secure prompt suppression.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a complete list of cases sent for trial, both those which have been tried and those in which the investigation has not yet been completed.

In certain serious cases, the Court has rightly considered it its duty to show severity against certain hooligans who were fishing in troubled waters.

For the reason given above it was impossible for the representatives of public force to determine the identity of the pillagers, as on arrival of the police or civic guard, they at once plunged into the crowd.

With the exception which I shall specify below, no one has been beaten or wounded, and all foreigners have remained absolutely unharmed as far as their persons are concerned.

The only wounded are two Belgian subjects who were spectators of one of the demonstrations of August 5th.

At the corner of the Rue Artevelde, a coffee-house leased to a German was attacked by a band of rioters when suddenly five or six revolver shots were fired from the interior of the establishment. A certain Isenbaert and a certain Simons, Belgian subjects, the two spectators mentioned above, were struck by the revolver bullets, one in the right arm, the other in the head; the latter was not a serious wound, the bullet having passed between the skull and the scalp. The perpetrator of that crime was himself also a Belgian subject, a certain Meeus, brother-in-law of the German lessee.

Mr. Justice Denis is charged with the investigation of the case of Meeus.

As to the violation of the cemetery, there is only one cemetery at Antwerp, namely the great necropolis of Kiel, which lies about five kilometres away from the place where the riots occurred.

As appears from the Report No. 900 of the Ninth Section, enclosed herewith, no damage was done to the graves of the Germans or to those of any others who were there buried. The graves of the German subjects have remained completely intact and are still at the present moment kept in repair and decorated with flowers as they have always been.

It ought to be noted that the damage done in the public houses has been, as a rule, only partly to the prejudice of the German tenants. As a matter of fact, almost all these premises belong to brewers, as in most cases does also the furniture of the business part of the public houses. So true is this that several civil actions for damages and indemnities have already been brought by the brewers before the jurisdiction of the Court of my Department.

Attorney-General,  
JACOBS.

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No. 43.

*The Belgian Minister at Constantinople to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Constantinople, September 7, 1914.*

Since I had the honour of announcing to you my return to Constantinople on 16th August, I have addressed to you no political despatch, finding myself without any means of transmitting one to you.

I entrust the present letter to a special messenger of the French Embassy, in the hope that it will reach you.

On my return here, I found the situation very strained. The incident of the "Goeben" had just taken place.

The German Ambassador, all-powerful here, to the extent that the Ottoman ministers fairly frequently hold their Council meetings at his house, used all his efforts to push the Turks into an imprudent step, which might provoke war with the powers of the Triple Entente.

At this moment, Talaat Bey and Halil Bey, President of the Chamber, had just left for Sofia and Bucharest with the object, they

said, of settling the question of the islands with Greece. But the real aim of their journey was to feel the ground with a view to constituting a compact group (*un bloc*), which might engage in war against Russia.

They were soon able to assure themselves that this attempt had no chance of success, and it was at that moment that I had the honour of telegraphing to you that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were beginning to hope that the complication of a war with Turkey would not supervene.

Since then the situation has gone through different phases and more than once has looked dangerous.

Baron de Wangenheim, and especially General Liman von Sanders, are doing all they can to incite the Turks to war, and they have succeeded in creating here an absolutely German atmosphere in Ottoman circles.

A week ago a rupture appeared probable. The Government not only did not send back the German crews of the "Goeben" and the "Breslau," but hundreds of sailors and artillerymen were seen arriving from Germany, to serve both in the naval forces and in the batteries guarding the Straits.

The moment therefore appeared near, when the sense of national dignity would oblige the three Allied Powers to put a limit to the provocations of Turkey. Their Ambassadors then began to prepare for departure, and I had the honour of informing you of this by telegraph, adding that in the event of my receiving my passports myself, I proposed to entrust the protection of the Belgians residing in Turkey to the Ambassador of the United States.

But in consequence of energetic representations made on August 30th to the Grand Vizier, the situation has seemed to clear up somewhat. His Highness is personally in favour of peace. The same may be said of several members of the Cabinet, amongst others Djavid Bey, who sees the abyss into which the finances of the State will be hurled.

Unhappily the power of Enver Pasha is still very great, and he would like to launch the country into the maddest adventures at any cost.

The mobilisation which has taken place under his orders far surpassed in rigour that which took place during the Balkan War. This time, nobody is excepted between the ages of 20 and 45. Requisitions have assumed a character of a veritable spoliation. The military authorities not only require the provisions to be delivered to them

which are found in the shops of private owners or at the Customs House, but also goods of every kind, from motor-cars to ladies' toilet articles.

Numerous boats coming from the Black Sea and going past on their way to the Mediterranean, have been stopped at the passage and unloaded by force.

These proceedings, which the Minister of a foreign Power has not hesitated to term piracy, in a note which he addressed to the Porte, have, as their result, made trading ships desert the Bosphorus.

I learn that the receipts of the customs at Constantinople have diminished by more than 75 per cent. As to tithes, they will amount to practically nothing, according to what I was told by a member of the Council of the Debt. On the one hand, the harvest has been gathered in under adverse conditions, in consequence of lack of labour; on the other hand, the military authorities have seized a mass of agricultural produce, before there was opportunity for the tithe to be levied.

It will be possible for the September coupons of the Public Unified Debt to be paid, but that will probably not be the case with the following coupon, and, for the first time since the Decree of Muharram, a suspension of the service of the Public Debt will be seen, whilst the deficit, according to the British Delegate on the Council of the Debt, will reach the figure of £T16,500,000.

It is not surprising that under these conditions Djavid Bey, as Minister of Finance, is exerting himself to stop the Government on the fatal incline, down which German influence and the chauvinism of Enver Pasha wish to drag them.

For the moment, it is especially war against Greece which is contemplated. As I was told yesterday by an Ambassador, the Hellenic Government are well aware that they can no longer hold without question all that was assigned to them by the Treaty of London. The European situation has changed and they will have to make some concessions. Athens would be willing to make concessions with regard to the government in Chios and Mitylene; for instance, it would be prepared to recognise the suzerainty of the Sultan over these islands. But the Turks, in accordance with their system of bargaining, are now formulating on this head such demands that it seems difficult for an understanding to be reached.

There are, nevertheless, various reasons which lead one to believe at present that Turkey will not decide to open hostilities against Greece.

Turkey could not attack Greece by sea, since England has given it to be understood that if the "Goeben" or the "Breslau" comes out of the Dardanelles, the British squadron has orders to sink them.

As to a campaign on land, that would need the consent of Bulgaria, and certain signs seem to indicate that there is little disposition at Sofia to yield an assistance which might involve the country in grave complications.

All the Ambassadors at Constantinople are, in fact, convinced that a rupture between Turkey and Greece will inevitably lead to a war with the three great allied Powers.

To sum up, the danger has diminished, but it is far from having disappeared. The Powers of the Triple Entente are doing their best to remove it, but German influence may bring things to such a pass that the dignity of the three allied countries will be compromised.

Finally, if war breaks out, this will mean political, as well as economic, ruin for Turkey, since the persons most competent to speak are of the opinion that the Turkish army is incapable of taking the field.

BARON MONCHEUR.

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No. 44.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to the President of the French Republic.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, September 13, 1914.*

The great victory which the allied army has just gained, thanks to its bravery and to the military genius of its leaders, has given us profound joy.

In addressing to you my warmest congratulations I speak for the whole Belgian people.

We keep an unshakable confidence in the final success of the struggle, and the abominable cruelties which our people has suffered, far from intimidating us, as was hoped, serve only to increase the energy and ardour of our troops.

ALBERT.

No. 45.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, September 13, 1914.*

I wish to congratulate you very cordially on the superb conduct of the English troops in the Battle of the Marne. In the name of the Belgian nation I express to you our profoundest admiration for the dauntless courage of the officers and soldiers of your army.

God will certainly help our armies to avenge the atrocities committed upon peaceable citizens and against a country whose only crime has been that it refused to be false to its engagements.

ALBERT.

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No. 46.

*His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Antwerp, September 13, 1914.*

The magnificent victory which the troops of your Majesty have just gained fills us, both the Belgian people and myself, with sincere admiration for the courage of the Russian soldiers and the talent of their leaders. It is with all my heart that I address to Your Majesty my warmest congratulations.

The cruelties which the country is suffering so unjustly do not at all deject it, and its ardour grows at the thought of the innumerable armies of Your Imperial Majesty advancing triumphantly, uniting their efforts to those of the victorious troops of the friendly Powers who are fighting valiantly in France.

ALBERT.



## No. 47.

*The President of the French Republic to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Bordeaux, September 14, 1914.*

I return Your Majesty lively thanks for the congratulations which you have been good enough to address to the leaders and soldiers of the French army. Our troops are proud of fighting side by side with the valiant armies of Belgium and England for civilisation and for liberty. When the hour of remedial justice strikes no one will be able to forget what Your Majesty and the admirable Belgian people have done for the triumph of the common cause.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.

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## No. 48.

*His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, September 14, 1914.*

I thank you most sincerely for your kind telegram and for your appreciation of the services of my troops. I earnestly trust that the combined operations of the allied forces in coöperation with your brave army, whose heroic efforts are beyond all praise, will meet with continued success and will free your much-tried country from the invader.

GEORGE V.

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## No. 49.

*His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the King of the Belgians.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Tsarskoy-Selo, September 14, 1914.*

Touched by the congratulations of Your Majesty, I thank you very cordially and take pleasure in calling to mind on this occasion

that in the present contest it was Belgium who first opposed a heroic resistance to the invaders. The noble attitude of the Belgian people and of its valiant army, led to glory by its King, has evoked the admiration of the whole world. As a testimony of this admiration, which I share with all Russia, I beg Your Majesty to accept the Cross of Chevalier of my Military Order of St. George, which is not given to any but the brave.

NICOLAS.

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No. 50.

*The Belgian Minister at Vienna to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berne, September 16, 1914.*

It was on the evening of August 27th that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, after making use of certain not very lucid phrases as to acts of barbarity alleged to have been committed upon Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgium, announced to me the rupture of our relations.

What was the determining motive which led to this change of attitude in regard to us?

Was it the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Minister of War has placed at the disposal of the German military authorities a certain number of siege guns of 30.5 calibre, mounted on motors, constructed in the works of the "Skoda" Society at Pilsen (Bohemia) and served by Austro-Hungarian gunners?

Was it the desire to have ground for an eventual demand, to be put forward at the conclusion of peace, for a war indemnity?

Was it the feeling that they must satisfy public opinion, which had been strongly excited against us by the extremely violent language of the press?

Was it finally a yielding to pressure exercised by the German Embassy?

I imagine that it was a combination of all these motives which provoked this decision.

I have been assured from a good source that a certain number of the guns, whose manufacture I mentioned in one of my reports last winter, without being then able to give the precise figure of their calibre, have been sent to France and Belgium.

In one of the conversations which I had had with Count Forgach, the latter had spoken to me of numerous Jewish trades-men and diamond-cutters from Galicia having been completely ruined in consequence of their summary expulsion from the *Place* of Antwerp. His Excellency had not concealed from me that certain demands for compensation would be advanced on this head.

The Austrian journals have not only published numerous letters, duly signed, coming from travellers who complain of having undergone bad treatment in Belgium, but they have reproduced all the German accusations with regard to cruelties and atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated by our people during the course of the conflict. It is evidently the disagreeable realisation of the wrong they have committed in violating our neutrality, and the lively desire, if not to efface, at any rate to weaken, the bad impression produced by those proceedings against the rights of peoples, which have prompted this particularly bitter campaign against us.

“We thought the Belgians possessed of a high civilisation and culture, and now we see they are worse than Serbians, worse than the negroes of the Congo.” This is the dominant note. Further, with reference to the violation of our neutrality and on the subject of the political side of the question, the most serious papers, such as the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Fremdenblatt* itself, have published articles containing arguments which are absurd and childish. They could do this all the more easily, because no one was in a position to reply to them, or, at least, foreign papers which would have refuted their arguments could not cross the frontiers of the Monarchy.

Naturally the public confidently accepted all they read in regard to us, and the result was a malevolent and hostile disposition towards the Belgians, which has been shown also in the circle of the Police Prefecture of Vienna. Certain high functionaries of this administration distinguished themselves in this respect. Before the declaration of war had been presented to us, countrymen of ours who had just arrived in Vienna, or those whose immediate circumstances obliged them to pass through the capital, were summoned to the police, were questioned, were watched or interned, either under the suspicion that they were spies, or because they were considered as being of age sufficient for military service in their country. Nevertheless, so far as I know, no grave abuse has been committed and none of our compatriots has been really ill-treated. Thanks to the efforts of our Consul-General with the Police Authorities, and thanks to my representations at the Imperial and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, three

men who had been interned were released, but kept under supervision.

After having announced to me that relations were broken off, Count Berchtold expressed to me in a very kind way his personal regrets, adding that after the end of the war he would be pleased to see me once more occupy the same post, if the Royal Government wished to appoint me to it.

In conformity with your telegraphic instructions I put myself into communication with the Spanish Ambassador, who had already undertaken the protection of Russian and Serbian subjects, and who hastened to undertake the defence of our interests as well.

I also addressed to our Consuls-General and Consuls a circular in which I thanked them in the name of the Royal Government for their whole-hearted coöperation. I told them that they could keep their archives for the time being, while at the same time they were to put themselves into communication with their Spanish colleagues, and I expressed the hope that they would continue, even in their private capacity, to take an interest in the lot of our countrymen who resided in their districts.

Since a faster train service had been organised to the Swiss frontier from the 1st of this month, a saloon was put at my disposal and attached to the train which left Vienna on the 3rd at 10.30 P. M. I left with my daughter and with M. and Mme. de Raymond, accompanied by their three children and a governess. We reached the Swiss frontier at Buchs on the 5th at 7.30 A. M. Free tickets had been handed to us and the transport of our luggage took place under the same conditions.

I am, &c.,  
COMTE ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE.

No. 51.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,  
*Hove (Sussex),  
September 21, 1914.*

I had the honour to address to you on the 4th August (see No. 25) a telegraphic summary of the conversation I had had the same

day with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, after having received the telegram by which you informed me of the ultimatum of the German Government and the reply which the Government had made to it.

The mission which you entrusted to me immediately after my return to Belgium prevented me, as you know, from sending you a detailed account of this conversation, and now that it is ended I am anxious to carry out this duty.

Your telegram was brought to me on the 3rd towards 8 p. m. By the time I had deciphered it, it was too late for me to go to Wilhelmstrasse. I resolved to postpone until the following morning the verbal explanations which it was my duty to demand from Herr von Jagow on the subject of the German Government's unjustifiable action. Early the next day I telephoned to him asking him to receive me as soon as possible. He replied, asking me to go immediately. At 9 o'clock I was shown into his room. The Ministry was still empty.

"Well, what have you to say to me?" These were his first words as he hurried to meet me.

"I have to ask you for explanations in regard to the ultimatum which the German Minister handed on Sunday evening to my Government. I suppose you have some reason to give in explanation of such action."

"An absolute necessity forced us to present that demand to you. It is with mortal grief that the Emperor and his Government have had to resign themselves to doing so. To myself it is the most painful resolution, and the most cruel thing I have had to do throughout my career. But the passage through Belgium is for Germany a question of life and death. She must be finished with France as quickly as possible, crush her completely, so as then to be able to turn against Russia, otherwise she herself will be caught between the hammer and the anvil. We have learnt that the French army was preparing to pass through Belgium and to attack us on our flank. We must forestall her."

"But," I answered, "you are in direct contact with France on a frontier of 200 kilometres; why in order to settle your quarrel did you need to turn aside and pass through our country?"

"The French frontier is too strongly fortified, and we are obliged," he repeated, "to act very quickly before Russia has had time to mobilise her army."

"Contrary to what you think, France has given us a formal promise to respect our neutrality, provided that you respect it too. What

would you have said if, instead of making us this promise of her own accord, she had presented to us the same summons before you, if she had demanded a passage through our country, and if we had yielded to her threats? That we were cowards, incapable of defending our neutrality and unworthy of an independent existence?"

Herr von Jagow did not reply to this question.

"Have you," I continued, "anything with which to reproach us? Have we not always correctly and scrupulously fulfilled the duties which the neutrality of Belgium imposed upon us with regard to Germany as well as the other guarantee Powers? Since the foundation of our kingdom have we not been loyal and trustworthy neighbours to you?"

"Germany has nothing with which to reproach Belgium, whose attitude has always been correct."

"And so, in recognition of our loyalty, you wish to make of our country the battlefield for your struggle with France, the battlefield of Europe; and we know what devastation modern warfare brings with it! Have you thought of that?"

"If the Belgian army," the Secretary of State replied, "allows us to pass freely, without destroying the railways, without blowing up the bridges and tunnels, and if it retires on Antwerp without attempting to defend Liège, we promise not only to respect the independence of Belgium, the lives and property of the inhabitants, but also to indemnify you for the loss incurred."

"Sir," I replied, "the Belgian Government, conscious of its duties towards all the guarantors of its neutrality, can make no reply to such a proposal other than the reply which it has made without hesitation. The whole nation will support its King and its Government. You must recognise yourself that no other reply was possible."

As I urged him to speak, Herr von Jagow, in the face of my persistence, ended by saying: "I recognise it. I understand your reply. I understand it as private individual, but as Secretary of State I have no opinion to express." And then he repeated the expression of his grief at having come to such a point after so many years of friendly relationship. But a rapid march through Belgium was for Germany a question of life or death. We in our turn should understand that.

I answered immediately: "Belgium would have lost her honour if she had listened to you, and no nation, any more than an individual, can live without honour. Europe will be our judge. And besides," I added, "you will not take Liège as easily as you think,

and you will have to meet England, the faithful guarantor of our neutrality."

At these words Herr Jagow shrugged his shoulders, an action which could be interpreted in two ways. It signified: "What an idea! It is impossible!" Or, perhaps: "The lot is cast, we cannot go back."

I added, before retiring, that I was ready to leave Berlin with my staff and to ask for my passports. "But I cannot break my relations with you in this way," cried the Secretary of State; "perhaps there will still be something for us to talk over." "It is for my Government to take a decision about that," I replied; "it does not depend upon you or me. I will wait for their orders to ask for my passports."

As I left Herr von Jagow after this painful interview, which was to be our last, I carried away the impression that he had expected something else when I had asked to see him, some unforeseen proposal, perhaps the request to allow the Belgian army to retire in security to Antwerp after having made a show of resistance on the Meuse and having, on the invasion of the country, formally defended the principle of her neutrality. After my first words, the face of the speaker seemed to me to betray a feeling of disappointment, and his persistence in telling me not to break our relations yet strengthened this idea which I had had from the start of our conversation.

I am, &c.,

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 52.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Hove (Sussex), September 22, 1914.*

In continuation of my report of yesterday, I have the honour to present to you the account of the conversation I had on the 5th August with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I add to it an account of the return journey to Brussels of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin.

On 5th August, in the morning, I received the telegram, in which you directed me to ask for my passports and informed me of the de-

parture of the German Minister from Brussels. I went immediately to the Wilhelmstrasse, where I was received by the Under-Secretary of State, to whom I made known your instructions.

Herr Zimmermann expressed to me, with much emotion, his profound regrets for the cause of my departure. But, he added, the passage through Belgium is an absolute necessity for us—a question of life or death (*Sein oder nicht sein*). Germany must crush France as quickly as possible in order to be able then to turn against Russia.

Herr Zimmermann sought no pretext to excuse the violation of our neutrality. He did not invoke the supposed French plan, alleged against France by the Chancellor in the speech which he had delivered the evening before in the Reichstag, of passing through Belgium in order to attack Germany on the Lower Rhine, a plan to which Herr von Jagow had alluded in his conversation with me.

I replied nearly in the same terms that I had used the evening before in my discussion with Herr Jagow; if France had been ready first and had demanded a passage of us on the same conditions as Germany, we should have made the same reply to her. If, in a cowardly way, we had yielded to her threats, you would not have had enough words of contempt and anger to throw in our faces and we should have deserved them, since we should have failed to keep our word and have violated our engagement to remain neutral, which had been received by the founders of our independence. “You must recognise that we could not have acted in any other way without forfeiting our honour, and you could not imagine for one moment that the Belgian Government would throw itself to the ground before the feet of the German Government and would give up to it the keys of our cities and our fortresses. Have you anything with which to reproach us? Have we not been good and loyal neighbours, desirous of maintaining with you, as with the other nations bordering on Belgium, the most cordial relations? For 80 years no cloud has arisen to darken our relations. And to-day how do you recognise the friendship and the confidence of the Belgian people which is now nearly a century old? By the intention of making its territory the field of European battle and devastation.”

Herr Zimmermann simply replied that the department for Foreign Affairs was powerless. Since the order for mobilisation had been issued by the Emperor, all power now belonged to the military authorities. It was they who had considered the invasion of Belgium



to be an indispensable operation of war. "I hope," he added with emphasis, "that this war will be the last. It must also mark the end of the policy of alliances which has led to this result."

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity and that the Department for Foreign Affairs, since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict, had been on the side of a peaceful solution and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed. To-day, even, it is my belief, contrary to what I wrote you at first, that Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann spoke the truth when they assured my colleagues and myself that they did not know beforehand the *text itself* of the ultimatum addressed by Austria-Hungary to Serbia. A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war. As to the hope expressed by Herr Zimmermann that this war would be the last, it is necessary to understand him as speaking on the assumption of a victorious campaign by Germany. The Under-Secretary of State, in spite of the visible fear which the coalition of his country's enemies caused him, is too good a Prussian to have had at that moment any doubt of final victory.

He was not able to promise me that I should be sent by way of Holland; he feared that the military authorities would have me taken to Denmark. Before leaving the Department I urged upon Dr. Zahn, Director of the Protocol, with whom I had always maintained the best relations, that I should not be obliged to take a route so out of the way as that of Denmark. Herr Zahn assured me that he would do his best and he kept his promise. In fact when Count von Mirbach, Councillor at Law, brought me my passport at 3 P. M., after having expressed to me his regret at having to undertake such a mission, he told me that a special train would be ready to take me the following morning with the English Ambassador to the Dutch frontier.

I had only a few hours left to finish my preparations, to dismiss my servants, and to entrust the archives of the Legation to the care of the Spanish Ambassador, who had been authorised by his Government to undertake the protection of Belgian interests during the war. I recommended the Councillor and the Secretaries to hold themselves in readiness to depart the following morning at 7 A. M., and I appointed the Legation as our meeting place.

On the 6th August at the hour named, M. Peltzer, Major and

Madame de Mélotte, M. Adrien Nieuwenhuys, M. Jacques Davignon, M. and Madame Rothé and myself, accompanied by two Belgian servants, left the Hotel of the Jägerstrasse in motor-cars sent in part by the Department for Foreign Affairs. The roads which led to the Lehrter Bahnhof, where we were to join the train, were guarded by mounted police. There were few people about in the streets at that hour of the morning and our journey did not give rise to any demonstrations.

The special train which was placed under the orders of a Colonel of the Reserve, whose attitude towards us was very courteous, was provided with a dining car. Before our departure Count Botha von Wedel, Minister Plenipotentiary, came and greeted the British Ambassador and myself in the name of the Under-Secretary of State, and enquired if we needed anything. The journey took place slowly on the line Stendhal-Hanover-Minden, with long stops in order to allow the passage of trains full of reservists. At the first stations the population watched our journey without animosity, perhaps because they were unaware of our identity. At Minden on the Weser our identity had obviously been divulged, for an assembly of curious people, mostly women, approached the dining car in which I was chatting with Sir Edward Goschen. They shouted patriotic songs for our benefit, put out their tongues and shook their fists with accompanying words to which we paid no attention.

The German train took the Ambassador to the Hook of Holland, where he embarked for England. The staff of the Belgian Legation and myself got out at The Hague. At the Dutch frontier, which we crossed on the 7th at 8 A.M., we were able to obtain papers; they informed us of the events at Liége. After passing twenty-four hours without any news, in an anguish of patriotism which you will easily understand, the telegrams giving an account of the heroic resistance of General Leman and of our soldiers made our hearts beat with joy and pride. Our travelling companions belonging to the British Embassy warmly expressed their admiration for the conduct of the Belgian Army.

At The Hague we found my colleague, Baron Fallon, at the station, to whom I had been able to telegraph in the course of the journey. He gave us a most cordial reception, as likewise did Prince Albert de Ligne, and brought us the latest editions of Dutch papers filled with news concerning the defence of Liége. Thanks to his extreme obligingness, the two railway companies which own the line as far as the Belgian frontier, without any charge, put at our dis-

posal special trains which took us, one to Rotterdam and the other to Antwerp. We arrived at Brussels at 6 P. M.

In conclusion I am glad to bring to your notice the intelligence and devotion with which I was assisted by the members of the Legation in the course of these difficult days. You know already of the indefatigable zeal shown on all occasions by M. Peltzer. The two secretaries, the Military Attaché and the Chancellor, have rivalled him in calmness and sangfroid. I must give special praise to the courage shown by the ladies of the Legation. It was an encouragement and a consolation to us.

The few hours which were left me before my departure did not allow of my taking with me our Consul-General at Hamburg. He would not have been able to reach Berlin in time, as the line was crowded by military trains. I should have been glad to spare him the fatigue and weariness of returning by way of Denmark.

I am, &c.,

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 53.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

In diplomatic circles for the last three days, a more decided uneasiness has prevailed with regard to the possibility of a declaration of war by Turkey.

The Grand Vizier continues to affirm in the most persistent fashion Turkey's intention of remaining neutral. The Sultan expressed himself in the same way in the course of the audience which he granted yesterday to Sir Louis Mallet.

But, as I was told yesterday by an Ambassador whose judgment in the matter is the less suspect since he does not belong to the Triple Entente, it is no longer the Sultan or the Grand Vizier who governs; it is not even Enver Pasha; it is Germany. She rules with a high hand not only the Porte, but the Army and the Navy, into which she has sent hundreds of officers.

The "Goeben" and the "Breslau" fly the Turkish flag, but the crews have not even discarded their German uniforms. On the Dar-

danelles and on the Bosphorus the cannon of the forts are manned by German artillerymen.

Turkey is no longer anything but an instrument of war at the disposal of Germany, and she will make use of it on the day she finds it to her advantage to do so.

It is true that the Turkish army is much too weak to make any effective diversion against Russia. But Roumania seems on the point of taking up an attitude hostile to Austria; this she could only do after assuring herself of the benevolent neutrality of Bulgaria. Perhaps in Berlin there is a desire to influence the decisions of Roumania and Bulgaria by causing them to fear an attack on their weak side, that is to say, their coasts, which they could not defend against a bombardment by the Turkish fleet.

On Sunday and yesterday the "Breslau" and "Goeben" in succession had gunnery drill in the Black Sea. These goings and comings have helped to raise apprehensions here.

On Sunday morning Sir L. Mallet once more declared quite frankly to the Grand Vizier that if these two units went out into the Aegean Sea the English fleet which is at the entrance to the Dardanelles would sink them immediately.

BARON MONCHEUR.

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No. 54.

*Telegram communicated on 25th September by the American Consul at Antwerp to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

*For Legation, Brussels, Circular 23,*

*September 24.*

At the request of the German Government and on the understanding that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatever to make, you may bring to the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Congo act of February 26th, 1885, relating to the neutralisation of the Colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The note points out that chapter three of this act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation.

BRYAN,

Secretary of State, Washington.

## No. 55.

*Baron A. Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Madrid, September 30, 1914.*

I have not neglected to carry out the instructions contained in your telegram of August 30th last (*see* No. 40) relating to the alleged bad treatment of which, according to the *Neue Freie Press*, Austrian subjects had been victims at Antwerp and at Ostend.

The Minister of State has just informed me that the Embassy of his Catholic Majesty at Vienna has on the 11th of this month handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs the protest of the Belgian Government.

I am, &c.,

BARON A. GRENIER.

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## No. 56.

*Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Minister in France, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir, *Bordeaux, October 11, 1914.*

The President of the Republic summoned me this morning and received me in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said to me in effect:—

“I have during the night and this morning received many telegrams from M. Klobukowski informing me of the grave situation in which Belgium is placed. It has caused me great emotion and sincere regrets. I have also learned that a Cabinet Council, at which General Pau and the English general were present, has declared that in view of probable attacks by the German forces the Belgian Government and its army must leave the national territory. King Albert has expressed a desire to receive for himself, his Government and his Army the hospitality of France. He has named the port of Havre, adding that the Army will continue to coöperate in the joint action of the Allies.

“The Government of the Republic required no deliberation on

this matter, since at the first word we were unanimous in affirming our sentiments of affection and admiration for the noble Belgian people and in declaring that the widest hospitality would be offered to them in France, leaving them their full independence and sovereignty.

"I wish to assure King Albert without delay and I beg you to lend me your assistance in conveying the following cypher telegram to His Majesty:—

" 'His Majesty, King Albert, Ostend.

" 'I am informed of the decision made by the Belgian Government. The Government of the Republic is profoundly moved by it and will immediately take the necessary steps to assure the sojourn in France of Your Majesty and his Ministers in full independence and sovereignty. I am anxious to say personally to Your Majesty how proud France is of offering you, until the hour of our joint victory, hospitality in the town which you have chosen, and I beg you to accept the assurance of my unalterable friendship.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ.' "

The President of the Republic and M. Delcassé have omitted nothing to assure me of their sympathy in the misfortunes which are falling so unjustly upon Belgium. M. Poincaré laid much emphasis on the measures which will be taken in order to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the country.

During the day I had an opportunity of being received a second time by the President of the Republic, who had charged M. William Martin, the Chief of the Protocol, with the duty of going at once to Havre in order to look into the question of making provision for Their Majesties, the Ministers, and the high functionaries of the Belgian State. I had an opportunity of conferring several times with the Chief of the Political Direction. Everywhere I found a welcome full of sincere grief, completely sympathetic and absolutely devoted.

I am, &c.,

BARON GUILLAUME.

## No. 57.

*His Majesty King Albert to the President of the French Republic.*

M. le President,

*Ostend, October 12, 1914.*

I am profoundly touched by the hospitality which France is ready to offer so cordially to the Belgian Government and by the measures which the Republic is taking in order to secure our full independence and sovereignty. We await with unshakable confidence the hour of joint victory. Fighting side by side for a just cause our courage will know no yielding.

I beg you, M. le President, to accept the assurance of my unalterable affection.

ALBERT.

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No. 58.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le Havre, October 21, 1914.*

Please have recourse to the good offices of the Spanish Ambassador in order to forward to the German Government the following telegram:—

Under date September 25th, the United States Consul at Antwerp sent a telegram (*see* No. 54) according to which he was authorised to draw the attention of the Belgian Government to the fact that on August 22nd the German Government addressed a note to the American Ambassador at Berlin referring to Article 11 of the Act of Berlin of February 26th, 1885, with regard to the neutralisation of the Colonies within the conventional free-trade zone. The note drew attention to the fact that this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is disposed to accept such a neutralisation.

The Belgian Government cannot explain how this note, which was sent on August 22nd to the Ambassador of the United States at Berlin, did not reach him until September 25th.

Under date August 7th the Belgian Government put itself into

communication with the French and British Governments to propose to them the neutralisation of the conventional basin of the Congo, and, in the meanwhile, gave to its agents the order to observe a strictly defensive attitude. It desired, in fact, that the war should not be extended to Central Africa.

The British and French Governments could not be parties to this proposal by reason of the acts of hostility which had already at this time been committed in Africa. In particular German forces had attacked British Central Africa and British East Africa.

At the same time the Belgian Government was advised that the German Colonial forces had from August 22nd been attacking the port of Lukuga, on Lake Tanganyika.

The Belgian Government in consequence draws the attention of the Imperial Government to the fact that it was they who had taken the initiative in hostilities in Africa, and had thus opposed the realisation of the desire of the Belgian Government concerning the application of the above-mentioned Article 11.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 59.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

In consequence of the Russian successes the Germans are increasing their pressure on the Porte with the object of bringing about war. The Porte still gives the Ambassadors assurances of peaceful intentions, but pushes forward its preparations for war.

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No. 60.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Constantinople, October 31, 1914.*

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 23rd of this month that Germany was increasing her pressure on Turkey to go to war,



as her armies are experiencing reverses in Poland as well as in France.

Since then events have been very much hastened.

The day before yesterday, October 29th, the English Ambassador came to see me and warned me that according to reliable information troops of Bedouins, led by German officers, had crossed the Egyptian frontier, and that if the news were confirmed a *casus belli* with Turkey would be the result.

But on the same evening we learnt the still more serious fact of the attack on Russian troops and ports by a part of the Turkish fleet, commanded of course by German officers.

According to the unanimous opinion of diplomatic circles the *coup* was prepared and executed by the Germans without the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and perhaps even of the Turkish Naval Minister, Djemal Pacha, with the object of forcing the Government, several members of which had a well-marked repugnance to war, to decide on it.

From that moment there was no longer any hope of maintaining peace here, and I telegraphed to you on the night of the 29th-30th that the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente were preparing for departure.

Yesterday, October 30th, they went separately to the Grand Vizier to demand their passports. Prince Saïd Halim was in a state of extreme agitation and seemed to be in despair at the turn that events were taking. He repeated with emphasis to the Ambassadors that he did not desire war and there is reason for believing that he spoke in good faith.

To-day at 2 o'clock the Ambassadors had not yet received their passports and a persistent rumour was even going about this morning that all hope of some arrangement was not lost.

But this was not possible. To make good the outrage committed on Russia by ships flying the Turkish flag, it was not sufficient for the Porte to make excuses and to disavow the action of the German admiral who was in command. The Powers of the Triple Entente would further require that the German crews and, in general, all officers of this nationality belonging to the German mission to Turkey should be sent back. Now the Young Turk Government, even if it desired to have recourse to this measure of safety, would lack the courage and energy necessary to execute it. It is caught in the German wheel and will remain there.

I have just telegraphed to you that the Ambassadors are leaving

this evening whether they have received their passports or not. The French Ambassador has postponed his departure till to-morrow evening for reasons of personal convenience.

The press has received an order to publish a *communiqué* designed to mislead the public and to make it believe that Russia commenced hostilities. This manœuvre will have been dictated by Germany, and it recalls that which was employed to make France appear responsible for the violation of Belgian neutrality.

Here the city is very quiet. There has been no demonstration against foreigners. There is rather a feeling of consternation which prevails among many Turks who do not share the ideas of Enver Pasha and his chauvinistic followers.

It is probable enough that this fresh war will have no considerable development, at least for a long time. The Powers of the Triple Entente are very much occupied elsewhere and will not make any very great efforts here.

As I have often written, England and Russia, who did not desire any new complications from the East, have here shown extreme patience for three months. But if they could have known that peace could not be maintained it would have been preferable to send an ultimatum to Turkey on the arrival of the "Goeben" in the Dardanelles last August. Since that time, in fact, the entry to the Straits, on the side of the Black Sea as well as the Aegean Sea, has been very much strengthened by new batteries manned by Germans, and by a whole system of mines. And in other respects we must recognise that, thanks to the sacrifices which are ruining the country and thanks to the millions which have come from Germany, the army is much more strongly organised than at the outbreak of the European war.

It is therefore probable that the European fleets will not attempt at present to force the Straits. From this point of view it is very regrettable that in the Russian Black Sea Fleet there is no unit equal in strength to the "Goeben."

I had the honour to telegraph to you on the 30th of this month that in accordance with the instructions you transmitted by telegram on the 9th August to M. Leclercq, I would remain at my post unless the Porte handed me my passports.

In view of the irregularity of telegraphic communications, I thought it advisable to return to this question in my telegram of to-day, and I asked you to let me know by courier if you adhere to your instructions of the 9th August.

I do not think that the Porte will hand me my passports unless the Germans, who, I repeat, rule everything with a high hand, consider that my presence here offers danger from the point of view of information that I might supply to the Allies.

But in reference to this question, I think I ought to let you know that a German who is connected with the Embassy of his country at Constantinople has here evolved the opinion that, the Belgian Government, having left Belgian soil, is no longer considered existent by Germany, and that in consequence, the Embassy, in order to remain faithful to its theory, must prevent the Porte from sending his passports to the representative of a Government which no longer exists.

I should not be able to stay here with dignity if my maintenance were based on such a theory.

I must, nevertheless, add that up to the present nothing in the behaviour of the Sublime Porte towards me indicates that it has adopted the point of view attributed to the German Embassy.

I am, &c.,

BARON MONCHEUR.

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No. 61.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le Havre, November 1, 1914.*

In view of the existing tension you will judge whether it is not desirable, through our Consuls, to advise our countrymen residing in Turkey to go to the coast towns where they will have an opportunity of embarking.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 62.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. van Ypersele de Strihou, Belgian Minister at Bukarest.*

(Telegraphic.)

*Le Havre, November 6, 1914.*

The Turkish Minister has asked for his passports. Notify the Belgian Minister at Constantinople either directly or through the Rou-

manian Government to do the same and to leave Turkey with his staff and the consular officials.

DAVIGNON.

No. 63.

*Jonkheer de Weede, Minister of the Netherlands, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Le Havre, November 7, 1914.*

I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the Government of the Queen has authorised me, in accordance with the request of the Turkish Minister, to look after Turkish interests in Belgium during the rupture of diplomatic relations between Belgium and Turkey.

I am, &c.,

JONKHEER DE WEEDE.

No. 64.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Belgian Ministers in Foreign Countries.*

Sir,

*Le Havre, November 9, 1914.*

The French Government has informed the Belgian Government of the state of war existing between France and Turkey, and in these circumstances the presence at Havre of the Turkish Minister with the Belgian Government became delicate. Understanding the situation in which he was placed by the course of events His Excellency Noursret Sadoullah Bey took the initiative by asking for his passports and by putting Turkish interests in Belgium under the protection of the Minister of the Netherlands.

Under date November 6th I sent to His Excellency the passports which he had asked for, and remarked that, according to the interpretation of the Belgian Government, the rupture of diplomatic relations in no way implied a state of war between the two countries.

The Belgian Minister at Constantinople has received instructions

to ask for his passports and to leave Turkey. The care of Belgian interests in Turkey has been entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States of America.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 65.

*Baron Moncheur, Belgian Minister at Constantinople, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Melin, November 16, 1914.*

On Saturday, the 7th of this month, at 4 P. M., I received a telegram from my colleague at Bukarest informing me that the Turkish Minister in Belgium having asked for his passports, you ordered me to do the same and to leave Turkey with my staff and the officials of the Belgian Consular Service.

Since receiving your communication, made through M. van Ypersele de Strihou, I went to the Ambassador of the United States in order to make all arrangements for the protection of Belgians remaining in Turkey.

On his advice I telephoned to the Porte to ask if the Grand Vizier could receive me. On receiving the reply that His Highness was at a meeting of the council, I sent the same evening to his residence on the Bosphorus a letter setting out the reasons why I was asking for my passports and informing the Porte that in leaving Constantinople with my staff I left Baron de Hulsch and Baron Marghetich, attached provisionally to the American Embassy, to help M. Morgenthau in protecting my countrymen and their interests.

Passports were sent to me 24 hours later in an envelope of the Sublime Porte, but without any accompanying letter.

I left Constantinople on Tuesday, November 10th, at 7 A. M. The American Ambassador sent me his motor-car, and in spite of the early hour, he came to say good-bye at the station. The Grand Vizier had sent his Chief Secretary to salute me on the departure of the train.

My colleague of the Bulgarian Legation having previously warned his Government of my passage through Bulgarian territory, the Sub-Prefect came to salute me at the frontier station in the name of M. Radoslavof. At Dedeagatch the authorities also waited upon me, act-

ing under superior orders, and facilitated my departure in the most obliging manner. From Dedeagatch I telegraphed my thanks to M. Radoslavof.

The French and English subjects at Constantinople, whose protection is also entrusted to the Ambassador of the United States, highly praised the efficient way in which he has taken their interests in hand. He has already shown much energy and decision in this respect.

It is entirely due to him that several English subjects whom Enver Pasha wished to hold back as hostages were able to leave the country. Consequently, I am certain that our colony will be well protected.

The Legation is closed, but I have left the staff of Khavas's, just as has been done in the other Embassies and Legations. This is essential for the protection of the house and its contents. The American flag has been hoisted.

I am, &c.,

BARON MONCHEUR.

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No. 66.

*The Minister of the United States of America to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Mr. Minister,

*Brussels, November 16, 1914.*

I am in receipt of the following telegram from my Government, which I am directed to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge:

"At request of German Government, and on understanding that the department is merely acting as a medium of communication and has no comments whatsoever to make, you may bring to attention of Foreign Office the fact that on August 22nd German Government addressed a Note to American Ambassador referring to Article 11 of the Congo Act, February 26th, 1885, relating to neutralisation of colonies lying within the conventional free trade zone. The note points out that Chapter 3 of this Act deals with neutrality and that Germany is willing to agree to such neutralisation."

I avail myself, &c.,

BRAND WHITLOCK.

(See No. 54.)

## No. 67.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Brand Whitlock,  
Minister of United States of America.*

Sir,

*Le Havre, December 5, 1914.*

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt from Your Excellency of the letter of November 16th, referring to the neutralisation of the Conventional Basin of the Congo suggested by Germany.

The proposal of the German Government, which was dated August 22nd, was notified to us by the Consul-General of the United States at Antwerp on September 25th.

Your Excellency has learned by reading the Grey Book the steps which the Belgian Government has taken with a view to maintaining the neutrality of the Congo. (See *First Grey Book*, No. 57.) You will find herewith a copy of the telegram regarding this matter which I addressed on October 21st to the Imperial Government through the Spanish Government. (See No. 58.)

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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PART II <sup>1</sup>

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I.

GERMAN ACCUSATIONS AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE BELGIAN CIVIL  
POPULATION.

II.

ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF THE FUNDS OF THE HASSELT AGENCY OF THE  
NATIONAL BANK OF BELGIUM.

<sup>1</sup> Sections X, XI, and XVI are the only sections of Part II which relate to the outbreak of the war. The other sections have therefore not been included in this publication except by title.

The translation of Section X is taken from "The Second Belgian Grey Book," which did not contain translations of Sections XI and XVI. These sections were translated in the Division of International Law of the Endowment from the official French publication issued by Belgium.

III.

PROTECTION OF GERMAN BUILDINGS IN BELGIUM.

IV.

BOMBARDMENTS BY ZEPPELINS.

V.

SENDING OF AN OFFICIAL MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

VI.

CIVIL PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

VII.

USE OF DUM-DUM BULLETS BY THE GERMAN ARMIES.

VIII.

EMPLOYMENT OF UNDISCIPLINED AND UNENROLLED NATIVES.

IX.

VIOLATIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION.

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X.

GERMANY ACCUSES BELGIUM OF HAVING CONCLUDED A MILITARY UNDER-  
STANDING WITH ENGLAND.

No. 98.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Rep-  
resentatives abroad.*

Sir, *Havre, October 19, 1914.*

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has recently published an article with the object of gaining credence for the view that in 1906 England had, in view of a Franco-German war, endeavoured to in-



volve Belgium in the Triple Entente. This article has been commented upon in the *Times* of the 14th October.

You will find enclosed a note refuting the allegations of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

I have the honour to request you to be so good as to cause it to be inserted in one of the principal newspapers in the country to which you are accredited.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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Enclosure to No. 98.

*Note.*

The *Times* of the 14th October reproduces a long article from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* commenting on the discovery made in the archives of the War Office at Brussels of a document entitled "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and of a mémoire addressed to the Belgian Minister of War, purporting to prove that in April, 1906, the Chief of the Staff, on the initiative of the English Military Attache, and with the approval of General Grierson, had elaborated a plan of coöperation between the British Expeditionary Forces and the Belgian Army in the event of a Franco-German war. This agreement would probably have been preceded by a similar arrangement concluded with the French General Staff.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* also reproduces certain passages from a report of the Minister at Berlin written in December, 1911, with regard to another plan of the Belgian Staff, in which the measures to be taken in the event of a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany are examined. Baron Greindl pointed out that this plan only took stock of the precautions to be taken in the single case of an aggression by Germany, whereas in view of its geographical situation, Belgium might equally well be exposed to an attack from France or from England.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* draws from this discovery the strange conclusion that England intended to draw Belgium into the war, and at a certain moment contemplated the violation of Dutch neutrality.

We have only one regret to express with regard to the discovery

of these documents, viz., that the publication of our military works is maimed and arranged in such a manner as to give to the reader the impression of the duplicity of England and of an adhesion on the part of Belgium to the policy of the Triple Entente in violation of its duties of neutrality. We ask the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* to publish *in extenso* the result of their ferretings in our secret papers. This would furnish a new and striking proof of the loyalty, the correctness, and the impartiality which for 84 years Belgium has brought to the discharge of her international duties.

It was quite natural that Colonel Barnardiston, the military agent at Brussels of one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, should on the occasion of the Algeciras crisis make enquiries of the Chief of the Belgian Staff as to the measures which it had taken to prevent every violation of this neutrality.

The Chief of the Staff—then Lieutenant-General Ducarne—replied that Belgium was in a position to repel an invasion from *whatever quarter it might come*.

Did the discussion pass these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston, in a conversation of a private and confidential character, reveal to General Ducarne the plan of campaign which the British General Staff would have desired to follow in the event of this neutrality being violated? We doubt it, but what can be solemnly affirmed, and the contrary cannot be proved, is that neither the King nor his Government have ever been invited, either directly or indirectly, to join the Triple Entente in the event of a Franco-German war.

Further, by their words and their actions, they have always shown so categorical an attitude that every supposition that they would depart from the most strict neutrality has been removed *a priori*.

So far as concerns the despatch of Baron Greindl, of the 23rd December, 1911, it has reference to a proposal for the defence of Luxembourg, due to the personal initiative of the Head of the First Division of the War Office. This proposal was entirely private in its character, and had not been approved by the War Office.

There is no ground for astonishment if this proposal had in view, above all, an attack from the side of Germany, since the great German military writers, and especially von Bernhardt, von Schlieffenbach and von der Goltz, spoke openly in their treatises on the Next War of the violation of Belgian territory by the German armies.

At the beginning of hostilities the Imperial Government, by the mouth of the Chancellor and of the Foreign Secretary, did not seek

empty pretexts for the aggression of which Belgium has been the victim. It justified it on the ground of military interests.

Since then, faced with the universal reprobation which this act has aroused, it seeks to mislead opinion by representing Belgium as having been subject to the Triple Entente from a time preceding the war.

These intrigues will deceive no one. They will turn to the shame of Germany. History will testify that that Power, after having bound herself by treaty to defend the neutrality of Belgium, took the initiative in violating it without even being able to find a pretext to justify herself.

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No. 99.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

Sir,

*Havre, 4 December, 1914.*

Germany having discovered a note on the interview which took place in 1912 between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, returns to the alleged Barnardiston secret, and endeavours to show that the aggression of Germany against Belgium was justified because the latter had herself failed in her duties of neutrality by negotiating a military agreement with England.

I have thought it my duty to oppose a new *démenti* to this assertion. You will find enclosed a communication on this subject.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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Enclosure to No. 99.

*Note.*

In its number of the 26th November, the *Kölnische Zeitung* writes:—

“We were compelled to violate Belgian neutrality because Belgium had not observed her duties of neutrality. The truth

of this forcibly appears from two incontestable documents. There is the one published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, proving that there existed between Belgium and England a secret agreement for the coöperation of the military forces of these two countries in the struggle against Germany.

"On the other hand," adds the *Kölnische Zeitung*, "it follows, from the report of the confidential conversation between Messrs. Jungbluth and Bridges, that the English intended to disembark in Belgium, in any case, even if their aid was not solicited by Belgium."

The thesis advanced by the German press thus consists in justifying the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium, on the ground that Belgium herself, by negotiating with England a military agreement against Germany, had failed in her duties of neutrality.

This is a false thesis, contradicted by the facts and by the very documents which the German press cites.

When on the 13th October the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published for the first time the secret Barnardiston document, we challenged it to prove the existence of a military agreement between Belgium and England. This challenge has not been taken up, and the photographic documents which it publishes have no value as to this point. One would seek in vain to infer from them that Belgium had not observed the obligation of the strictest neutrality.

What, in fact, happened in 1906? Colonel Barnardiston, military attaché to the British Legation, went at the end of January to the head of the first department at the War Office, and had an interview with him.

Colonel Barnardiston asked General Ducarne if Belgium was ready to defend her neutrality. The reply was in the affirmative.

He then enquired as to the number of days necessary for the mobilisation of our army.

"It takes place in four days," said the General.

"How many men can you raise?" continued the military attaché.

The General confirmed that we would mobilise 100,000 men.

After having received this information, Colonel Barnardiston declared that in the event of the violation of our neutrality by Germany, England would send to Belgium 100,000 men to defend us. He further pressed the question that he should know whether we were ready to resist a German invasion.

The General replied that we were ready to defend ourselves at Liége against Germany, at Namur against France, and at Antwerp

against England. There then followed several conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the military attaché on the measures which England would take with a view to giving effect to her guarantee.

In devoting himself to this study, the Chief of the Staff only performed his most elementary duty, which was precisely to study the dispositions calculated to enable Belgium to repel, either alone or with the aid of her guarantors, a violation of her neutrality.

On the 10th May, 1906, General Ducarne addressed to the Minister of War a report on his interviews with the British military attaché. In this report it is observed on two occasions that the despatch of English help to Belgium would be conditional on the violation of its territory. Further, a marginal note of the Minister,\* which by an excess of perfidy the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* does not translate, in order that it may escape the majority of German readers, establishes incontestably that the entry of the English into Belgium would not take place till after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

The course of events has sufficiently proved that these precautions were justified. These very natural conversations between the Chief of the Staff and the British military attaché merely demonstrate the serious apprehensions entertained by England on the subject of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium.

Were these apprehensions legitimate? To be convinced on this point, it is sufficient to read the works of the great German military writers of the period—von Bernhardi, von Schlieffenbach, von der Goltz.

Were the conversations of General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston followed by a convention or an *entente*?

Germany will herself furnish us with an answer by a document which she has caused to be published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of the 25th November. This document, which refers to an interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, furnishes a striking testimony that the conversation on the fulfilment of the guarantee by England had had no results in 1912 and was at the same point at which it had been left six years before, in 1906.

No document could justify in a clearer manner the loyalty with which the Government of the King fulfilled their international obligations.

Colonel Bridges is reported to have said that, on the occasion of the last occurrences, as we were not in a position to defend our

\* The note is in the handwriting of the General and not of the Minister (*see* No. 101),

neutrality ourselves, the British Government would have disembarked immediately, even if we had not asked for assistance.

To which General Jungbluth is said to have replied immediately: "But you could not disembark in our country without our consent."

Is there any reason for attaching so much importance to the views of a military attaché which, as we could prove, have never been shared by the Foreign Office? Did he admit the thesis, false in our view although supported by some authors, that, in the event of a violation of neutrality, the intervention of a guarantor is justifiable, even in the absence of any appeal from the guaranteed? We do not know. One thing is certain that the military attaché, when faced with the objection of the General, did not insist.

Was Belgium bound to communicate these conversations to her guarantors? As to the first, Colonel Barnardiston was not authorised to contract an engagement any more than General Ducarne was authorised to take note of a promise of assistance. The incriminated conversations had, moreover, a purely military character, they could have no political bearing, they never formed the subject of deliberation by the Government, and they were not known to the Department of Foreign Affairs till a much later date.

So far as concerns the interview between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges, was it necessary to inform the Powers that the latter had given expression to an opinion which the Belgian Government would not admit any more than the British Government would, and against which General Jungbluth had immediately protested, without his interviewer thinking it necessary to insist on it?

The alleged justification of Germany turns against her. In his speech of the 4th of August, in his interview in the morning with the English Ambassador, the Imperial Chancellor declared that the aggression against Belgium was to be attributed only to strategic necessity. The cause is understood.

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No. 100.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

Sir,

*Havre, 15 December, 1914.*

In continuation of my letter of the 4th December last with reference to the allegations of the German Government regarding an

alleged Anglo-Belgian military agreement, I have the honour to direct your attention to the publication in the *Times* of the 7th of this month of the account of the conversation which took place between Sir E. Grey and Count de Lalaing on the 7th April, 1913.

I enclose, for your information and use, a translation of the English communiqué.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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Enclosure to No. 100.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

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*Proof of British Sincerity.*

With reference to statements implying that Great Britain ever contemplated a violation of Belgian neutrality, the Foreign Office issues for publication the following record of a conversation with the Belgian Minister on April 7th, 1913. It was sent to the British Minister in Brussels and a record was communicated by him to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time:—

“Sir,

“In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unofficially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source.

“The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France.

“I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should

be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

“I am, &c.,

“E. GREY.”

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No. 101.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

Sir,

*Havre, 13th January, 1915.*

In my despatch of the 4th December I had the honour of sending you a denial of the accusation made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* against Belgium, to the effect that the latter country had deviated from her duty of neutrality by negotiating with Great Britain a military agreement directed against Germany.

In this communiqué I said that a marginal note made by the Minister of War established the fact that the entry of British troops into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.

At the time when I prepared the communiqué I had been unable to obtain a copy of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* containing a photograph of this document. I only had before me the German translation of the Ducarne Report made by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and reproduced by the German papers. This translation omits the most important phrase in the document, which says “that the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after our neutrality had been violated by Germany.” It is true that the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in a later portion of its article prints this phrase in French, letting it be understood that it is merely a marginal note. But now it appears, as is shown by the photograph, that the phrase forms part of the Report of General Ducarne, that it was written by his hand, and that its proper place is marked by a reference mark.

In these circumstances it appears to me necessary to call the attention of the various Governments and of readers to the falsification of the Ducarne document by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. I should be obliged if you would be kind enough to obtain the publication of this communiqué, which is in the form of a newspaper article, in one of the newspapers of your capital. It is



unnecessary for you to make it the subject of a communication to the Government.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

Enclosure to No. 101.

THE BARNARDISTON AFFAIR AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has a singular way of perusing, reading, and translating documents. German learned criticism when carried away by the heat of argument loses all sense of cold objectivity. Guided by its desires, it sees, or fails to see; it inserts phrases in the text or excludes them; it transposes or invents.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Barnardiston affair is a remarkable example of this.

On the 13th October the *Zeitung* mentioned the discovery which German searchers made in the offices of the Belgian General Staff, and the Ducarne Report, which sets out the interviews of Barnardiston with certain Belgian officers.

It then stated that this report was part of a dossier (*Mappe*) bearing the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique," and it endeavoured to show that from the details of this report it followed that a "convention" had been concluded between Belgium and Great Britain.

An answer was immediately made that the report and its details did not allow of this incorrect conclusion, that there were interviews but that there was never an agreement.

On the 25th of November the *Zeitung* again took the matter up and published facsimiles of the documents. We no longer hear of the title "Intervention Anglaise en Belgique": a new title appeared. According to the *Zeitung*, which had suddenly become clairvoyante, the famous report had been enclosed in a wrapper (*Umschlag*) with the inscription "Conventions Anglo-Belges."

This second discovery, made just at the right time, and at a moment when the *Zeitung* found itself in a position to make no reply, appeared sufficiently strange. How was it that this inscription which, being placed at the top, ought to have attracted attention at the very first moment, was not seen on the 13th October, and could only be seen on the 25th November?

\* \* \* \* \*

Suspicious people then examined the documents more closely. They compared the photographs and the translations, and it was seen that some of the versions were akin to forgeries.

We understand that the *Zeitung* maintains that the Barnardiston affair was not limited to *pourparlers*. It makes out that there was an agreement, and this is how it goes about to show to its kind readers that it is right.

The photograph of the Ducarne Report contains the following phrase:—

“My visitor (Barnardiston) emphasised the following points: (1) Our CONVERSATION WAS absolutely *confidential*.”

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* has wonderful eyesight. It stated:—

“Herr Barnardiston betonte: 1° dass unser ABKOMMEN absolut vertraulich *sein sollte*.”

It turned the word “conversation” into “convention.” It made Barnardiston say that our CONVENTION *would be* absolutely confidential.

How can it then help succeeding in its claims? Voltaire required two lines to hang a man. But Germany has made progress since then. To curse a people three letters in a word are sufficient. A “conversation” became “convention.”

But that is not all. In the photograph of the official record of the report erasures and additions are visible. When General Ducarne was reporting the suggestions or the first *démarche* of Barnardiston he perceived that he had omitted to mention at the very beginning the hypothesis on which the interview was based. He wrote five lines in the margin, and by two signs he marked the place where the addition ought to figure in his letter.

Alas, this addition troubled the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*! The actual words were “the entry of the British into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany.” What could it do to diminish or remove the effect of this? It was quite simple. In its translation the *Zeitung* does not mention the addition. But to give an appearance of perfect loyalty it quotes it in its comments. This is the art of detaching words from their context.

Subordinates go on to complete and perfect the manœuvre. They

proceed to publish a mutilated text, and so make people think that the addition was perhaps a subsequent note made possibly by somebody other than the author of the report.

And that is how history is written in Germany!

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No. 102.

*M. Davignon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Representatives of Belgium.*

Sir,

*Havre, 13th February, 1915.*

I have the honour of sending to you herewith the completed translation of a note published by the *Times* on the 27th January last, in which Sir E. Grey replies to the explanations given by M. von Bethmann-Hollweg to the American press on the question of the British attitude in the present war and the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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Enclosure to No. 102.

*Sir E. Grey's reply to the Chancellor.*

*January 26, 1915.*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorises the publication of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent:—

It is not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere "scrap of paper." The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the world largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency of civilisation.

What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain, in requiring Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium, "was going to make war just for a word, just for a scrap of paper"; that is, that Great Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He

now asks the American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of Belgium as a mere trifle, and Germany who "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously." The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of plain facts.

First, the German Chancellor alleges that "England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government." This allegation is absolutely false. It is based upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations between British and Belgian officers in 1906 and again in 1911. The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British War Office or Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely informal character, and no military agreement of any sort was at either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations took place between British and Belgian officers, it was expressly laid down on the British side that the discussion of military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium *for the defence of her neutrality*, and on the Belgian side a marginal note upon the record explains that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place *after the violation of our neutrality by Germany*." As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the British, "You could only land in our country with our consent," and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality of Belgium, and that "so long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory."

The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in this connexion. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, "He did not believe England would take such a step, because he did not think English public opinion would justify such action." What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: "I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him, namely, that

Germany was establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract; railways deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality unless it were previously violated by another Power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such communications. In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium having thereby "abandoned" and "forfeited" her neutrality, and he implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a "wrong" had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911. It would seem to follow, that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's code, a wrong becomes a right if the party which is to be the subject of the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist it. Those who are content with older and more generally accepted standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said in his Pastoral letter: "Belgium was bound in honour to defend her own independence. She kept her oath. The other Powers were bound to respect and protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath; England kept hers. These are the facts."

In support of the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that Germany "took her responsibilities towards neutral States seriously," he alleges nothing except that "he spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany" in invading Belgium. That a man knows the right, while doing the wrong, is not usually accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness.

The real nature of Germany's view of her "responsibilities towards neutral States" may, however, be learnt, on authority which cannot be disputed, by reference to the English White Paper. If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously, why, when Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium. The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's colleague. It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon Shakespeare:

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just;  
But four times he that gets his blow in fust."

"They had to advance into France," said Herr von Jagow, "by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible."

Germany's real attitude towards Belgium was thus frankly given by the German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German Chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag, claimed the right to commit a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of "hacking a way through." The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere scrap of paper. The truth was spoken in the first statements by the two German Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant wrong. Moreover, all attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this matter, and all talk about "responsibilities towards neutral States," come badly from the man who on the 29th July asked Great Britain to enter into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his "efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and Germany," an understanding, he added, which would have "absolutely guaranteed the peace of Europe." He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at Cardiff, that Germany required, as the price of an understanding, an unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression against Germany; they were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in case of aggression by Germany. An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have meant an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe; but it would have meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe.

The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British Ambassador in August last he "may have been a bit excited at seeing the hopes and work of the whole period of his Chancellorship going for nought." Considering that at the date of the conversation (4th August) Germany had already made war on France the natural conclusion is that the shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted, not in the fact of a European war, but in the fact that England had not agreed to stand out of it.

The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the

application of which is the more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading facts which produced the present war. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal, which England put forward and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a Conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and honourable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England for peace, why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known, after the Balkan Conference in London, that England could be trusted to play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to England's good faith in those negotiations. The proposal for a second Conference between the Powers was made by Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in 1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.

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## No. 103.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

Sir,

*Havre, March 4, 1915.*

I have the honour of sending you herewith the protest of the Government of the King against the declaration of the German Chancellor that Belgium had abandoned her neutrality since 1906 by concluding an agreement with Great Britain. I would ask you to communicate this protest to the Government to which you are accredited and to give it as much publicity as possible.

I am, &c.,

DAVIGNON.

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Enclosure to No. 103.

*Communiqué.*

“On December 2nd, 1914, the Chancellor of the German Empire declared before the Reichstag that ‘on August 4th we had already certain indications of the fault committed by the Belgian Government, but I had not yet at my disposition any formal proofs in writ-

ing, though the British Government was aware that such proofs existed. Now, by means of certain documents discovered at Brussels, which I have caused to be published, it has become clear how, and in what measure, Belgium had abandoned her neutrality in favour of England. The whole world now realises that when our troops on the night of August 3rd-4th moved into Belgian territory, they were setting foot on the soil of a State which had long ago abandoned its neutrality.'

"Belgium is justly proud of her traditions of honour and correct action, and can not pass over this campaign directed against her honour by a Chancery which has made untruthfulness its regular method, without branding the attempt with a well-merited stigma. Hard though the sufferings of the present hour may be, the Belgian people regards honour as a thing precious and immutable.

"Belgium never allowed her patrimony of national uprightness to be lessened. It was the resolve to keep that patrimony intact which dictated her decision on the night of August 2nd, and the impartial historian will repeat the fact to future generations still proud of their moral integrity.

"There is a campaign on foot to distort historical truth before the eyes of the nations, and no means are too base for employment in it. Once more the Belgian Government must speak out, and so speaking must address its declaration to every land where Right and Honour are still worshipped.

"At the outbreak of the War, the crime perpetrated against Belgium was obvious, and the interest of Germany in avowing it seemed evident—she was trying to exercise a sort of moral pressure on her victim. The violation of international law was avowed by the Imperial Chancellor from the very tribune of the Reichstag. At that moment things went so far that money was offered in compensation for lost honour to the nation that Germany was trying to fascinate! As if honour could be bought back by gold! But 'necessity knows no law'—*not kennt kein gebot*. It was said that every act was permissible—even the act of beating down by a lightning-stroke a nation that it was necessary to crush. Once more the course of war has demonstrated that one initial crime infallibly brings about a series of subsequent crimes.

"No sooner had our soil—that soil whose inviolability had been guaranteed by Germany—suffered invasion, than part of the invading army began to disgrace itself by the systematic perpetration of arson, rape and murder on a harmless people, with incredible details



of cruelties, theft and pillage. And while this flood of unparalleled barbarism was being let loose on Belgium, no act of Belgium could be found to justify the invasion: the spoiler himself confessed it.

“This situation of affairs showed up in a most unfavourable light the Empire which, in order to conquer France, had set itself to torture unoffending Belgium. The moral position was odious, and Germany had to get out of it at all costs. On the one hand the martyrdom of innocent Belgium was disturbing the conscience of the whole world. On the other hand, there were nations which this menacing triumph of brute force exposed to a similar fate, though they had no concern with the War. They were asking themselves, and with good reason, the most agonising questions as to their own future security.

“A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military Attachés and two Chiefs-of-Staff of the Belgian Army. In order to transform these reports into documents which would justify Germany’s conduct, it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could be made to appear decent. And thus Germany, when she had crushed a people that had remained scrupulously neutral, could pretend that she was enacting (though she might not have known it at the moment) the rôle of the minister of avenging justice.

“Undoubtedly this idea had its advantageous points—if it could be successfully carried out. Moral guilt could be heaped upon the Belgian people—a people whose loyal and vigorous resistance had caused the failure of the first plans of the German General Staff. They were in arms for honour alone, and they were to suffer their final outrage: it was not enough that they were sacrificed—they were to be dishonoured also. Thus it came to pass that, with a shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German Chancery gave out that a convention had existed, by which Belgium had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on those ignorant of the facts, German honesty suppressed, when the précis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded had reference only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had already been violated.

“The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German

Chancery the only answer that they deserve—they are a tissue of lies, all the more shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have studied the original documents.

“But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:—

“(1) The report of certain interviews which took place between Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views as to the way in which England could help Belgium in case the latter were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a hypothetical case, *viz.*, ‘the entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.’ The translation in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* of November 25th omits this clause, the phrase which gives its exact scope and significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne’s report contains the words ‘the officer with whom I spoke insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.’ For the word *conversation* the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* substitutes the word ‘*convention*.’ Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that our ‘convention’ would be absolutely confidential!

“Such proceedings need no comment.

“(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation the former observed to the latter that ‘any English intervention in favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression, could only take place with our consent.’ The British Military Attaché raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium, without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel Bridges’ personal opinion only. The British Government has always held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter was a necessary preliminary.

“The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no ‘Convention’ ever made, but also that neither of the two Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no con-

clusion arising from these conversations was ever brought before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.

“The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of them is either garbled or suppressed.

“In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government, faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of infamy—which so far is his only legitimate conquest. It also takes the opportunity of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is obvious, that:—

“(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the smallest size, had entered Belgium. No trustworthy evidence can be produced to contradict this affirmation.

“(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help made by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her guarantors.

“(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for that defence.

“Belgium, the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehoods. She has faith in the justice of the World. On the day of judgment the triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right and Honour.”

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## XI.

### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY SENT BATTERIES OF CANNON INTO BELGIUM BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

No. 104.

M. le Baron,

*Havre, October 20, 1914.*

I would ask you kindly to request the Spanish Legation to transmit the following declaration to the Government of His Apostolic Majesty:

“When the Government of the King replied to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, it was ignorant of certain

facts which would have modified its reply, or rather which would have caused it to take the initiative in breaking off diplomatic relations. It appears, in effect, from a proclamation of the German Lieutenant-General, who calls himself Governor of the fortified city of Liège, that 'the heavy motor batteries sent by Austria have proved their efficiency in the fighting around Namur.' This fighting took place before Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Belgium, which was based principally on the military coöperation of Belgium with France and Great Britain. If the Belgian Government had been aware at that time of the participation of Austria-Hungary in the attack on Belgium, it would immediately have recalled the King's Minister accredited to Vienna. The Austrian declaration of August 28 stated that Austria-Hungary found itself constrained to break off diplomatic relations and considered itself *from that date* at war with Belgium.

"It was therefore during a period of absolute peace, at a time when the two countries had diplomatic relations with each other, that the Austrian artillery attacked and destroyed the Namur forts."

Kindly accept, etc.

DAVIGNON.

(See the *First Grey Book*, Nos. 77 and 78.)

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No. 105.

*The King's Minister at Madrid to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Mr. Minister,

*Madrid, April 5, 1915.*

The Minister of State has just handed me and I have the honour to transmit herewith to you a note, dated February 6 last, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary to the Spanish Ambassador at Vienna, in reply to a communication from M. Polo de Bernabe concerning the Austro-Hungarian batteries placed at the disposal of the German army at the siege of Namur.

The Marquis de Lema adds that this document, which accompanies a letter from the Ambassador dated February 11, reached him after an unaccountable delay.

Kindly accept, etc.

BARON GRENIER.

## ANNEX TO No. 105.

*Note.*

If the Royal Government of Belgium states that at the time of its reply to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary certain facts were unknown to it and that it was unaware especially that previous to the Monarchy's declaration of war on Belgium Austro-Hungarian batteries had entered into action in the fighting around Namur, the Imperial and Royal Government begs to state that when it made its declaration of war on the said Kingdom, it likewise was in a similar situation. At that time, the Imperial and Royal Government had not been authentically informed of the fact that, long before the commencement of the present war and without the knowledge of Austria-Hungary, which was one of the States guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, Belgium had opened negotiations with other guaranteeing Powers looking to the military coöperation of Belgium with Great Britain and France, negotiations which, as appears from documents recently discovered by the German authorities in the Belgian archives, finally resulted in the conclusion of military arrangements directed against Germany. It was undoubtedly these tendencies, absolutely contrary to the spirit and the tenour of the Treaties of April 19, 1839, which induced the Belgian Government to decline the proposals that Germany had made for the purpose of obtaining free passage for German troops through Belgian territory,—proposals called forth by the hostile attitude of Belgium and dictated by the imperative necessity for the German Empire to preserve itself—and thus to force Germany to make war on Belgium. It was precisely by such proceedings that the Belgian Government gave grounds for the employment, in the operations against Belgian fortresses, of the Austro-Hungarian batteries, which, at the beginning of warlike complications, had been placed by the Monarchy at the disposal of Germany. As appears from the foregoing remarks, the Royal Government of Belgium itself provoked the state of affairs which it is now endeavouring to lay at the door of the Imperial and Royal Government. This Government is therefore entirely in the right in repudiating this charge, which is without foundation, and in stating, on its side, that Belgium's conduct has been in contradiction with the duties devolving upon it as a perpetually neutral State.

No. 106.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, the King's Minister at Madrid.*

M. le Baron, *Havre, April 20, 1915.*

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith, the reply of the King's Government to the note of the Imperial and Royal Government which you transmitted to me with your report of April 5.

I should be obliged to you if you would have it transmitted to its destination through the good offices of the Spanish Government.

Kindly accept, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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ANNEX TO No. 106.

In a note, dated February 11, the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to justify the participation of Austro-Hungarian artillery in the destruction of the forts at Namur at a time when Belgium and Austria-Hungary were still at peace, points to the discovery in the Belgian archives of documents revealing an alleged Anglo-Belgian military understanding directed against Germany. It declares that it was these tendencies, contrary to the spirit of the Treaties of 1839, that instigated Belgium to reject the German proposals, which were called forth by the hostile attitude of Belgium and were dictated to Germany in the interest of its self-preservation. Finally, it adds that the employment of Austrian cannon, which at the beginning of hostilities were placed at the disposal of Germany, against the forts at Namur, was due to this hostile attitude on the part of the King's Government and that the Imperial and Royal Government has the right to state that the conduct of Belgium has been in contradiction with the duties devolving upon it as a perpetually neutral State.

The Imperial and Royal Government pretends therefore to justify hostilities directed against us in a time of peace by alleging that we have failed to fulfil our duties in the matter of neutrality by negotiating with England a military agreement against Germany. This calumnious accusation, which is keenly resented by the King's Government, in no way influenced the declaration of war which Austria-Hungary addressed to Belgium on August 28, 1914. As a matter of fact, even though the guilt of the Belgian Government were proved,

the question would still present itself how it could justify an act of aggression which took place two months before the discovery of the incriminating documents.

But the King's Government, which for more than eighty-four years has fulfilled its international obligations with scrupulous exactness, energetically repudiates the charge of the German chancellery accusing it of playing false.

If the Imperial and Royal Government had read the documents found in the archives of Brussels, it would have convinced itself that they did not prove any guilt on the part of the King's Government.

These documents are two in number.

The first is a report from General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian general staff, to the Minister of War on the interviews which he had had with Colonel Barnardiston, British military attaché at the beginning of 1906. These interviews concerned the carrying out of the guarantee by England. In his opening sentences General Ducarne mentions the hypothesis assumed by his interlocutor: "English troops would not enter Belgium until after the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany."

The hypothesis assumed—namely, previous violation of Belgian neutrality—is enough in itself to free the King's Government of the charge made against it by Germany, provided, of course, that the documents be not quoted in part, that they be not made to say what is not contained in them, as was done by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* in translating them.

The violation of Belgian neutrality on the eastern frontier being an eventuality, of which there appeared many threatening indications as early as 1906, the first duty of the Belgian general staff was to study a plan for the assistance, which England, as a guaranteeing power, would send into Belgium, under this hypothesis, to repel a German attack. The fact that this eventuality took place with a brutality that no one would have imagined as possible shows that this solicitude was justified. Moreover, Colonel Barnardiston, a mere military attaché, had not the power necessary to conclude an agreement, nor was General Ducarne, an official of the War Department, empowered to take note of a promise of assistance. Not only such a convention was never concluded, but the impugned conversations were never the subject of deliberation on the part of the Government.

The second document relates to a conversation on the same subject, which took place in the month of April 1912 between military

attaché Bridges and Lieutenant-General Jungbluth. In the course of this conversation General Jungbluth remarked to his interlocutor that English intervention in favour of Belgium could take place only with the consent of the latter. The British military attaché objected that England would perhaps be led to exercise its rights and fulfil its duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgium without waiting for the latter to call for aid. That was Colonel Bridges' personal opinion; it was never shared by his Government and it clearly follows from this conversation that intervention by England could not have taken place before the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. This second document would of itself remove the suspicion that a convention, as a result of the Ducarne-Barnardiston interviews, had been concluded in 1906. As a matter of fact, Colonel Bridges did not in 1912 allude to the interview of Colonel Barnardiston in 1906, and it is evident that if a convention had been concluded six years before, the interlocutors, in taking up the subject, would have had only to refer to it.

The Imperial and Royal Government is manifestly in error in attributing the German attack to the hostile attitude of Belgium. Up to August 2, 1914, the date of the ultimatum, no difference had arisen between the two countries, their relations had not ceased to remain cordial, and Germany had given voice to no complaint against us.

It is clear from the evidence of the official documents published up to the present time and of the speech of the Imperial Chancellor delivered on August 4 that Germany had nothing with which to reproach Belgium, and that, if its troops attacked Belgium, it was for the purpose of pushing into France by the quickest and easiest way, in order to strike a decisive blow as soon as possible. "We were compelled," said the Chancellor in his speech of August 4, "to override the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong—I speak frankly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached."

In order to declare war on Belgium, the Imperial and Royal Government invoked all manner of pretexts except the non-fulfilment of neutral duties, and it cannot deny that while we were on friendly terms with it and while we were endeavouring to comply with the requests of its representative at Brussels, it was ordering its troops to destroy our forts at Namur.



## XII.

LEGEND CONCERNING THE PUTTING OUT OF EYES.

## XIII.

ANNULMENT OF THE EXEQUATOR OF CONSULS IN BELGIUM.

## XIV.

ARBITRARY ARREST OF M. MAX, BURGOMASTER OF BRUSSELS.

## XV.

FINE IMPOSED ON THE CITY OF COURTRAI FOR HAVING OBEYED TWO  
GERMAN COMMANDERS.

## XVI.

NO FRENCH OR ENGLISH TROOPS ENTERED BELGIUM BEFORE  
AUGUST 5.

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No. 116.*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Missions  
in Foreign Countries.*

Mr. Minister,

*Havre, January 28, 1915.*

As you are aware, Germany is endeavouring to justify its attack on Belgium by alleging facts which, if true, would prove deference to the wishes of France and England on the part of our country, and consequently a disregard of our obligations as neutrals.

Thus the Wolff Agency telegraphed to the newspapers, according to an article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that as early as July 24 French troops under arms had entered Belgian territory.

I deem it my duty to issue a denial of this audacious statement.

I should be obliged to you if you would kindly have this denial published in the country of your residence.

Accept, etc.

DAVIGNON.

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ANNEX TO No. 116.*Note.*

A German manufacturer saw at Erquelinnes on July 24 two companies of French troops under arms. He so states to the General Government of Belgium, and the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*

considers it as an established fact. We regret that the memory of the anonymous witness, who has vouched for this story under oath, has served him so poorly. It is quite possible, however, that after the lapse of six months his memory has confused the names of places.

We have already said, but we are compelled to repeat, that no French or English armed troops entered Belgium before August 5. The Government did not appeal to the guarantee of its guarantors, nor did it remove in favour of French troops the prohibition to enter the territory of the Kingdom until Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium. This violation took place on August 4th, at eight o'clock in the morning, and it was on the same day, at six o'clock in the evening, that the Government decided to call France and England to its aid. Before that date no French soldier had entered Belgium.

As against the German manufacturer, we call to witness the officials of the Empire, the German Minister at Brussels, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Chancellor himself. During the night of August 2-3 Herr von Below endeavoured to find some grievance against us to support his ultimatum. At two o'clock in the morning he called on the Secretary-General at the Department and told him that a patrol of French cavalry had crossed the frontier. Baron van der Elst asked him where this took place. In Germany, was the reply. If a single French soldier under arms had crossed our frontier, it is evident that he would not have escaped the vigilance of Herr von Below's numerous spies.

On the 3rd of August the Belgian Minister was received by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. "Have you any complaints against us?" enquired Baron Beyens. "Have we not for three-quarters of a century always lived up to all the duties of our neutrality with respect to Germany as well as with respect to all the great guaranteeing powers?" "Germany," replied Herr von Jagow, "has no complaint to make against Belgium, whose attitude has always been one of perfect correctness."

Finally, the Chancellor, at the session of the Reichstag on August 4, expressed himself no less frankly: "Our troops," he declared, "have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. The wrong—I speak frankly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good." But inasmuch as the frank admission of the Chancellor has been disavowed by the German press, because the cynical disregard of the treaties created in all neutral countries the same unpleasant

impression, Germany has endeavoured to impugn the loyalty of Belgium.

Thus Germany, after having unjustly attacked, ruined, and murdered us, would rob us of the only thing we have left, our honour. But these imputations of witnesses, whose very names are withheld, imputations which are advanced six months after the events, will not mislead public opinion. From the outset public opinion has condemned the premeditated attack on Belgium and has passed judgment on the abominable calumnies invented to justify that attack.

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No. 117.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Klobukowski,  
French Minister.*

Mr. Minister,

*Havre, February 6, 1915.*

Your Excellency has been so good as to call my attention to the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, which published testimony to the effect that French soldiers under arms had entered Belgium before the outbreak of hostilities. This trick is part of the campaign attempting to prove that Belgium, in complicity with France and England, had failed to live up to its international obligations, and that the first hostile acts were committed, not by Germany, but by Belgium.

As early as the month of November the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* published seven depositions of witnesses, which were reproduced in the November number of the *War Journal*. These seven depositions agreed in the statement that French soldiers and officers were present in Belgium before the war. But the place where they had been seen varied: now it was Charleroi, now Namur, Ougrée, or Liège. We did not protest against these allegations. As your Excellency knows, French soldiers on leave, in uniform but unarmed, were often seen in Belgium, especially at Dinant, Namur, and Liège. Foreigners also mistake for French soldiers the Belgian guides, who wear red trousers. But a witness having asserted that two French regiments were at the *Gare du Midi* on August 2, we published a denial, which appeared in the *Petit Havre*.

In its issue of January 9, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, again on testimony given under oath, stated that armed French troops from Paris had landed at Erquelinnes on July 24. In an

official communication, a summary of which appeared in *Le Matin*, I showed that this accusation was unfounded. Your Excellency will find this communication herewith enclosed (see Annex No. 116). It is evident that the entry of French troops into Belgium, before the latter had appealed to its guarantors, would have been reported to the Government by the customs and police agents, as well as to the German Minister by his spies. No complaint was addressed to us in this respect before the German attack. Dispossessed of our territory, it is not possible for us to make investigations with regard to the depositions of German witnesses. But it will be possible for the French Government to deny the aforesaid accusation, in so far as the landing of troops at Erquelinnes on the evening of July 24 is concerned.

Such a denial would be gratefully appreciated by us.

I take, etc.

DAVIGNON.

No. 118.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister, to M. Davignon, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs.*

Mr. Minister,

*Havre, March 13, 1915.*

Referring to your Excellency's letter of February 6 last, concerning alleged violations by France of Belgian neutrality, sworn to under oath before German courts, I have the honour to hand you herewith a letter from M. Millerand and categorical declarations by our Consuls at Liège and at Brussels, in which I entirely concur.

These documents, together with the energetic denials of the Royal Government, proving how absolutely unfounded are the charges in the testimony invoked, which teems with gross errors and more or less intentional inaccuracies, will be communicated to the neutral Powers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic proposes, moreover, to have them summarised in the form of a brochure, so as to reach the public opinion of the various countries.

The object of the German publications is evidently to justify in the eyes of neutrals the attack on Belgium.

Although the cause has been heard, through the diplomatic publications, notably the *Belgian Grey Book* and the declarations of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag, it is none the less interesting and instructive to catch the Germans again red-handed in acts of deceit and of bad faith.

I take, etc.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

## ANNEX I TO No. 118.

*The Minister of War to M. Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, February 16, 1915.*

Under date of February 13 you kindly brought to my attention the fact that M. Davignon had expressed a desire to have the French Government deny the accusation concerning the landing of French troops at Erquelinnes on the evening of July 24, and asked how I felt on this subject.

I have the honour to inform you that it seems to me that nothing but advantage could accrue from the publication of the most formal denial of the allegations of the German press on this point, as well as on the points mentioned in the letters of your representatives in Belgium, copies of which you sent me.

In order to facilitate the measures that you believe you should take to refute these mendacious allegations, I deem it my duty to give you the following details:

(a) No landing of French troops at Erquelinnes could have been witnessed on July 24, 1914, for on that date not only no measure of preparedness, but not even of precaution, had been taken, either to watch the frontier or to guard the railroads.

The first precautionary measure, the cancelling of leaves of absence, was taken on July 26.

(b) Even at a later date, at the time when measures were taken to cover mobilisation, no covering measures were taken on the Belgian frontier, because of the respect due to the neutrality of that country.

(c) Furthermore, on August 2, the first day of mobilisation, in order to prevent any untoward incident, my predecessor issued the following telegraphic order to the General commanding the first region:

*August 2, 214 3/11 to the First Region, Lille.*

"It is absolutely necessary in the present diplomatic situation that there be no untoward incident on the Franco-Belgian frontier, and therefore that the troops keep at a distance of not less than 2 kilometres approximately from that frontier.

"Customs officers and forest rangers will be instructed to avoid all untoward incidents."

This order merely extended to the first region, when it became affected by the mobilisation telegram, the orders given to the regions along the Franco-German frontier, which prescribed that the troops

should not cross a line which, by reason of the chances of conflict, my predecessor deemed it advisable to fix at a distance of about 10 kilometres from the German frontier.

The German allegations are therefore mendacious in all respects; they have not even the excuse of likelihood.

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ANNEX II TO No. 118.

*M. Pallu de la Barrière, French Consul at Liège, now at Havre, to  
M. Klobukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Re-  
public to the Belgian Government, now at Havre.*

*Havre, February 2, 1915.*

I have the honour to communicate to you, in so far as the consular district of Liège is concerned, the following remarks called forth by the item in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* concerning the alleged violation of Belgian neutrality by France:

To the three charges made under oath before the courts of Essen, Eschweiler, and Bonn, I am in a position to reply with a formal denial.

I declare that the facts set forth in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* are false.

That paper says: "In the latter part of July I frequently saw French soldiers in the neighbourhood of Liège. Together with the Belgians they were digging trenches around Liège."

No French soldiers could have been seen either at Liège or in its vicinity at that time (or even later), for the good reason that there was not a single soldier there. This being so, it was no less impossible to see our soldiers helping Belgian soldiers to dig trenches. I can even assure you that at that date the Belgians themselves were not digging trenches, as I was able to observe in passing by and between several of the forts. On the contrary, I saw Belgian soldiers cutting down trees in the vicinity of these forts at the very beginning of mobilisation (August 2, 1914).

*Second Charge.—Court of Eschweiler, October 20, 1914.*

"In the latter part of July I saw French officers and soldiers in the streets of Liège, and in large numbers, contrary to custom. They were French line soldiers (red kepis) who were passing through the streets of the city."

Neither on that date nor up to August 6, the date of my departure from Liège, did I see in the streets of that city or in its environs, or even at my consulate, a single French officer or soldier in uniform.

In this connexion, I might add that as soon as French mobilisation began, I gave strict instructions to Frenchmen called to the colours, forbidding them to leave Belgium in uniform, in case some of the reservists might have uniforms. I did this in order to prevent any demonstration whatever on the part of the populace and any act contrary to the observance of Belgian neutrality.

*Third Charge.—Court of Bonn, December 9, 1914.*

“At Namur, on August 2, everyone was saying: We have help; the French have arrived; whole trainloads have reached Liège; on the road between Namur and Luxemburg only French soldiers (cavalry and infantry) were to be seen; all the stations were under the military occupation of the French. From Namur to the frontier we were conducted under a French escort.”

I protest vigorously against this new charge, which is as false as the preceding ones. Up to August 6, as can be proved by the record of my telephonic communications at the Post Office Department at Liège, I communicated several times a day with my consular agent at Namur, to keep myself informed of even the slightest incidents. I affirm that on August 2 no train had brought Frenchmen to Namur. Whether misinformed persons stated “that the French had arrived” I do not know. What is certain is that such a statement was erroneous as regards Namur as well as Liège.

Besides, if there had been French soldiers on the road between Namur and Luxemburg, I would have been informed of that fact at once, as well as of the military occupation of the railroad stations on that line by our troops. These assertions are mendacious.

The same is true as to Germans being conducted to the frontier under a French escort.

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ANNEX III TO No. 118.

*Baron Lahure, French Consul at Brussels, now at Havre, to M. Klobukowski, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to the Belgian Government, now at Havre.*

*Havre, February 2, 1915.*

You have been so kind as to send me a translation of the stories circulated in Germany, particularly in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine*

*Zeitung* for January 9, concerning alleged violations of Belgian neutrality by France.

I hasten to give below, in so far as Brussels is concerned, and following the order of the quotations, the observations that the reading of this testimony has suggested to me.

1. Court of Rastatt.—“A regiment in grey campaign uniform took part in the review at Brussels on July 26, on the occasion of the Lord Mayor’s visit.”

The Belgian General Staff, considering a change in its uniforms, had a company of infantry march in the various reviews at Brussels before the war, dressed in the proposed new bluish grey uniform and wearing a helmet of the same colour. The object of this was in all likelihood to learn the opinion of the public on the uniform that was being tried.

I have never heard any one mention an incident that is alleged to have taken place in the neighbourhood of the *Bourse* on July 29, when an officer is said to have harangued the crowd. The witness alleges that he had four stars on his collar and that he was a cavalry officer.

This is manifestly inaccurate, as no French officer has stars on his collar. Only Belgian officers have stars on their collars, and never more than three.

3. Court of Tittlungen.—French soldiers in uniform were seen in the streets of Brussels, as early as the morning of August 3, after the sending of the ultimatum, but before the declaration of war. The crowd cheered a French hussar.

That is quite possible and an absolutely normal state of affairs. French soldiers, who are on leave and whose families reside in Belgium, were, as a matter of fact, authorised to visit their relations in uniform, but unarmed. The national holidays of Belgium taking place at the end of July and coinciding with the Brussels fair, this was a time when soldiers were accustomed to ask for leave of from eight to fifteen days to visit their families before the manœuvres. Perhaps the soldier in question was on sick leave with his family and was preparing to rejoin his corps before the expiration of his leave.

Since our French colony at Brussels numbers 25,000 persons and is located in the centre of the city, it is quite natural that a group of Frenchmen may have cheered the uniform of our army when war had just been declared on our country; and there would be no occasion for astonishment if Belgians had joined in acclaiming a



soldier of one of the powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality at a time when it had just been violated by the delivery of the ultimatum announced by the press.

5. Court of Düsseldorf.—Ovations on the boulevards of Brussels to French soldiers on August 2.

As I have just pointed out, this is an entirely normal state of affairs, resulting from the number of French soldiers on leave who happen to be in Brussels at this time. The 2nd of August being the first day of our mobilisation, the Legation, which had been advised of it during the night, had immediately communicated its mobilisation call to the Havas Agency. It had appeared in the Belgian newspapers on Sunday morning, August 2. In the course of the day soldiers in uniform undoubtedly passed through the city on their way to the station.

6. Court of the Reserve Battalion of the 119th Infantry Regiment of the Landwehr at Stuttgart.—Several French artillery officers, whom the crowd cheered enthusiastically, were seen on July 16.

The place where this demonstration took place is not specified. July 16 was a Thursday. During the holidays there is always a large crowd in the centre of the city, even on week-days. I have never heard any one speak of an ovation to a group of officers of our artillery, and I ask myself how they could have been walking in uniform without the Legation's being advised of that fact. Our officers are, as a matter of fact, required to ask the Legation for permission to wear their uniforms, and the permission is granted only in exceptional cases.

Might these not have been a group of Belgian musicians, members of a band having a uniform somewhat like that of our artillery adjutants: black with a red band, kepi with a feather and lace?

8. Court of Hamburg.—The crowd sang the *Marseillaise* in front of the *Bourse* on August 2 and cheered a group of French soldiers.

Groups of our fellow-countrymen, who are so numerous in Brussels, did, as a matter of fact, sing the *Marseillaise* and cheered our soldiers on leave who were returning to France, when they met them. The *Bourse* being situated on the main thoroughfare leading to the *Gare du Midi* and war being declared on France, this patriotic demonstration was quite natural.

That the crowd cheered English officers on the arrival of the train at the *Gare du Nord* in Brussels on August 5th is not in the

least surprising, inasmuch as German troops had two days before violated the territory of Belgium and as the Government had on August 4 appealed to England.

9. Court of Anrath.—On Sunday, August 2, a soldier in full equipment, with his bayonet on his gun, was seen on the *Boulevard Botanique* at Brussels, apparently engaged in gathering together young Frenchmen who were subject to military service. The witness recognised the soldier as French by his red trousers. Here there is evident confusion, as no soldier on leave had a gun. Furthermore, it is difficult to see of what use a soldier would be on the boulevard of the Botanical Garden, where there is no gathering point of the French colony, where he might have collected reservists.

It must have been a Belgian soldier of one of the guide regiments, which also wear red trousers. The Belgian army having been mobilised on August 2, fully equipped soldiers, even single soldiers, were frequently seen on their way to the station, bound for the concentration point of their corps.

None of these facts can therefore be seriously considered as indications of the violation of Belgian neutrality by France; but, on the other hand, there are proofs of German premeditation, easy to verify if the testimony of householders, with whom German reserve officers had lodgings, and of furniture moving companies were taken. It could be proved that in the month of July Germany had begun the mobilisation of its army by individual call and under conditions that had never been put into effect up to that time, not even at the time of the greatest tension following the Agadir demonstration.

I was informed of this shortly after July 14 by one of our fellow-countrymen, a business man, with whom I lunched at the manufacturers' club on the Boulevard Anspach. He considered as a sure premonitory sign that war would soon break out the fact, which had come to his knowledge, that a large number of Germans, particularly reserve officers, had, as if in obedience to the same order, settled up their business in Belgium, sending their furniture to Germany and placing their apartments or houses on the market for rent. Such a thing had never before been done, and it might be presumed therefrom that they felt sure their country would violate Belgian neutrality. Otherwise how account for their solicitude to protect their furniture by sending it to Germany?

I was much impressed by this sign and you will surely remember, Mr. Minister, that I made the fact known to you. I mentioned it likewise to Lieutenant-Colonel Génie, a certain number of reserve

officers of our army having come to tell me how surprised they were at not having yet received individual orders calling them back to France.

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## No. 119.

*M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Diplomatic Representatives abroad.*

Mr. Minister,

*Havre, April 10, 1915.*

In its ultimatum of August 2, the German Government has endeavoured to justify its invasion of Belgium by alleging that the German right wing was threatened by an attack on the part of the French through Belgian territory.

“The German Government,” said this ultimatum, “has received trustworthy information to the effect that the French forces intend to march upon the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march against Germany through Belgian territory.”

These allegations were, from the very first, in evident contradiction with the formal declarations of the French Government and with the facts. Nevertheless, in certain neutral countries the question was raised whether there might not be some foundation for them.

The events that followed removed all doubt on this score, and no thoughtful person could give them the slightest credence.

The fact that the Belgian army found itself alone in facing the German armies during the first period of the campaign demonstrated the falsity of the statements of the German General Staff.

The German writer on military matters, General von Bernhardi, attempted, however, in an article published in the *New York Sun* a few months ago, to make the Americans believe that in the month of July France and England were preparing to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

Desiring to make an unanswerable reply to these accusations, the French Government published a note, in which it gave exact information as to the disposition of French troops at the beginning of the war. You will find a copy thereof under this cover.

This publication clearly proves, in the first place, the sincerity of the declarations which the French Government made to us on the outbreak of hostilities; it further proves that the German allegations

were only an idle pretext with a view to masking the real purpose of the Imperial General Staff, which was, by means of an overwhelming march, to take France by surprise in the midst of mobilisation.

An error has slipped into the *communiqué*. The violation of Belgium territory took place on the 4th, not the 3rd, of August. (*First Grey Book*, No. 30, page 12).

Accept, etc.

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ANNEX TO No. 119.

FRANCE AND THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

*The Reply of France to German Lies.*

In an article published in an American newspaper, the German General von Bernhardi, in discussing the origin of the war, pretends to prove that French concentration and the presence of our principal forces on our left wing demonstrate the fact that the French Government had resolved, together with Great Britain, to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

To this allegation of General von Bernhardi, the French concentration plan is an unanswerable reply.

I. OUR CONCENTRATION PLAN.

On the outbreak of the war, all the French forces were, by virtue of the concentration plan, stationed, facing the northwest, between Belfort and the Belgian frontier, as follows:

1st Army: between Belfort and the general line Mirecourt-Lunéville;

2nd Army: between that line and the Moselle;

3rd Army: between the Moselle and the line Verdun-Audun-le-Romain;

5th Army: between that line and the Belgian frontier.

The 4th Army was held in reserve west of Commercy.

Consequently, all the French forces were stationed facing Germany, and Germany alone.

II. VARIATIONS IN OUR CONCENTRATION.

So true was it that such was the disposition of the forces that when the violation of Belgian neutrality by the German troops be-

came known, the French General Staff was obliged to order *variations* in the concentration plan.

The eventuality of these variations had naturally been studied, for there had been numerous indications that a violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany was to be feared.

When this violation took place and when the Belgian Government (August 4, *Yellow Book*, page 161) had asked for our support, the lines of our 2nd Army were extended to the region of Verdun; the 4th Army was placed between the 3rd and the 5th, on the Meuse; the 5th slipped towards the northwest along the Belgian frontier, as far as the heights of Fourmies.

In addition, two corps of the 2nd Army, the 18th and the 9th, were shifted from the region of Nancy towards Mézières and Hirson.

Two divisions from Algeria and the division from Morocco were likewise sent in this direction.

Finally, a corps of cavalry was ordered to enter Belgium, to reconnoiter the German columns and impede their movements (August 6), three days after the latter had violated the Belgian frontier.

Thanks to this variation, the French General Staff was able to meet the shock of the German attack west of the Meuse by bringing our principal forces to that point.

If there had been premeditation on its part, this sudden change in the disposition of our troops would not have been necessary and we would have been able to arrive in time to prevent the enemy from crossing the Meuse into Belgium.

A single detail is sufficient to illustrate this unanswerable argument: our left covering corps, the second, that is to say that of Amiens, was, by virtue of the concentration plan, not facing the Belgian frontier, but in the region of Montmédy-Longuyon.

### III. THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ENGLISH ARMY.

As for the English Army, its support was not assured us until August 5, that is to say, after the violation of the Belgian frontier by the Germans, which took place on August 3 (*Yellow Book*, page 151).

The concentration of the British Army was effected back of Maubeuge, from August 14 to 21.

IV. VARIOUS ORDERS CONCERNING THE INTENTIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

On July 30 the French Government, in spite of the military measures taken by Germany, orders our covering troops to remain at 10 kilometres from the frontier.

On August 2 a second order directs our troops to leave to the Germans the entire responsibility for hostilities and to confine themselves to driving back any attacking troops that enter upon French territory.

On August 3 a further telegram orders our troops absolutely to avoid any untoward incident on the Franco-Belgian frontier. The French troops must keep two to three kilometres from the frontier.

On the same day, August 3, a new order is issued, confirming the instructions of August 2 and giving them precision.

An order of the Minister of War, issued on August 4, states:

“By spreading false reports, Germany will endeavour to induce us to violate Belgian neutrality. Until orders are issued to the contrary, it is strictly and formally forbidden, even to patrols and troopers, to enter Belgian territory, and aviators are forbidden to fly over that territory.”

On August 5, at the request of the Belgian Government (made on the 4th), French airships and dirigibles are authorised to fly over Belgian territory, and our reconnoitering parties are authorised to enter that territory.

XVII.

TAX ON ABSENTEES.

XVIII.

CARRYING OFF OF MACHINERY.

XIX.

GERMAN ACCUSATIONS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF GERMAN OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS MADE PRISONERS OF WAR BY THE BELGIAN ARMY.

XX.

CREATION OF EXCEPTIONAL TRIBUNALS.

**THE  
FRENCH YELLOW BOOK**





# THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK <sup>1</sup>

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## CHAPTER I.

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### WARNINGS. (1913.)

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#### No. 1.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, March 17, 1913.*

Our naval and military attachés are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the

<sup>1</sup> *Miscellaneous. No. 15 (1914). Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War, published by the French Government. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty, December, 1914. London: Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1914. [Cd. 7717.] Translated and printed by the British Government. No English translation was published by the French Government. Title of publication in the original text: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Documents Diplomatiques, 1914. La Guerre Européenne, I, Pièces Relatives aux Négociations qui ont Précédé les Déclarations de Guerre de l'Allemagne à la Russie (1er Août 1914) et à la France (3 Août 1914) Déclaration du 4 Septembre 1914. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, MDCCCXCIV.*

future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (*personnalité*) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the consequence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic sentiment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was compared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patriotism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counterpart would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

## ENCLOSURE I.

*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Étienne, Minister of War.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been immediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the *Kölnische Zeitung* cannot be disregarded; several important newspapers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realising that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to consider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in

filling in the gaps.\* The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right moment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pellé a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published:

“We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year.

“The Treaty of the 4th November, 1911, has proved a complete disillusion.

“The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco.

“It seemed, a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to conquer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

“Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second-rate power.

“In the crisis of 1911, however, this second-rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. *People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again.*”

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occasion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, “her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection.” The disgust of Germany can well be understood.

\* The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is continually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has accepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws.

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the *levée en masse* of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the *Kölnische Zeitung*, we are in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace—so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than any one—but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the necessary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with éclat all the various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France.

## ENCLOSURE II.

*M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché to the French Embassy at Berlin, to  
M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.*

*Berlin, March 15, 1913.*

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Finance Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with "an increase of military strength of immense scope" to use the expression of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communiqué of the *Lokal Anzeiger* as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914, the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, "There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by

the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success."

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The *Kölnische Zeitung* has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But we must be willing to realize that the opinion expressed by the *Kölnische Zeitung* is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people.

In this connexion I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old Prince Henckel von Donnersmarek, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donnersmarek spoke as follows:—

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves."

And the Prince added: "I have even been considered in France

as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be unfavourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid, that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interests of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that nation will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.' And Prince Donnersmarck added: "An exactitude which played so great a rôle forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be necessary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 had been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent together the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been



raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the warlike times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to obtain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be necessary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up: In Germany the execution of military reforms always

follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provisions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in *personnel* and *matériel*.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more.

They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

FARAMOND.

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## No. 2.

*M. Étienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, April 2, 1913.*

I have just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

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ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum on the Strengthening of the German Army.*

*Berlin, March 19, 1913.*

I.—GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

The increase has taken place in three stages:—

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Serbia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would insure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly insuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutsch-tum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

## II.—AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria,

and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by

strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her.

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No. 3.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, May 6, 1913.*

I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is

in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confidentially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely nothing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Government, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East; preparations have even been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago—that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest confidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even

been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the "Imperator," did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German *milieu* by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Accordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. *They wish to be always ready.*

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country.

JULES CAMBON.



## No. 4.

*M. Allizé, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 10, 1913.*

From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the political and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Germany. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

ALLIZÉ.

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No. 5.

*Report to M. Stéphen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany According to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents).*

*Paris, July 30, 1913.*

From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it

is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds:—

- (1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a disappointment for Germany;
- (2) France—a new France—undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Brandenburg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentlemen, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unanimous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:

The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact

that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion, although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice, has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Germany, on the other hand, had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered:—"Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain.

The forces consist of the following elements:—

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and

a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants, and financiers, in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein—conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states—Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden—are divided by these two opinions:—an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of war-like feeling.

An example will make this idea clear:—The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than

this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is *inevitable*. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, *i.e.*, to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the Democratic and Socialist masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from "Bismarckism" as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying force of the *Wehrvereine* and other associations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; other finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows:—The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the

Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conservative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading rôle in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity—all these regard war as good business.

Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all

kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the *Post*. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the *Kriegsvereine*, *Wehrvereine* and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her coöperation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany.

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No. 6.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin to M. Stéphen Pichon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, November 22, 1913.*

I have received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fortnight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff—General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely



changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the war-like tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, "for," he said, to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and Your Majesty can have no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless persisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the Court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of General von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts to escape him. Whatever may have been

the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the general situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry."

JULES CAMBON.

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## CHAPTER II.

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### PRELIMINARIES.

From the Death of the Hereditary Archduke (June 28, 1914) to the Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia (July 23, 1914).

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#### No. 7.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, June 28, 1914.*

News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assassinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph.

DUMAINE.

## No. 8.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 2, 1914.*

The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Serbia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired.

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intolerable to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

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No. 9.

*M. de Manneville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 4, 1914.*

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Serbia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Serbia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

DE MANNEVILLE.

## No. 10.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 6, 1914.*

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Serbia are in danger of producing in his country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him: "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 11.

*M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Budapest, July 11, 1914.*

Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial enquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a *démarche* at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

With regard to this *démarche* it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "*démarche*," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "*pourparlers*," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every reason to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is *preparing a coup*, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (*à plaisir*). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents. were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'APCHIER LE MAUGIN.

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No. 12.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 15, 1914.*

Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organisation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs; this would ensure to the Dual Monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities

for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The *Militärische Rundschau* frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned—to be or not to be—which is in truth the great matter to-day."

Surpassing itself, the *Neue Freie Presse* of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a *war to the knife* against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race.

DUMAINE.

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No. 13.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 19, 1914.*

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sum up the information which he has obtained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains.

DUMAINE.

## No. 14.

*Memorandum.*

*(Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situation in Austria.)*

*Vienna, July 20, 1914.*

From information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Servia; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in coöperation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply; that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Belgrade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Servia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out: generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has

obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant.

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No. 15.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 21, 1914.*

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Government was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only for judicial coöperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation, the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant.

JULES CAMBON.



## No. 16.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,  
St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 21, 1914.*

I specially draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the *démarche* at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 17.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the  
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 22, 1914.*

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great astonishment at this. He emphasises that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrère also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working at Vienna in order that Serbia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial enquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maximum from Serbia by starting to intimidate her, directly and indirectly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his influence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 18.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Emperor. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Poland," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the *démarche* will be made at Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be accepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring ex-

planations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling.

DUMAINE.

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No. 19.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 22, 1914.*

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the *démarche* which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him that at Berlin a *démarche* of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a *démarche* of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the circumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the consequences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who

also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feelings take a public form (*démarche*) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two victorious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, asked him to recommend his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 20.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg and Rome.*

*Paris, July 23, 1914.*

According to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna, the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call

the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formulated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 21.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.*

*Munich, July 23, 1914.*

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him (*dont il avait connaissance*), was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious.

ALLIZÉ.

CHAPTER III.

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THE AUSTRIAN NOTE AND THE SERVIAN REPLY.

(From Friday, July 24, to Saturday, July 25.)

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No. 22.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I should be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions.

*Reval, July 24, 1914, 1 A.M.*

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connexion with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at

Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Benckendorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 23.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France."*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I have sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but from information contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues as to his action.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 24.

(Note communicated by Count Scézszen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, on Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 A.M.)

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:—

“On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:—

“ ‘Serbia recognises that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.’ ”

“The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

“Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in



subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions.

“This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world.

“It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

“The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy.

“To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

“In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their ‘Official Journal’ of the 13/26 July the following declaration:—

“ ‘The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary—*i.e.*, the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

“ ‘The Royal Government regret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus

compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

“ ‘The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.’

“ ‘This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ‘Official Bulletin’ of the Army.

“ ‘The Royal Servian Government further undertake:—

“ ‘1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

“ ‘2. To dissolve immediately the society styled “Narodna Odbrana,” to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

“ ‘3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

“ ‘4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

“ ‘5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

“ ‘6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the

Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

“ ‘7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

“ ‘8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Ložnica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

“ ‘9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally,

“ ‘10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.’

“The Austro-Hungarian Government expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July.\*

“A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.”

I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you

\* The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction:—

“In the copy of the despatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

“I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.”

are accredited, accompanying your communication with the following observations:—

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by

appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the French Government a *dossier* elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Vienna, July 24, 1914.*

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#### ANNEX.

The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassina-

tion committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions:—

1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, one Milan Čiganović, and Trifko Grabež, with the assistance of Commander Voijsa Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties committed the act were delivered to Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež by the man Milan Čiganović and Commander Voijsa Tankosić at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depôt of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabež in a forest near the shooting ground at Topšider.

5. To enable Princip, Čabrinović, and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was organised by Čiganović.

By this arrangement the introduction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabać (Rade Popović) and Ložnica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbić, of Ložnica, with the assistance of various individuals.

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No. 25.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France,"  
and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg,  
Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Scézsén informs me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>See note on page 573.

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March, 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June, which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.

The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the coöperation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a dépôt of the Servian army; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Scézszen without any observations informed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical a *démarche* with so short a time-limit; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Peters-

burgh and were at sea, and consequently were not able to exert, in agreement with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace.

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

No. 26.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiébaud, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Serbia must try to gain time, as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "*mise en demeure*" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one-sided, and that Serbia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full information as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburg for the views and intentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed of it.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.



## No. 27.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Serbia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punishment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dispute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Germany would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrère informs us that Italy is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 28.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Government, of which he would not leave me a copy, but at my request he read it twice over to me.

The note was almost word for word as follows:—

“The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army.

“The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously increased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them.”

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point

that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally; it is as follows:—"The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of good-will it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple *mise en demeure*, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 29.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep impression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed.

Most of the Chargés d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has presented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburg. He is inclined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will no doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (*par un sentiment de solidarité monarchique*) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 30.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 24, 1914.*

I asked the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government

having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. Moreover, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, "It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna?" I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time-limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement (*un peu d'émotion*) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would endeavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off."

All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag

along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the *Lokal Anzeiger* this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must stand together (*sentiment de la solidarité monarchique*). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Serbia.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 31.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Serbia.

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct.

Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 32.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the initiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the mediation, between Austria and Servia, of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lichnowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the *démarche* upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 33.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 24, 1914.*

The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a telegram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time-limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's *Times*, it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 34.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 24, 1914.*

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Government's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia be-



fore him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the coöperation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four Powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburg.

I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to coöperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satisfaction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 35.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's *démarche*.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 36.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article in the *Echo de Paris* which applied the term "German threat" (*menace allemande*) to his *démarche* of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the *Direction Politique*, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connexion with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's *démarche*. Having asked him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the *Echo de Paris* involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German *démarche* appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time-limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian Minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express regret for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the

most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Serbia's business to reply in terms which the interests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time-limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any *démarche* at Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 37.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the coöperation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Petersburg. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude (*pourrait s'en désintéresser.*)

DE FLEURIAU.

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No. 38.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time-limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial *dossier*, the communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from making any allusion to the measures which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Serbia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recriminations of Count de Pourtalès left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 39.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time-limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the *dossier* which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for every one.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the *démarche* which she made to the Powers by communicating her note to them, and would place her in a position of conflict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corresponding and urgent *démarche* to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 40.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 25, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time-limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian *démarche* should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communication which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from

to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

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No. 41.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

This morning the British Chargé d'Affaires, acting under instructions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time-limit imposed on Serbia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German \* Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfortunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted.

The British Chargé d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one.

JULES CAMBON.

\* In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed.

## No. 42.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this communication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time-limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time-limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 43.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires has, in accordance with his instructions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time-limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these *démarches* were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time-limit could not be extended, action at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Serbia and to force her into war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an “*exécution*” in a local matter.

The Chargé d’Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hostilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Chargé d’Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. “One knows,” he said to me, “what this word ‘satisfaction’ means.” M. Broniewski’s impressions of Germany’s ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 44.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the *démarche* which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time-limit imposed on Servia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o’clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna.

BARRÈRE.



## No. 45.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time-limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the *démarche* which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams *en clair*, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated the tenor of his instructions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the *dossier* to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy. Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia: it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

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No. 46.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agree to publish to-morrow in the *Journal Officiel* the declaration which has been required of them;

they will communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other associations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary; they undertake to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no participation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

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No. 47.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 25, 1914.*

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This evening the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister.

The correspondent of the *Agence Havas* at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the *Siegessäul*, the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had

been feared here that Serbia would accept the whole Austrian note, reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg and London will not succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 48.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 25, 1914.*

Your telegram reaches me exactly at the moment when the time-limit given to Serbia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Chargé d’Affaires has had to carry out his *démarche*. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Serbia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government’s acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

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No. 49.

*Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note.—(Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.)*

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and are

convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connexion the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo

proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal Officiel," on the date of the 13/26 July, the following declaration:—

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 18/31 March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake:—

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Noradna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15/28 June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznica line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.*

## CHAPTER IV.

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FROM THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, (JULY 25, 1914), TO  
THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERBIA  
(JULY 28, 1914).

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No. 50.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows:—refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time-limit asked for by Russia,—departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Serbia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession—order for mobilisation given in Serbia, whose Government retired to Kragoujewatz, where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an extension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paléologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilisation, however, would only be made



effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London the German *démarche* was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a *démarche* at Vienna for an extension of the time-limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time-limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time to join in the *démarche* of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time-limit fixed for Serbia; he does not regret it, this *démarche* having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and M. Sazonof and M. Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to England,

France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 51.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

Telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Consulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the impression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 52.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 26, 1914.*

M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business.

BARRÈRE.

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## No. 53.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de  
Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

M. Paléologue sends me the following telegram:—

“M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the mediation of the British Government.”

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the British Government accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Office.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 54.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate."

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 55.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 26, 1914.*

M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from

Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allowing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, the latter received instructions from the Foreign Office with reference to the *démarche* to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirsky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action.

DUMAINE.

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No. 56.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 26, 1914.*

The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay. Although the Servian Government had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off relations, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to proceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Ambassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be localised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.

In the course of an interview between M. Barrère and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indicated that probably the Italian Government would not have approved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact relieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a communication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement, nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburg."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the question concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburg alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am-

bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 57.

*Note for the Minister.*

*Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.*

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the *Direction Politique*, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the *Echo de Paris* of the evening before, and in order to define exactly the sense of the *démarches* of the German Government, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, suggested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful coöperation (*sentiment de solidarité pacifique*), they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace."

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, everything is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite

personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position without any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What responsibility was the German Government assuming and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe!

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St. Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,\* and had only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situation

\* *Cf.* No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

*Cf.* also the English Blue Book, No. 95, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states:—

“Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.”



which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill-informed, represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the "spectre" of a conference: a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

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No. 58.

*M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Christiania, July 26, 1914.*

The whole German fleet in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

CHEVALLEY.

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No. 59.

*M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.*

According to information which I have just received from Thionville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold

themselves at the disposition of the *Kommandatur* at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence.

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D'ANNOVILLE.

No. 60.

*M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Basle, July 27, 1914.*

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district received orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted.

FARGES.

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No. 61.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.  
Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La  
France" (for the President of the Council), and to the French  
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic:—On Friday he reads a note in which the German Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences";—the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the

Powers having, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Serbia to yield, Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;"—the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Serbia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions to insist on Germany's peaceful intentions, and on her warm desire to coöperate in the maintenance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible refusal of Austria to accept Serbia's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Serbia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the mediation of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate the occupation of Serbia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield; they have thus fulfilled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Serbia to the Powers, Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome: the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during

this conversation Russia, Austria and Serbia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her good-will by other means than words.

I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Government in whatever form appears to you opportune.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 62.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Council (on board the "La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

After his *démarche* of yesterday tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburg in favour of peace, the German Ambassador returned, as I have informed you, to the *Direction Politique* on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the conversation; he even suggested the following terms:—"During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful coöperation, they examined the means which might be employed to maintain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms appeared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation; that, however, a brief note in the sense indicated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows:—"The German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh interview, in the course of which they sought means of action by the

Powers for the maintenance of peace.” This phrasing, deliberately colourless, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted.

This morning Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: “Note well the phrase ‘in an identical spirit of peaceful coöperation.’ This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth.” The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows:—“The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Petersburg, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tranquillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Government have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in a pacific spirit.”

I have let you know the reply which has been given (a French *démarche* at St. Petersburg would be misunderstood, and must have as corollary a German *démarche* at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen’s letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his *démarche* itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to complete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

## No. 63.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicolson has told me, however, that Prince Liechnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to preserve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 64.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.*

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restrain the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 65.

*M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Therapia, July 27, 1914.*

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Serbia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

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No. 66.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Serbia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday on his own initiative; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia.

DE FLEURIAU.

## No. 67.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was disposed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Austrian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention proposed by England at St. Petersburg and Vienna could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude, had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 68.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paléologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that



Servia was disposed to appeal to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little conference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

DE FLEURIAU.

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No. 69.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Government to ask for the mediation of England; it is, however, possible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way.

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place.

DE FLEURIAU.

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No. 70.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy

at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, to stop active military operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his *démarche* in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburg and Belgrade instructions in the sense asked for by the British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna; a *démarche* from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "conversations."

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 71.

*M. de Fleuriau, French Chargé d'Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 27, 1914.*

I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the necessary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same *démarche*.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations; they are consulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and

the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

DE FLEURIAU.

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No. 72.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 27, 1914.*

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and forcible character; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Austria. "In no way," the Minister replied: "we were not consulted; we were told nothing; it was not for us then to make any such communication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Serbia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England.

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 73.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secretary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would resemble a conference of the Powers; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg. Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a *démarche* by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg could be brought about by diplomatic means without assuming the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifications; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburg the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time.

JULES CAMBON.

## No. 74.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 27, 1914.*

I had a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the *démarche* which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassador, that he could not accept the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but

that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form; that what was important was the coöperation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this coöperation could take effect through common *démarches* at St. Petersburg and at Vienna; that he had often expressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always opposed to one another in Europe; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Serbia to Austria which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Serbia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Serbia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was necessary to find a form for this intervention which he could

accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg have been entered upon and are in progress. I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the impression that the hour of *détente* had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken; that he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his proposal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to associate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 75.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 27, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum which amounted to an indictment of Serbia; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Serbia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Government, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Serbia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are required of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures contemplated by Austria, and Count Scézszen replied that they might

be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual good-will, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their coöperation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave responsibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scézszen handed to me.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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ENCLOSURE.

*Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scézszen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 1914.*

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the South Slav districts, in order to attach them to a Great-Servian state, dates from far back. This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached its culminating point at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purposes openly and undisguisedly, and showed, under the patronage of the Servian Government, its intention of achieving its aims by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy with shouts of rancour and by the perversion of facts, associations were being formed to foment this strife—irrespective of other means of propaganda.

The association which had become the most important was the Narodna Odbrana. Having its origin in a revolutionary committee which already existed, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation dependent upon the Foreign Office at Belgrade through military and civil officials. Amongst its founders should be specially mentioned General Buzo Jankvic,

ex-Ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic and Valislav Valovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government Printing Establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tanovic and Milan Pribicevic. This association adopted as its aim the creation and organisation of armed bands, with a view to the war that they hoped for against the Monarchy. A convincing description of the activity of the Narodna Odbrana at this time will be found, in particular, in the statements of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the Council of War at Serajevo; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy, as *comitadji*. Krstanovic had been brought, with about one hundred and forty others, to a school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija, in the district of Jagodina, managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnick. The only masters in this school were Servian officers; General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic introduced great regularity into the courses of organisation of these bands, which lasted three months.

The *comitadji* received there complete instruction in musketry, bomb throwing, mines and the destruction of railways, tunnels, bridges and telegraphs; their duty was, according to their leaders, to put into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.

By this action on the part of the Narodna Odbrana, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, guerrilla warfare was carried on against the Monarchy. In this way the subjects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced as Servian emissaries systematically to practise secret attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the announcement of the Servian Government on the 31st March 1909, in which that Government announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in public law by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and solemnly promised that they would do their best to maintain in future friendly and neighbourly relations with the Monarchy.

With this declaration it might have been expected that the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, would be brought to an end, and that means might have been found for an amicable *rapprochement* between Servia and the Monarchy. Deprived of the support of the Servian Government, and



combated by that Government in accordance with its engagements, the hostile propaganda could only have continued secretly, and would have been condemned to prompt destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Servian districts in the south of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interest.

However, these hopes have not been realised. Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued: and, under the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to suppress this agitation, the propaganda instituted against Austria has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and has developed into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by the old methods, which have been adapted to the situation, and by more thorough methods, have been called "to an inevitable struggle of annihilation" against Austria. Their secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav domains in the south of the Monarchy, whose subjects have been incited to treason.

Above all, this spirit has found constant expression in the Servian press.

Up to the present time, no fewer than 81 newspapers appearing in Servia have had to be withdrawn from postal circulation on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law. There is hardly a clause protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and of the members of the Imperial Family or the integrity of the State that has not been violated by Servian papers. In Appendix I. will be found a few of the numerous instances occurring in the press, of ideas of the nature indicated above.

Without entering into a detailed examination of the points of view of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that the press has, in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which reparation is due. This idea recurs not only in the papers of advanced views, but also in the *Samuprava*, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office at Belgrade, where this idea finds expression in hardly veiled terms. (*See Appendix II. (b).*)

Nor can one omit to consider how the attempt made on 15th June 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic against Commandant von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was applauded by the press.

It will be remembered that Zerajic killed himself immediately

after his deed, and before committing it had burned all his papers. For these reasons it is impossible to throw full light upon the motive of this outrage; it has, however, been possible from a document found on his person to form the conclusion that he was a follower of the views of Kropotkin. Circumstantial evidence likewise leads to the conclusion that the attempt was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from proclaiming the criminal as a national Servian hero, or from praising his deed. The *Politika* even combated the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be a "Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."

The *Politika* considers the 18th August of the same year, "the birthday of His Imperial and Royal Majesty," as a favourable opportunity on which to return to the subject of Zerajic, "whose name will be to the people something like that of a saint," and solemnly to praise the outrage in a poem. (Appendix No. 1.)

This is the way in which this crime, which was quite foreign to territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, has been exploited for the furtherance of this idea, and in which the murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim, and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This sanctification of murder, as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy, reappears later in papers speaking of the attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner of Cujav. (Appendix I.(e).)

These newspapers, which are circulated not only in Servia, but also, as was ascertained later, illicitly in the Monarchy, by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the misdeeds of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana has become the centre of the agitation carried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. They still include the very violent opponents of the Monarchy mentioned above in the capacity of active and energetic organisers. Organised on a broad and far-reaching scale and governed by a hierarchy of officials (*see* Appendix II., "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana had soon acquired about 400 members who carried on a very active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna became closely allied with the "Shooting Federation" (762 societies), the Association of the Sokol, *Dusan Silni* (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the Association of Horse-

men, *Knez Mihajlo*, the Society of Sportsmen and the League of Development, as well as numerous other associations, all of which, under the guidance and protection of the Narodna, work on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a complete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are only members of the single body of the Narodna. Thus the latter has set up all over Servia a very close network of agitation and has attracted to its principles all those who are receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of this Society demonstrate sufficiently clearly the policy of the Narodna.

In its statutes, ostensibly those of a "Development Society," concerning itself only with the spiritual and corporal improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna discloses in its deed of amalgamation (*see* Appendix II.) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "reorganised programme."

To preach to the Servian people especially "the sacred truth by fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pretence that the Monarchy wishes "to take away Servia's liberty, her language, and even to destroy her"; that it is an unavoidable necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her first and greatest enemy, "a war of destruction with rifle and cannon" and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war for the liberation of the conquered territories in which seven millions of their brothers are subject to contumely and oppression. All the efforts for progress of the Narodna are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people, with a view to the struggle of annihilation that they foresee.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna work in the same spirit. The association of the Sokol of Kragujevac will serve as an example. (*See* Appendix III.)

As in the case of the Narodna, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the annual meeting of 1914 made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is the real object of the Sokol, and only spoke of "preparation for War" against a "dangerous, heartless, and odious enemy invading us from the North," who robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberties and rights, and keeps them in bondage and irons.

In the administrative reports of the association the technical

work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the records of the real "objects of the activities of the Administration," especially "*the preparation of national development and the necessity of strengthening the oppressed nation,*" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "*incomplete programme, its unfinished task,*" and accomplishing "*that great action which is to be carried out in the near future: the liberation of brothers who are living beyond the Drina and who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified.*"

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "hawks must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers not yet freed."

As in the case of the aspirations of progress in the Narodna, the gymnastic activity of the Sokol is not the real object, but simply a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on with the same intentions, not to say with the very same words.

When the Narodna makes its appeal for the struggle of annihilation against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the people of the Monarchy but to all the Southern Slavs. In the eyes of the Narodna the Slav regions in the south of the Monarchy belong to "our subjected Servian territories." (*See also Appendix IV.*) So also the Slav subjects of the south of the Monarchy must take part in this "national work," so also this "healthy and necessary" activity must make itself felt on the other side of the southern frontier, and even on the soil of the Monarchy the Narodna seeks its "heroes for the holy war," among whom Obilie, the murderer of Mourad, is cited as an example worthy of imitation, of sacrifice for one's country.

But in order to induce the brothers "outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna is intimately associated with the "brothers on this side of the frontier." It is not said in what way this intimate association is effected, no doubt because *it appertains to that part of the "common work"* which "for many reasons cannot and ought not to be explained."

How far this branch of its activity extends is shown by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs."

The foreign activity of the Narodna and its affiliated branches is particularly varied.

What is relatively the less dangerous, because it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by the influential

members of the Narodna in the southwestern parts of the Monarchy, where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These occasions give the speakers the opportunity of explaining the true aims of the association in the most receptive circles of their adherents, in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already *au courant*.

Amongst these emissaries one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic, Director of the Government Printing Establishment, already alluded to; it was he who on the 8th of August, 1909, issued an appeal to the Servian people in which he called Austria "the enemy of Serbia" and invited Serbia to prepare herself for a war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions he has undertaken tours of this nature. At Karlova, in 1912, he flung prudence to the winds and spoke of "the union of all the Serbs against the common enemy."

More dangerous are the relations formed by associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna, under the cloak of common interests and of culture, with associations in the Monarchy; for the respective envoys and corporate visits of these associations, which escape all control, are utilised by the Servians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, an envoy of the Narodna at the fête of Serajevo in September 1912 (*see* Appendix VI.) had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. The sending of a representative of the Sokol of Kragujevac to this fête must have meant for the brothers of Bosnia: "We have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still strong"—a thought which, to the initiated, will no doubt have found a quite different expression consonant with the aims of the Narodna explained above (Appendix III.). As to the events that take place at the meetings of the same kind in Servia, it is clear that they escape all control of the Royal and Imperial authorities, who only possess on this matter confidential information which is difficult to check. In this connexion doubts must be raised regarding the visit of Agram students to Servia (April 1912) who received from the Servians an official reception of an almost military character, accompanied even by a parade and by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the association of the Sokol of Kragujevac could say, "This event marks the beginning and the key of a great deed which must find its accomplishment in the near future; it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bounds until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed."

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-Hungarian authorities that the associations of the Servian Sokols have succeeded in making arrangements with some similar societies of the Monarchy to establish a connexion with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear; for the information on this point is still being collected. Up to the present, however, the information obtained admits of the conclusion that traces have been discovered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols have seduced and led astray certain groups of persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda among circles so very different assumes minor importance if it is compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna and its friends in the form of a personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of mutiny to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late Officers of Honved V.B.D.K.V.N. and the Lieutenant of Gendarmerie of Slav Croatia V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevitch, left the service of the army of the Monarchy in the most suspicious circumstances and turned towards Servia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their hopes falsified, or at any rate in part, and are thinking of returning to the country that they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily so well known that it hardly needs illustration. What is less known is that people who have been expelled from the Croatian and Bosnian schools, owing to grave acts against discipline, are received in Servia with open arms and often even protected by the State and supported as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their masters, who, inspired by hostility towards Austria, are to a great extent members of the Narodna, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case may be quoted here. Last March several pupils of the normal training college of Pakrac (Croatia) were expelled on account of a strike. They returned to Servia, where they immediately obtained places as schoolmasters or were admitted to training colleges. One of those who had been so expelled, and who had relations with circles unfriendly to the Monarchy, declared publicly that he and his people would express the opinion and disseminate the view during the stay

of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province is Servian territory. It should be particularly noted that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia the prefect of the Servian district of Krajna gave to three scholars, who were thus involved, Servian passports, in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croats. With these passports the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested.

But all this is not enough to give a complete representation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna.

The Imperial and Royal Government has been informed for a long time past confidentially that the Narodna has made military preparations for the war which it desires to make against the Monarchy in the following way: it has been sending emissaries in order, as soon as hostilities broke out, to attempt in bands the destruction of the transport and to stir up revolt or panic (*see Appendix VII.*).

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the Council of War at Serajevo against Jovo Jajlicic and his associates for espionage, confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for war by armed bands still figures in the programme of the Narodna, to which must now further be added a complete service of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna, described as "reorganised," is, in reality, an *extended* programme. Acts of terrorism must finally result from an atmosphere of hatred which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which evades all responsibility; and in order to bring them about, all means are to be regarded as good in the struggle against Austria, including even, without any sense of shame, common acts of murder.

On the 8th of June 1912, a man named Jukic shot at von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that Councillor von Herwie, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded; in his flight he killed a policeman who followed him and he wounded two others.

From the subsequent investigation it appeared that Jukic was saturated with the ideas and plans of the Narodna, and that, although Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade, together with the Agram students, for the celebrations prepared in honour of these visitors on the 18th April

1912; that Jukic entered into relations with several people belonging to the Narodna with whom he had had political discussions. A few days afterwards he returned to Belgrade, and there he received *from a Servian Major a bomb and from a friend a Browning pistol*, with which he carried out his crime. The bomb found at Agram came, according to experts, from a military arsenal.

Jukic's attempt had not yet been forgotten, when on the 18th August 1913, Stephen Dojcie, who had returned from America to Agram, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlec, an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was the work of the foreign propaganda of the Narodna.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevitich, printed in Chicago, with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their impending "deliverance," and urging them to enter Servia, demonstrates the correspondence between the propaganda carried out unchecked by the Servians in America and that carried on from Servia in the territory of the Monarchy.

And again, scarcely a year afterwards, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th May 1913, Jacob Schäffer made an attempt at the Agram theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlec, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a policeman. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolph Hercigonja. From the depositions of the latter and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October 1912), where together with his accomplice Marojan Jakic he was seen in company with *comitadjis* and members of the Narodna. As frequently happens when immature minds concern themselves too early with political questions, these meetings had the worst possible result. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma of Belgrade, that the Slav areas in the south of the Monarchy should be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. He had further been persuaded by the teachings of his friends that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office in the Monarchy.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at



Agram and converted them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne.

A few months before Suka Alginovic had been tried for high treason. In the course of his trial three witnesses declared that Alginovic had told them that he had received one hundred dina from the Narodna and a similar sum from a secret association of students to start propaganda, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

*It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna and of those who share in its views has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke.*

From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy which were grouped around it, recently decided that the hour had struck to translate theory into practice.

It is noteworthy that the Narodna limits itself in this way to *inciting*, and where the incitement had fallen on fertile soil, to *providing means of material assistance*, but that it has confided all the dangerous part in this active propaganda exclusively to the youth of the Monarchy, which has been excited and corrupted by this organisation, which alone ought to bear the burden of this pitiful "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th June.

Princip and Grabez are examples of these young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna. At Belgrade, where he consorted with students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the hereditary Archduke (against whom was directed the particularly rancorous hatred of the elements hostile to the Monarchy), when he made his tour in the annexed territories.

He became friendly with Kabrinovitch, who mingled with the same associates, and whose radically revolutionary opinions, as he himself admits, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the active propaganda. But however carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however determined the conspirators may have been, the attempt would nevertheless not have been carried out if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukic, to provide for the conspirators means of committing their crime; for as Princip and Kabrinovitch have expressly

admitted, they lack the necessary arms as well as money to purchase them. It is interesting to see where the conspirators procured their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivogin Dacic, the two principal men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators turned as to a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition among those ready to commit crimes that they could obtain from the members of the Narodna instruments for murder. The fortuitous circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless frustrated this plan; however, Princip and Kabrinovitch had no difficulty in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an *ex-comitadji*, and now a railway official at Belgrade and member of the Narodna. The latter and his friend Major Voja Tankosic, who has already been mentioned, and was also one of the heads of the Narodna, and who in 1908 was the head of the school of armed bands of Kuprija (Appendix V.), now appear as the moving spirits in the plot. They had only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, namely, whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their own suggestions. Thenceforward they were ready to give every assistance. Tankosic procured four Browning pistols, and ammunition, and money for the journey. Six hand grenades from the Servian army completed the armament, a fact which recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious to be successful, Tankosic obtained shooting lessons for them, but Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means scarcely desired by the assassins. They therefore suborned Zian Kali, pointing out that the two culprits must commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to them because secrecy would relieve them of the slight danger which they themselves were incurring in this enterprise. *Sure death for victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, such is the motto, as is now known, of the Narodna.*

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the arms and the bombs should arrive in Bosnia by underhand methods and without being perceived. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power; he explained to the conspirators the route which had been agreed upon, and assured them that the Servian customs authorities would help them. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret route prepared in advance and already often used for

the secret designs of the Narodna. With a simplicity and assurance which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabak and Loznica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose; the secret transport with its complicated system of constantly changing guides, who could be summoned as if by magic, and were always to be found on the spot when there was need, was effected without any difficulty. Without investigating the object of this strange journey of a few very young students, the Servian authorities set this smooth machinery in motion at a word from the *ex-comitadji* and minor railway official Ciganovic. However, they had no need to make any enquiry, for, from the information before them, it was clear that a new mission of the Narodna was being carried out. When he saw the arsenal of bombs and revolvers, the guard, Crbic, smiled a benevolent smile of approval, showing conclusively how accustomed they were on this route to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have committed a serious default in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, they have allowed the press to excite hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of masters and of judges, to busy themselves with a public campaign against the Monarchy, instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of its citizens; they have not prevented men with a share in the direction of the military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience contrary to all moral sentiment, to such an extent that in this conflict vulgar and treacherous assassination appears the most praiseworthy weapon.

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No. 75 (2).

*Official Communiqué of the Press Bureau.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply.

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the

anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restrictions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian *démarche*, but also with regard to the claims advanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the reëstablishment of a permanent peace in the south-east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobilisation.

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No. 76.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*On board the "La France," July 28, 1914.*

I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday; the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador; that relating to the mediation which Russia advises Servia to ask for and to the British *démarches* at Berlin, as well as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement

with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers on the other hand to Germany a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the *démarche* by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the Great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 77.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "La France."*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade and St. Petersburg, and in a meeting at London of the German, French and

Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Scézszen has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attaché at Vienna, mobilisation dating from July 28 appears to be certain.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 78.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers, to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instruc-

tions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note; she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 79.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.*

*Paris, July 28, 1914.*

Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have forwarded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our adherence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who has received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same *démarche*; you will adapt your attitude to his.

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No. 80.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 28, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey

replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This information has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szápáry had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agreement could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Petersburg and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situation, the latter replied "that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explanations with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, M. Sazonof declares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his *démarche* for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

PAUL CAMBON.



## No. 81.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 28, 1914.*

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szápáry was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Government did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires takes a favourable view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the *démarche* made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a *démarche* with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which

might take the character of a diplomatic *démarche* at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any *démarche* at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally; but to place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 82.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.*

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the proposal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 83.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 28, 1914.*

Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be

useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially declared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of *pourparlers* by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany—"Mediation between Austria and Russia,"—is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

DUMAINE.

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## CHAPTER V.

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FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA ON SERVIA (JULY 28, 1914) TO THE GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA (JULY 31, 1914).

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No. 84.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted.

BARRÈRE.

## No. 85.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the integrity of Servia; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburg alone.

This sophism, which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-German action at St. Petersburg; it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburg Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the requirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the coöperation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safeguard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an *entente* which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantages by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," conditions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandisement was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 86.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

I am now in a position to assure your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to London to the same effect.

PALÉOLOGUE.

## No. 87.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.

The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

## No. 88.

*M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Frankfort, July 29, 1914.*

I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext of preparations for the autumn manœuvres.

RONSSIN.

## No. 89.

*M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Munich, July 29, 1914.*

I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manœuvres the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately.

ALLIZÉ.

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No. 90.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general mobilisation of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

DUMAINE.

No. 91.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be despatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discussions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 92.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I asked the Secretary of State to-day how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a *détente*, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburg they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the suggestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Imperial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian



reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance, the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of controlling the police enquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture.

I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their influence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the British Ambassador to come and see him. He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to impose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my colleague of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was making to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmissible for her to have broken with Serbia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised

fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the German Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 93.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 29, 1914.*

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Petersburg by M. Sazonof and Szápáry should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

## No. 94.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

The following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador:—

“The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly conversation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred.” A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburg.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exercise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 95.

*M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to communicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. It appears

from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While informing the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two telegrams addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after pointing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the conversations of the Russian Ministry with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on); the second communicated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conversations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna.

BIENVENU-MARTIN.

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No. 96.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, July 29, 1914.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa,

Moscow and Kazan. He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Germany had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not move. In this connexion he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Serbia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Serbia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to intervene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yesterday, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, in order to show him to what extent British intervention might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."

BARRÈRE.

No. 97.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 29, 1914.*

I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of mediation by the four Powers, which had in principle obtained the adherence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Russian frontier, the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian conversations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in coöperating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 98.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 29, 1914.*

In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted at Vienna,

it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This suggestion has been accepted in principle by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lichnowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia concerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 99.

*M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Belgrade, July 29, 1914.*

The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

No. 100.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused, on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising attitude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 101.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me that the German Ambassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Government to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her military preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobilised eight army corps and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance.

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of



the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversation entered into between the Powers which are less directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.

Yesterday in the late afternoon the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 102.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attaché of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtalès, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Russian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation. He repeated to me: "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment."

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 103.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia:—

"It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria."

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian kingdom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal to you in his name:

"If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations."

Count Pourtalès promised to support this proposal with his Government.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by

Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discussion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 104.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 30, 1914.*

In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his country, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who examined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.

M. Schebeko explained that the only object of the military preparations on the Russian side was to reply to those made by Austria, and to indicate the intention and the right of the Tsar to formulate his views on the settlement of the Servian question. The steps towards mobilisation taken in Galicia, answered Count Berchtold, have no aggressive intention and are only directed towards maintaining the situation as it stands. On both sides endeavours will be made to prevent these measures from being interpreted as signs of hostility.

With a view to settling the Austro-Servian dispute it was agreed that *pourparlers* should be resumed at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and Count Szápáry; they had only been interrupted owing to a misunderstanding, as Count Berchtold thought that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs claimed that the Austrian representative should be given powers which would allow him to modify the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Count Szápáry will only be authorised to discuss what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige for which both Empires had equal concern.

It would therefore for the moment be in this direct form, and

only between the two most interested Powers, that the discussion which Sir Edward Grey proposed to entrust to the four Powers not directly interested would take place.

Sir M. de Bunsen, who was with me, at once declared to M. Schebeko that the Foreign Office would entirely approve of this new procedure. Repeating the statement he made at the Ballplatz, the Russian Ambassador stated that his Government would take a much broader view than was generally supposed of the demands of the Monarchy; M. Schebeko did everything to convince Count Berchtold of the sincerity of Russia's desire to arrive at an agreement which would be acceptable to the two Empires.

The interview was carried on in a friendly tone and gave reason for thinking that all chances of localising the dispute were not lost, when the news of the German mobilisation arrived at Vienna.

DUMAINE.

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No. 105.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presidency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, but that from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams between the Tsar and William II.) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that

mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the *Lokal Anzeiger*, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news calculated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the measures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 106.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

Please inform Sir E. Grey of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations. England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, however, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France, soldiers who

were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 107.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr van Jagow (to whom Count Pourtalès had communicated the conciliatory formula

suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 108.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 30, 1914.*

Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the German Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defensive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.

The information which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis.

PAUL CAMBON.

## No. 109.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 30, 1914.*

In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time" he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirschky, whose Pan-German and Russophobic sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part."

The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased.

JULES CAMBON.



No. 110.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

At the beginning of our conversation to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their intervention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly

be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 111.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, July 31, 1914.*

The Minister of State has just left the Legation, he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormeldange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sûre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me—and this was the real object of his visit—to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration.

*Postscript.*—Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing suspicion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking."

MOLLARD.

## No. 112.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has handed me a note from his Government asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburg for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers endeavoured to secure that Serbia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition (*if Austria, recognising that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations*) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to change their formula in the following way:—

That the Powers would examine how Serbia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or independence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, provided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Government joined in the British suggestion, and in the following

terms asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg to try to obtain, without delay, the assent of the Russian Government:—

“Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

“The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Serbia could give full satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Serbia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty.

“I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed.”

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 113.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

The news of the bombardment of Belgrade during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way:—

“If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian

territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 114.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort), with the object of a direct understanding between Vienna and St. Petersburg, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying it in accordance with the request of Great Britain; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors, that British mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany, who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been

consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 115.

*M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Vienna, July 31, 1914.*

General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock.

My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

DUMAINE.

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No. 116.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, July 31, 1914.*

Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been declared, and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand is being made at St. Petersburg that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her

side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 117.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

*Paris, July 31, 1914.*

The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 118.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.*

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further outdistanced; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, knowing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 119.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

L'Agence Havas having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subsequently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

KLOBUKOWSKI.



## CHAPTER VI.

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DECLARATION OF WAR BY GERMANY ON RUSSIA (SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, AT 7.10 P.M.) ; AND ON FRANCE (MONDAY, AUGUST 3, AT 6.45 P.M.).

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## No. 120.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Two *démarches* were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors—the one at Paris, which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburg, precise and conciliatory.

Count Scézszen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Serbia; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Serbia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Serbia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Serbia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible.

At St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Serbia. The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the *pourparlers* should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed

out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Servia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Government is ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. This Power has in fact presented an ultimatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British proposal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers.

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. Yesterday when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the President of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (*des dispositions pour sa propre personne*); we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed with Russia to begin negotiations.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 121.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had explained that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these conversations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The question may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.

Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these circumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account.

J. CAMBON.

No. 122.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Government, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had repeatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 123.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has been instructed by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-morrow afternoon.

J. CAMBON.

## No. 124.

*M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Rome, August 1, 1914.*

I went to the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time-limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time-limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

BARRÈRE.

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No. 125.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the *pourparlers* which have been carried on since yesterday:—

(1) A British compromise, proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss *even the basis* of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany, who, abandoning all *pourparlers*, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula (which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the countries which have mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador, for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 126.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a position to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place, the British fleet is mobilised, and Sir Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (*venaient à le passer*), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of intervening in time.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 127.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign  
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

We are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence England by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if

it breaks out, will fall on Russia. Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.

France has not ceased in coöperation with England to advise moderation at St. Petersburg; this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify the first formula which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Scézszen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Scézszen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in coöperation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a good-will which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has continued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in coöperation with England, continue to work for the success of these *pourparlers*.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This measure has been taken by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.



To-day M. Paléologue telegraphed that Count Pourtalès had notified the Russian Government of German mobilisation.

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.

Our decree of mobilisation is then an *essential measure* of protection. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 128.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 1, 1914.*

The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Government an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy.

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar *démarche* is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg.

MOLLARD.

No. 129.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.*

*Paris, August 1, 1914.*

Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867, the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 130.

*M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 131.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, accord-

ing to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

*The Minister of State,  
President of the Government.  
EYSCHEN.*

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No. 132.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just received, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country; but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

**MOLLARD.**

No. 133.

*Note handed in by the German Ambassador.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not constitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely preventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, are under German administration.

VON SCHOEN.

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No. 134.

*M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.*

Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Government; he will leave St. Petersburg to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instructions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

PALÉOLOGUE.

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No. 135.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just declared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 136.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilometres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 137.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 2, 1914.*

After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration to me:—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the

Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a *casus belli*. It is a specially British interest and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing itself against Germany.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 138.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

I note the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 30th, 31st July and the 1st August, and in that which you have sent to me to-day.

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 139.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Paris, August 2, 1914.*

German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador:—

“The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government.

“The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who commanded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses.

“The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts.”

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 140.

*M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*The Hague, August 3, 1914.*

The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Germany

was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France.

PELLET.

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No. 141.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide.

The Government of the King answered that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent, that Belgium, which, since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia.

KLOBUKOWSKI.



## No. 142.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered:

“It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take.”

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## No. 143.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows:—

“In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.”

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward

Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic communication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 144.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.

The German Ambassador has sent to the press a *communiqué* saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a *point d'appui*. My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 145.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 3, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion, which is declaring itself more and more in our favour.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 146.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I am told that the German Ambassador is said to have stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 147.

*Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his farewell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 p.m.*

M. le Président,

The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency,

that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

SCHOEN.

No. 148.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leaving this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consulate General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassador, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

## No. 149.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.*

*(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I request you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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## No. 150.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

No. 151.

*M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.*

*Paris, August 3, 1914.*

I learn from an official Belgian source that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

RENÉ VIVIANI.

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No. 152.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to coöperate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future."

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places."

KLOBUKOWSKI.

No. 153.

*M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*London, August 4, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night.

PAUL CAMBON.

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No. 154.

*M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. René Viviani,  
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

This morning the German Minister informs the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

KLOBUKOWSKI.

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No. 155.

*M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Min-  
ister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Copenhagen, August 6, 1914.*

The French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram:—

I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the staff of the Embassy and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Darmstadt with his family. The treatment which we have received is of such

a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in accordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Coblenz, by French aviators, who according to his statement "had come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest information as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious; on my part I asked him if he had read the note which I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detachments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier, whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added: "You will admit that under no circumstances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature."

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was difficult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have



any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We were not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me anticipate what was in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention, as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy.

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this alteration under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth:—

“M. le Baron,

*Berlin, August 3, 1914.*

“I have been thinking over the route for my return to my country about which you came to speak to me this evening. You propose

that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Government, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficulties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movement of trains.

"Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners.

"I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

JULES CAMBON."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the evening, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new requirement I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would return to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me, but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy:—

"Sir,

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

"More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesies,

would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am nothing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Langwerth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary.

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just announced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

"In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated.

JULES CAMBON."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct, but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only represented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accompanied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alexandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or

to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments, which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Chargé d’Affaires, the women and children and every one were subjected to the same treatment.

At the last German station about 11 o’clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the following letter to Herr von Jagow:

“Sir, *Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914.*

“Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

“To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further.

“They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the door of each compartment and facing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour.

“I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, violence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yesterday I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dangerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier.

JULES CAMBON.”

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my

companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was required from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.\*

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Denmark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I succeed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attachés.

JULES CAMBON.

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No. 156.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Paris, August 5, 1914.*

The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morning, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M.

\* Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection; this he promised to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (Enclosure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to telegraphic instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Legation and left me, with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the protection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my German colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess, and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear.

My departure, which was required to take place as soon as possible, was fixed for two o'clock; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet any one.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.).

MOLLARD.

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ENCLOSURE I.

*M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excellency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accordance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Republic intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the violation of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally

fulfilled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867.

I remain, etc.,  
EYSCHEN,  
*Minister of State, President of the  
Government.*

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ENCLOSURE II.

*Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the  
Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.*

Sir,

A short time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment received from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard.

EYSCHEN.

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ENCLOSURE III.

*To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen.*

Your Excellency,

In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of



placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard.

VON BUCH.

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ENCLOSURE IV.

*M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency, M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government of Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.*

I have just received your communication and I submit to force.

Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the fortunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her.

In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

ARMAND MOLLARD.

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No. 157.

*Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris.*

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the

neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and of Convention V. of The Hague, 18th October, 1907, *on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land* (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Government; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Government of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them, and in violation of the above Convention of The Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August, 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea.

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Convention of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

*Paris, August 4, 1914, 2 p.m.*

No. 158.

*Message from M. Poincaré, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.)*

*(The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the Message.)*

“Gentlemen,

“France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated. The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created.

“For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation.

“They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

“Since the ultimatum of Austria opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation.

“To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

“At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. *(Unanimous and repeated applause.)*

“On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted

the noble Belgian nation (*loud and unanimous applause*), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (*Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.*)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed.

"Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (*loud applause*), has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (*Unanimous and repeated applause.*)

"The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops, by land and sea, the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman (*loud and prolonged applause*).

"Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory (*applause*).

"In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals (*loud and unanimous applause*).

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith (*loud and prolonged applause and cries of 'Vive la France'*).

"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (*loud and unanimous applause*); she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain (*loud and unanimous applause*).

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (*loud and repeated applause*) 'Haut les cœurs et vive la France!' (*unanimous and prolonged applause*).

RAYMOND POINCARÉ."

No. 159.

*Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

*(Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.)*

M. René Viviani, *President of the Council.*

Gentlemen,

The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum, in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale* asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the Great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment, and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire

for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the Great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government, with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute

secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time-limit given to Servia by Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declaration which the German representative continued to shower upon us ("*Hear! hear!*").



We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause.*)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom, as well as to all the Great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in

the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter which he handed to me on the subject:—

“M. le Président,

“The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

“I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

“At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

“My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

“Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

(Signed) SCHOEN.”

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (*Loud and unanimous applause.*)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with re-

markable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. (*Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.*) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (*Renewed loud and unanimous applause.*)

The entire British fleet is mobilised and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. (*Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

Since 1912 *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.

“Foreign Office,

“My dear Ambassador,

November 22, 1912.

“From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to coöperate in war.

“You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

“I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.”

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912:—

“Dear Sir Edward, London, November 23, 1912.

“You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

“Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.

PAUL CAMBON.”

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen (*loud and unanimous applause*). I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment (*renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause*).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration:—

“In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war.”

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (*unanimous applause*), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe.

She has reëstablished the balance of power in Europe, a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial coöperation of King Edward VII. of England and the Government of the Crown (*applause*), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (*loud and unanimous applause*).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since

1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise (*prolonged applause*).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject; Italy, with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d’Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another (*renewed applause*).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack—it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud to defend (*loud applause*).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (*Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on-

lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (*Loud applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.*) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (*applause*).

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (*prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet*).

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## CHAPTER VII.

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### No. 160.

#### DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

(September 4, 1914.)

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#### DECLARATION.

*M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad.*

*Paris, September 4, 1914.*

The following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London:—

“The undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:—

“The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed,

no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.  
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.  
EDWARD GREY.

“This declaration will be published to-day.

DELCASSÉ.”

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## APPENDICES.

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### EXTRACTS.

FROM THE “BLUE BOOK” (ENGLISH), FROM THE “GREY BOOK”  
(BELGIAN), FROM THE “WHITE BOOK” (GERMAN), FROM  
THE “ORANGE BOOK” (RUSSIAN).

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### APPENDIX I.

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EXTRACTS FROM THE “BLUE BOOK” RELATING TO THE ATTITUDE  
TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN REGARD TO RUSSIA,  
GERMANY, AND FRANCE, DURING THE POURPARLERS WHICH PRE-  
CEDED THE WAR.

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#### No. 6.

*Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir  
Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were



quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Serbia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Serbia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time-limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Serbia was prepared to go to meet the

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Serbia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack upon Austria by Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

G. BUCHANAN.

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No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia

was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

E. GREY.

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No. 88.\*

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The

\* *Sic* in the French text this should be 89.

situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.

E. GREY.

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No. 99.

*Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Paris, July 30, 1914.*

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report,

since received from St. Petersburg, states that the German communication had been modified, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Serbia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war.

F. BERTIE.

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No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.*

M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and

that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as

there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

E. GREY.

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No. 148.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.*

*Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.*

After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following memorandum:—

“I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow—in effect, whether we should declare

violation of Belgian neutrality to be a *casus belli*. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

E. GREY.

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## APPENDIX II.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" RELATING TO THE PROPOSALS MADE  
BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT IN  
ORDER TO OBTAIN ENGLAND'S NEUTRALITY.

No. 85.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Berlin, July 29, 1914.*

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.



His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

E. GOSCHEN.

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No. 101.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Although apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England

and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, so far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

E. GREY.

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No. 123.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.*

I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium

by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

E. GREY.

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## APPENDIX II. (b).

GERMAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN, ON THE PLEA OF A "MISUNDERSTANDING," A GUARANTEE BY ENGLAND OF THE NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN A GERMAN-RUSSIAN WAR.

(Semi-official publication in the "*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*," August 20, 1914.

No. 1.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.*

*London, July 31, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and asked me if I thought I could say that we would not attack France if she remained neutral in a German-Russian war. I said I thought I could assume responsibility for this.

LICHNOWSKY.

## No. 2.

*Telegram from the Emperor William to King George V.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

I have just received the communication from your Government offering me the neutrality of France under the guarantee of Great Britain. This offer was accompanied by the question whether, in these circumstances, Germany would not attack France. For technical reasons my mobilisation, which has been ordered for both fronts, East and West, this afternoon, must be carried out in accordance with preparations already begun.

Orders countermanding this cannot be given and unfortunately your telegram came too late. But if France offers her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English navy and army, I will refrain from attacking her and will use my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. At this moment the troops on my frontier are stopped by telegraphic and telephonic orders from continuing their advance over the French frontier.

WILLIAM.

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No. 3.*Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Empire, to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.**Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

Germany is ready to agree to the English proposals if England will guarantee, with her military and naval forces, the neutrality of France in the Russo-German conflict. German mobilisation took place to-day, in reply to Russian provocation, and before the receipt of the English proposals. Consequently our concentration on the French frontier cannot be modified. We guarantee, however, that between now and Monday, August 3, at 7 P.M., the French frontier shall not be crossed if England's acceptance has reached us by that time.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

## No. 4.

*Telegram from King George V. to the Emperor William.*

*London, August 1, 1914.*

In reply to your telegram which has just reached me, I think there has been a misunderstanding with regard to the suggestion made during the course of a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey, when they were discussing how an armed conflict between Germany and France might be delayed until a means of agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia has been found. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky to-morrow morning to make it clear that there has certainly been misunderstanding on the part of the latter.

GEORGE.

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## No. 5.

*Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire.*

*London, August 2, 1914.*

Sir Edward Grey's suggestions, founded on England's wish to remain neutral, were made without previous agreement with France, and have since been abandoned as useless.

LICHNOWSKY.

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## APPENDIX III.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "BLUE BOOK" RELATING TO ENGLAND'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW ON THE QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

## No. 153.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:—

“Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

E. GREY.

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No. 155.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty’s Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His Majesty’s Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty’s Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

E. GREY.

## No. 157.

*German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London.—(Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)*

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious *that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland.* Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

JAGOW.

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No. 159.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.*

*Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.*

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received by 12

o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

E. GREY.

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No. 160.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, August 8, 1914.*

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the



same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last

terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.

At about 9:30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the

very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

E. GOSCHEN.

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#### APPENDIX IV.

##### EXTRACTS FROM THE "GREY BOOK" POINTING OUT THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH GERMANY VIOLATED BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

##### No. 2.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 24, 1914.*

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact

instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

DAIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 2.

Sir,

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

Belgium has most scrupulously observed the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circumstances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.

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No. 8.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 29, 1914.*

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 9.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war in Germany, and said:—

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Government of the French Republic.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 11.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days to be able to present to me: Owing to the possibility of a European war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it:—

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence

which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been considerably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communicated to me.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 12.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.*

Sir,

*Brussels, July 31, 1914.*

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he explained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain

newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed.

DAVIGNON.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 12.

*The Belgian Minister at Berlin to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, May 2, 1913.*

I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations respecting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th:—

“A member of the Social Democrat Party said: ‘The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.’”



“Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied: ‘Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.’

“This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium.

“In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Democrat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: ‘Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.’

“A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear.”

BARON BEYENS.

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No. 13.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 1, 1914.*

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.

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No. 14.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

The British Ambassador has been instructed to enquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.

No. 15.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 1, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:—

“I am authorised to declare that, in the event of an international war, the French Government, in accordance with the declarations they have always made, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude.”

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our independence and our frontiers should be respected.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 19.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir, *Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassompierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest

importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 20.

*Note presented by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 2, 1914.*

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration:—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned conditions, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in coöperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance

of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms. The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

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No. 22.

*Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.).*

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse viâ Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, consider themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality

should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 27.

*Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914 (6 A.M.).*

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to them by the German Government, the latter, to their deep regret, find themselves compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.

VON BELOW.

No. 28.

*Note communicated by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Government expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.

FRANCIS H. VILLIERS.

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No. 30.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at London and Paris.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The General Staff announced that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 31.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.*

Sir,

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excellency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 35.

*Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

Sir,

*Berlin, August 4, 1914.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality:—

“We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law.

“Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained.

“Any one in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria.”

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us.

BEYENS.

No. 39.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 4, 1914.*

Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the Treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.

COUNT DE LALAING.

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No. 40.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British,  
French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 4, 1914.*

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to coöperate as guaranteeing powers in the defence of her territory.

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.



Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places.

DAVIGNON.

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No. 41.

*Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*London, August 5, 1914.*

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two countries as from 11 o'clock.

COUNT DE LALAING.

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No. 44.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian  
Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations  
with Belgium.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

By the Treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs: "Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of Article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excellency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing.

DAVIGNON.

No. 48.

*Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Britannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839.

No. 52.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.*

Sir,

*Brussels, August 5, 1914.*

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to coöperate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian territory.

DAVIGNON.

## No. 60.

*Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon,  
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

(Telegram.)

*The Hague, August 9, 1914.*

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so:—

The fortress of Liège has been taken by assault after a brave defence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him.

BARON FALLON.

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No. 71.

*M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,  
Belgian Minister at The Hague.*

(Telegram.)

*Brussels, August 12, 1914.*

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs:—

“The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal.”

DAVIGNON.

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## APPENDIX V.

### TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II. AND THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

(EXTRACTS FROM THE GERMAN “WHITE BOOK.”)

#### I.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 28, 1914, 10.45 P.M.

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding

with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,  
WILLIAM.

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## II.

### *The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

*Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1914, 1 P.M.*

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far.

NICHOLAS.

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## III.

### *The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

*July 29, 1914, 6.30 P.M.*

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot—as I told You in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of

Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed You—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

WILLIAM.

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IV.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

*July 30, 1914, 1 A.M.*

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner, and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.

WILLIAM.

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V.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

*Peterhof, July 30, 1914, 1.20 P.M.*

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honourary aide to the Kaiser) with in-

structions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.

NICHOLAS.

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VI.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

July 31, 1914.

I thank You cordially for Your mediation, which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

Your cordially devoted

NICHOLAS.

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VII.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

July 31, 1914, 2 P.M.

Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops were being mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are

going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia, which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary.

WILLIAM.

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VIII.

*The Emperor Nicholas to the Emperor William.*

*August 1, 1914, 2 P.M.*

I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, *viz.*, that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-trying friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply.

NICHOLAS.

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IX.

*The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.*

*Berlin, August 1, 1914.*

I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.



Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.

WILLIAM.

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## APPENDIX VI.

### EXTRACTS FROM THE "ORANGE BOOK" RELATING TO GERMANY'S DECLARATION OF WAR ON RUSSIA.

No. 76.

*Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.*

*July 19 (August 1), 7.10 P.M.*

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary

to answer \*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude \*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

F. POURTALÈS.

No. 77.

*Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Respecting Recent Events.*

*July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

A garbled version of the events of the last few days having appeared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review:—

On the 10th (23rd) July 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time-limit of forty-eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some

\* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note.

of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to reëxamine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Serbian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peaceful issue which might prove acceptable to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was

communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia half-way in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the proposed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia.

Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro-

posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by mid-day on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SAZONOF.

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No. 78.

*Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives  
Abroad.*

(Telegram.) *St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914.*

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

SAZONOF.





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